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# THE HISTORY

OF THE

# PASSION AND RESURRECTION OF OUR LORD

CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN CRITICISM.

111688

BY

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*NEW EDITION, SPECIALLY REVISED FOR ENGLISH READERS.*

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EDINBURGH:

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# AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

SINCE the first edition of the present work appeared in Germany, the author against whose destructive tendencies it was primarily directed has been removed from this life. A few years ago, David Strauss closed his earthly career. The seed which he scattered by a long, restless, and uninterrupted activity, extending over a generation, has not been prevented by his death from developing and flourishing. It is true this thinker, having never filled an official position, neither founded a school, nor was able to collect and form a circle of disciples, properly so called; but as the widespread impression which he produced on the educated classes still continues, so the impulse which he gave to theological research remains as a fermenting leaven, and, going even beyond the master, threatens to complete the process of dissolution. Strauss had made the facts of the life of Jesus Christ the object of his attack; it is only a necessary consequence if those who follow in his steps call in question also more remote facts. "Whosoever hath not the Son, the same hath not the Father who hath sent Him;" if the second article is overturned, the first is deprived of its basis. The Old Testament also is turned into a conglomerate of myths, and the living God, the almighty Creator of heaven and earth, loses His right to existence.

No doubt the admiring approval which Strauss long enjoyed from ecclesiastical and theological liberalism was sensibly abated toward the end of his life. This was the consequence of the last work of his hand, with which he closed his literary activity: *The Old and the New Faith: a Confession.* Such was the title with which it appeared in the year 1872. In and of themselves,

the views and positions of this book did not offend the majority of his followers. At bottom, indeed, they were quite at one with them; but the openness with which the confession was uttered was vexatious—it did not suit them. Liberalism in Germany chiefly, and in the present day in particular, with all its hatred to hierarchism and orthodoxy, would fain have the appearance of knowing how to honour religion, and to value religiousness. And so it declined to identify itself with a man who in so undisguised and pronounced a way did homage to religious Nihilism. Strauss ceased to be the hero of the day; already dying, he was killed with silence. The reproach raised against him redounds, in our opinion, rather to his honour. This is the merit which he has won in connection with the church of Christ, and for which he has a right to the thanks of the church, that he made an end of all half-way positions, and gave all concealment the *coup-de-grâce;* that he showed by word and work the goal which every one who follows in his steps reaches, and *must* inevitably reach. Without hesitation and without compunction, without phrasing and without scruple, without moving a muscle of his face, he draws the last consequence clearly and surely; he cannot do otherwise, and he will not. It is well to have such an antagonist; it rewards the labour to take the lists against him—there is a prospect of some good result.

We do not think that Strauss meets with a right estimate when he is primarily regarded as a critic. No doubt he passes, not only in Germany, but wherever his name and works have spread, as the most distinguished, acute, and thoroughgoing critic that has ever arisen within the Christian church. And this description he has well deserved. For at every point he meets the narratives of Holy Scripture with the most determined distrust, and is at pains to sow the seeds of this distrust in the hearts of his readers. Nothing is so well attested that it escapes his critical knife; nothing is so firmly established that he has not overwhelming grounds to advance against it. But the question is as to the *motive* of these critical operations. The case does not

stand thus: that immediately and in the first place a historical doubt arose in him in respect to the biblical narratives, and that only *after* he had become convinced of the untrustworthiness of the narratives, he had drawn his consequence from the failing basis. On the contrary, he started from a philosophical presupposition. For him it was a confirmed truth from the outset; and to procure its prevalence and acknowledgment was the origin of his tendency. But he came on a powerful hindrance. So long as the facts related in Scripture held their stand unshaken, so long every effort was vain. The task, accordingly, was to get these obstructive elements out of the way. For this end he called in the powerful services of criticism. Criticism was not an end with him, but a means to the end, a means, no doubt, which seemed indispensable and unavoidable.

This state of the case points out the line to be followed in contending against the adversary. It would be to little purpose if one should be content to meet the objections of criticism with remarks exposing their weakness. This course has been repeatedly tried, but wholly without success. The adversary did not yield to such weapons, for they did not hit; they did not reach him; they delivered their strokes into the air. But even the observant onlooker did not follow such a fight with the interest which expects a decisive issue. In the present work, accordingly, another method is followed. We have nowhere, indeed, neglected, and that by historical arguments, to establish the reality of the facts related; only our attention has never been limited to this point. But as Strauss advanced from a presupposition to the critical process, so we, too, have approached the biblical narratives from a presupposition,—that, namely, of a faith that has subsisted for thousands of years; and the investigation has put the reader in a position to judge which presupposition proves itself true on the narratives of Scripture, and puts it in the light of a self-evidencing certainty, whether that of Strauss, or not rather, on the other hand, that which the church, from the beginning downwards, has proclaimed as her confession.

We have no doubt that the measure of interest this work has excited in Germany is due to our following this method. And so the publisher has been induced to spread it also on the other side of the Channel. No doubt ecclesiastical and religious liberalism is far from having the importance and power in England which it has attained in Germany. It is very certain that the attitude of the English nation to Christianity and to the facts of divine revelation has also had its times of trial, not only during the period of deism, but also in later times. It has, however, stood the proof, and, taken on the whole, the country is still at the present day not disposed to deny the true foundations on which the welfare of nations rests. Meanwhile, it is not impossible that there, too, many individual minds, affected by the dash of waves from a distance, are led astray as to that which alone can give support, comfort, and confidence to man. Unhappily there is only too much zeal shown in securing that the products of unbelief may scatter their seeds in all lands. Hence it appears opportune, or rather it seems a bounden duty, that there, too, voices from Germany should find a hearing which uphold the reality of the facts of Christian revelation, and which lead the proof that these facts stand the severity of scientific criticism, and go forth proved and attested from its fires. With this view the present work is offered to that circle of English readers for which it is adapted. And may God's blessing attend it!

# THE PASSION HISTORY.

## INTRODUCTION.

### 1. THE TENDENCY OF CRITICISM.

WHEN Sebastian Schmidt, the Strasburg theologian, opened his treatise, *De Passione Christi Satisfactoria*, by expressing his sorrow that, while the doctrine of the atoning sufferings and death of Jesus Christ had the strongest claim to be acknowledged and embraced, it was yet impugned in so many ways, he had no presentiment that the future assailants of this citadel of the Christian faith would be totally different from those with whom he had to contend in his day. "I would," he says, "that disputation concerning so grave a doctrine of the faith were unnecessary. For it were better that the weightiest article of the faith should be simply believed than that doubts and questions should be raised regarding it. But alas that matters have gone so far that the satisfaction made by the Passion and death of Christ is made a subject of controversy, audaciously denied, and attacked in every possible way by bold and perverse minds." And yet he had only to complain of representations which distorted and weakened a doctrine which modern criticism is attempting to destroy, root and branch. When Strauss raises the question of getting rid of the existing office of the Christian ministry, and thus of delivering the German people from an oppressive yoke of beliefs, he gives it as his opinion, that this result is to be accomplished by uprooting from the human mind all belief in the miraculous. "*He who would banish priests from the church, must first banish miracles from religion.*" Now this of itself would not secure the object aimed at. The man whom he repeatedly calls his forerunner and leader likewise rejected the idea of the miraculous. Yet Schleiermacher not only discharged the duties of the pastoral office with zeal and

cheerfulness, but also gave fruitful hints as to the method of doing so. The undeniable fact that he contributed materially to the revival of the religious life of his time, shows how little he widened the gap which existed between his contemporaries and Christianity, notwithstanding this defect in his creed. Even were criticism successful in casting serious suspicion on the reality of the miraculous, it would still be far from the attainment of its object. The presupposition on which the ministry of the New Testament rests is an entirely different one, and the charm which Christianity exercises on the human heart springs from something else. The Apostle Paul characterizes the office which Christianity is called to exercise in the world as the "ministry of reconciliation." He indicates thereby, not a particular side of its function, but its sum and substance. Its whole work is comprehended in the words: "We are ambassadors for Christ—be ye reconciled to God." When the same apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 14): "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain," he does not mean that preaching would in that case be deprived of its proper subject, but only that it would lose its divine warrant, and that the μαρτυρία which was destitute of this warrant could afford a foundation for no more than a vain faith. Its proper *subject-matter* is not really touched thereby. The apostle defined its *subject-matter* for all times when he said: "We preach Christ crucified" (1 Cor. i. 23); "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified" (1 Cor. ii. 2). But what is the relation between the two statements which are combined in that great utterance: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation"? It is obvious that the one follows from the other. The latter becomes illusory as soon as there is any hesitation in regard to the former. When preaching can no longer speak of the sacrificial death of Christ, it becomes not merely vain,—it becomes altogether null and void; and the office which is concerned with this as its central theme loses not only its *raison d'être*, but all and every possibility of continuing in operation. There is one feeling, and only one, in the human heart to which the preaching of Christ may appeal with the assurance that its voice will find a response. The morality of Christianity may excite profound admiration, the light which Christianity casts on unsolved problems may awaken a sincere

interest in it, but that enduring bond which binds the heart of man to the gospel of Christ is connected with neither of these feelings. It is by means of the oppressive consciousness of sin that the Father draws heavy-laden souls to His Son. "The greatest evil is guilt." Notwithstanding the warning of Strauss, we quote this common saying, for we have to do not with the "flowers of modern poetry," but with the *testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae.* No doubt even the consciousness of sin will not prevent the preaching of the Cross becoming foolishness to one person, a stumbling-block to another, and to many a savour of death unto death. Those who prefer to remove the burden which they feel by some atonement of their own making, or who resign themselves to bear it with indolent murmuring, pass over very easily to a position of pronounced hostility to the gracious symbol which brings persecution on those who adhere to it (Gal. vi. 12). But up to this hour there have not been wanting those who, under a consciousness of the needs of their conscience, have recognised and embraced the gift of God, and in the possession of it have found their rest. *They* became the reward of the Son; *they* were the field white unto the harvest. And as long as criticism does not succeed in undermining the authority of the message concerning the atoning sacrifice of Christ, so long shall the ministry of reconciliation and the community of the faithful endure. Strauss, therefore, has in point of fact undertaken to uproot a doctrine which has been the comfort of pious hearts for thousands of years. It required no consideration on the part of the critical author of *The Life of Jesus* to see what course was the proper one for him to adopt for this purpose. It was not incumbent on him to controvert the dogma directly, nor yet to deal with the apostle who is its especial expounder;—he might have been content, therefore, without joining in the charge which Festus makes against this witness to the truth (*Leben Jesu,* p. 277). But it was necessary for him to consider how the inconvenient and disagreeable doctrine could be deprived of its historical basis. No doubt the historical fact of the crucifixion of Jesus was beyond dispute. But perhaps it was practicable to rest with admitting that simple fact, and to set aside, as myths and fables, all those details of the gospel narrative which pointed to dogmatic conclusions. And this attempt has actually been made by criticism.

We have every reason to wonder at the courage which ventures to enter upon this path, and to pursue it towards its goal. Even if we lay aside all religious presuppositions, and assume the attitude of mere historians, we are not in a condition to prophesy for the undertaking a successful issue, and can at the best predict for it such success as was achieved by the man who began to build a tower without counting the cost, and was unable to finish it, and so made himself the mockery of the people. The means which criticism has employed, with more or less apparent success, in regard to other parts of the life of Jesus, are altogether unavailable in regard to the Passion history. Here the harmonistic difficulties are so unimportant that no serious objections can be founded on them, for in all essential points the four Evangelical narratives agree with each other. No doubt it is asserted that there are psychological impossibilities here and there; but deeper experience of itself explains some of them, and others are found in passages where the psychological mode of view is altogether inappropriate. Inconsistencies with assured historical facts, like those which may seem to exist in the narratives connected with the childhood of Jesus, cannot be pointed out by the most deeply-read historian in the region of the Passion history. With what weapons, then, does Strauss propose to carry on his conflict? Any one who expected him to introduce new arguments which were previously unheard of finds his expectation disappointed. Indications are not wanting that Strauss himself felt that he had undertaken to cleave a rock with a frail staff. The peculiarly rough style in which he treats this particular part of his subject, his use of analogies which are calculated to wound very deeply the religious sensibilities, and his habit of drawing parallels from the region of profane history,—all these things are intended to throw discredit on a cause which he was unable to assail on solid grounds. The task of the apologist would therefore seem to be a light one. And it would be light, if nothing more were necessary than to invalidate assertions, to expose fallacies, and, in short, to pull to pieces the separate arguments of criticism one after another. But that is not the task which we set before ourselves. Such a proceeding seems to us to be equally unjust and unprofitable. We call it *unjust*. When we look into the grounds on which Strauss rests his opposition to particular portions of the Passion history,—the conflict in the garden, the last seven sayings

of our Lord, or the representation of the character of Pilate which is given by the fourth Gospel,—we cannot but ask with surprise, how it was possible that difficulties of such a character should have been able to excite in the mind of a clear thinker any doubt of the credibility of these narratives? In the course of our investigations we shall come upon passages where mere astonishment will be changed into the warmer feeling of indignation. But, nevertheless, Strauss is not so far wrong when he turns sharply against those who isolate his objections from their place and connection in his system in order to pillory them individually. These objections are nowhere expressed as his real and ultimate motive for setting aside the Evangelical narratives. They are stated in the interest of a principle, and in such a way that they are not made to establish and justify, but merely to recommend and confirm it. And it cannot be denied that, so regarded, they acquire a more imposing appearance and a greater importance than they would be entitled to if considered separately and by themselves. Criticism does not turn to its readers asking whether the arguments which it has adduced do not shatter their faith in the facts which are narrated, but whether the narratives in question do not appear in the most satisfactory light—are not intelligible down to the smallest detail—when the assumption is made that they are myths which were the offspring of interested feeling, and which were invented with the view of supplying a historical foundation for the doctrine of the atoning death of Jesus. No doubt it is incumbent on the apologist to refute the individual arguments of Strauss, but real justice will be done to his demands only when the question which he puts is met by a corresponding counter-question, viz.: Whether the mind which reflects on our narratives will really rest satisfied when it adopts the assumptions of criticism, or whether this will not rather be the case only when it adopts the view that the recorded facts actually occurred, and gave rise to the doctrine of the sacrificial death of our Lord? Unless this question is not only considered, —whether by an appeal to the conscience or to the historical sense,—but at the same time decided to some extent, criticism will be deprived of the right to exhibit the disparaging spirit which is peculiar to it, and will have no ground for complaining that it is the object of unjust depreciation at the hands of its opponents. But in proposing to carry out our task from this

point of view, we are not exclusively influenced by a wish to satisfy the just demands of criticism. The course which we have indicated seems to us to be the only *fruitful* one, and fruitful in a sense which is not immediately apparent. In no conflict is the gain a material one if we succeed merely in maintaining our ground and repelling the assaults of our adversary. We prove ourselves victorious only by moving onwards; and a defence of the Passion history may be made a basis from which to press on so as to secure a further success.

## 2. DOGMATIC REFLECTION.

The doctrine of the atoning sufferings and death of Jesus is one of those which have as yet been imperfectly opened up to the theological understanding. The church has no doubt always acknowledged what Dorner says (*Ueber die Rechtfertigung*, p. 9): "that Christ placed Himself under the curse which rested upon us; that as our Substitute in intention and act He took upon Himself our sins and covered our unrighteousness with His righteousness; that He purchased us in His offering up of Himself and suffering vicariously through His high-priestly and God-satisfying love, so that atonement has now been made."

It is only necessary to glance at the liturgical formularies of the church to see how deep and firm this conviction has been in all ages. And it rests upon a thoroughly sure foundation. It can appeal to apostolical preaching in its defence. Its right to make this appeal is acknowledged by every unprejudiced interpreter of Scripture, and no exegesis except that which has a Socinian tendency can call it in question. We note an admission made by a modern theologian in a work bearing upon this subject. Dr. Holsten (see the treatise *zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, p. 136) does not conceal, but states in the frankest terms, that he has wholly broken with the traditional and apostolic view. But at the same time he unhesitatingly admits that Paul regarded the death of Jesus as a sin-offering for the sins of men, as a sacrifice presented with the view of securing for them righteousness and life. But because the apostles invariably state this doctrine only in an assertive way, without disclosing its deeper grounds, it has come to pass that dogmatic history can show no

palpable advance in the understanding of it. Theological thought turned its attention to the subject only at a comparatively late period. There was no definite occasion for its doing so earlier. And besides, it belonged to the proper order of things that an agreement should be arrived at upon the question of our Lord's person, before the work which He accomplished as Redeemer was made the subject of consideration. The investigation of this topic was therefore carried on all the more strenuously after it had once been entered upon. It was pursued with ever-deepening interest, and gave rise to the most violent controversies, which slackened only for short intervals, and which even at the present hour, when opinion still stands confronting opinion, are not finally adjusted. The history of these proceedings has been written by Ritschl[1] in a work of pre-eminent ability. By the comprehensiveness, thoroughness, and completeness of his review the author has done a service even to those who do not wholly agree with his conclusions, and who are not quite able to acquit him of the charge of partiality. Even the first beginnings of the theological investigation of this subject in the twelfth century were marked by the same contrast which appears, although with many modifications, in its subsequent history. Anselm invariably laid the emphasis upon the effect which the work of Christ produced upon God. According to him, the voluntary suffering and death of the God-man, possessing a *valor infinitus* owing to the dignity of His person, satisfied the justice of God, which was offended by the sin of the world, and placed God in a position to forgive the sins of those who accepted offered grace and to open for them the gate of salvation. This is the theory of *satisfaction*. Abelard, on the other hand, laid exclusive emphasis upon the effect which the Son of God was called to produce *upon men*. According to him, Jesus appeared in order to exhibit to them the love of God; His death was the highest manifestation of this divine love, awakens in them a corresponding love, and thus reconciles them to God, and sets them free from the slavery of sin.[2] These two theories were

[1] *Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3 vols., Bonn 1870–74. The first volume, which has been translated into English and published by Edmonston & Douglas, Edinburgh 1872, is occupied with the history of the doctrine.

[2] Abelard undoubtedly speaks of a certain effect which the Redeemer produced upon God also. He refers to the *intercessions* which Christ presents to God in

propounded almost contemporaneously, and were both in a like degree the openers up of new paths. The question,—Which of them adhered most closely to the view which had previously obtained in the church, though in a somewhat latent and tacit way, is as easily answered as the further question,—For which of these views have later doctrinal developments shown preponderating sympathy? A *retrospective* glance will undoubtedly fail to discover anywhere in the past a doctrinal representation similar to that of Anselm; but the fundamental idea which he laid hold of and developed is by no means foreign to patristic literature. Even the church Fathers know of a ransom price for the guilty world, which was paid by means of the suffering and death of Jesus Christ. And although they have for the most part represented this λύτρον as due to Satan, still the general idea that a satisfaction was rendered remains all the more intact, since there were some even then who regarded the divine hand as the Receiver of the ransom price.[1] But it is also undoubted that a *prospective* glance will scarcely find anywhere a bare reproduction of the idea of Anselm. It was always felt to be necessary to explain, to modify, or to supplement it. But, nevertheless, theology in its further development moved always in the *direction* which Anselm had indicated, while the path on which Abelard led the way was pursued only by such sects as the Socinians, and, among the Illuminationists, by Töllner and Tieftrunk. Ritschl seems therefore to have entered upon a bold undertaking —an undertaking which ignores the indications of history, and has no prospect of success—when he states it as one of the objects of his work to deprive the doctrine of Anselm of a continuance of support, to destroy the partiality felt for it by that modern pietistic theology which is reacting against rationalism, and to procure for the view of Abelard the respect to which it is entitled (see I. p. 24).

behalf of men. He may have been influenced by plain Bible facts, and also by a feeling of incongruity between his theory and Scripture. It is questionable whether this addition to his representation does not tend to confusion rather than fill up the gap which is evident in it.

[1] To these belong not only Gregory Nazianzen, and afterwards John of Damascus, but others beside. Ambrose certainly emphasizes in the strongest way the reference to Satan, and employs the analogy of a usurer; yet this does not prevent him also acknowledging that satisfaction was given to the *divine* justice by the death of Christ.

No one will propose to stand up for the doctrinal system of Anselm in every respect. The opinion of Ebrard (*Kirchengesch.* II. p. 214), that the whole outcome of scholastic thought may be found in it, is as inaccurate as the absolute contentment with which others adhere to it is unjustifiable. It has its weaknesses and defects, and is far from exhibiting the whole doctrine of the Scripture. But, on the one hand, it is to be observed that the later forms of representation, adopted by evangelical writers who moved in other respects wholly in Anselm's direction, have in great measure removed these weaknesses and defects; and, on the other hand, it is doubtful if the objection which is usually raised against Anselm's fundamental thought is as well grounded as is commonly supposed. Ritschl, in harmony with the views of many others, specially charges Anselm with attempting to solve the problem by means of conceptions which belong to the sphere of law, and especially to that of private right. He says that Abelard is here very much in advance of him, inasmuch as he developes the idea of reconciliation with reference to the moral disposition of the parties towards each other, and that Luther far surpassed all previous theologians, Melanchthon in particular, in placing emphasis on love as summing up in itself the whole of the Christian idea of God. And he attributes to the theologians of the Illumination the great merit of giving due weight to the idea of "fatherly kindness" as belonging to the representation of God which is conformable to nature.[1] The charge made against Anselm, however, reaches beyond himself. It also touches the great Teacher who spoke the parable of the wicked servant, and who expressed Himself, in the house of Simon the Pharisee, in those words which are so familiar to all.

[1] What we owe here to the Illumination theologians is of no real value. We were not aware that any motive for the sending of Christ, except the divine compassion, had ever been asserted in the past. Passages like John iii. 16, Rom. v. 8, made this impossible. Anselm expressed himself explicitly on this point: "Misericordiam Dei, quae tibi perire videbatur tam magnam invenimus, ut major cogitari non posset." The incredibly superficial sense in which the Illuminationists understood the idea of "fatherly benevolence" was certainly unknown before their time. The honour, attributed to Luther by Ritschl, of having surpassed all previous theologians, and Melanchthon in particular, in his firm hold of the idea of the divine love, is one which he would certainly have declined. If there was a single point in which there was a *perfect* understanding between Luther and Melanchthon, it was in regard to the doctrine of justification and reconciliation.

It will not do, therefore, to place judicial and ethical ideas in opposition, as if the employment of the former took one out of the ethical region. For how can legal terms be avoided when one is dealing with a problem in which the conception, "righteousness of God," occupies a prominent place, and whose central difficulty lies in the ideas λύτρον, λυτροῦσθαι, on which so strong an emphasis is put by our Lord Himself and by His apostles? In order to avoid them, it would be necessary to deprive these expressions of their plain and natural signification, and to understand them in a sense with which the Scriptures are totally unacquainted. In relation to λύτρον, for example, Ritschl has attempted to do so. He brings forward conjectures as to what Aramaic expression our Lord may have employed. And by the help of these conjectures he succeeds in degrading the "ransom" to a mere means of protection (*Schutzmittel*). Now this expression is indefinite enough; it will accommodate itself to any method of representation, and is consistent with any theory whatsoever. Such a mode of treating the subject will produce only an uncertain and deceptive result. It will explain nothing clearly, but will simply lead the mind into error. The laws of language admit of no doubt being entertained in regard to the meaning of the terms λύτρον and λυτροῦσθαι.

The thought to which Anselm, in harmony with Christian antiquity, gave expression, and which Luther, Melanchthon, and later Evangelical theologians share with him, namely, that God could not directly forgive the sins of men, notwithstanding His love to them, but that *His holiness and righteousness* required that an objective atonement should first be made,—and that this atonement, whether it be called *satisfactio* or ἱλασμός, *solutio τοῦ* λύτρου (Hollaz), was made by Christ,—this thought has a firm scriptural foundation which nothing can destroy. Gerhard is entirely supported by the authority of Scripture in the deductions which he draws in regard to this subject, in opposition to Socinianism. Comp. *loc.* xvi. § 47: "Non sunt per se et in se contrariae proprietates misericordiae et justitiae, verum ratione objecti requirebatur mirabile illud justitiae ac misericordiae temperamentum per Christi satisfactionem impetrandum. Misericordia voluit homini parcere, quoniam erat creatura Dei. Vicissim vero justitia hominem propter peccatum ad poenam promeritam deposcendum statuit, cui veritas divina suum addidit suffragium.

Intercessit igitur Christi meritum et satisfactio, ut salva justitia sua Deus in gratiam nos reciperet." But the theological development of this thought is encompassed by the most serious difficulties, and not only Rothe and Ritschl, but even men like Hofmann and Nitzsch have presented the most decided opposition to it. When the definite question is asked, How does the love of God harmonize with His holiness? the answer given to it is that our Lord suffered the penalty of our sins in our stead; that He was, as our Substitute, the object of the divine wrath. Gerhard, Hollaz, Quenstedt, Seb. Schmidt, and others express themselves unanimously thus: "Poenas a nobis promeritas perpessus est et patiendo persolvit;" "legis maledictionem, quam nostra inobedientia commerueramus sustinuit;" "poenas peccatis totius mundi debitas ultro luit;" "expositus fuit irae divinae eamque sensit." And after there had been established by the suffering and death of the Mediator an "accuratum equilibrium," or an "aequivalentia offensae et satisfactionis juxta regulum rigidae Dei justitiae" (Quenstedt), or a "proportio justitiae vindicativae et satisfactionis" (J. A. Osiander), then God was able to give effect to His mercy, "ut peccatoribus conversis peccata in poenam ne imputarentur" (Hollaz). We are by no means perfectly satisfied with these definitions. That the Passion of Jesus should be represented as penal suffering with extreme caution is partially admitted, even by those who are fully persuaded that the representation is correct. There is need, however, of our guarding ourselves against more than the error of those who liken the sufferings of Jesus to a definite sum-total, and establish an arithmetical proportion between them and the *reatus poenae* on the part of the sinful world, thus withdrawing the subject from the pneumatic region and relegating it to the material. Stahl has enlarged on this topic with peculiar discretion, and has shown in an admirable way that the atonement which the Son of God was called to make was opposed to rather than identical with the endurance of penalty. And, to our mind, it seems very questionable whether the expression penalty in relation to the Passion of Jesus can claim scriptural support.

If the Lutheran translation of Isa. liii. 5 were correct, "the penalty (*Strafe*) lay upon Him that we might have peace," then the passage might be cited in favour of the idea (Gerhard also renders it: *ipse castigatus est, ut esset nobis pax*). It is not

absolutely clear that the Hebrew word מוּסָר is to be understood in the sense of vengeful retribution. We usually meet it in the sense of fatherly chastisement, that παιδεία which is said, Heb. xii. 11, to yield the peaceable fruit of righteousness; and assuredly Delitzsch makes a bold and arbitrary assertion when he says (*Commentary on the Hebrews*) that there is not a more appropriate term than this for vicarious punishment in the whole treasures of the Hebrew language. But it seems to us to be entirely impracticable to make the words מוּסַר שְׁלוֹמֵנוּ עָלָיו mean that the Servant of God suffered chastisement for our sins, and thereby procured salvation and peace for us. No doubt מוּסַר שְׁלוֹמֵנוּ may bear the meaning, "the chastisement which has as its object, which is the condition of, or works out our peace" (in the sense of Heb. xii. 11); but when it is connected with עָלָיו, it does not yield the idea that the chastisement endured by the Servant of God is the cause of our peace. At all events, it is by no means proper that an expression which is not employed anywhere else in Scripture, in regard to this subject, should be adopted on the ground of a passage whose exegesis is doubtful, and which, besides, is never quoted in the New Testament, although the Apostle Peter (1 Pet. ii. 24) had every inducement to do so. Church dogmatics has brought nothing forward to justify the use of the expression, except the conflict of Jesus in the garden, and the fourth of His last seven sayings. Whether the idea of punishment has been really evolved from these narratives, or imported into them, is a question which we reserve for subsequent consideration. We raise a similar objection to the statement that the suffering Saviour was the object (according to Delitzsch, *loc. cit.* p. 1, the mark or target) of the divine wrath: "expositus fuit irae divinae" (Quenstedt). As much violence is done to the letter of the Scripture by this form of expression, as is done to its spirit by the formula: "the suffering of Jesus was a divine arrangement whereby satisfaction was exacted from Him by the wrathful justice of God." Now we may decline to make use of such expressions without thereby exposing ourselves to the charge of doubting the reality of the divine wrath in general, or even its manifestation in the work of atonement. It is only in regard to the representation that the wrath of the Father was directed against the Son, that the suffering Saviour endured the wrath of God externally, felt it inwardly, and therein tasted the pain of

hell,[1] that we miss the attestation of Scripture, and we are firmly persuaded that it is not faith's feebleness, but faith itself which shrinks from the representation. We may unhesitatingly accept the statement of Hollaz: "satisfecit Christus Deo unitrino infinito, justo et *irato*, veraci, sapienti et misericordi," and yet reject the idea that He "was the mark of the divine wrath," or that "God satisfied His wrath on Him." Consequences which follow logically from an attempted explanation of the doctrine of atonement cannot be correct when they are unable to abide the test of Scripture, and when they bear upon their front the character of monstrosities. The attempt to divest them of this character is made in vain by means of experiments upon the idea of wrath. The representation that wrath is the correlate of love,—that it is an aspect of love, and must therefore be sharply distinguished from hate, may be very useful as a means of maintaining the idea of a divine wrath, and of explaining its genesis, but it does not tend in the least to relieve the difficulty with which we have been dealing. For although wrath may have its origin in love,[2] yet when it is perfected it always includes a certain element of displeasure which can scarcely be distinguished from hate. Church dogmatics, however, had no interest whatever in establishing any such distinction. It not only admitted, without hesitation, that the hatred of God rested upon the suffering Saviour, but stated the idea in the most emphatic way and in the strongest terms. It was on account of the *justitia vindicatrix* of God that it was impossible for Him to take up any other attitude towards His Son. "Non potuit non extreme eum odisse" (Quenstedt). But in so doing it has laid itself open to attack, and the weakness of its position cannot be covered by the qualifying explanation, that the Son did not fall under the *odium* of God absolutely, that the Father was not angry with Him *ratione personae suae*, but only in a relative sense.[3] We shall find an opportunity to establish our objections to these definitions afterwards.

Notwithstanding the defects which we have pointed out, the majority of modern writers have turned again to the traditional

[1] "Wrath is the essence of hell, and of this essence of hell the Crucified One tasted."—Delitzsch *On the Hebrews.*

[2] Aquinas says the same thing of hate: "Odium omne ex amore causatur."

[3] Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* III. pp. 355–358.

view, and profess to find in it the only possible solution of the problem. Rothe (*Dogm.* II. § 46) has given a large and yet incomplete list of those to whom this statement applies. In regard to the well-known Erlangen controversy, Dorner (*Gesch. der Prot. Theol.* p. 876) gives it as his opinion that it agitated the doctrine to some extent, but led to no important results. It had as *one* result, however, the relative victory secured by the champions of the orthodox opinions. Hofmann himself was unable to maintain his original position, and was obliged to retire from it. This fact admits of but one explanation, and that is, that the dogmatic theory of the church, when compared with all other attempted theological adjustments, was still found to harmonize best with the statements of Scripture. It is true that discrepancies between it and these statements might be pointed out here and there, but there was found to be an absence of that degree of disharmony which characterized all other theories. It is quite evident that the theology of recent years has approximated to the traditional view of the doctrine now under discussion in the same measure as it has returned to the Scriptures. This return has caused a reaction against that rationalism which limited the merit of Christ to His sealing His doctrine (Wegscheider: "doctrinam ipsius morte hominibus sancitam") with His blood, and regarded the atonement accomplished by Him merely as a revelation of the goodness of God, and has deflected that retrograde movement into the stream of true progress. Schleiermacher evinced a strong dislike to the "theology of wounds," of which he said much that was severe (*Glaubensl.* II. p. 152). But at the same time he could not help availing himself of the ideas of representation and satisfaction, and recognising the formula, that Christ, by the free surrender of Himself to suffering and death, satisfied the justice of God, and thus set us free from the penalty of sin. Even the mode of teaching which concentrates the whole virtue of Christ's redemptive work in His suffering is not wholly repudiated by him (*loc. cit.* p. 151). Certainly he gives to these ideas and formulas a signification of which the doctrine of the church is ignorant; but if it was his intention to put an arrest in this way upon the process of assimilation to that doctrine which was going on, the course which things have taken shows that the purpose has failed of success. No doubt all do not express themselves on

the matter as frankly as Delitzsch has done. Many a one claims to have gone beyond the developments even of a Quenstedt and a Hollaz. But if Dorner (*loc. cit.* p. 877) has correctly characterized the present position and direction of thought upon the question, assuredly there is presented to our view a conglomeration of elements, derived partly from Schleiermacher, partly from the circle of orthodox doctrinal ideas, and contributed to by mysticism as well as speculation, which cannot be regarded as a proof of any real progress on the foundation of the doctrine of the church. So much, at least, may be confidently affirmed, that essentially *new* views of the subject are nowhere stated and developed. If the contrary be maintained, we ask wherein consists the alleged *new* feature, which we are said to owe to modern theological activity in this domain. We find, on the one hand, that that which was regarded by church dogmatics merely as a presupposition of Christ's atonement, is elevated to the rank of an element in it; and, on the other hand, that what church dogmatics held to be a result of the atonement, is represented as pertaining to its real substance. But it is very questionable if these modifications give us any deeper insight into the doctrine, and when we come to examine them more closely, we shall probably be compelled to express an adverse opinion. In support of the former of these modifications, Rothe in particular put forth the most strenuous exertions (comp. his *Theol. Ethik*, first ed. vol. II. p. 303 sqq. In the second edition the author left out most of the dogmatic contents of the first, including the part before us). He held that the sin of humanity, considered generally, was atoned for by the second Adam in His qualifying Himself to be the Redeemer; that this qualification was directly dependent on His absolute oneness with God on the one side, and with mankind in their totality on the other,—on a oneness for which He trained Himself in a strictly normal way, partly by means of His unconditional self-surrender to God, partly by means of His unreserved surrender of Himself to the human race; that this expiatory offering up of Himself, both to God and for men, was undoubtedly the work of His whole life, but inasmuch as the act of perfect surrender on the part of Jesus was completed only in His physical death, that He became absolutely qualified to be the Redeemer only when He stood the supreme test of His love by suffering martyrdom, and hence that it was essentially

by His death that the whole life of Jesus became an atonement for our sin. The extent to which this new attempt takes the edge from the church's representation of the doctrine, is a question which we do not raise; we are at present concerned only with showing that its leading features are by no means foreign to the traditional doctrine, and evince no advance beyond it. Church dogmatics has never been chargeable with isolating the death of Jesus, so as to make it appear as if the Father had been appeased by it in a mere pathological way, and as if the Son had made atonement in a magico-mechanical manner. Any such charge is at once disposed of by the circumstance, that church dogmatics has claimed the *obedientia activa* in the most unmistakeable terms as an element in its conception of the complete satisfaction of Christ.[1] And still less can it be charged with emphasizing the shedding of blood considered in and by itself, for it has laid the entire emphasis on the question *whose* blood was shed,—the "precious blood" of Him who was alone able to atone for sin. (Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* III. p. 275: "Solius naturae humanae passio et mors ne minimum quidem robur habet adversus iram Dei et aeternam mortem." Hollaz, *Exam.* II. p. 171: "A majestate Christi *θεανθρώπου* divina et infinita vim et pondus accipit mors et passio mediatoris, ut sit pretium aequivalens pro peccatis totius mundi. Nam non humana natura passa est, sed Deus in humana natura Christi passus est, quippe qui passionem et mortem carnis sibi appropriavit ejusque passioni vim, valorem et pondus addidit!") But that which Rothe elevates to the position of the essential medium of the atonement is by the dogmatics of the church regarded only as its presupposition, and accordingly it places the death of our Lord in the foreground, in the same degree that Rothe puts it in the background. Schleiermacher, as is well known, reduced to a minimum the significance of the death of Christ for our salvation. The whole concession which he makes is, that "it befitted the Finisher of faith to die a death which was not a mere incident, but an act in the highest sense of the word, so that He might proclaim, in His death also, the complete supremacy of the Spirit over the

[1] Comp. Gerhard, *loc.* iv. c. 15, *de Christi officio:* "In satisfactione occurrit obedientia tam activa quam passiva . . . arctissime connexae;" *loc.* xvi. *de Justific.* p. *fid.:* "Statuimus, Christum non solum passiva, sed etiam activa sua obedientia esse causam meritoriam nostrae justificationis."

flesh" (*Glaubensl.* II. p. 157). The admission made by Rothe does not go much further. For a supreme or highest "test," in spite of all assertions (*l.c.* p. 309), can never amount to an actual specific power or energy. The honour of having gone beyond the standpoint of church dogmatics cannot therefore be claimed for a theory which is unable to vindicate itself by Scripture, and especially by the preaching of the Apostle Paul. For Holsten (*l.c.* p. 309) is entirely correct when he says that the apostle regarded the sufferings and death of Jesus as the absolutely essential element in the redemptive work of the Messiah,—not its mere culmination, but its very substance.

But perhaps a more favourable opinion should be passed upon the results at which those have arrived who wish to gain a deeper understanding of the merit of Christ, by investigating it from the point of view of the pathway of salvation which His suffering and death have opened up for men. Niedner (*Gesch. der Theol. und Philos.* p. 127) mentions as a distinguishing feature of the old church teachers, that, instead of giving a one-sided prominence to the objective aspect of the work of the Redeemer, they tried rather to apprehend it on its dynamical side as the one source of salvation. Among modern theologians Nitzsch is pre-eminent in defending this method of representation. In his *System der christl. Lehre* (§ 136), he says: "Only in the twofold, mutual, active and passive fellowship between the world and the Redeemer can He be truly said to suffer death in its stead, and to offer Himself up to God: only as the *power and possibility of our actual deliverance from sin* is His obedience to death a ransom for many." And therefore he reasons (*Glaubensl.* p. 153): "No one dare, can, or ought to take comfort in the atonement who does not associate with it a dying of his own in the form of repentance (*Busstod*); for this must remain unaltered, that in the death of Jesus the divine-human principle of change of mind and the making of atonement co-exist." Now the practical point in which this view culminates has certainly obtained equal prominence at the hands of church dogmatics. It also speaks of the necessity of a "*Busstod*," whether there be understood by this "*mortificatio*," *contritio*, or *cessatio ab impietate et malitia*. We only require to bear in mind what motive Gerhard makes the incentive to repentance,[1] or his definition of it,[2]

[1] *Loc.* xv. *de poen.* § 141. [2] § 145.

and also to observe the close connection which he establishes between "repentance," faith, and new obedience,[1] in order to be convinced how well he knew how to turn the twelfth article of the Augsburg Confession to account, and how sincerely he held the opinion: "ut Deo reconciliemur ac remissionem peccatorum consequamur omnino necessaria est contritio" (l. l. § 82). But how very far he was from assuming that which Nitzsch inferred in reasoning from this practical point of view! It was impossible for him to accept any such inference, because he was conspicuous for his energy in rejecting every form of synergism on the part of man in regard to the forgiveness of sins. He permits himself to employ the words: "Contritionem esse causam sine qua non remissionis peccatorum" (l. l. § 85), but at the same time he asserts in the most solemn tone: "Contritio non est meritum remissionis peccatorum." He invariably denies that the forgiveness of sin is in any way dependent on the *dignitas* or *quantitas contritionis*, feeling that to admit this would in some measure detract from the merit of Christ. Christ, he says, would have died in vain if the *vis* and *virtus* of His merit depended on the performances of men; and he calls the notion a *vanum effugium*. He also applies to this aspect of the question the old saying which he was fond of quoting: "Non dimidiat veniam Dei pietas, aut nihil aut totum dat." It follows necessarily from this fundamental proposition that a doctrinal representation which says: "only as the power and possibility of our actual deliverance from sin is the death of Jesus a ransom for many," cannot maintain its ground at the bar of church dogmatics. Gerhard would have condemned it as a confused mixture of things that differed from each other, and he would have considered it an error to make that to be of the substance of the merit of Christ which, in a greater or less number of instances, is a result following from it. He says (*loc.* xvi. *de Justific.* p. *fid.* § 53): "distinguendum inter beneficii acquisitionem et ejusdem applicationem: illa generalis est, siquidem Christus sua morte omnibus promeruit peccatorum remissionem; haec vero specialis est, quia soli credentes per fidem beneficii illius participes fiunt. Apostolus, postquam pronunciaverat, Deum in Christo nos sibi ipsi recon-

[1] L. l. § 140: "Vera ac salvifica fides cum vera contritione et novae obedientiae studio ἀδιαιρέτως ac nexu indivulso est conjuncta:" *ibid.* § 54: "Sunt accidentia inseparabilia, παρεπόμενα τῇ φύσει."

ciliasse, subjungit, quod Deus dederit sibi et reliquis apostolis ministerium reconciliationis, per quod nimirum homines Deo reconcilentur et beneficiorum Christi participes fiant." (Similarly in *Loc.* vii. *de Elect. et reprob.* § 119.) And he has the testimony of Scripture on his side in drawing this distinction so sharply and decidedly. The Scriptures unambiguously proclaim that the obedience of Christ exercised a direct influence upon God, in consequence of which the race was received into favour, and that it was only after, and because this had taken place, that individuals received power to draw nigh to the now accessible throne of grace. Nothing can harmonize better with the statements of Scripture than Gerhard's words: "ad impetrandam peccatorum remissionem coram Dei judicio omnino satisfactio quaedam necessaria est, per quam justitiae ejus satisfiat; hanc satisfactionem pro peccatis *totius generis humani* Christus praestitit," and his exclamation in regard to this work of our Lord: "en reconciliationem *factam*," as well as that which follows in relation to the words of the apostle, Be ye reconciled to God: "en reconciliationem adhuc *faciendam*." No doubt Nitzsch is right when he remarks (*Christl. Glaubenslehre*, p. 153) that both are found conjoined in more than one utterance of Scripture, and he appeals especially to the passage which is so frequently quoted in this interest: "If one died for all, then *all died*" (2 Cor. v. 14). But church exegetes have been equally right in protesting against the conjunction which appears here being regarded as implying identity. The energy with which they have made this protest has undoubtedly led them to take up an untenable view of the passage in question. (Adam Osiander, IV. pp. 163–167, explains it thus: "Christo mortuo perinde est, ac si omnes mortui essent, scil. ea morte quam erant meriti." Similarly Quenstedt, III. p. 240, is an unjustifiable polemic against Calvin.) But even this exegetical slip reveals a correct apprehension of truth, and the general view underlying it is in complete agreement with Scripture. But certainly we do not move along the path of true progress by debating the relative merits of the prepositions ὑπέρ and ἀντί, loading the former with meaning and depriving the latter of its just force, or recognising the latter only so far as its meaning is determined by the former.

Among recent attempts made to solve the problem with which we have been dealing is that of Ritschl, contained in the work to

which reference has already been made. The first, or historical part of his treatise, owing especially to the confident tone which it breathed, excited the greatest expectations, and new and fresh elucidations of the subject were confidently awaited. We confess that we did not share in these anticipations. The depreciating terms in which his allusions to Anselm were made, and the laudatory terms applied to Abelard on the other hand, his statements that "the theory of the former does not harmonize with Christian reason," and that religiosity cannot find in it, but only in the theory of Anselm, a "serviceable vehicle," left us in no doubt as to the path on which Ritschl had entered, nor as to the conclusions at which he would arrive. But had we cherished any expectations like those alluded to, they would have been dispelled by the short treatise, *Ueber die christliche Vollkommenheit*, which the author sent forth in 1874 as the forerunner of the third part of his work. Ritschl certainly does not refuse to admit that the redemptive action and suffering of Christ exerted some kind of influence *upon God* also, but he regards it as merely secondary and indirect. To us, indeed, it seems so "indirect" as almost to escape our observation. The author states his view of the atonement wrought by Christ in the following proposition: "Our Lord, as the Revealer of God, from love to men, made known to them the grace and faithfulness of God for their admission into His fellowship, and, with the view of calling out a community of the children of God, exhibited His religious fidelity towards God by an uninterrupted discharge of the work to which He was called, and by manifesting patience amid the sufferings connected with His vocation," etc. (III. p. 536).[1] The only new element in this statement is the greater emphasis which it gives to the idea of the Christian community. Its remaining elements have already been appropriated by the Socinians and the theologians of the Illumination. Accordingly, "patience amid the sufferings connected with His vocation" is the substance of the Passion. It is not an atonement in the ecclesiastical, nor, we

[1] The author has entirely failed to bring his theory into harmony with Rom. iii. The expression "in His blood" stood in the way. How does he adjust matters? He says (II. p. 173) the pouring forth of the blood of the Crucified was the legal condition under which God evinced to the church, in this His representative, His righteousness for the forgiveness of sin. Does Ritschl really rest content with this expedient? Can he really suppose that he thus expresses the sense of the apostle? This is more than we can imagine.

may confidently add, in the biblical sense. This theory harmonizes with the Scripture just as little as it does justice to the craving of the pious heart, which can rest content only with the confession—

> "All our sins, Lord, Thou didst bear,
> Else had we sunk into despair."

### 3. THE TESTIMONY OF THE HISTORY.

A glance at the history of theological reflection may well justify the saying of Sebastian Schmidt: "Satius foret punctum fidei gravissimum simpliciter credi, quam de eo quaeri." Yea, a still greater authority appears to uphold *such* a "satius foret." Even the apostles have denied us an insight into this mystery, and in vain has exegesis wearied itself in the attempt to acquire a clear understanding of it from their utterances. Paul even refers this circumstance to a deliberate purpose. He writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor. i. 21): "It hath pleased God, through the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe." And as he immediately afterwards mentions that Christ crucified is the sum and substance of his preaching, this "foolishness of preaching" can refer only to the doctrine of the cross. It is the business of wisdom to investigate the hidden, to demonstrate the connection between cause and effect. The preaching, therefore, which is characterized by its contrast to "wisdom" will disdain to take such things into account; it will limit itself to demanding a believing acceptance of the facts which it proclaims. At the same time there is a gnosis in this domain whose validity cannot be impeached, and which is not liable to the charge either of ignoring the limits of knowledge or of engaging in a pursuit which must be resultless. It fully realizes what the apostle has said in regard to knowing in part and seeing through a glass darkly (ἐν αἰνίγματι). It shrinks from attempting to find out what transpired between the Father and the Son during the Passion quite as much as from trying to discover what took place between them before the Incarnation. Both subjects are, from the nature of the case, withdrawn from mortal view. But in regard to *what* Christ suffered, and *how* He suffered, we are in possession of a historical record. The evangelists have told the story with the utmost detail. And if so, is it possible that these

narratives can be altogether fruitless in results bearing on the gnosis in question? Strauss professes, it is true, to dispute the authenticity of the Passion history of our Lord on purely historical grounds, but his real and actual grounds are different. The history of the suffering Saviour, as told by the evangelists, is unintelligible on any supposition except that it describes the carrying out of an arrangement made by God for the expiation of sin. The polemic of the older Socinianism, in spite of all its acuteness, was broken on this history, just as it baffles the placid superficiality of the modern upholders of that system. By means of this history the doctrinal view of Anselm re-vindicates itself, rebounds from the pressure put upon it, and the conviction that it is substantially accurate gains ground. But should not that which seems to support the doctrine also assist us in gaining a deeper insight into it? May not an examination of historical details be of more assistance to us than dogmatic reflection as a means of understanding it? This is a question which involves a charge against exegetics as well as dogmatics. Neither of them has fulfilled its obligations in regard to the subject in question. Has exegetics done so? At first sight one would suppose that this question should be answered in the affirmative, for there is scarcely a portion of Scripture to which it has devoted so much attention as the Passion history. This is clear from the numerous monographs on its details, the list of which is not complete even in the copious catalogue of Hase. But investigation has always busied itself, for the most part, with mere externals which were of secondary importance, while theological exegesis, properly so called, has been neglected. This holds of the extensive, older works, no less than of the more recent manuals. Wichelhaus is not the only one who has devoted his *Versuch eines ausführlichen Commentars zu der Leidengeschichte* to the investigation of a question whose importance is overrated, and which is erroneously considered to be a crucial one, namely, whether our Lord instituted the Supper on the thirteenth or the fourteenth Nisan. And, besides, it has sometimes happened that an author's energies have been exhausted in the clearing up of this, and a number of similar questions of an almost exclusively archaeological nature, so that the real and essential question at stake was left undisposed of. This holds, for instance, of the most recent commentary on the Passion history, namely, that by Hengstenberg, which has

been compiled from the materials left in his academic lectures.—But dogmatics has also given similar cause for complaint,—the older as well as the newer dogmatic, but especially the latter. It has never realized the importance of the *history* of our Lord's Passion and Death, and has scarcely once dealt with it. If the comparatively fruitless attempt of Quenstedt be excepted, the dogmatists of the church have turned their attention only to the conflict in the garden, and the fourth of our Lord's utterances from the cross. Whether or not they have done it in the proper way, whether they have correctly apprehended the incidents so as to make them the basis of their deductions, or have not rather included them in categories already prepared, we do not at present inquire; in the meantime we content ourselves with stating the fact that, speaking generally, all the remaining historical materials have been left unused. In recent times the celebrated work of Hofmann has no doubt broken new ground in this respect. But in so far as he really avails himself of the Passion history of Jesus in this work, he does so with the sole view of showing that the sin of the world exhausted itself upon the suffering Saviour. No one can deny that this mode of view is both a correct and a justifiable one. This is admitted even by Nitzsch (see *Syst. der christl. Lehre*, § 134): "Sin must complete itself, must exhaust itself for all upon the Redeemer." But the attempt to make it a means of gaining a deeper understanding of the nature of the atonement accomplished by Christ is a mistake. It has its value, its power to build up and to shake, but it cannot be pressed into a higher service. The apostolic doctrinal representations do not give the slightest encouragement to any one to attempt the solution of the problem by this method. Accordingly, the course which we propose to pursue in availing ourselves of the history of our Lord's sufferings, with the view of gaining an insight into the dogma mentioned, is entirely different. We regard these sufferings not in the light of a lot that befell Him, but under the aspect of a work;—not, however, in the feeble, delusive sense contemplated by Hofmann, when he says that "the obedience which the God-appointed Mediator was called to render was perfected in His not refusing to endure the uttermost which hatred was able to do to Him" (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 318), but in the strictest sense of the word. If a work was to be accomplished during our Lord's Passion, or rather by means of

it, this presupposed that there was nothing which He would refuse to endure; but, for all that, this presupposition was not the work itself, and the question still remains, *what* was done by the suffering Christ in order to the accomplishment of the work of atonement? Now, it is with this very question in view that we betake ourselves to the history of His Passion. We shall consider this history in the light of the doctrinal statements of the apostles, this being the only course which we can take, for it is impossible for us to abandon all presupposition. But, on the other hand, we shall try to make the light of the history fall on the doctrinal utterances of the apostles, in order to gain a better understanding of them. To meet in this way the assaults of negative criticism, and so to make them subservient to the interests of true religion,—this is the task which we set before ourselves.

In the foregoing pages we have been at pains to show on what grounds we have adopted the method indicated rather than any other; but if we were in want of any additional confirmation of its rightness, we should find it in a work which has excited our interest owing to its bearing on this subject. We refer to Holsten's *zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*, a book which is worthy of note, not simply from its scientific ability, nor yet from the circumstance that its author has combined his influence with that of others in order to carry out the impulse imparted by Baur, and to move in a direction considerably divergent from that taken by Strauss, but much more because it reveals a gap in the domain of Soteriology which conservative theology has failed to fill up. Holsten is at pains to answer the question, In what way did the apostles, in particular Paul and Peter (also extending his investigation, however, to the authors of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse), base on the accomplished historical fact their views of the significance of the death of Jesus Christ? When we look at the results to which his deliberations have led him, we may well entertain very serious doubts if it was altogether prudent to raise that question. For these results do not, in any substantial sense, go beyond the admissions which are made by Strauss. We have no ground to dispute the author's claim to the merit of having laboured with the "earnestness of a moral and logical conscience;" but, on the other hand, we feel that the expectations which were excited

by this assurance have not been realized. For we confess that we do not see how we can continue to speak of a Christian piety, or even of a churchly exercise of Christianity, if these views be carried out. Nor are we able to imagine how a thinker can abide by this standpoint, or avoid deciding at last, whether with or without Strauss, for the conclusions of a Reimarus. When Holsten undertook to explain and to trace the genesis of the alleged divergent opinions of the apostles in regard to the death of Jesus, he felt himself compelled to deal, in the first place, with our Lord's own views of His approaching departure from the world. But here his investigations have led him to make statements which are shattered against another rock besides the express declarations which fell from the lips of Christ, and for the setting aside of which he has employed his exegetical skill in vain. He tries to persuade us that our Lord was uncertain of the ultimate issue of His career up to the last moment. No doubt the ever-increasing fanaticism of His opponents made it evident that His death was certain so far as it depended on the will of men; but so long as the possibility of *divine* interposition still remained, hope continued to assert itself in the pious soul of Jesus, and faded away only with the cry: "My God, why hast Thou forsaken me!" If it occurred to Him to ask amid His dying thoughts what divine purpose was to be accomplished by this termination of His career, the presuppositions of the Jewish mind could have supplied the answer, that His suffering might be substitutionary, in order to the expiation of the sins of others. But this thought was no more than a momentary presentiment or a passing reflection; amid the rush of events He was unable to retain it in His consciousness. "It was hidden like a germ in its depths; for the present it lay as if buried in death, in order to rise to new life in the future." Paul was the first to express in a clear and decided way that which had hovered only vaguely and indefinitely before the mind of Jesus Himself. How the author, with his eye on the Gospels, could have erred so far as to make assertions which have not even the semblance of a foundation, is not hard to comprehend when we remember the attitude which he has taken up towards the Holy Scriptures. This attitude is so peculiarly free that no one has ever before maintained it in the same way; it is so absolutely unfettered, not being defined even by arbitrarily chosen limitations, that the

same narrative is at one time rejected as inadmissible, and at another recognised as worthy of credit, just as it happens to suit the interests of the moment. It must therefore appear all the more mysterious that he should believe it to be possible to reconcile with his assumptions the idea of the *redemptive* significance of the death of Jesus in any shape or form whatsoever. We do not here speak from the standpoint of Christian dogmatics, although it also has shown the impracticability of such an attempt. Either Christ was the only-begotten Son of God, in which case He knew from the beginning, as is represented in the fourth Gospel, the time and the hour, the meaning and value, the end and object of His departure from the world; or He was not, in which case His death, as bearing on the salvation of the world, had no significance whatever. "Nam mors nudi hominis, passio solius carnis, ne minimum quidem robur habet ad nos liberandos;" so teach Quenstedt, Hollaz, Osiander, and others, with perfect unanimity. But we leave this point, for we are aware that we cannot treat with the author in this domain. But there is an alternative which cannot be rejected, even from his own standpoint, and it is this. Our Lord, by His suffering and dying, fulfilled a task which was appointed Him by the Father, in which case He must have clearly known what it was; or He was destitute of such knowledge, in which case, however, He could neither have discharged, nor even have been entrusted with, any task. Dr. Holsten is in great need of the broad basis which he has laid in order to account for the very dissimilar views of the death of Jesus which the apostles are alleged to have entertained. "Because the processes of thought which were awakened by the anticipation of death were retained in the deeps of the spiritual life of Jesus, and were unable to grow to clear vision, and because the disciples, for that reason, were not possessed of a consistent, fixed deliverance on the point conveyed to them by their Master, they must have felt at a loss among different possible explanations, and have proceeded in partially divergent directions." The author therefore discovers, even in the New Testament, all the possible and impossible opinions in regard to the purpose and virtue of our Lord's Passion which are known to dogmatic history. He is even persuaded that the Socinian view is perfectly apparent in the Apocalypse, and maintains that when our Lord is called "the faithful witness," the expression is designed to convey

nothing else than this, that our Lord triumphantly sealed the truth of His prophetic testimony by His death, and by the moral worth of such a death earned divine dignity and glory. However, it is only to the views of Peter and Paul that he devotes special consideration. So far as Peter was concerned, he says that the death of Jesus was to him inappropriate in the highest degree. He regarded it as a purposeless act, a useless addition to our Lord's Messianic activity, a superfluous act, altogether unimportant as bearing on redemption, so that it might as well *not* have happened. The Pauline λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ, especially the conclusions deduced from it by Paul, were to him, quite naturally, a stumbling-block. He was, unfortunately, unable to deny the fact itself, consequently he was compelled to endure this superfluity, to admit it into his consciousness and his preaching, but he never saw in it more than an element incidental to the Messianic work, and it always remained to him something merely external which was destitute of formative vital power. Ultimately, indeed, he recognised the death of Jesus as the accomplishment of a divine volition; only he did not see in it a fulfilment of a redemptive decree of the Father, but merely of that general will of Providence without which a sparrow does not fall to the ground. Our astonishment at a representation of the "Petrine conception of doctrine" which is so diametrically opposed to the real statements of the apostle as rightly interpreted, is surpassed only by the astonishment we feel on perceiving that the author could develope this caricature of the truth from the reproving words spoken by Paul at Antioch. The exegesis by means of which this was possible to him is sufficiently characterized when we mention as an instance of it, that he does not hesitate to base his melancholy remark that the death of Jesus was a divine work of supererogation (*Luxusthat*), on the word δωρεάν in Gal. ii. 21. A singular contrast to this complete travesty of the Petrine representation of doctrine in regard to our Lord's Passion, is Holsten's altogether correct and admirable delineation of the doctrinal position of Paul. But it requires us to acknowledge an unprecedented exception to the saying: "The disciple is not above his master." According to the view in question, Paul was, in this domain, far above his Master, and the apostle understood and saw distinctly that which existed in the consciousness of Jesus Himself only in the germ form of a

transient and vague presentiment. If these be the findings to which the author was led by his endeavour to understand from history the doctrinal declarations of the apostles, the result is one which is more fitted to act as a deterrent than to encourage us to enter upon a similar undertaking. But it may be asked with good reason if the first steps which were taken on this path were not already vitiated by a mistake, which made success impossible, from the very outset. According to Dr. Holsten, after the death of their Lord had taken place, the disciples made the fact of the crucifixion the subject of their *reflections*. These led them to take up a two-sided view of His death, one of which bore a historico-religious and the other a dogmatico-religious impress. Peter and the original apostles, holding the former view, saw in the fate of Christ the sinful act of men, the realization of a universal world-historical law which had obtained from the beginning in religious history, a circumstance which was a mere concomitant of the earthly life of the Messiah, a simple accident of His redemptive work. The latter view was worked out by Paul, and those who held it saw in the death of Jesus on the cross the gracious act of God, the revelation of a new redemptive principle, the essential purpose of the Messiah's coming to the world, the essence of His work. Of course the author can find room for these views only by denying the resurrection of our Lord. But even after he has proved by means of this violent expedient that there was scope for the reflections which he attributes to the disciples, there is one thing which he has failed, and which he will always fail to show, and that is, how the assumed inferences were possible to them. Either all experience deludes and all psychological laws mislead, or the circumstances of the disciples, after the death of Jesus, were such as had been predicted in the farewell discourse recorded by John (xvi. 20); their *real* reflections, if we may use the expression, were no other than those implied in the words spoken on the way to Emmaus: "we trusted that it had been He which should have redeemed Israel: and beside all this," etc. (Luke xxiv. 21); and, had they been left to themselves, they would never have reached a higher standpoint. But we know they were not so left. When they had been abandoned as a prey to sorrowful thoughts for a little while, "scattered every man to his own," they were gathered together once more. The Risen One explained to them the ground and

purpose of His death. It behoved Christ to suffer these things and to enter into His glory: His Spirit brought to their remembrance all things that had been formerly spoken to them on the subject, and led them into all truth. Paul also is fully conscious of this, and says plainly that he was made a partaker of this knowledge by means of a revelation from the Lord,—a revelation which not only excluded the idea of human instruction, but which strictly excluded all his own reflections as well. Thus it has come to pass that all the apostles—Paul, Peter, John—maintain one and the same view of the Passion of Christ, that the Scriptures proclaim throughout their whole extent the same doctrine of the atoning death of Christ, and that the church, resting on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, has professed it in all ages. Consequently we are not only ready to admit, but even to emphasize the fact, that the apostles, after being put in possession of this key for opening up the meaning of the history —though certainly not till then—gave utterance to their reflections regarding it to the churches, and did so with the intention of imparting profounder knowledge of the great mystery. This was the design of Paul when he reminded the Galatians that he had evidently set forth Christ before them, just as if His death had taken place before their eyes, and also when he asked the Corinthians to remember how he had delivered to them that which he had himself received, namely, that Christ died for their sins, and that He was buried. Now all this is very suggestive for theology. The doctrine of the apostles regarding the death of Jesus, as stated unambiguously in their writings, demands acceptance and recognition on the ground of their sufficient authority, and after being received on their testimony, it is to be compared with the history. The result of this comparison is not merely that the doctrine is authenticated, but that additional light is shed upon it, so that we attain to such clear knowledge regarding it as is possible in this domain of thought. This is the course which we intend to pursue, and we cherish the hope of being able in this way to repel the attacks of negative criticism much more effectively than would be possible by employing mere historical counter criticism.

The Passion history of our Lord has a well-marked beginning and an equally definite close. Between these limits, therefore, lies our field of investigation. In refraining from extending the

field on the former side, we have been influenced, not so much by historical considerations, as by a regard to the purpose we have in view. Hofmann has alluded to the necessity of bringing into greater prominence, as a means of rightly understanding our Lord's Passion, the contrast between it and the previous part of His life. Now, while not entirely agreeing with all that he says upon this topic, and feeling constrained to differ most decidedly from him as to one point, we admit that his remark, considered generally, is an entirely just one. It will come out in the course of our investigations that we are very far from wishing to separate the active and the passive obedience of Christ in the manner of a Piscator; we wish only to *distinguish* them from each other more precisely and decidedly than modern dogmatics is in the habit of doing, so that the passive obedience of Christ may obtain its *full* and undiminished value, and its *real* import be recognised. Now, with the view of carrying out this purpose, it is necessary to assume that the narrative itself has drawn a perceptible line of separation between the night which had come for our Lord and the working hours of life which went before. But this dividing line is very clearly marked in our Gospels; it is marked with sufficient distinctness even in the narrative of that evangelist who seems most of all to obliterate the boundary. Among all the attempts which have been made to subdivide or group the contents of the Gospel of John, not one seems to us to be quite satisfactory. There can be no doubt that ch. xiii. makes a fresh start; but we feel that there are objections to regarding it as the beginning of a second part of the book, and the opinion that the Passion history is to be held as beginning with it we regard as decidedly erroneous. The characterizing words with which ch. xiii. opens: "He loved to the end," obviously class the succeeding incidents under the heading of the active life of Jesus Christ; but it is equally undeniable that the words which describe the objects of the love: "His own who were in the world," point back to the two first chapters of the Gospel. The *beginning* of the manifestation of the love of Jesus to His own is described in ch. i. 35–ii. 11; and we read the result in the words: "and His disciples believed on Him." The "end" corresponds to this beginning; and the description of the love which endured to the end, concludes very characteristically with the confession of the disciples: "Now we believe that Thou camest forth from God," and

with the parallel testimony of our Lord: "they have known surely that I came out from Thee, and they have believed that Thou didst send Me" (John xvii. 8). Between these two there is contained the record of our Lord's manifestations to the world, the final result of which is thus expressed: "yet they believed not on Him" (John xii. 37). Ch. xiii.–xvii. are therefore parts of the still unbroken threads of the narrative going before. A new element is first introduced only with the words of ch. xviii.: "When Jesus had spoken these words, He went forth with His disciples over the brook Cedron." People speak of a gap between the high-priestly prayer of Jesus and the synoptic account of the transactions in the garden. It will appear, however, that there is no gap, except such as arises necessarily from the circumstances of the case, as correctly understood, and that the narrative of John contrasts with itself in the same sharp way as it is said to contrast with the synoptic Gospels. The crossing of the Cedron, then, indicates the beginning of the Passion history, and the burial of Jesus marks its close. The church dogmatists have been wont to regard this fact as belonging to the *Exinanitio Christo* (J. Gerhard, *loc.* iv. § 304: "status exinanitionis durat usque ad tempus sepulturae inclusive"). They placed its significance not merely in the circumstance that it was a proof of the reality of Christ's death (Calov, *Syst.* VII. p. 672), but they also looked on it as an essential element of the expiatory sufferings themselves. Quenstedt says: "Christ being buried, all our sins were buried with Him, and cast into the depths of the sea; and, as Christ's sepulchre was sealed, so also by the death of Christ have our sins been sealed up." And Calovius adds: "Our sins, therefore, cannot appear before God's face and accuse us." Hence also the practical application so admirably worked out by Quenstedt, on the basis of the passages in the Epistles to the Romans and the Ephesians, that our old man ought to be crucified and buried with Christ. The apostle's reason for placing between the two declarations in 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4, that Christ died, and that He rose again, the third declaration, that He was buried, has never yet been adequately explained. Nor is this done by the remark of Hofmann, that "the dead Christ by His burial was removed entirely from the upper world." Comp. *die heil. Schrift*, III. p. 349. So much, however, may be inferred from a comparison with the statements of Peter, Acts ii. 29 sq., that the

mention of the grave was intended to serve as a foil to the glory of the resurrection. The *sepultura* of Christ has therefore been rightly included by dogmatics in His state of humiliation. And when the matter is looked at from the purely historical standpoint, a similar conclusion is arrived at, and it is felt that the burial of our Lord cannot be excluded from the history of His sufferings, for even in the grave He was still the object of Jewish persecution.

Now, if we examine that which lies between these two landmarks, the crossing of the Cedron on the one hand, and the entombment on the other, we shall find that the history so defined may be divided into three clearly marked and outstanding phases. We mean the Conflict in the garden, the Passion, the Death. Each of these three demands separate and independent investigation, and only when they have received this will it be possible to acquire a satisfactory view of the whole. This demand holds in the highest degree of the scene in Gethsemane. It is not enough to make a strict separation between it and what goes before,—a course which Hofmann regards as the preliminary condition to understanding it,—but it must be separated no less carefully from that which comes after. If this latter be neglected we shall be exposed to one of two dangers,—we shall either be tempted, with the expositors of the church, to over-estimate the significance of the event, and to add to its proper contents, or we shall be in danger of committing the more serious mistake of ignoring its redemptive value. This and nothing else is the real reason why so many theologians have found it impossible to make their theories conform with the narrative, and this is the spot at which negative criticism has collected its weapons of attack. We shall find it difficult to wrest them from its hands, so long as the conflict in the garden is combined with the succeeding sufferings of our Lord; but when once we have decided to draw a sufficiently clear dividing line between them, these weapons are already rendered harmless. When our Lord said: "Arise, let us be going; behold, he is at hand that betrayeth me," not only had He taken up the *resolution* to do what the Father had commanded,—He had already accomplished an essential part of the work entrusted to Him, and accordingly He proceeded to perform a further part of it. On the new page of His life-work which was then opened, the story of His sufferings was written. To them

also we must give special consideration. It has sometimes happened that the sufferings of Jesus have been regarded simply as preliminary steps to His death. No further significance was attached to them, and the death became the absorbing object of attention. Nor have there been wanting those who looked at the death exclusively from the view-point of the sufferings, and regarded it merely as the last link in the chain. (This is not the view of the Apostle Peter, though Holsten would have us believe that it is; in the history of modern dogmatics, however, the view is common enough.) In regard to the question of the relative seriousness of these two errors, there can be but one opinion; but in the interests of our controversy with negative criticism we must carefully avoid even the one which is less grave. It is notorious that the doctrinal representations of the apostles attributed to the sufferings, as well as to the death of Jesus, an independent significance. When Peter speaks of Christ's mode of enduring as an example for us to follow, he is thinking only of His sufferings; the same thought is present to the mind of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, when he speaks of Christ having power to succour those that are tempted, owing to the fact that He Himself suffered from temptation; and those *παθήματα Χριστοῦ*, which all the apostles assume to be an element present in Christian life, are the reflex of these sufferings of Christ. Paul, again, has exclusively in view the death of Christ when he speaks of the effects which have been produced by "Christ crucified," or the "cross of Christ." The attacks made by criticism on the evangelical narratives of the sufferings of Jesus, will make an impression only on those by whom their independent value is overlooked. In any other case they will be felt to be a mere beating of the air. Accordingly, we divide the history which succeeds the conflict in the garden into two separate portions. In the meantime, we are content merely to indicate our reasons for pursuing this plan; and we refer our readers to the pages in which it is worked out for its full and proper vindication.

# PART FIRST.

## JESUS IN GETHSEMANE.

### 1. THE PROBLEM.

WHEN we regard the conflict of Jesus in the garden as an element of so essential a character in the Passion history that we co-ordinate it with the actual Passion of our Lord, and with His death as an independent third constituent, we feel that it is unnecessary to vindicate this procedure to those who recognise in relation to such subjects the authority of Holy Scripture. We have been led to adopt this course, not by glancing at the method which has been pursued by the theologians of the church, but owing to a plain intimation contained in the apostolic doctrinal representation. J. Gerhard calls the narrative before us the principal part of the Passion history; others describe it as a picture of the *passio magna* of our Lord, in doing which they have but attached its proper importance to the well-known passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews,—a passage whose bearing on the transactions in Gethsemane is admitted by all expositors, and not denied even by Strauss. Although the apostles knew nothing else but "Christ crucified," yet they were not in the habit of fixing attention for doctrinal purposes[1] on individual links in the chain of His Passion, or single drops of the cup that was put into His hands. When it happens, therefore, that this one element of the Passion history of Jesus is so peculiarly emphasized, and even employed as a proof of a principal article in the Christian creed, as well as a medium for understanding it,

[1] The references to the good confession which our Lord witnessed before Pontius Pilate (1 Tim. vi. 13), or to the meekness which He displayed amid suffering (1 Pet. ii. 23), or to His being led without the gate to die there (Heb. xiii. 12), belong wholly to the region of mere application, and are made solely for the encouragement of Christians.

it cannot have appeared to the author of the Epistle a mere fragment of a whole; he must have regarded it as a whole in itself, to which there belonged an independent significance. And in the main the historical representation of the event by the evangelists harmonizes entirely with this mode of viewing it. It has been said that there is no room for the Gethsemane scene in the fourth Gospel. Even Origen attributed to deliberate intention the silence of John in regard to this incident. Strauss goes so far as to maintain that every attempt to introduce it into the text seems an outrage upon the moral elevation and the manly earnestness of the Christ who is portrayed by this evangelist. Others have at least acknowledged their perplexity at the state of the matter, and have found an irreconcilable contradiction between the triumphant confidence which is breathed by the high-priestly prayer and this deadly agony. But it seems to us strange that a narrative which is supposed to be so irreconcilable with the Johannine representations can be accepted so readily from the Synoptists themselves. Has Matthew never submitted to his readers a similar representation of Jesus? Does not he too, and that in the immediately preceding context, ch. xxvi. 29–34, place Jesus on the very same pedestal as do the valedictory discourses in the fourth Gospel?

Quite apart from the Gospel of John, it is impossible to come to any conclusion except that the incident is introduced *altogether* unexpectedly; and far from ranking itself as a member of the historical development, or as one of its stages, it appears, even in the synoptic narrative, as occupying an independent place. The word ἤρξατο, with which the account of Matthew as well as that of Mark begins, betokens more than merely the "entrance of the situation" (Meyer). Bengel's comment, "*repente*," is as apt as the remark of J. Gerhard, who, appealing to what is said of the Saviour in John xi.: "He groaned in the spirit, and was troubled," draws therefrom the inference that "Christ spontaneously and voluntarily became sad in spirit." The ἤρξατο really receives justice only when the assumption is made that our Lord entered the garden in order to engage in a special conflict which He had to wage and carry out to a triumphant issue in one and the same hour.[1]

[1] "Precisely as, at the beginning of His ministry, He was tempted by Satan, not incidentally, but because He was led out into the wilderness by the Spirit for the very purpose." Hengst. *Comment. on John.*

And thus the evangelical representation also elevates the event to the same dignity as is attributed to it by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The true and proper ground on which criticism has regarded this narrative as one which must be entirely swept aside, is to be found in the fact that so marked a significance is attributed to it by the Scriptures themselves. We should otherwise be surprised at the pertinacious efforts which are made to destroy its historicity. For, on the one hand, it might be supposed that the negative tendency which is at present struggling for influence and supremacy would welcome this incident rather than the reverse. For if it is firmly resolved to be in thorough earnest about the "humanity" of Jesus, might it not see in our Lord as He appeared in Gethsemane one who was not only truly human, but who was also compassed about with human infirmity? And, on the other hand, the attempt to set the narrative aside produces difficulties of so grave a character that nothing except the most urgent necessity could lead to the selection of so perilous a battle-field. In the present case, then, criticism has not ventured to employ its usual weapons. Strauss would not have searched the Old Testament in vain for elements whereby to explain the origin of this additional "legend." Had he availed himself of such parallels[1] as had been referred to by the older thoughtful theologians, although in a very different sense, no greater exception would have been taken to this proceeding than to much else which he had done in the same line. On this occasion he has not adopted that course, nor yet has he made any effort to explain the origin of the "legend." In his larger work he tacitly declines to adopt the conjecture of Schleiermacher (*L. J.* p. 424), that the narrative may be the drapery of an admonition which is made more impressive through the example of Christ; and in his critique of the views of that theologian, he rejects it in express terms. His whole material of attack is reduced to the light phrase: "it has an appearance

[1] As this,—that the command of Jesus to His disciples: "Sit ye here while I go and pray yonder," vividly recalls the words which Abraham addressed to his attendants before he presented his intended sacrifice of obedience: "Abide ye here, and I . . . will go yonder and worship;" or this, that the selecting of the small company of three men agrees not less strikingly with the direction given by Jehovah to Moses, to bring up to the mountain with him Nadab and Abihu, and to request them to worship afar off (Ex. xxiv. 1).

of poetry rather than of history," and the arbitrary assertion that the narrative is to be traced, not to a historical, but to a dogmatic source,—an assertion which is entirely destitute of proof, and for which he has no reason to give except that Christ is said to have retired for prayer *three* times.[1] Why, it may be asked, did he not prefer in these circumstances to accept the incident as historical, since he would then have been at liberty to explain it in his own fashion? Why did he turn aside from the path on which he had entered by virtue of his involuntary confession; "Jesus *might* still have had to undergo a severe inward struggle when His terrible fate presented itself to His mind as unavoidable"? The reason is obvious. The Gethsemane history submits this alternative, namely, either to decide for the results of a Celsus and a Julian, or to accept the conclusions which have been drawn by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Any middle way vanishes before the gaze of a clear thinker like a dissolving view. But if the latter alternative was naturally viewed as inadmissible by negative criticism, it was not less indisposed to accept the standpoint of pagan polemics. Mocking and despising Christ do not fit in with its system. We can easily understand how Schleiermacher would be unable to speak of the Redeemer, as he conceived of Him, being under the "power of gloomy imaginations and vague feelings," all the more that this state of things must then have immediately succeeded, a "condition so resolved, stedfast, and harmonious with the divine will." But it was of importance for Strauss also to preserve a picture of Jesus which represented Him as the possessor of a lofty moral character, and as submissive to everything which the task imposed upon Him might entail. What other course, then, was left open for him but to sweep everything away, and to declare that there was not a single word of truth in the whole story?

Negative criticism being thus firmly resolved to set the narrative aside, apologetics has equally strong reasons for vindicating its historical authenticity. For it, the question of interest is not simply the defence of a given portion of the gospel history, but it cannot, and dare not, abandon a part of it to which

[1] In opposition to arguments of this nature it is very properly asked if we are to doubt the historical accuracy of the statement attributed to Paul in 2 Cor. xii. 8: "For this thing I besought the Lord *thrice* that it might depart from me," on account of the presence of the number three.

Scripture itself has attributed an independent significance so peculiarly great. And if this be its special interest, it must take its view-point from the position in question in order to discharge its task. Should any other standpoint be adopted, Apologetics may, no doubt, meet the questions which are raised; it may succeed in weakening the force of objections, but it will wring from opponents no more than concessive admissions, or constrain them to a more or less contented acquiescence, while that satisfaction, at which it must aim as its true goal, will not be produced.

At the very outset we repudiate all connection with the attempt which has been made in many ways, and certainly with the best intentions, to account for the conflict of our Lord on *psychological* grounds; and we do so because such a course does not seem to us to have any reasonable prospect of success. By those who have adopted this method, our Lord's manifestations in the garden are explained on the ground of a presentiment of that which awaited Him in the immediate future, and they apply to the case the distinction drawn by Peter Lombardus between *passio* and *propassio*. They say that He foresaw, clearly and distinctly, the chain of His sufferings, and how link would be joined on to link, till the whole terminated in an agonizing death. They find it, on the one hand, perfectly natural that this catastrophe, with all its terrors, should have cast dark shadows upon the soul of Jesus, filling it with grief and fear, seeing He was like to other men, and was formed in fashion as a man. On the other hand, they say that the ground of His manifesting the reverse of stoical apathy may be discovered in the very fact of His moral elevation, in the purity, depth, and truth of His sensibilities, and they add that there is also a divine *ἀσθένεια*, differing essentially from ordinary human weakness, and that it is expressly predicated of Jesus by the Apostle Paul.[1] Now, if the question were the explanation of such passing moods of sorrow or longing as undoubtedly came upon our Lord at various times (comp. Luke xii. 50; John xii. 27), possibly this key might be suitable. But how little it does towards accounting for the peculiar depth of His sorrow here in Gethsemane! The narrative is in every respect adapted to bring out the unprecedented character of this sorrow, and to mark it as one for which there

[1] Hengstenberg, in pursuing this line, has endeavoured to avail himself of the manifestations of a Socrates and a Seneca.

was no parallel in the whole circle of human experience, nor even in the rest of Christ's own experience. The characteristic description by the evangelists leads to this conclusion. A similar impression is conveyed by our Lord's own confession; and the course which we see Him adopting points in the same direction. All the three narrators appear to search for expressions by which to describe the superabundance of the sorrow, its superlative, absolute degree. With this view they select the unusual and peculiar terms, *ἀδημονεῖν*, *ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι*, *ἀγωνία*,—terms which find their explanation in the incident before us, and not by means of etymological investigations. The impression which the narrators wish to convey is that the witnesses of our Lord's self-revelation had never seen Him wear the same appearance before. "He was transfigured before them, and the fashion of His countenance was altered"—so we read in the history of the transfiguration (Matt. xvii. 2; Luke ix. 29); a similar transformation, but in a very different sense, is now exhibited before their eyes. They had often seen Him deeply troubled, yea, even to tears, but the superabundance of this present sorrow was new to them, and far surpassed anything they had ever noticed in Him previously. He appeared to them as if on the verge of despair (*ἀδημονῶν*), as if beside Himself (*ἔκθαμβος*), as if He were in the agonies of death (*ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ*).[1] And the confession which fell from Christ's own lips shows that the impression made upon the minds of the disciples was a correct one. "My soul is exceeding sorrowful (*περίλυπος*), even unto death." The older Lutheran interpreters rightly protested against the opinion that this might mean that the *ψυχή* of Jesus was alone abandoned to sorrow, while peace continued to reign in the depths of His *πνεῦμα*. Now the term *περίλυπος* of itself breaks through this arbitrary limitation, and excludes the distinction alluded to as one which is here wholly irrelevant. It neither points to "encompassing" sufferings in some such sense as the *περικυκλοῦν* of Ps. xviii. 6 (this apparent parallelism may be disposed of for far stronger reasons than the fact of its not being justifiable on grammatical grounds), nor yet is its meaning exhausted by the weaker idea of an "exceeding sorrow" (taken from Matt. xxvi. 22); but it

[1] Comp. the description of the high priest Onias, 2 Macc. iii. 16, 17: "his countenance declared the anguish (*ἀγωνίαν*) of his soul . . . the sorrow he had in his heart."

denotes that complete mastery of the *whole* consciousness[1] which Jesus formerly perceived and called attention to in His disciples: "Sorrow hath filled your hearts" (John xvi. 6). The *qualitative* side is brought out in the next place by the concluding words, "unto death." Here reference has justly been made to the saying of one of the Old Testament prophets. Σφόδρα λελύπημαι ἐγὼ ἕως θανάτου, said Jonah, the son of Amittai, ch. iv. 9. It is by no means "unworthy of the Lord" to adduce this parallel. Echoes of the Book of Jonah, and allusions to the person of this prophet, are found, as is well known, on several occasions in the discourses of Christ; and the expression, "a greater than Jonah," is entirely verified even here, in so far as the feelings of the prophet feebly typified the experience of our Lord, just as the experience of the Apostle Paul ("we are pressed above strength, insomuch that we despaired even of life") was a faint echo of it. The expression "unto death," as occurring in the passage with which we are now dealing, has its authentic explanation in the "agony" of Luke. This harmony between our Lord's own confession and the description of Him given by the evangelists, becomes a full chord by means of that part of the narrative which tells us of the course which was taken by the sorrowing Saviour. He turns to the disciples with the words, "Tarry ye here and watch *with me*." It may perhaps be conceded to Bengel, Hengstenberg, and other interpreters, that this request was made partly with the design of making them *witnesses* of the impending conflict, but we do so with hesitation. In any case, our Lord's own need of the comfort which their society might give was the principal motive. The more we study the parallel in John xvi. 32, the more does the μετά compel us to acknowledge this: "If there be any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies" (Phil. ii. 1), —tarry here and watch with Me. He could present such a request to those whose weakness and helplessness He had so often proved, only when He Himself, "being sore amazed and very heavy," was plunged in the depths of sorrow. When we see this request, therefore, coming forth from the depths of His "exceeding sorrowful soul" (Matt. xxvi. 38), we may use it as a means of estimating the degree of His depression. Now, if

[1] Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* III. p. 76: "περίλυπος non tantum secundum rationem inferiorem, sed etiam secundum superiorem mentis facultatem."

all these things be put together, we shall certainly regard any one as bold who asks us to account for a sorrow of this nature on the ground of a presentiment of the cross. How very strangely this fearful foreboding would contrast with the calmness and patience, the courage and confidence, which our Lord exhibited amid His actual sufferings! To this it is answered, no doubt, that since He had already tasted their bitterness by anticipation, they were unable in their actuality to pierce Him with the full sharpness of their sting. But those who fall back on this expedient have unconsciously abandoned the idea of mere presentiment, and without intending it have forsaken the purely psychological method of interpretation. Others proceed more cautiously, and while somewhat withdrawing the *suffering* of our Lord from the field of vision, and concentrating attention on the other hand on His dying, suggest this question, Must not death have been a far more foreign thing to Christ than it could be to us? must it not have affected the pure and sinless One far more violently than was possible in the case of those who bore the germ of it within them from their birth, owing to innate sin? Just as there broke from the lips of Jesus when He was dying His bitter and grievous cry of lamentation, so it is said even the thought of the near and inevitable approach of death must have filled the soul of Jesus with a sense of horror which the heart of a mere child of Adam could never experience. It cannot be denied that this mode of representation has been repeatedly carried out with considerable ingenuity; and, although its materials are drawn rather from the imagination than from Scripture, it has succeeded in gaining some acceptance. Of course its defenders can only disguise, but cannot get over the difficulty arising from the fact that Jesus Himself never expressed Himself in this manner. If our Lord invariably described His death as a going to the Father, if He was anxious that His disciples should regard it as a ground for rejoicing (John xiv. 28), it is difficult to maintain the view that the thought of His approaching end could so profoundly agitate and afflict His soul. But even assuming that this were made out,—*endeavours* to do so have never been lacking,—in the end every attempt at a psychological explanation strikes upon a rock, which must shatter the laborious structure beyond all hope of recovery. We refer to the circumstance that our Lord went so far as to long and pray that He might be

spared the cup of suffering. The words of the text are clear. They leave no room for misunderstanding, nor can they be put aside. Jesus evidently considered with Himself the possibility of the offered cup passing from Him. He was certainly not thinking of fortuitous earthly circumstances,[1] but rather of some definite interposition from above. "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me!" So we read in Matthew; and such, we believe, were the words used by the Suppliant. Mark and Luke give the *words* less precisely, but they are all the more careful to give their meaning. The former, for example, has taken care to prevent our understanding the "if" as implying any doubt upon the question. "All things are possible unto Thee" (Mark xiv. 36). Jesus finds the possibility of *His* being "saved from this hour" in that same divine omnipotence to which He had formerly referred the disciples, in relation to the salvation of *their* souls. Comp. Mark x. 27. And on the ground of a possibility so conceived of, He presents His petition. That the petition is not to be understood as unconditional, but that the spirit of it is correctly described by Luke's "if Thou wilt," so much we admit, on the understanding that the limitation is not to be employed for the purpose of making an *excuse* for the Suppliant, which is here uncalled for, and entirely out of place. But this does not in the slightest degree detract from the absolute earnestness of the supplication, which is attested, moreover, by the peculiarly importunate invocation, "O my Father!"[2] The attempt made by Gerhard to condition this earnestness to some extent, and to transform the qualified petition into mere inward submission to the Father,[3] was no doubt occasioned by the wish to explain the contrasted manifestation with which he was immediately afterwards to deal; but it cannot be vindicated, and least of all by the unhappily chosen parallel which this theologian has drawn.[4] Now, however, there arises the serious

[1] Schleiermacher, *Leben Jesu*, p. 424: "There was a possibility actually existing that the matter would take another turn; something might have interposed to cause this." The further development of this thought, together with an enumeration of conceivable hindrances, is contained in p. 438 sq.

[2] It is found in this single passage only, as a substitute for the simple πάτερ used elsewhere.

[3] See J. Gerhard, *Harm. Evangel.* III. 1: "Orat ut verus homo, ideoque . . . desiderium suum, quo aestuabat, *in sinum patris coelestis deponit.*" So also Calvin.

[4] His parallel is as follows: "Sic pii in adversis non speculantur arcana Dei

difficulty, how could so earnest a request consist with our Lord's usual manner of referring to His sufferings and death? The knowledge He had of His Father's decree was as clear as the testimony He bore to it was explicit; and He declared it to be His fixed resolution to submit to this decree.[1] How does the present petition for deliverance from the bitter cup accord with this? At present we content ourselves with asking this one question, if it is proposed that the "dread foreboding" idea should be used here also as a means of explanation? So long as the question dealt with is the sorrow alone, one may feel satisfied, or at least be persuaded into satisfaction, with the expedient that the ψυχή, "which conceives desire and aversion" (Meyer, *Comm. z. Matt.*), was dismayed at the prospect of painful suffering; in the region where the reflection of the πνεῦμα comes in, and must come in, this psychological method of procedure is necessarily[2] forbidden. Or the knot must be cut, as has been done by many of the Fathers

decreta, cogitantes, omnia ab aeterno praevisa et decreta esse, ideoque frustra preces fundi; sed calamitates suas vel auferri vel mitigari vera fide petentes voluntati divinae suam voluntatem reverenter submittunt." It is doubtless perfectly justifiable to point to the Saviour praying in Gethsemane as a pattern for believers. But to attempt to explain the original from a kind of imitation, is altogether inadmissible.

[1] The single passage, Matt. xvi. 21 sq., is quite sufficient to place this beyond doubt. . . . "From that time forth began Jesus to show unto His disciples how that He must go . . . and suffer . . . and be killed," etc. The word "began" shows that from a very definite period onwards ("from that time forth"—from the time of the confession made by the disciples) our Lord did not cease to place His suffering and dying in the clearest light. The word "must," again, excludes the erroneous opinion that the state of matters which had come about, and which was to be further evolved, justified Him in assuming or fearing that He would suffer and die; it points rather to a high decree of God, which had ordained such a destiny for Him. The word "show," in the next place, testifies no less to our Lord's own understanding of this divine necessity (comp. John v. 20), than to His desire to help His disciples to the same knowledge. Finally, the reproof addressed to Peter evinces the submission of the Son to this "good pleasure" of the Father, as the proof of that divine disposition, which is not swayed by human determining motives, and whose course nothing would obstruct but a Satanic will.

[2] With justice Sebastian Schmidt (in the *Diss. de passione seu sacrificio Jesu voluntario*) energetically opposes those who venture to avail themselves in this region also of the distinction drawn by Thomas Aquinas between a *voluntas sensualitatis* and the *voluntas rationalis* in Christ. He asks with conclusive force, if the *prayer* of Jesus—"let this cup pass from me"—*as such* can be called a manifestation of the *voluntas sensualitatis*. "Qui oravit, num sine voluntate rationis oravit? aut num voluntas per modum naturae vel voluntas sensualitatis orare potest? Orare sane praestantissimus inter actus rationis est." Comp. S. Schmidt, *Mysterium gratiae divinae in Incarnat. et Passione Filii Dei*, p. 207.

of the church, who said that the prayer of Jesus did not refer to His own person at all.[1] J. Gerhard virtually undertakes the same thing by a remark not quite worthy of his usual style of speaking: "*paululum avertit* Jesus animum a consideratione decreti divini."

It is usually said of the exegesis which is dominated by churchly dogmatics, that it is fettered in such a way that all confidence in the accuracy of its conclusions is necessarily destroyed at the very outset. In general, and in many individual instances, this charge may not be altogether groundless; in the present instance, however, the impression which we receive is that this is the very exegesis which bursts through restraining bonds. When, rejecting all assistance from the teachings of spiritual experience, it explains the manifestation of Jesus in the garden, not from personal feelings occasioned by the course of events, but on the ground of a burden which was hanging over Him, and which was laid upon His soul some time during this hour, it does real justice to the narrative in respect of its right to claim independent significance. As is well known, this exegesis arrived at the conclusion that our Lord bore in Gethsemane the wrath and sentence of God, the curse of the law,—that He endured there "dolores et angores vere infernales."[2] But in truth the

[1] They mostly regard the prayer of Jesus as an intercession, although they are not unanimous as to the object of it, thinking now of the disciples, now of the Jews, and now of the traitor. Even Basilius, who regards the word from the cross, "Father, forgive them," as a striking parallel, commits himself to the same error. This is of a piece with the exegesis which believes that the message sent by the imprisoned Baptist to Jesus was accounted for by the necessities of those disciples to whom he entrusted it.

[2] Abr. Calov, *Bibl. N. T. illustrata* (Frankfurt 1676), p. 442: "Tristitia animam Jesu obsidet vere letalis, non modo quantam mors temporalis, sed quantam mors infernalis importat; cum hac enim hic colluctatus est, imo hanc sensit Christus in hoc agone gravissimo." Compare also his examination of the question, in opposition to the Socinians and Romanists, "An filius Dei senserit dolores infernales," in the *Systema locorum theologic.* (Wittenberg 1677), VII. p. 657 sq. Similarly Dav. Hollaz, *Exam. theol. acroam.* (Leipzig 1725), III. p. 199: "Quam acerba fuerit interna animae Christi passio, colligitur e nominibus, quibus ejus gravitas exprimitur; vocatur enim ἀγωνία, στρίλυγξ, ἐκθάμβησις, ἀδημονία . . . Sensit Christus iram Dei . . . Sustinuit infernales dolores, aeternis damnatorum doloribus aequipollentes; sustinuit eos non in τοῦ damnatorum, sed in monte Oliveti." Quenst. *Theol. did. pol.* p. 247: "Sensit infernales poenas, licet non in Inferno et in aeternum." Luther also had already spoken in the same line. "When Jesus prayed in the garden He was truly in Gehenna and in hell; He really experienced in His own person death and hell; we ought to realize that He was then obliged to

orthodox explanation can be considered satisfactory only as stated in the general form which has just been indicated. In going beyond this, good ground is given for manifold objections. On the one hand, we take exception to expressions which are only applicable to the strictly juridical conception of the satisfaction made by Christ in its rigid onesidedness and obliviousness of the consequences which follow from it.[1] And, on the other hand, we find fault with its tone of mere assertion, which is not only unsupported by an exegetical and historical vindication, but which actually despises it. The upholders of this view may have thought themselves entitled to maintain such a tone on the ground that the authoritative explanation in the Epistle to the Hebrews seems to attest its accuracy. But although it is impossible to rest satisfied with any conception of the transaction in Gethsemane unless it can bear to be tested by this apostolic utterance, still that which may be of priceless value as a test is not to be made the point of departure in attempting to solve the problem.

### 2. THE SOLUTION.

It has been frequently said, and in recent times by Hofmann in particular (see the discussion of the section with which we are dealing in his *Schriftbew.* II. p. 306 sq.), that, as a fundamental condition of understanding the conflict of Jesus, the period of His life which now opens is to be apprehended in the full force of its contrast to the period which preceded.[2] The manner

suffer the pain of hell." Many similar utterances of the Reformer are collected in the carefully edited work of Held, *De opere Jesu Christi salutari quid Lutherus senserit*, Göttingen 1860, p. 150 sqq.

[1] Even orthodox interpreters themselves had difficulty in maintaining these expressions against various objections. When it was objected to them that the suffering Saviour had never been reduced to despair, which, nevertheless, was clearly an element in the *dolores infernales*, Hollaz could help himself only by means of the assertion, "desperatio non est pars cruciatuum infernalium" (*l.c.* p. 171), or he attempts to do so by means of a distinction which it is quite impossible to maintain, "qui dolores infernales patitur iis succumbendo, ille desperat; qui patitur eos superando, non desperat" (p. 201). Buddeus, therefore, preferred to give the modifying explanation: "quando a nonnullis dicitur, Christum dolores infernales sensisse, non ita hoc capiendum est, acsi eos ipsos dolores, quos damnati experiuntur, senserit; sed potius ita intelligendum, quod dolores adeo graves, ut *cum infernalibus comparari* possint, revera in anima sua senserit." Comp. *Instit. Theol. Dogm.* p. 784.

[2] This form of statement, which was certainly not unknown to the theology of the church, and which reaches back to the time of St. Bernard, was never employed by

in which the theologian just referred to draws the dividing line, —"hitherto Jesus has wrought, and from this time onwards He is to suffer,"—is one to which the facts lying before us present serious objections. And they are not removed by the admission that, just as Christ's acting was never dissociated from suffering, so also His whole suffering was undoubtedly a sacred, voluntary act. The evangelical history has much more to say of Jesus after He had crossed the Kidron than merely this, "a suffering never involuntary." It bears testimony to an acting properly so called, which continued unbroken up to the moment of His death. Nothing whatever was awanting of all that which dogmatics is accustomed to reckon among the functions of the prophetic office; even His miraculous activity projects itself into the Passion period. Our Lord acted upon His disciples not only in Gethsemane, but even thereafter, as often as His eye fell on any one of their number; He acted upon enemies and persecutors, upon the indifferent and upon sympathisers; He laboured in words of doctrine, correction, and prophecy; and that which He announced to Pilate as the work of His vocation—"for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth"—reached its termination, like the service of His love generally, only in the final τετέλεσται. But supposing that the contrast between the two periods of our Lord's life admitted of being apprehended in the rigorous way referred to, what advantage would it give us for the understanding of the Gethsemane history?[1]

it in a sense like this. It could not do so, since it held the opinion, "omnes actus Christi a primo conceptionis momento usque ad triduum mortis fuisse satisfactorios" (Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* III. p. 253); still less could it do so when it held the doctrine that Christ "*agendo culpam*, quam homo injuste commiserat, expiaverit" (*l c.* p. 244). The controversy which was carried on by the Giessen theologians, with Wenzer at their head, against J. Piscator, in which Gerhard (*loc.* xvi. 57 sq.) also took part, and which was vigorously continued by Quenstedt (*l.c.* p. 283), shows how little people were disposed to draw so sharp a distinction between the acting and suffering of our Lord, or to be satisfied with so frail a bridge between the two.

[1] M. Baumgarten, who makes the same presupposition, finds its explanatory element in the circumstance that the world's complete insensibility to the word and work of Jesus was actually demonstrated. "The beginning of His Passion synchronizes with the impossibility of a further activity, and is intelligible from this very arrest of its progress" (*Geschichte Jesu*, p. 357). But how far this view is from harmonizing with the utterance of our Lord,—I have finished the work which Thou gavest me to do! He whom we behold praying is not One who feels His activity hindered by an unfeeling and non-receptive world, but One who looks back with satisfaction upon work successfully accomplished.

It is answered, that at this turning-point the Father gave up His Son to the power of His enemies, so that they were now able to proceed against Him according to their desire (*to do unto Him whatsoever they listed*, Matt. xvii. 12), and that our Lord in the garden shrank back from this abandonment to the power of God-opposed will, and from the loss of all manifestations of the Father's love which it involved. It may be admitted that individual expressions of Jesus supply a foundation for this reply;[1] it may also be acknowledged that it aims at going farther than the expedient commonly resorted to, and which we have already rejected;[2] however, it is just as far from agreeing with the history as the theory for which it is designed to act as a foundation is dogmatically unsatisfactory. That our Lord during His Passion enjoyed the full sense of fellowship with the Father is obvious, not only from the facts of the case, but from His own express testimony. When His Passion was full in view, He said: "I am not alone, because the Father is with Me" (John xvi. 32), in the very same sense as He had said in the days of His active ministry (John viii. 29): "He that sent Me is with Me; the Father hath not left Me alone." But this also cannot be denied, that throughout the whole of the way leading to the cross, He enjoyed an undiminished sense of His Father's love, just as He had fully experienced it in His relation to the world. For the state of the case is not this, that the traces of this experience are withdrawn from our view,[3] nor yet does our Lord Himself complain of an unsatisfied longing, or express Himself as if He

[1] The first announcement of His sufferings, Matt. xvii. 22: "The Son of man shall be betrayed into the hands of men" (the delivery into the hands of *men* seems to presuppose His being withdrawn from the protection of the hand of *God*), is specially relevant here, particularly when viewed in the light of the words addressed by our Lord to His disciples after His prayer-conflict: "Behold, the hour is at hand, and the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners," Matt. xxvi. 45.

[2] In the fourth edition of his commentary (p. 562) Meyer introduces a similar remark, for which he is apparently indebted to Hofmann, and which, as interwoven with his representation, sinks to the level of empty phraseology. He says, that Jesus having been "up to this point ever victorious over alien powers, because His hour was not yet come, now felt, when it had come, the full weight of His unavoidable abandonment by God to these powers, and to the terrible death which was impending." This is simply a new piece on an old garment.

[3] Strauss consequently presupposes that the evangelists represented the Passion history of Jesus in such a way as to make it appear that God bore testimony to the Sufferer at each successive stage, and that all apparent marks of infamy were in reality His symbols of honour and supports for faith.

were at all in want of the sense of His Father's love.[1] Thus, according to this new endeavour also, the mere anticipation of the hostile *acts* of which the world's will was to make Him the object is the ground of the sorrow of Jesus in Gethsemane. We are to accept that as the explanation of the anguish, the agony of Him who laid it upon His friends as a duty, not to fear those who can kill the body, but have power to do nothing more! Or is the case helped by calling in the aid of the representation, that it was not to man, but to Satan, that God gave authority to execute his hostile wishes against Jesus? So long as nothing else is shown by which the prince of this world burdened the foreboding heart of Jesus, except His approaching sufferings, so long the case remains substantially the same. He who said, "The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in Me . . . arise, let us go hence," confronts the real secret author of His sufferings no less fearlessly than his agents. But, finally, if these assumptions be made, what meaning would the words of the Suppliant, "let this cup pass from me," receive, except one which our Lord Himself shows to be a decided misunderstanding of them. Even in Gethsemane He says to Peter, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and He shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels!" What is involved in this reproving question? Simply this, that no such desire could spring up in His heart. But it is quite impossible to evade the application of this declaration to our Lord's immediately preceding prayer-conflict. We at least fail to understand by what devices the inference can be resisted, that our Lord could not possibly have prayed to His God in the garden in any such tone or sense.

The Suppliant in Gethsemane does not at all make upon our minds the impression that He is fleeing from the cunning and power of His enemies to the omnipotence of God, who is able to stretch protecting hands over Him. The immediate impression produced by the narrative is not of this character, nor is it produced as the result of reflection. No doubt Jesus cries to His

[1] That which our Lord said, John xii. 30, of the voice which sounded from heaven, and bore testimony to Him: "This voice came not because of Me, but for your sakes," has a wide application which cannot be called in question. The single cry of lament on the cross is to be judged by its own proper rule, and will be dealt with in its own place.

Father,—but not in the sense of the Psalm,—"Judge me, O God, and plead my cause against an ungodly nation: O deliver me from the deceitful and unjust man!" He turns towards the divine power,—"all things are possible unto Thee,"—but He neither desires nor thinks of a manifestation of it which would "set them in slippery places," and bring their counsel to nought. He shrinks back from the fate which is hanging over Him, but He does not regard it as a fate which can be brought about by the machinations of men, by an unhallowed concatenation of circumstances merely subject to the divine permission. He speaks of *this cup*. Modern interpreters are accustomed to view the expression in the light of the figurative speech of the Old Testament (the Lord is the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup, Ps. xvi. 5), and to regard it as denoting the lot which is apportioned to any one. But even the fact that, apart from the Apocalypse, the figure of the cup is not employed in the whole New Testament *except* for the Passion of Christ, makes this generally accepted interpretation doubtful. "*My* cup . . . that I shall drink of" (Matt. xx. 22, 23), says our Lord with evident emphasis; and with still more perceptible emphasis He appends (John xviii. 11) the explanation, "which my Father hath given me."[1] We do not import anything into the words, but recognise their true value, when we understand them, on the one hand, of a very definite purpose, which the Father had formed in relation to His Son,—He Himself had mingled this very cup for Him (*ἡτοίμασεν*),[2]—and when we think, on the other hand, of a *request* preferred by the Giver of the cup to Him for whom He had prepared it, that He should accept and willingly drink it after overcoming His reluctance to do so.[3] But this is a totally

[1] The expression δίδόναι is usually employed in the Gospel of John, where the immediateness of the relation between the Father and the Son is in question. So especially in the high-priestly prayer, where it is used no fewer than seven times.

[2] Quenstedt: "Non fatalis quaedam necessitas, sed voluntas patris libere ab aeterno decreta et in scripturis praedicta."

[3] If we were required to find an Old Testament basis for the figurative expression, it would be sufficient to point to the paragraph, Jer. xxv. 15 sq. But we refer to it not with the view of vindicating the representation of a "cup of wrath" (Gerhard: "Calix irae et furoris divinae;" also Delitzsch, *Commentary on the Hebrews*), but because it contains a demand addressed by God to those who might possibly resist their fate. Comp. ver. 28: "And it shall be, if they refuse to take the cup at thine hand to drink, then shalt thou say unto them, Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, Ye shall certainly drink."

different representation from that of a lot happening to a man, even though it be subject to the overruling of divine Providence, or of a fate overtaking Him without His being asked whether He is willing to endure it or not. When, therefore, our Lord prays, "Let this cup pass from Me," it is not the aim of this petition to influence the divine will to frustrate a wicked human counsel, but to induce the Almighty to withdraw from the execution of His own decree, and to desist from a demand which oppresses the suppliant "out of measure, above strength." And when Jesus falls prostrate, to offer up "strong crying," He does not beseech God to fight for Him against the persecutors whose feet are upon the threshold, but He sets Himself to wrestle with the Father in regard to His determinate counsel; it is with the *βουλὴ ὡρισμένη τοῦ Θεοῦ* that He takes to do at this moment.

This distinction may be characterized as an illusory one, because not capable of being actually carried out. It may be alleged that this very thing was the purpose of God, namely, that our Lord should be overcome by His enemies, and suffer death at their hands, as is expressly declared by the apostle: "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have slain" (Acts ii. 23). The appalling element of the transaction has not unfrequently been placed in the very circumstance, that in the present case the will of God harmonized with the will of the world, that the counsel of a Caiaphas corresponded to a divine counsel. But even the older Lutheran theologians showed that this was a mistaken and delusive mode of viewing the subject. When Seb. Schmidt, among others, maintained emphatically that God, who willed the Passion of Jesus, was not by any means to be held as thereby willing the acts of the Jews, he was undoubtedly influenced in a secondary degree by a confessional interest: he was concerned with avoiding all appearance of admitting that God in any sense willed a sin;[1] but his especial motive was to procure in this way a deeper view of the Passion of our Lord. We may recognise the idea of a divine permission as perfectly justifiable; we may admit that God

[1] Comp. his "de pass. Christ. necess." in *Myst. Grat.* p. 217: "Voluit et decrevit pater, ut filius pateretur et moreretur; non voluit, ut Judaei, Herodes, Pilatus, passionem et mortem ei inferrent. Non voluit Deus actionem Judaeorum, quae mala erat. sed voluit passionem bonam."

refrains from hindering evil deeds, in order to employ them in the service of His own purpose; but a ruling limited to permitting could never be a "determinate counsel," a *πρόθεσις ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων*. It is unnecessary to refute the idea that it was the divine command that the Son should suffer at the hands of the world, and that it was not the will of His Father to present any hindrance to His suffering, because this acquiescence never could amount to that free act of which it is said, "Therefore doth My Father love Me, because I lay down My life;" nor to that voluntariness (*ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ*) concerning which the uniform teaching of theology is "non est meritorium quod non est voluntarium." *This* was the will of men: "Away with him, away with him, we have no king." And, on the other hand, *this* was the counsel of God,—to place Him in the midst, before the eyes of all, as a "propitiation in His blood." In a word, the cup which the Father gave to His Son in Gethsemane was bound up with the task of making atonement for the sin of the world, which was imposed upon Him.

It is very usual, especially in reference to the repeated withdrawals of the Suppliant, to speak of a *resolution* to which Jesus won His way in Gethsemane. In possession of it, He left off praying, and He maintained it resolutely throughout the whole of the *via dolorosa*, until He carried it out victoriously in His death. If this mean that He now, for the first time, attained to this resoluteness of will, the representation is opposed to the plain facts of the history. Our Lord intimated, long before, that it was His mission to make atonement for the sin of the world by suffering death, and frequent testimony is borne to the fact that it was for the very purpose of fulfilling it that He had come to the world. No one can point to a moment in His life when He first embraced the resolution which, according to His own declarations, was necessarily bound up with His coming in the flesh. "I am the living bread which *came down* from heaven, . . . and the bread which I will give is My flesh, which I will give *for* the life of the world" (John vi. 51). "The Son of man came . . . to minister, and to give His life a *ransom* for many" (Matt. xx. 28). But if all that is meant is, that now, when the hour had come, His will wavered for a little, but immediately afterwards regained complete fixity, still we feel compelled to reject the *expression* as inadequate and misleading. A resolution

implies a future in which it is to be carried into effect. But we can here speak of a resolution being taken up by Jesus to perform an *atoning* work only in this sense, that an actual beginning is made in the way of accomplishing it, which, however, disposes of the idea of mere resolution. When our Lord says, *Thy will be done*, He does not simply announce His submissiveness to that which the Father had determined regarding Him, but by virtue of this saying the will indicated already enters on the path of fulfilment. And how far did this take place in deed and in truth even here in Gethsemane? Thus far, that Jesus TAKES UPON HIMSELF at this moment the *sin of the world*, which He was to atone for by His sufferings! No doubt the way in which John the Baptist describes the Messiah when He appeared—ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου—was entirely true for the whole period of the manifestation of Jesus. The genitive τοῦ Θεοῦ and the present αἴρων attest the inseparability of the predicate from the subject[1] as emphatically as it is attested by the history of our Lord at each stage of its progress. On this very account Christ was able, from the beginning, to give remission of sins, and to invite sinners to Himself with the promise that He would give rest to their souls. And therefore the evangelist already saw in Him who "healed all that were sick," the fulfilment of the prophecy: "Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses" (Matt. viii. 17). The αἴρειν, as the old dogmatic writers teach, points "et retrorsum et antrorsum." But if one wishes to fix upon something definite in which it was realized in the strictest and most literal sense, it is found only in the transaction in Gethsemane. For what is the meaning of this αἴρειν?[2] The question here is not whether it is to be understood in the sense of taking away, or of bearing. The matter cannot be put in this

[1] The words of Peter: "Ye were redeemed . . . with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish," etc. (1 Pet. i. 19, 20), explain in the most satisfactory way the intimation of the Baptist, and bear out this idea exactly. The purport of the expression "Lamb *of God*" in the lips of John is nothing else than that which Peter has in view when he says: "Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world" (comp. Gen. xxii. 8: "God will provide Himself a lamb"); and the corresponding explanation of the present αἴρων is given by the apostle when he writes: "but was manifest in these last times for you."

[2] Ritschl has forced his own theory of the atoning suffering of Christ even on this utterance of the Baptist. He explains it as follows (*l.c.* II. p. 68): "As innocent, Jesus enters upon a state of suffering which should properly be borne by

alternative form. The parallel, 1 John iii. 5, has provided against the idea of "taking away" being excluded, and it has already been shown in a most convincing manner by Grotius that sin can be taken away only by an atoning bearing of it: the נשׂא is accomplished by means of the סבל. But the question is, what is the immediate primal signification of the term—that which presupposes not merely the taking away, but also the bearing? Now, this is found only in the idea of *lifting up*. Αἴρειν means *to take upon oneself, suscipere, sursum ferre* (Ps. xci. 12: to bear up in the hands). True, indeed, that which one assumes or takes up, he proposes to bear, and so the two ideas may be regarded as coalescing, thus vindicating the remark of Quenstedt, "interdum *sursum ferre*, et *portare* se includunt." But for all that, the distinction still remains. "Take up (ἆρας) the cross and follow Me," said Jesus to the rich young man (Mark x. 21). The ἆρας asked of him nothing more than the taking up of the burden, without including the further idea of carrying it, which received its special form of expression in the *following* to which Jesus called him. We lay great stress on this distinction in the present case. Nor are we without predecessors who have done so. Church dogmatics itself has very definitely separated the *susceptio* from the *gestatio* or *oneroso portatio*. On its part the distinction has been drawn out only ideally, without being referred to different historical facts.[1] But this latter appears to us to beabsolutely necessary. And our contention is, that here in Gethsemane our Lord accomplished the *susceptio* of the sin of the world, which He thereafter bore during His Passion, and expiated by dying on the cross. In this, and in nothing else, consists the independent significance of the momentous transaction.

We should probably have avoided an objection which may

sinful humanity, which, however, in consequence of the impression made by His undeserved suffering, is brought back to God." We confess that it is long since we lighted upon so strange an interpretation of this exclamation. Besides, he questions whether the words were used by the Baptist, and states that the Christian church probably attributed them to him in a liturgical form. Any one who has actually engaged in liturgical studies will certainly not subscribe to this "probably."

[1] The application it makes of this distinction in further developing it, namely, that the *susceptio* peccati is to be taken ratione culpae, and the *portatio*, on the other hand, ratione *poenae* quam Christus pro nobis et nostri loco luerit, is one which is entirely intelligible considering the premises, and there is a sense too in which we can also accept it.

possibly be made against this view, namely, that it separates in an external-mechanical manner that which is essentially inseparable, had we fallen back on the formula that Gethsemane shows the consecration of the High Priest in the sense in which the baptism of Jesus shows what has been called the consecration of the Messiah. We have nothing to say against the expression answered in itself; we even believe that the words of the Suppliant (John xvii. 19)—"for (ὑπέρ) their sakes I sanctify (consecrate) Myself"[1]—may justify it. We have nevertheless intentionally refrained from using it, and that not on account of an indefiniteness attaching to it which is favourable to misunderstandings, but with the view of exhibiting its concrete import. One may continue with the older dogmatists to call the whole life of Jesus an unbroken Passion. But the same Calovius, who (*Syst.* VII. p. 640) firmly maintains that "the Passion of the Son of God did not begin with the closing period of His life, nor even with the temptation in the desert," has equally demanded for the last (*extrema*) Passion (in contradistinction to the *passio inchoata*), the *passio* κατ' ἐξοχήν, a well-defined temporal boundary. But if this had its beginning at some definite point, how can one avoid recognising an act by virtue of which the sin of the world, which it was our Lord's vocation to expiate, was *assumed* by Him for this very purpose? Or what do the words of the apostle imply: "God hath made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21)? They cannot be understood of the incarnation of the Son, when the Father sent Him "in the likeness of sinful flesh," for the words "who knew no sin" necessarily presuppose a past in the life of Him who appeared, in which the knowing it was possible. But it is no less impracticable to limit them to something that befell our Lord through which He "became a sinner according to outward appearance, or appeared as a sinner."[2]

[1] Hengst., in his *Comm. on John*, explains it of the assumption of the office of Redeemer by Jesus. But the ὑπέρ requires to be taken in a less general sense. The preposition points here as certainly to the atoning sufferings of Christ as the expression "He that sanctifieth," in Heb. ii. 11, designates Him who tasted death for every man. But, on the other hand, the expression *assumption*, which Hengst. chooses, is all the more appropriate. This prayer-word of our Lord is the passage in the Gospel of John which comes into the closest connection with the scene in Gethsemane; at all events, it is much more nearly related to it than the parallels usually adduced from ch. xii.

[2] This interpretation, upheld by Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 329, and recently also in the *Heil. Schr. N. T.* IV. p. 165) and also by Ritschl (see his already cited work,

It is quite impossible to be content with this "appearance" as such. Immediately the question of its explanation arises. They were in error who esteemed Him that appeared as a sinner, "stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted," the truth being that "the Lord laid on Him the iniquity of us all." The view to which we must adhere, therefore, is, that He who knew no sin, "ratione culpae et reatus," was made sin for us,—that the sin of the world was laid upon Him, and that He took it upon Himself.[1] But if so, there must have been a moment in which this "making" on God's side, and this being made sin on the Son's side took place. And what moment can that have been? The passage before us has been very usually compared with the similar one in the Epistle to the Galatians: "Christ hath redeemed us . . . being made a curse for us." And, in point of fact, the two utterances are closely related; for the Son of God was made a curse for us precisely in the way in which the Father made Him to be sin for us. But we should err were we to refer both to the same historical foundation. When and how He became this latter has been expressly declared by the apostle in the parenthetical addition to the passage in Galatians. Not of the suffering, nor of the dying, but of the crucified Saviour, does he use the expression; and it was verified at the moment of our Lord's being lifted up upon the cross. When and how, on the other hand, He became the former, is a question to which we have no answer to give, except to point to Gethsemane. When the Father presented the cup to Him, He intended Him to become sin for behoof of men; and when the Son said, Thy will be done, He had taken the sin of the world upon Himself in order to bear it, and by making expiation, to bear it away.

It was an easy task to prove that the sorrow of Jesus in the garden, as expressed by Himself and described by the evangelists,

II. p. 174), was previously presented by Socinus (*De Servat. Chr.* i. 8: "Deus eum qui innocens erat, nostri causa tanquam peccatorem tractavit"). We quote only the closing words of Quenstedt's admirable refutation: "eo modo Christus factus est peccatum pro nobis, uti nos reddimur justitia in illo. Nos vero reddimur in illo justitia non solum ut justi habeamur (that we should 'become righteous according to outward appearance,'—'appear' as righteous) sed ut vere justitia ejus nobis imputetur."

[1] That the apostle, when he wished to say this, did not by any means make use of indefinite expressions (as Hofmann suggests), but spoke correctly and precisely, has been most satisfactorily shown by Quenstedt (*Theol. did. pol.* III. p. 252) in relation to the word ποιεῖν, the abstract term ἁμαρτία and the word γίγνεσθαι.

is not explicable on the theory of a presentiment of His sufferings and death. But the mode in which we have explained the incident supplies another motive, which makes the anguish of the Suppliant intelligible. Doubtless our Lord, in His earthly past, came into the closest contact with the sin of men. He had to suffer from it more than the "contradiction of sinners against Himself." He had directly touched and assailed it, in order to remove it from the men whom the Father had given Him. And thus, from the very beginning, it had given Him toil, brought grief upon Him, and drawn sighs from His heart (Mark iii. 5, "being grieved for the hardness of their hearts"). But, notwithstanding this close and constant contact with darkness, He Himself remained still in the sphere of light, just as He continued to be ceremonially pure although He touched those who were leprous; for He was light, and in Him was no darkness at all. The sayings, "He is pure," and "who knew no sin," remain permanently and unchangeably true.[1] Has this been at all altered in Gethsemane? Assuredly in *the* sense in which Paul, Rom. vii. 7, speaks of the subject, a knowledge of sin could never find place in our Lord's experience; for *this* knowledge presupposes sin in its subject, even though it may be dead. But might it not find place in another sense? If this be denied, the words of the apostle, "who knew no sin," would be very surprising to us. If his object had been merely to emphasize the innocence and holiness of Jesus (Osiander, *Comm. z. 2 Cor.* p. 228; Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. p. 36), why did he not simply use the expression which is familiar to the Scripture, not only in general (Acts iii. 14, etc.), but especially where it is representing the Holy One of God as an atoning sufferer,—the expression δίκαιος? (Comp. 1 John ii. 1, 2; 1 Pet. iii. 18, etc.) When, therefore, instead of doing so, he chooses this peculiar periphrasis, he can only mean by the clause which is contrasted with it—"He hath made Him to be sin"—that our Lord was then led or constrained to acquire a knowledge of sin, which He never would have acquired of Himself.[2] The law (as Paul had experienced it)

[1] Just like His being rich, notwithstanding His becoming poor for us, 2 Cor. viii. 9.

[2] The negative statement is justly interpreted by the positive, but it is quite as justifiable to draw an inference as to the meaning of the latter from the contents of the former.

could never have been to *Him* the instrument of such a knowledge, because an ἐπιθυμία had never slumbered in His soul. But from the circumstance of His having experienced, on account of a divine decree, that which He would never have experienced as a development of His own life, and having learned, through the pressure of a burden laid upon Him, that which He would never have known in the form of personal ἐπιθυμία, there follows the idea of a sovereign act which sheds light upon His "amazement" and "sorrow unto death,"[1] and which makes the sincere and profound shrinking of the Suppliant intelligible.

An old expositor has been induced by the figure of the cup to apply to our Lord, when He entered into the presence of the Father to pray, the later words, "and when He had tasted, He would not drink" (Matt. xxvii. 34). And, indeed, the demand made upon Him at this time was such that it could not but fill His heart with trembling, and excite even in His will a tendency to reaction. The fear within became a fighting without. That this reluctance of will is not sufficiently explained by the presentiment of approaching suffering, has been already shown. At present we return to the subject only with the view of showing that that part of our narrative which appears to favour this view is not in reality sufficient to give it valid support. We read (Matt. xxvi. 41): "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak." The majority of expositors indeed have declined, more or less decidedly, to see any reference here to the Person of our Lord. Others, again, have maintained the contrary. Stier, with the warmth peculiar to him, declares that this is the only view which is justifiable; and even Hofmann finds in the "weakness" of the flesh the true ground of the earnest supplications of Jesus in the garden (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 74). The generality of the expression makes it include the Person of Christ just as little as the similar sentence, "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing" (John vi. 63), admits of being applied to *His* flesh,—the flesh which was expressly designated the "meat that endureth unto everlasting life." If it were seriously held that

[1] This it is which Luther thought of or felt when he broke out with the remarkable expression: "What do they mean; what kind of words are these, 'My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death'? I hold them for the greatest words in the whole Bible." See *Colloq. Conv.* IV p. 260.

our Lord spoke the words "out of His own state and feeling" (Stier), where would we drift to? Even farther than Hofmann has gone, when he ventured on the highly perilous step of applying to the Person of Christ the statement made in Heb. v. 2 as to the high priest of the Old Testament being compassed with infirmity. That which the apostle teaches regarding the law (Rom. viii. 3), that it was weak through the flesh, would in the next place be asserted also of the πνεῦμα of our Lord. Yea, in reference to the "not as I will," one would be forced to maintain that there was in Christ, in some sense or other, a "will of the flesh," a "carnal mind." And however much we might wish to maintain that the σάρξ of Jesus was entirely free from sin, we would then be also obliged to admit that there was even in Him, in some sense or other, that antagonism between the spirit and the flesh which the apostle has shown in the case of sinful man.[1] Ver. 41 speaks of *temptation* with emphasis. And though we readily admit that our Lord Himself experienced a temptation in Gethsemane, this did not arise from His flesh, nor even did it find there its ground or point of attachment.[2] The Scripture throughout speaks of a "weakness of the flesh" only under the presupposition of sin. (Comp. Rom. vi. 19; 1 Cor. iii. 1 sq.) The expression regarding the spirit and the flesh is therefore to be referred exclusively to the disciples, a conclusion to which the connection also leads. Our Lord finds them sleeping. They have not kept His command, "Watch with Me." And if, after expressing His surprise that their strength had not been sufficient for this, He adds the admonition, Watch and pray, the emphasis cannot rest on the *watching* already asked of them, and in which they had proved defective, but on the *praying* as a factor in the watchfulness. This praying, as the essential activity of the spirit, and that whereby it acquires higher strength, is a protection against the temptation into which men are led by the flesh, and in which, on account of its weakness, they succumb to hostile powers. The words, therefore, are not intended to excuse the sleeping disciples, for that would ill accord with the ante-

[1] It is therefore noteworthy that Bengel, who maintains the view which we have rejected, that the words refer to Jesus Himself, adds the remark: "inde frequens apostolis mentio carnis et spiritus."

[2] The assertion of Stier (*l.c.* p. 291) is erroneous: "The temptation came to Him not *from* the flesh, as in our case, but it touched Him *in* the flesh, which He had in common with us, even in respect to its weakness."

cedent reproof, or even to explain their indolent repose,[1] but to impart to them reproof, instruction, and counsel. The deep-rooted misunderstanding of them which is so common, rests upon the erroneous assumption, that the expression *willing* (πρόθυμος) indicates mere inclination and readiness. If the willing spirit stands in contrast to the weak flesh, certainly the former is not to be understood of a feeble, inoperative inclination. However, this is not by any means the correct signification of the term. It denotes rather burning zeal, the thoroughgoing energy which overcomes all hindrances.[2] As the Scripture is wont to contrast ἀσθενής with δυνατός or ἰσχυρός, so πρόθυμος coincides substantially with these latter terms. The "willing spirit" is the spirit of power. And as the apostle admonishes Christians to mortify the deeds of the flesh in the power of the spirit, or to renounce its works, so in an entirely similar way the disciples are here directed to be fervent in spirit, and to crush the weakness of the flesh in its pernicious workings. But the expression bore upon them alone, and to them only was it appropriate. It contributes absolutely nothing toward explaining the conflict of Jesus Himself. If we wish to do *this*, the interpretative element must be drawn from another quarter. But whence? This is the question we must consider. There was apparent, then, on the part of Jesus, a direction of will which at first was *not* in accord with the direction in which the will of God pointed. That the well-known scholastic distinctions are of no avail for solving the problem, Gerhard has already perceived and clearly stated. And we have ourselves said at an earlier stage, that a reference to the fact that the prayer is only *conditional* in its form, avails just as little. It is true that church dogmatics

[1] The *explanation* has been given by the evangelist Luke by the remark: ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης. And it is a sufficient one. But the sorrow of the disciples must be properly understood. It was a sorrow according to the flesh, differing not merely in degree, but in kind, from that of our Lord. It was that sorrow which Christ combated in His farewell discourse with His disciple, and sought to dispel with the light of truth. Comp. John xvi. 7.

[2] When, in Hab. i. 8, the rushing hosts of the Chaldeans are viewed "as an eagle that hasteth (πρόθυμος) to eat," there is implied in the expression πρόθυμος more than mere willingness. In the passage 2 Cor. ix. 2, Paul explains the term προθυμία by ζῆλος. And in the parallel 1 Pet. v. 2, μὴ αἰσχροκερδῶς ἀλλὰ προθύμως, the idea of "willingness" disappears before that of zeal for the work of the Lord, all the more certainly since that idea was already expressed by the preceding term ἑκουσίως. From the parallel usually adduced, Rom. i. 15, nothing but the slightest and most superficial examination would deduce the idea of mere readiness.

has in general been content with this.[1] But it could not escape the acute intellect of a Calovius that the difference between the "as I will" and "as Thou" still remains, although the Suppliant does not insist on the former, but ultimately yields to the latter. This theologian accordingly felt himself compelled to make a very essential modification of the current interpretation, a modification which he was able to maintain and justify only by means of an extremely violent exegesis.[2] The difficulty would be insurmountable if we had here to do with the will of God in the same sense in which the apostle refers to it when he calls it "that good and acceptable and perfect will of God" (Rom. xii. 2; Eph. v. 10, 17). The faintest element of opposition to *this* divine will would be absolutely inconsistent with the character of Him who could ask, "which of you convinceth me of sin?" who said, "I always do the things that please the Father;" and who, even in His boyhood, made the avowal, "I must be about my Father's business."[3] The idea in the section with which we are dealing does *not* belong to the ethical region of the *καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν*. But here, as in all cases where the reference is to the will of the Son as distinguished from that of the Father, or to the relation of the former to the latter, we have to do exclusively with a gracious purpose of God for the

[1] Comp. Hollaz, *Exam.* II. p. 165: "Christus calici exhauriendo non repugnavit absolute, sed cum conditione alterius cujusdam modi redimendi genus humanum per divinam et infinitam potentiam suppositi." Similarly Quenstedt: "Sub conditione, si per decreti rationem fieri posset." *Theol. did. pol.* III. pp. 348, 358.

[2] He transforms the *θέλω* in the mouth of Jesus into a *θέλοιμι, ἤθελον*, and interprets: "vellem quidem quam maxime declinare hoc malum, si velles, pater; veruntamen volo, fiat, non quod alioqui ego vellem, sed quod tu vis. *Θέλημα* Jesu est *κατά τι*, nam *ἁπλῶς* Christus idem voluit, quod pater volebat."

[3] The position laid down by Hollaz (*Exam.* II. p. 165) is extremely hazardous: "neque deprecatio calicis utpote conditionata et voluntati patris attemperata *potentiam peccandi arguit.*" If sin were implied in an absolute refusal of the cup, then even the "deprecatio conditionata" (if such a thing can be at all imagined) would imply a germ of sin. We are entitled to speak of Jesus being subjected to temptation in the garden; but let us adhere firmly to the truth—"tempted, yet *without sin*" (Heb. iv. 15). It is not enough to say that in His case the temptation did not result in sin; nor is it even enough to say that it found no sin in Him. His temptation had nothing to do with the question of sin. Jesus could not be tempted to sin, because "in Him is no sin." He could be tempted only to opposition to decisions which the Father had formed in regard to Him. Consequently Paul could institute the comparison which he draws out in Rom. v. 12 sq. between the *ὑπακοή* of Christ and the *παρακοή* of Adam. In this case, *also*, when temptation came, there was as yet no question of sin, for *up to that time* there was no sin in the world; only through the *παρίβασις* to which he was successfully enticed did it find entrance.

accomplishment of which the Redeemer had been sent into the world.[1] And thereby the difficulty is materially lessened. But it does not entirely disappear. For if there was presented to our Lord's mind the possibility of avoiding the cup which was offered to Him, how did He not exclude it in the exercise of that same instantaneous decision with which He met the solicitations of one of His disciples, or with the same readiness with which He repelled the insinuations of the tempter in the wilderness? The definition given of the ἐπόμενον ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα[2] of Jesus by the sixth Ecumenical Council was certainly not intended to convey the idea that His separate human will was obliged always to labour and strive in order to bring itself into harmony with the purpose of God. The affirmation in the symbol of this Council, that the two modes of willing and working in Christ were united without schism, without confusion, and without change, demands rather the representation of an immediateness in this "following" so absolute as even to exclude the device of a temporary *intellectual* indecision.[3] How happened it, then, that in Gethsemane there was an absence of this immediateness,—that the very reverse of it appears? We repeat there would be no satisfactory answer whatever to this question, if there was nothing else to take into account but the impending violence of His enemies. But, on the other hand, how satisfactorily it is answered in the light of the thought that our Lord in this hour assumed the sin of the world! The request that He should take this upon Him as *His* burden, would not only excite the profoundest sorrow of heart, but even His will—the will of the sinless One—could not but recoil from it. Had there been

[1] Thus John v. 30: "I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent Me." Also ch. vi. 38: "I came down from heaven not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me." And also Heb. x. 9: "Lo, I come to do Thy will."

[2] Καὶ δύο μὲν φυσικὰ θελήματα οὐχ ὑπεναντία, μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἑπόμενον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ θέλημα καὶ μὴ ἀντιπίπτον ἢ ἀντίπαλον, μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον τῷ θείῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ παντοδυνάτῳ θελήματι.

[3] Seb. Schmidt has availed himself of this expedient. He substitutes for a difference of will a waiting on Jesus' part for a "novum indicium paternae voluntatis." "Si tu volueris, lubens faciam, et promtus sum ad faciendum quod vis; si modo te velle denuo et tandem confirmaveris." Comp. "Diss. de Pass. Christ. innocentissima" in the *Myst. Grat.* p. 267. Hofmann also makes the following strange remark in the same direction: "Jesus prayed for the removal of the evil only till He became assured that it was the will of God that He should endure it," *Schriftbew.* II. p. 37.

no such reaction, Christ had not accomplished His task,—He should have quite failed to realize what it was. An act of simple acquiescence on the part of Christ, unaccompanied by a supplicatory protestation, is the one thing which we should have failed to comprehend. No representation of the intensity with which He recoiled, no account of the conflict which preceded His submission, no description of the burden which was laid upon Him, can be too highly coloured; no picture can be drawn which will come up to the reality. Strauss says that the intention of Luke is to introduce into his Gethsemane narrative exaggerating and intensifying elements. Others have at least been of opinion that their mythical origin is undoubted. Nothing has as yet been canonically decided as to the character of the third Gospel. Each expositor gives forth his own view of the matter. But *the* charge is not true that its representations are in general less precise than those of the other Gospels. Least of all can this be maintained in the present instance. If Matthew and Mark show a perceptible lessening of the feeling of repugnance to the cup during the progress of the praying, Luke *seems*, no doubt, to give an opposite view. But this is merely in appearance. For the expression in Luke xxii. 44, "He prayed *more earnestly*" (*ἐκτενέστερον*), does not indicate an increased urgency in His appeal to the Father, any more than the expression, "His sweat was, as it were, great drops of blood" (whether the words be understood in a literal, or, with Theophylact, in a parabolic sense),[1] betokens the putting forth of exertion on the part of Him who found His own will in conflict with another opposing will. As to the former expression, it succeeds the statement that He was strengthened by an angel. But surely one would not date from this point an increased longing to be delivered from the cup which was presented to Him. The word *ἐκτενέστερον* denotes in general not the intensity (Suid.: *ἐνεργητικώτερον*), but rather the continuousness of the activity in question.[2] While the Lord had intermitted His previous praying more than once in order to speak to His disciples, from this time forth there was

[1] The former is unquestionably the more correct view. The parallel in 4 Macc. vii. 8 is at least worthy of being compared, although, of course, it cannot decide the interpretation: "*τοὺς ἱερουργοῦντας τὸν νόμον ἰδίῳ αἵματι, καὶ γυναικὶ ἱδρῶτι τοῖς μίχρι θανάτου πάθεσιν ὑπερασπίζοντας.*" Comp. Hengst. *loc. cit.* p. 134.

[2] The expression bears this signification at least in the N. T. It appears there as a predicate sometimes of love, sometimes of prayer. As it describes (1 Pet. i. 22,

no such intermission. He continued in prayer till the close of His conflict. He continued in prayer, with this difference, that after the appearance of the angel He prayed no longer in a supplicatory and petitionary sense, but in the sense of *Thy will be done.* No doubt the agony and the bloody sweat accompanied *this* prayer. As to this latter, we cannot regard it as the accompaniment of an active calling forth of strength for the purpose of subduing His own will, but only as resulting from the burden which He took upon Himself at that moment. For the object of the strengthening from above was not to sustain a sinking moral power in Jesus, or to revive a failing energy; but its purpose was to strengthen Him to assume the burden which wrung from Him the bloody sweat of His agony.[1] "And when He rose from prayer" (Luke xxii. 45), He stood up as the Lamb of God who had taken upon Himself the sins of the world. He proceeds to bear them, and, finally, to atone for them.

### 3. THE APOSTOLIC WORD APPLIED AS A TEST.

The views that have been propounded are the results not of dogmatic assumptions, but solely of an investigation of the history lying before us. But, as we remarked at an earlier stage, no interpretation of the narrative can produce full confidence unless it is confirmed by the doctrinal passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ch. v. 7 sq.); consequently the views which we have adduced must now be subjected to this test. It has already been said that all interpreters of consequence admit a reference in the statement of the apostle to the incident in Gethsemane. But we claim much more, and maintain that it has that incident *alone* in view. The somewhat general definition of time with which the statement opens—"in the days of His flesh"—does not militate against this view. Nothing more than this is intended, that the Person to whom the writer refers, at a certain period (not more particularly defined) of His *earthly* manifestation, accomplished something which bore on His entrance upon His *everlasting*

iv. 8) Christian brotherly love as a stedfast, enduring love, so in the same way it designates continuous, uninterrupted praying (Acts xii. 5: προσευχὴ ἐκτενὴς ἐγίνετο; the church prayed for Peter without ceasing).

[1] Hollaz, *Exam.* II. p. 165: "Confortatio angelica non facta fuit ad praecavendam labilitatem Christi moralem, sed ad infirmitatem naturae ipsius in summo exinanitionis gradu suffulciendam."

Priesthood ("a priest for ever," ver. 6). And the exact mutual correspondence of the prominent expressions in the two passages harmonizes well with this assumption. For the words "prayers and supplications" point as obviously to those others, "He kneeled down and prayed," Luke xxii. 41 (the bowing of the knees, the usual attitude of a suppliant), as the clause "unto Him that was able to save" recalls the utterance, "all things are possible unto Thee." And the "strong crying" corresponds as unmistakeably to the "Abba, Father, O my Father" (comp. Rom. viii. 15: "we *cry*, Abba, Father;" and also Gal. iv. 6), as the "obedience" corresponds to "Thy will be done." The statement of the apostle then is, that Christ learned obedience. Both ideas are emphasized. The one, "our Lord learned," is an element in the proof that the high-priesthood of Jesus resembled that of Aaron in His being taken from among men; the other, "He learned *obedience*," was the basis of the demand for obedience made upon the members of the church, without the fulfilment of which He could not become unto them "the author of eternal salvation." But the statement, like that earlier one (ch. ii. 17), that experience was a prerequisite to His becoming a merciful High Priest, has a strange sound. It required to be prepared for and justified. For this end His "learning" is proved by a reference to a historical fact; and His "obedience," on the other hand, is placed under a particular view-point. The former is done in ver. 7, and the latter in ver. 8. Ver. 7 contains a participial sentence. It must not be decomposed by a "while" (Camerar. Quenst. Delitz.), nor yet can it be understood in a pluperfect sense (Hofmann). It merely affirms a historical fact,—a fact which secures for the idea of "learning" in relation to Jesus its just place. It gives the objective ground for the statement of the apostle. If it was the case that our Lord, "in the days of His flesh," went so far in opposition to a divine decree as to request with earnest supplication that it might be altered, His submission was not immediate; and if He subsequently yielded to the will of the Father, evidently He had first learned "obedience." Now, undoubtedly, this historical fact, considered in itself, might well be regarded as a mysterious one, for the subject is the Son, who is in everlasting fellowship with the Father. But (and this is what ver. 8 tells us) we require to recognise the true character of the obedience which is here in

question; it was an obedience of suffering. And *this* obedience our Lord had to learn *although* He were a Son, yea, just *because* He was a Son.

The passage appears to us to elucidate the Gethsemane incident in two respects. In the first place, by means of a remark which is undoubtedly introduced by the apostle into the course of his argument solely as a parenthesis. We refer to the words, "and was heard ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας." While placing them in a parenthesis, because it is absolutely impossible for us to discover any reason for their being included in the apostle's statement proper, we do so not as holding the opinion that the author gave expression in passing to an incidental and comparatively unimportant thought. We assume, on the contrary, a very definite and pressing motive for this declaration. It is the invariable habit of Scripture to refrain from asserting that a prayer has been answered unless there be some good reason for doing so. It regards this throughout as a thing undoubted. It assumes as a matter of course that the petition of the Son is granted by the Father. The express assurance that He had been heard was therefore appropriate only where, to judge by appearances, the reverse had been the case. The Suppliant presented His petition "to Him that was able to save Him from death," and yet He had to suffer death. Was His petition, then, rejected? No, says the apostle, He was heard notwithstanding, and that ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας. This definitive addition, as is well known, has received two very different interpretations from the time of the oldest translations, and throughout the whole history of exegesis. The authorities in favour of the interpretation, "on account of His piety the Suppliant received an answer," are just as weighty as those who favour the opposite view, that He was heard "against fear," *i.e.* that, through being heard, He was delivered from the feeling of dread. The question, which of these two views is the more correct, has been discussed in recent times, especially between Hofmann and Delitzsch, and yet one does not receive the impression that the arguments of these investigators have brought the matter to a final issue. An ultimate decision cannot be attained either on grammatical or lexical grounds. That the preposition ἀπό may be employed as giving the ground of an assertion, we are not exactly prepared (with Lommatzsch, *ad locum Ep. ad Heb.* ch. v. 1–8, *Commentatio Grammatica*) to deny (although the parallels adduced by

Delitzsch (p. 192) are *not* demonstrative of the fact). But we do not require to appeal to the expression מִן עָנָה in order to prove that it can certainly be understood in the sense of setting one free from something that is present; if the examples collected by Hofmann (II. p. 69) are not felt to be sufficient, the passage in 2 Cor. xi. 3, to which we draw the reader's attention ("so your minds should be corrupted *from* the simplicity," etc., *ἀπὸ τῆς ἁπλότητος*), may avail to remove any remaining hesitation. In the same way, it must be granted that the expression *εὐλάβεια*, which we shall examine more closely at a later time, can be taken generally as a designation of piety no less than as a designation of fear and dread; the idiom of the Epistle to the Hebrews excludes neither the one nor the other. There is need, therefore, of other grounds of decision than those found in language. The circumstance that the defenders of the former view feel themselves constrained to adopt the singular and impracticable expedient[1] of maintaining that our Lord was heard in respect of being raised from the dead, certainly tends very materially to prejudice one against it. In the meantime, however, we shall not pursue this thought farther. More cogent arguments are within our reach. If we are right in our opinion that it is the object of the parenthesis in ver. 7 to prevent its being supposed that the Petitioner had *not* been heard, the supplementary definition cannot by any possibility declare *why*, but only *in how far* He had been heard. Not the ground *on* which, but the sense *in* which the Father heard Him was appropriate here.[2] God heard Him in so far as He delivered Him *ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας*.[3]

[1] We do not retract this judgment, although the church dogmatists (Calov.: "festina resurrectione;" Gerhard, Quenstedt) all start from the assumption which we have rejected. If the Suppliant appeals to "Him that was able to save Him from death" that the "hour might pass from Him," then nothing but helpless perplexity can foist upon the words of the petition a meaning equally foreign to its letter and to its spirit: "Leave Me not to dwell in the state of the dead, loose Me from its pains, make death to Me the gate of paradise!"

[2] It is even in itself doubtful whether the Scripture lays down any statement of the specific ground on which a prayer is heard. When the question is asked why any one has been heard, according to the scriptural view, the substance of the answer is simply this, He was heard *just because He prayed.* Comp. Jas. v. 17, 18.

[3] Here we also make our appeal to language for the justification of the view we have adduced, by calling attention to a peculiar and anomalous mode of expression on the part of the apostle. The word *εἰσακουσθείς* is used, indeed, here and there in the N. T. in relation to the person who had presented an answered prayer (Matt.

We have already admitted that the expression, considered generally, can bear either of the significations claimed for it by the upholders of the rival views. But in this passage neither the one nor the other can be the correct one, except with modifications. It is a remarkable thing that the expositors on both sides maintain that the author could not have expressed himself more inappropriately if he had had in his mind that which their opponents assert. And, in truth, both parties are so far correct. If the meek submission of the Suppliant, "Not My will, but Thine be done," be the substance of the *εὐλάβεια*, there is no room in it for the beseeching petition so strongly and even exclusively emphasized by our apostle. On the other hand, he who understands the *εὐλάβεια* as meaning dread of something about to happen, loses the idea of religious reverence or of godly fear, which is absolutely inseparable from the expression (ch. xi. 7, xii. 28). We go back upon the results at which we have already arrived. If our Lord experienced a shrinking dread of the cup which was presented to Him, in other words, of the demand made by God that He should take upon Himself, as His burden, the sin of the world, then, indeed, no expression could more appropriately represent *this* fear than *εὐλάβεια*. It sheds upon the history a light as clear as the history, in turn, reflects upon it. The intense shrinking from the cup which the Father asked Him to drink, impelled the Son to supplicate for deliverance from it. And the Suppliant was also heard,—not that His request was granted, but He Himself was heard, inasmuch as He was set free from fear of the cup,—inasmuch as He became strong to take up the burden which was appointed for Him. The apostle writes *εἰσακουσθείς*. Does he give this as an inference which he drew from the later manifestation of Jesus? That we regard as in itself highly improbable; and, moreover, ver. 7 moves throughout on historical ground. But we are in possession of a historical fact in which the *εἰσακουσθείς* finds a firm basis. The third evangelist says: "And there

vi. 7). But for the most part, when the passive form is employed, the subject of the verb is the prayer itself, not the person who offered it. Thus Luke i. 13: "thy prayer is heard," and Acts x. 31: "Cornelius, thy prayer is heard." It is on account of the clause *ἀπὸ τῆς εὐλαβείας* that the person heard is here substituted for the prayers that were heard. For the Person, by virtue of the answer which His prayer received, was delivered from the fear which up to that time had enveloped Him.

appeared an angel unto Him from heaven, strengthening Him." Then it was that He was freed from the εὐλάβεια, and accordingly He bowed Himself and took up the burden of sin *without fear*. Without *fear*, but not, indeed, without feeling its full weight.

But there is still another respect in which we propose to vindicate our view of the incident in Gethsemane by the doctrinal passage under our notice. We read in ver. 8 that "He learned obedience by the things which He suffered" (ἔμαθεν ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν τὴν ὑπακοήν). The author himself shares in the feeling of surprise which this sentence is fitted to occasion. It is of the Son that this statement is made. But did not obedience belong necessarily to the Son? If He was entitled to the credit of having walked unswervingly on the path of obedience; if the Apostle Paul points to His obedience as one that continued from the time He became man till He died on the cross, how then could He be said to learn it? "Though He was a Son, yet learned He obedience." But it is τὴν ὑπακοήν, consequently not obedience generally; not "the virtue of obedience," but that particular obedience which is here treated of, and which is here in question. What obedience was it? The answer is given by the clause, "by the things which He suffered." We believe it is a misunderstanding of the words to regard them as describing the *manner* in which the Son learned obedience. There are considerable grammatical difficulties in the way of this view. The analogies adduced for such a use of the preposition ἀπό, namely, the expression in Matt. xxiv. 32 (*learn a parable* ἀπὸ τῆς συκῆς), or Matt. xi. 29 (*learn* ἀπ' ἐμοῦ), are exceedingly peculiar. The very slightest reflection will show that the cases are entirely different. But, besides, how strange a thought this would yield —a thought which is absolutely inapplicable to our Lord! It were sad if, in order to explain an apostolic utterance, one were compelled to fall back upon the banal phrases of a heathen philosophy of life (πάθει μάθος *quae nocent docent*). One may develope the idea of a proud soul being crushed by suffering, and learning thereby to submit to the mighty hand of God. But who would venture to employ this analogy in any sense whatever in reference to our Lord! No, it is not the intention of the apostle to show *how* the Son learned obedience, but to show what *kind* of an obedience that was which He *learned*, and which alone He *could* learn. The sentence with which we are dealing

—ἀφ' ὧν ἔπαθεν ἔμαθεν—is exactly analogous to another in ch. ii. 18: ἐν ᾧ πέπονθεν πειρασθείς. As the supplementary clause in the latter passage denotes the sphere of the temptation in question, so the corresponding clause in the former indicates the sense in which Christ could learn obedience. The explanation of Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 72): "Although He were a Son, yet a time began for Him in which He had to submit to that which befell Him, in which He learned obedience in a new way, for He now proved His filial obedience by suffering," brings out the meaning of the apostle on the whole much better than the explanation of Delitzsch. Only, the idea of learning is not to be transformed into that of proving or verifying, nor is the obedience to be referred to the coming of suffering upon Him. If the latter be assumed, then the expression "learning" will not receive strict justice, for no one will say that the previous life of Jesus was free from all experience of suffering. The only obedience which the Son could *learn* was one required of Him by virtue of an essentially new demand on the part of the Father; and He *had* to learn it, "though He were a Son," when He was requested to do that from which His holy nature could not but recoil. Ver. 8 in itself, as well as in its relation to ver. 7, becomes perfectly clear when we understand by the "obedience" the fulfilment of a divine purpose, according to which the Son was obligated to bear the sin of the world; and we rely on it therefore with perfect confidence for confirmation of the views which we have propounded in regard to our Lord's conflict in the garden.

We cannot leave this passage without pointing, in the last place, to the connection between it and ver. 5, evidenced by the relative pronoun with which it begins. If we read in ver. 5 that He "glorified not Himself to be made an High Priest," then the statement in ver. 7 unquestionably implies that something took place in Gethsemane on God's side, and that Christ Himself accomplished something there which bore upon His attaining the glory of a High Priest. He there took a step towards this dignity. But what step? What act in the process of *becoming* a High Priest was accomplished there? The activity of the High Priest in the "true tabernacle" consists in this, that He maintains before His Father the validity of the atonement for sin which He made upon the earth. If, then, His manifestation in the garden was a factor co-operating to make

Him capable of doing so, this factor cannot have been merely a more or less remote prerequisite to the atonement; nor yet can it have consisted in the prayer in which we find our Lord engaged, considered as such,—whether or not it be designated by the name of an offering well pleasing unto God,—but it must have been a fruit or result of His praying, of such a character that it can quite properly be regarded as constituting an element of the atonement which was to be accomplished. And nothing offers itself to our view which meets this requirement except the assumption, by the High Priest Redeemer, of the sin which He was to bear.

In concluding our examination of the incident in Gethsemane, we claim for the view of it, which has now been confirmed on all sides, the merit of having done justice to the problem which the evangelical representation, no less than the doctrinal passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, submits to the interpreter,—the problem of exhibiting the independent significance of the narrative as a part of the history of the suffering Christ. We believe also that we have thus avoided the two dangers to which the history of the exposition of the portion of Scripture with which we have been dealing bears witness. It has been treated, on the one hand, in a purely historical manner, and writers have spoken, in a tone more or less rationalistic, of the outpourings of a pious soul in a dark night of sorrow. But thereby it is made soteriologically meaningless; and those who, like Schleiermacher, are unable to understand such an outpouring on psychological grounds, have no interest in maintaining the historical reality of the incident. The whole question is thus thoroughly betrayed into the hands of negative criticism, for nothing is left wherewith to resist its attacks, except the mere authority of the writers who made known the fact; apologetics has no available weapon remaining. But, on the other hand, the conflict in the garden has been called the *passio magna*, and in it the essential Passion of Jesus has been made to consist, with the addition, at most, of the cry of lament from the cross: "Why hast Thou forsaken me?" Several church dogmatists take this view; Delitzsch also seems to incline towards it; he even goes beyond it when he makes the very doubtful, or at least insufficiently considered assertion, that in Gethsemane the sacrifice of Jesus was already as good as accomplished, being only carried out afterwards upon

the cross as an external reality.[1] The cross, then, is a purely external reality, without any essentially new internal contents! The result of this mode of viewing the subject was that the sufferings of our Lord, from the time of His betrayal to His death, were almost wholly withdrawn from view, and relegated to the category of things more or less indifferent. By our view both of these errors are equally avoided. But, finally, we plead in its favour the additional circumstance that from our standpoint the absence of the narrative from the fourth Gospel can be best explained. Historical investigation will always feel it strange that John, who was not only present in Gethsemane, but who was certainly the most sympathetic and the acutest observer among the three favoured disciples, is silent as to the awful scene. But if our interpretation of it is correct, we can easily understand how that evangelist who points on the very first page of his Gospel to the Lamb who takes away the sin of the world, the same Lamb of whom he says at its close, "A bone of Him shall not be broken," might feel that no interest would be served by his narrating an incident which was rooted in the traditions of Christendom no less firmly than was that other incident of which he is equally silent, the institution of the Lord's Supper.

Our Lord rises up laden with the burden of the world's sin. As is expressly said of Him at a later time, "And He, bearing His cross, went forth" (John xix. 17), so He now applies Himself to the task of bearing the burden which He had assumed,—a burden seen by no human eye,—seen only by Him who had imposed it, and who was looking down upon His Son, well pleased: "Behold, my servant shall deal prudently." From the time that He spoke the dismissal word, "let us go," the aspect which Jesus wore was not that of One who was sinking beneath His burden, yet His bearing was not of a purely passive character; it was a bearing so as to make atonement, it was a performing, an acting. Accordingly, with the manifestations of the suffering Lamb (ἀμνός), the unfolding of the might of the Lamb (ἀρνίον) who overcomes went hand in hand. Into these lists the "Captain of our salvation" now enters.

[1] Hengstenberg has also erred in the same direction when he says, *l.c.* p. 141: "Jesus may be said to have died in Gethsemane; His death struggle on the cross was only a feeble after-tremor."

# PART SECOND.

## THE SUFFERINGS OF JESUS.

IT is only to the most general outline of the Passion history of Jesus[1] that negative criticism awards historical credibility. That our Lord was put to death by the authority of the Roman procurator is admitted by Strauss, on the authority of Tacitus, to be an undoubted fact. He also thinks it not improbable that the Jewish authorities, in some such way as is described in the Gospels, may have induced the governor to confirm and carry out the sentence of death. And he gives as a reason for their desiring to bring about this result, the fact that Jesus had so unsparingly attacked the Pharisees and priests who formed the ruling party in the nation. By exposing their hypocrisy, pride, and covetousness, and expressly urging the people to dissociate themselves from their influence, our Lord impelled the class so attacked to come to a determination to rid themselves of so dangerous an opponent. On the other hand, he holds that the majority of the details in the story of the development of the catastrophe, not only those which the eager search for myths might regard as an easy prey, such as the dream of Pilate's wife, the fate of the traitor, etc., but even the most essential and important features of the narrative, originated in a "tendency" which coloured the compositions of the Christian church. We might ask those who have read the *Acta Pilati* if, after comparing it with the evangelical records, they have not been impressed with the complete historical credibility of these latter. But we do not pursue this line of thought, just as, when dealing with a cognate subject, we did not press the argument which is based

[1] The well-known book written by the Scotch theologian, William Hanna, on this part of the life of Jesus Christ, is chiefly practical in its aim, but it also contains valuable exegetical material, to which regard has been had in the following investigations.

on a comparison of the miracles of the Gospel with the monstrosities recorded in the *Evangelia Infantiae*, and which draws from the difference of their character conclusions which no unprejudiced mind can reject. We refrain from doing so, although we cannot but note the circumstance that no part of the life of Jesus is more conspicuously confirmed by facts that are otherwise attested than this very history of His Passion. We at once admit that the historical investigation which is "accompanied by the fundamental law of causality, by virtue of which it demands for every effect which appears a cause included in the series of natural powers," may find occasion to take exception to the Gospel narrative here and there, and to describe this and that as in the highest degree improbable. Now, the assumptions on which one can fall back are these two. It may be said that the facts narrated did not really take place, but that the narrators had an obvious interest to serve by inventing them, clothing them with the colours which they wear, and placing them in the light in which they appear. Or it may be said that the history in question must not be viewed from the ordinary historical standpoint, that it is concerned not merely with the play of finite forces, but with a divine δεῖ, as the true and ultimate cause—*δεῖ οὕτως γενέσθαι*. These assumptions themselves, in so far as their own more general and deeper grounds are concerned, lie outside the sphere of apologetics. It has only to decide the question, which of the two can plead in its own favour, that it gives the more satisfactory explanation of these narratives. In this way apologetics will make it possible for us to give a solid judgment on the question, Did the evangelists narrate facts or invent fables, and were the doctrines which the apostles built on this foundation mere phantoms or eternal truths?

We proceed, then, to open up the Passion history on the basis, of course, of a particular assumption, just as Strauss does in his treatment of it,—with an assumption, but not with an assertion. We only make trial of this explanatory key, and wait to see whether it will prove itself to be really suitable. What our assumption is, appears clearly from the findings at which we arrived in our consideration of the incident in Gethsemane. Our Lord there took upon Himself the sin of the world; the burden is to be *borne* by Him along the path of His Passion. That which was then the object of the *αἴρειν* is now the object

of the βαστάζειν. The bearing as such does not amount to an atonement. The suffering One bears, the dying One atones. The *death* of Jesus was the sacrifice for the sin of the world. He therefore calls His surrendered life *a ransom for many;* and the shed blood—"His own blood, the precious blood of . . . a lamb without blemish"—is called by the apostles the price of "eternal redemption" (Heb. ix. 12; 1 Pet. i. 18, 19). The "shedding of blood" was the condition of the "remission" of sins, and "in His blood" was the Son "set forth to be a propitiation." Death is the proper wages of sin; and just as it was a favourite habit with the church dogmatists to prove the necessity of the death of Christ from the threatening of death, which was suspended over our first parents by God (Gen. ii. 67),[1] so they taught that "by pouring forth His most precious blood, and submitting to an ignominious death, Christ endured the penalty due to sin" (Hollaz, *Exam.* II. p. 167). However, it would not at all harmonize with the Scriptures to bring down the sufferings of Christ to the level of more or less obscure factors, so that they should appear historically *only* as the preliminary to His death, and be placed dogmatically under the *obedientia passiva in such a manner* as to be deprived of their independent significance and their essential connection with the idea of atonement. That is not the meaning of the announcements of the prophets, nor of our Lord's own utterances, nor of the preaching of the apostles. The well-known prophecy in Isaiah gives much more prominence to the *sufferings* than to the dying of the Servant of the Lord. Jesus not only places clearly before the minds of His disciples, and with all emphasis, the fact of His death, but He prepares them for the many and bitter *sufferings* which were to come upon Him (Matt. xvi. 21, "He must suffer many things, . . . and be killed;" ch. xx. 18, 19, etc.), and which He would require to endure before going hence. Among the apostles, it is Peter especially who holds up before believers the παθήματα *Christi,* and pictures to them the *suffering* Saviour. For he can refer to Him only in this character when he speaks of the example which He has left for our imitation, and by which we are admonished to arm ourselves with the same long-suffering mind.

[1] Quenstedt, III. p. 236: "Mors homini denunciata est ante peccatum, illata propter peccatum, ablata per eum qui non novit peccatum. Mortem ergo subiit Salvator, ut mortis reus a morte per ejus mortem liberaretur."

However, he was very far from intending to point to Him solely as the meek Sufferer; it was much more his intention to place the sufferings of Jesus under the view-point of the atonement. This is evidenced not only by the expression "for us" (ch. ii. 21, iii. 18, iv. 1), which is constantly added, but especially by the announcement which is interwoven with this very chain of thought: "who . . . bare our sins . . . on the tree," 1 Pet. ii. 24. The bearing of our sins *on* the cross presupposes a bearing of them *to* the cross. If atonement for sin was completed by means of the former, namely, the death of Jesus, then the latter also, His Passion, just because it looked towards atonement as its goal, is to be included in the domain of this idea.

Before testing by the details of the Passion history the assumption that the suffering Christ bore the sin of the world in order to atone for them thereafter by dying, the question as to the concrete import of the assumption requires to be first disposed of. We shall at the same time discover what are the chief respects in which the test indicated has to be carried out. It has been very generally admitted in some sense or other, that our Lord went from Gethsemane to Golgotha bearing the burden of sin. Even those who ignore the profound connection between sin and calamity, and who regard the well-known expression of the disciples (John ix. 9), in its whole bearings, as the utterance of narrow Jewish prejudice, are obliged in the present instance to admit the propriety of the question: Has this man sinned, or who has sinned, that such things have happened unto him? For the "man of sorrows" who here appears before us is not like a Job, upon whose head the so-called blows of fate accumulated; but everything which befalls Him has been desired, decided upon, and carried out by men. On one side, therefore, there must necessarily be sin as the occasion of these sufferings. *They* call *Him* a "malefactor," who ought to suffer what His deeds deserve. But *He* says: "they hated Me without a cause;" He makes the sin, therefore, to rest on *them*. But the most convincing proof of the cleanness of His hands, *considered in itself*, does not suffice to confirm the accuracy of our assumption. Admitting that the statement which is proclaimed by both Testaments: "who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth," is thoroughly illustrated by the history of our Lord,—the picture of an innocent sufferer is not an adequate representation of Him who *bore*

the sin of the world. Nor yet is He truly represented as a sin-bearer by the recently propounded view, that malignant hatred to the divine exhausted its full strength upon the Redeemer. We repeat our admission, that no exception can be taken to this idea in itself. So it *happened*, and so it *was bound* to happen; for how could the Paraclete, whose office it is to take of the things of Christ and make them the subject-matter of His announcements, accomplish His work of reproving the world of sin, unless this sin in its length and breadth, its height and depth, had been manifested and carried out against the suffering Saviour? But if our view must be limited to this, we shall see nothing more in Christ than a sufferer whom we may extol, saying with the apostle, "when He was reviled He reviled not again, when He suffered He threatened not," or with the upholder of the theory referred to, "He maintained to the uttermost His loyalty to His vocation and His holiness;" but we shall not see in this calm, patient, stedfast, and pure sufferer, one who is bearing the sin of the world. What condition is necessary to vindicate this latter representation? It has been said, and said emphatically, that God permitted His Son to be the object of the world's enmity. This is not adequate, and it is misleading. That which is appropriate here is not what dogmatics calls *permissio Dei*, but the *voluntas divina* itself. The doctrine which it teaches: "Deus quidem permittit, sed non vult τό permissum; permissio non est actio, sed actionis negatio," does not fit in with the state of the case in this history. That which befell Jesus befell Him through His Father; and if He suffered at the hands of the world, the will of God was therein accomplished in so far as these sufferings constituted the pathway to the goal which God had ordained in His eternal counsel. In this case, however, we see in Him who endured the hatred of the world, in the whole fulness of its manifestations, the Bearer of its sin in the strictest sense. If this, then, is implied in the history—we say in the *history*, not in an assertion, whether on the part of our Lord or of the evangelists, that it must so be, or that the Scriptures could not otherwise be fulfilled,—if it is implied in the facts of the history itself, and that in such a way as to make them intelligible only when so regarded, then we can claim for the assumption which we have made that it is confirmed by the Gospel history. But it is implied. We do not wish to anticipate

the consideration of the individual steps of our Lord's progress upon the *via dolorosa*, but only to touch in a preliminary way the general features of the development of the tragedy. Had our Lord, like the prophets of an earlier time, and the proto-martyr at a later time, fallen a victim to an outburst of zealotism, —and more than once this nearly took place, comp. Luke iv. 29, John viii. 59, x. 31,—then, indeed, the idea of a bare *permissio Dei* would be entirely relevant, and it might be said that the Sufferer, by divine permission, suffered at the hands of the world's sin. But a crushed and broken martyr is an inadequate representation of Him who *bore* that sin. We see Jesus, therefore, avoiding mere martyrdom no less carefully than He avoided unwelcome homage; as often as He was threatened by it He deliberately eluded it (*He conveyed Himself away,—did hide Himself,—passing through the midst of them, went His way,—escaped out of their hand*), and He often allowed this motive to determine the external movements of His life.[1] In what way, then, did our Lord's death come about? Instead of a turbulent mode of procedure, such as that to which Stephen fell a victim, we discover throughout not merely a strict observance of legal forms, but the Sufferer was even put to death in connection with the administration of ordinances which were appointed by God. The expression quoted and attested by Jesus Himself: "I said, ye are gods" (John x. 34), was applicable to all those to whose agency the death of Christ was essentially due. The Sanhedrim had authority from God to decide judicially such questions as were submitted to them in this instance. It was not the utterance of Caiaphas in itself which was of such deep significance to the evangelist John, but the circumstance that He had given it forth "being high priest" (John xi. 51); so the prominent point is not the condemnation of Jesus considered in itself, but the fact that it was pronounced by a tribunal which was still possessed of divine authority, although it was on the eve of "vanishing away."[2]

[1] The peculiar hesitation which He displayed before going up to the feast of Tabernacles, John vii., and which cannot be removed by any exegetical device, is satisfactorily explained from this point of view.

[2] It ended in that year in the ἑαυτὸς ἐκεῖνος. When the Apostle Peter soon after said to the Council: "whether it be right to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye" (Acts iv. 19), and laid down the fundamental proposition: "we ought to obey God rather than *men*" (ch. v. 29), the declaration implied that the Sanhedrim was no longer invested with authority "from above."

Pilate had power from God to pronounce a sentence of death; and our Lord says expressly of this power belonging to the governor, that it was given him "from above" (John xix. 11). It is very easy to attribute the fate of Jesus, as Strauss does, to the combined agency of the lowest passions, and to say that wounded vanity and the lust of power allied themselves with cowardly fear. And it is still easier to give expression to amazement at the unparalleled wickedness of those who had a hand in bringing about the sufferings of our Lord. But the fact is very remarkable, that the readiest to use such warm expressions are just those who, like Renan,[1] have no idea of the real meaning of the Passion of Christ, and who reduce Him to the level of a mere martyr suffering for His convictions. The suffering Saviour never spoke as if He were the sport of human caprice and the victim of the passions of men; it is always under a higher hand that He humbles Himself ("committed Himself to Him that judgeth righteously"). The history nowhere exhibits the triumph of the God-opposed human will, but shows it restrained at each successive step by a higher counsel. And the opponents of Jesus by no means appear in the character of pronounced and conscious enemies of God; the history and our Lord Himself characterize them in an entirely different way. He invariably condemns the sin which they commit against Him; He even emphasizes the fact that they are inexcusable (John xv. 22: "they have no cloak for their sin"); but by the words which He speaks to the disciples: "The time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service: and these things will they do unto you because they have not known the Father nor Me,"—by these words He undoubtedly passes a judgment on His own persecutors also. He prays for them on the cross. We know indeed that the source of this supernatural love and patience was the divine fulness which dwelt in Him, but the appended reason still remains, for He uses it in His prayer to His Father as a plea, just as Peter at a later time employed it as a bridge to lead sinners themselves to repentance (Acts

[1] The French scholar in this goes much too far for the feeling of his admirers. His usually enthusiastic critic, E. Havet, cannot forgive his branding the act of the Jews as an absolutely inexpiable crime. He has nothing else to say in vindication of the author except that his imagination had hurried him to a view which his philosophy certainly rejected. For his part, he must ask pardon for the Jews, and even more than pardon.

iii. 17): "*for they know not* what they do." This, then, is not merely an exemplification of the workings of that love which mercifully "hides a multitude of sins," but much rather of that "compassion towards the ignorant and on them that are out of the way," which characterized (Heb. v. 2), although in another sense, the sacrificing High Priest of the first Testament. An apostle at a later time designated it as the calling of Christians to "suffer according to the will of God." He uses the expression in a double sense. He looks, on the one hand, *backwards* to the source from which suffering comes. *God* sends it, even although one should discover in the unrighteous hand of man its secondary cause. On the other hand, he points forward to the results in which God intends suffering to issue. But in both respects he puts us in mind of Him who suffered in the highest measure according to the will of God. What He suffered through sinners came upon Him from God; and on this pathway of suffering He reached the goal which the Father had appointed for Him at Golgotha. And if so, then we may conclude that in suffering He *bore* the sin of the world.

### 1. THE ARREST OF JESUS.

The history of the arrest of Jesus is narrated by the four evangelists in terms which are harmonious throughout, although each of them contributes something special to make the picture complete. "So much," says Strauss, "is without doubt historical, that Jesus was taken by the officers of the Sanhedrim, under the leadership of a faithless disciple, without any serious attempt at resistance being made." On the other hand, criticism regards the characteristic features of the narrative as in the highest degree open to suspicion. It sees in the first three narrators evident traces of the growing myth, and in the fourth the tendency to preserve the representation of the Logos Christ. The question we ask is, whether the "improbable" does not appear as the probable as soon as the narrative is considered from the view-point from which we have assumed that the Passion history may be understood?

The arrest of Jesus is itself an essential element of the PASSION, the history of which begins with it. So it is to be characterized in itself, and by reason of the circumstances which attended it. *He* was deprived of liberty, who alone was free, and whose it

was to free through the truth those who were in bondage (John viii. 32–36). They bound the hands of Him (John xviii. 12) of whom the apostle afterwards says, not in a tone of assertion, but on the ground of notorious facts, "who went about doing good and healing" (Acts x. 38). Men came to the conclusion that they dared not continue to be the placid spectators of such an activity ("if we let him thus alone," John xi. 48), and that it was on no account to be borne with any longer. *He* was treated as a robber and murderer ("as against a thief," Matt. xxvi. 55), who was able to say, "All that ever came before Me are thieves and robbers. . . . I am the good Shepherd." Two of His disciples intensified the pain and shame of His suffering. One of them was Judas Iscariot. At the head of the band as their guide ("guide to them that took Jesus," Acts i. 16), he was first seen by our Lord ("Behold, he is at hand that doth betray me," Matt. xxvi. 46); and John, by his remark (ch. xviii. 5), "And Judas stood with them," is careful to show that Judas remained there during the whole scene, and thus contributed in a most essential degree to heighten the suffering of Jesus. The Sanhedrim had given a command, that if any one knew where He were, He should show it (John xi. 57); the only one who felt himself impelled to give heed to the command was "one of the twelve"—a "friend." It was with a troubled spirit that Jesus foretold this to His disciples (John xiii. 21); and how much deeper His pain must have been when the prediction was fulfilled! Peter, too, tended to increase the suffering of Jesus on the occasion of His arrest; not only because his act appeared to justify the measures which the adversaries had carefully taken, and for which Jesus reproached them, but also because it was undoubtedly the signal for a ruder and more violent attack on His person. They were no match for the words of His mouth. Before their might they fell helpless on the ground, but the sword-stroke of Peter restored their confidence and courage. With such weapons they were at home and in their element, and Jesus suffered from the manifestations of their reawakened consciousness of power.

Both by direct expressions and also by the history itself is this suffering of Jesus Christ represented as a fruit of SIN. His arrest was a work of darkness. "This is your hour," He says, with as obvious a reference to the night hour as is contained in words spoken at an earlier time, which are equally applicable to

the present case: "Every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light." "Not on the feast,"—that was the advice of prudence; "not by day,"—that was a matter of course, considering the character of their deed. "I sat daily with you, teaching *in the temple.*" Of this Jesus reminds the chief priests and captains *of the temple.* Directly under their eyes,—coming and going among them (*μεθ' ὑμῶν*), He had done His work during those previous days. They had then the opportunity of stretching forth their hands against Him (Luke xxii. 53); and even the Roman *σπεῖρα,* had they been in want of extraneous assistance, was at their immediate disposal. But *the* time which they chose, and which they were *compelled* to choose, was that which corresponded to the character of their light-shunning work. The same holds of the act of the traitor, but in a higher degree. *It was night,* says John (ch. xiii. 30), when Judas communicated his now matured purpose to the high priests. It is not the fourth evangelist alone who ascribes the conduct of the faithless disciple to Satanic influences. The third makes a like assumption in express terms (Luke xxii. 3), and the accounts of the two first evangelists are certainly not such as to exclude it. But not one of them neglects to point to the threads out of which the awful crime was woven in Judas' own heart. There the thorns were already growing when the enemy scattered the evil seed. It has been often said that covetousness is not an adequate explanation of an act like that of Judas. Such an objection is destitute of any foundation. The registers of crime show numerous cases in which motives, apparently the most trifling, have led to the commission of the most dreadful deeds. Murder has been done, for the sake of insignificant gains, by those who were neither starving nor poor; slight affronts have instigated those who were not of exceptionally passionate temperament to inflict a death-blow. In the case before us, the argument based on the apparent disproportion between motive and act would acquire consistency, if it were assumed, on the one hand, that the disciple-relation was still to continue; and, on the other, that the lust of gain had but recently arisen. No doubt the traitor was one of the Twelve till the end. Our Lord chose him to this position, and treated him accordingly up to the last hour of fellowship. It is only after Judas' death that even Peter (Acts i. 16 sq.) appears to regard the lot of the ministry which he had obtained as vacant. But in his heart

he had abandoned the position of a disciple long before. His alienation from his Master, and his coldness towards Him, had already grown into that complete indifference which once marked the relations of the covenant people to Jehovah's Shepherd, whom they valued at the ransom price of a slave (Zech. xi. 13). Nor does his covetousness here burst forth all of a sudden, and for the first time. Even already he had abused his position in the disciple circle for the purpose of gratifying it. "He was a thief," says John. A thief! Covetousness had thus gained dominion over his heart, and could consequently show itself in him as the "root of all evil." Nothing can be imagined to which it might not have impelled him. Under these circumstances, we may confidently accept as the real and true motive of the betrayal the feeling to which it is always traced by the evangelists. It is just when the matter is so regarded, however, that SIN, in that naked, undisguised form which excites a feeling of revulsion in human nature itself, appears as the cause of the suffering of Him who was arrested.[1] The employment of the usual love-token, instead of disguising the character of his deed, brings out its utter hideousness. The bold kiss (*κατεφίλησεν*) which the traitor in the exercise of his disciple-privilege imprinted on the lips of his Master ("Master, Master," Mark xiv. 45) was not designed to throw a veil over his act,

[1] Judas Iscariot is the only one among the authors of the sufferings of Jesus, the circumstances of whose death are narrated by the Scriptures. It was no "postulate of the Christian consciousness" (Strauss) that the vengeance of God must have overtaken him in some such way. In its depths there is in reality no feeling that an evil deed must needs be followed by conspicuous retribution in the present world; but *if* the traitor came speedily to a bad end, the evangelist had a purpose to serve in recording the fact; and not merely that general purpose contemplated by Luke when he records (Acts xii. 21 sq.) the singular and sudden death of Herod Agrippa, the persecutor of the apostles and the infant church, but the more special purpose of making the traitor's fate a mirror in which to show the enormity of the crime he committed (as the apocryphal tradition says regarding it, not inappropriately: *μίγα ἀσιβείας ὑπόδειγμα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ παραστῆσαι Ἰούδας*). For *the* act, which left open to its author no resource but to terminate the pangs of an unavailing repentance by self-murder, must have involved an inconceivable degree of guilt. Strauss does not admit that there is a single word of truth in the whole story of the traitor's fate. The way in which he attempts to show that it is a fiction, constructed of materials borrowed from the Old Testament, makes such monstrous demands upon his readers, that they cannot but feel bewildered in the presence of his ingenious combinations. The reward said to have been given to the traitor he traces to the familiar passage in Zechariah (but certainly not without perceptible hesitation), although the reason for the amount of this award, so far as the high priests were concerned (on account of

nor was he *in circumstances* to deceive another's eye. Not with deceitful lips, under which was the poison of asps, does he proffer the friendly token, but in unexampled unnaturalness he makes no secret of his vileness and falsity. This is the crying sin, which the last question addressed by Jesus to the lost disciple (comp. Luke xxii. 48: "Judas, betrayest thou the Son of man with a kiss?") rebukes with peculiarly outspoken severity. The apparently opposite conduct of Peter is in many respects open to a like judgment. According to the narrative of Luke (ch. xxii. 49), other disciples also felt the impulse to which Peter yielded. But while these—at least the sons of thunder, comp. Luke ix. 54—were raising the question, just as they did formerly, if this were not the time to take to the sword, Peter had already completed his act of violence. We do not need to assume that it was his intention thereby to repel the doubt expressed by our Lord as to his courage and fidelity; the sin of the disciple is evident even without assuming that any such calculation took place in his mind. He now translates into *act* that which he had formerly expressed in *word:* "Lord, this shall not be unto Thee," Matt. xvi. 22. Then his *word* received the severe rebuke, "Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art an offence unto Me;" his *act,* in which he was as far from understanding the mind of God, is met by a like rebuke (Matt. xxvi. 53, 54). But his act

Ex. xxi. 32), was self-evident. Of the points on which criticism has thrown suspicion, only one requires closer consideration—we mean the discrepancy between the narrative in Matthew and that in the Acts of the Apostles, owing to which some interpreters have assumed a double tradition in regard to the incident,—an assumption which has been especially due to the influence of the well-known story of the uncritical Papias. But the difficulty disappears so soon as we fix our attention on the difference of the objects contemplated by the evangelical narrative and the discourse in the Acts respectively. The historical writer narrates the principal fact—the self-murder—as to its genesis and its execution. As for Peter, again, it would have been strange if, in an address to his fellow-apostles, he had proclaimed a fact which was well known to them all. Instead of doing so, he points to the circumstances by which the death of the traitor was attended, and draws a conclusion from his death which had an important bearing upon his purpose. He required to find a reason for the proposal which he was about to submit to the company of disciples. His mode of narrating the story corresponds to the motive by which he was influenced, but yet it by no means excludes the representation given by Matthew. The passages of the Old Testament quoted by him, and the way in which he applies them, place the accuracy of this view of the case beyond all doubt. (Of course we could not agree with the statement made by Hengstenberg, *l.c.* p. 195, that Peter "had touched a single and especially characteristic circumstance in a rhetorical manner.")

involves a more serious opposition than his word. For it includes an additional wrong in employing carnal weapons where nothing was appropriate but the sword of the Spirit (Matt. xxvi. 52)—*the sword* which he was in vain exhorted to wield in Gethsemane. We are unable to adopt the view which has been recently suggested, and which implies that the attempt of Peter was desired, and even intended, by Jesus.[1] An act which He severely rebuked cannot have been wished by Him; and the necessity imposed upon Him of resuming an activity which did not belong to the idea of the suffering Christ, must certainly have been most unwelcome to Him. It may be pleasing to observe that our Lord even in His latter hours employs His unbound hands in "doing well;" that at the beginning of His Passion—which in the highest sense and degree undid the evil which men had done—He arrests an individual wanton act, asking a respite from His enemies in order to do so;[2] but notwithstanding this He still appears before our eyes as One suffering at the hands of sin.

But however obvious the sin may be which prepared for our Lord the suffering of the arrestment, it was not in reality by the "hands of sinners" that the victory over Him was gained. But in the exercise of a voluntary obedience He submits to the decree of His Father, by which things were so appointed and ordained. *This* aspect of the question, namely, that bonds and imprisonment were allotted to Him *by God*, is brought into prominence by the fourth Gospel especially. Strauss has rightly

[1] Hengst. (*l.c.* p. 151) errs entirely in making the impossible, and in every respect inadmissible assertion, that the procedure of Peter "was included in the plan of Jesus," just as if our Lord had intended it.

[2] We regard the words of Jesus, ἐᾶτε ἕως τούτου (Luke xxii. 51), as an address not to the disciples, but to those who arrested Him. The interpretation which the former assumption yields, "let them go so far as even to arrest Me," is prevented by the ἕως, which would thus lose its proper sense as designating *a limit*. For the rendering "even" (Meyer) or "this uttermost" (Hofmann) is forced. The difficulty raised by Bleek and others as to applying the words to the officers, namely, that in this case ἀποκρίσις would be inappropriate, is removed when one remembers in how many ways this formula is used by the evangelists. The sword-stroke of Peter occasioned an immediate crowding upon Jesus, with the view of overpowering Him. Thereupon (ἀποκρίσις) He asks: "leave Me at liberty until I shall have accomplished *this*," namely, what the immediately succeeding words indicate: "and He touched his ear, and healed him." The remark made by Meyer, that Jesus first addresses Himself to the officers in ver. 52, overlooks the circumstance that a solemn declaration to the whole band is very different from a warding off of those in His immediate neighbourhood, who were on the very point of stepping forward to lay hands on Him.

apprehended the Johannine representation when he says that it shows us the voluntariness of the surrender of Jesus, both in the light of His words and on the ground of the facts that occurred. There was no need of the traitor's "token:" the Lord neither can nor will deny Himself. Nor was the arrest due to military power. It was beaten back before the sword which proceeded from the mouth of the Son of God. Men were obliged to permit Him to extend to His own an effectual protection, and to defend them as long as He was with them ("while I was with them in the world," John xvii. 12) in the fullest sense of the word. *They* were allowed to escape unmolested; and as for Himself, unless He had been complying with His Father's command (John x. 18), the result would have been the same as on a former occasion when the officers who had been sent to take Him confessed their powerlessness, comp. John vii. 45 sq. But Strauss is wrong when he says that in John's stating that Jesus makes Himself known and surrenders Himself to His enemies, while the other accounts make Him to be pointed out by another, is involved "the whole of the distinction between the fourth Gospel and the older ones." John enriches the narrative with details; he makes the scene distinct and animated, but adds no new feature to the portraiture of Jesus. The other narrators depict Jesus as wearing the same aspect of grandeur and nobility; it shines forth, for example, in its wondrously intimate connection with His obedience, in the declaration to which Matthew gives especially frequent utterance, "This was done, that the Scriptures might be fulfilled." The greater the importance attached to the betrayal of Judas, in connection with the arrest of Jesus, and that not merely on account of its being the means by which it was accomplished, but because this act made the suffering which the arrest involved peculiarly bitter, the more important it was to show that this drop of His cup had also been apportioned for the Sufferer by God. In a certain sense this was already intimated by the circumstance that Jesus chose this disciple also, like all the others, by direction from above, and that He had to leave him in his place in the circle, even when He recognised in him the future traitor (John vi. 70, 71). But still more convincing evidence may be adduced, and that chiefly from the narrative itself. Judas erroneously imagined that the thought which he bore in his mind was profoundly concealed from all. And, in truth, it was hidden from

the eyes of his fellow-disciples up to the last; but the Lord Himself saw his plan gradually ripening, and never disguised from Judas the fact that his heart was read. Judas was of opinion that he was executing, by a free determination, a well-conceived scheme which promised him earthly gain, but after he had once turned away from the Saviour—undoubtedly of his own free will—then *necessity was laid upon him*[1] to become the traitor; his *act* was at the same time his fate. He hears the *imperative:* "That thou doest, do quickly" (John xiii. 27); he hears it in the very moment of betrayal. Ἑταῖρε, ἐφ' ὃ πάρει, said Jesus, when Judas kissed Him. As it is grammatically impossible to take ὅ in an interrogative sense, nothing remains but to assume an aposiopesis. But this assumption, and the words by which alone the sentence can be completed,—"*carry out* that for which thou art come,"—find decided support in the expression quoted above from John. Jesus sought to prevent the act of Judas by warnings only. And why was it only thus, to the exclusion of all other ways and means? Because herein also He was submitting to the divine counsel, for this too was ordained of God in regard to the suffering Messiah; the word of prophecy bore testimony to it. Not less expressly than He said of His Passion as a whole, that the prophets had announced it beforehand, did He designate the act of the traitor in particular as a fulfilment of Scripture. In order to justify the circumstance that He had not kept this particular member of the Twelve, He says, in His prayer to the Father (John xvii. 12), "that the Scripture might be fulfilled." With these same terms also He introduces to the disciples His predic-

[1] The ground of the repentance of Judas is to be found in this circumstance. That it included any moral element must be doubted, considering all that preceded, even although the son of perdition himself appears to acknowledge his crime. But neither does it resemble that "sorrow of the world" of which Paul speaks (2 Cor. vii. 10); it bears no relation to it whatsoever. Strauss is right when he says that it is difficult to understand how the traitor could be surprised that the condemnation of Jesus followed as the result of his act. The peculiar explanation of it, suggested by Meyer and others, evidences this. It was on something else that his eye was fixed when he saw that Jesus was condemned. It now becomes clear to him how *he* was chosen to bring this fate on the Messiah. It was not the guilt which he had incurred, considered in itself, which oppressed him so heavily, but it was the fact of its having been interwoven with the divine purpose, which drove him to despair, and the refuge of the despairing. The remorse of Judas and his self-murder, like his act generally, have no analogy in history. The judgment uttered by our Lord, therefore, in Matt. xxvi. 24, scarcely admits of an application to any other individual.

tion of the Judas-sin (John xiii. 18). In both passages the expression used is "the Scripture," and not, as elsewhere, "the Scriptures of the prophets," and this of itself suggests something different from a direct Messianic prediction. The passage which we find quoted from the Psalms is not in reality a direct prediction. Yet, while Christ had to leave out a part of the passage since it was not appropriate to His circumstances, the remainder certainly corresponds, with remarkable precision, to the state of the case before us. "He that eateth bread with Me hath lifted up his heel against Me." The foot which had just been washed by the Master is lifted up against Him by the false-hearted disciple, and that in an hour wherein he had taken of the bread placed by that Master upon His table. But if the Psalm was a description of the suffering of the righteous,—a suffering which was literally exemplified in the case of Him who was in the highest sense a righteous Man,—there was in this very circumstance a reason not only for enduring with patience, but also for accepting what was sent as appointed by God Himself.[1]

[1] No *direct* prediction as to the history of Judas is adduced, except the one quoted by the first Gospel (Matt. xxvii. 9, 10), from Zech. xi. 12 sq. While Strauss makes this passage the source of the entire "myth" as to the fate of the traitor, it has occasioned abundant difficulties to many interpreters, and opinions regarding it are very diverse. The initial difficulty, that the evangelist cites a prophecy which belongs to Zechariah, as spoken by Jeremiah, may possibly be got over in either of the following ways. We may hold, with one party, that Zechariah had borrowed an earlier prophecy (by Jeremiah), because a second fulfilment of it was impending (Bleek also supposes the prophecy in question to belong, as to its substance, to a much earlier period, probably to the time of the Jewish king Uzziah; he absolutely denies that it belongs to the time of the Zechariah who flourished after the exile),—so that Matthew quotes it in the same fashion as Mark makes his quotation, ch. i. 2, 3. Or we may hold, with another party: "Jeremiam inter prophetas primum habuisse locum, ac propterea Matthaeum Sacharjae textum sub Jeremiae titulo protulisse, quod is primus in volumine prophetarum esset,"—a view which receives a certain amount of support in the circumstance that, although the prophet Zechariah is often quoted in the Gospels, his *name* is never mentioned, while in no case are any names prefixed to the quotations of Matthew, except those of Isaiah and Jeremiah, no other prophet whatsoever being mentioned. But more serious difficulties are occasioned by the discrepancies between the words, as quoted by Matthew, and the original text as well as the Septuagint version, and in addition, by the rather obscure and apparently violent application which the evangelist makes of the prophetical passage. Strauss, with his usual ingenuity, puts his finger on all that is perplexing in the case. But the perplexity which we feel on first looking at the circumstances will be supplanted by a totally different feeling as soon as we abandon the preconceived opinion that Matthew wished to narrate the whole history of Judas, at least all that he says of him in ch. xxvii. 3 sq., in the light of prophecy, and fix our gaze on the point on which alone his eye rests. As to what

From God, therefore, came upon Jesus the suffering which was involved in the arrest, with all its attendant and aggravating circumstances. But why and for *what purpose* did the Father decree this in regard to His Son? This question may be evaded, or it may even be put aside as unprofitable and irrelevant, on the plea that it isolates and compels us to view by itself an individual feature of the subject which acquires importance simply from its connection with the whole. But the Gospel narrative itself compels us to examine it. The history of the arrest of Jesus concludes, in the narrative of Matthew, with these words: "All this was done that the Scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled." But to whom are these words to be attributed? A reference to the analogous statement in ch. i. 22 might dispose

this is, no doubt can exist. Had it been the intention of the evangelist to call attention, by means of a prophetic passage, to the *reward* which the traitor earned, it would have been the natural course for him, after recording in ch. xxvi. 15: *οἱ δὲ ἔστησαν αὐτῷ τριάκοντα ἀργύρια*, to quote the words in Zech. xi. 12, *καὶ ἔστησαν τὸ μισθόν μου τριάκοντα ἀργυροῦς*; but he has *not* done so. Or had it been of consequence to him to make a quotation bearing on the *repentance* of the traitor, then, after relating in ver. 5, *καὶ ῥίψας τὰ ἀργύρια ἐν τῷ ναῷ*, the words in Zechariah, *καὶ ἐνίβαλον αὐτοὺς εἰς οἶκον κυρίου*, would certainly not have escaped him; but these are just the words which he has scrupulously overlooked. Throughout he gives a mere summary of the general contents of the prophecy (Bengel: "Evangelista summam rei respicit et paraphrasin addit"); the words, "the price of Him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did value," suggest the idea of a summarizing and explanatory parenthesis,—"to wit, the price for Him that was valued, at which they valued Him in the name of the sons of Israel, the nation as such." On the other hand, one thing is emphasized. The expression "then was fulfilled" refers exclusively to vers. 6–8. "And they took" (ver. 9) refers to the word "took" in ver. 6; "and gave them for the potter's field" (ver. 10) refers to "and bought with them the potter's field" (ver. 7); and the words, "as the Lord appointed me," which bring into prominence a higher will, a divine decree, point back to ver. 8, to the fact that the potter's field thereafter bore the name of the field of blood, and remained until that day as a monument of the ingratitude of the Jewish people to testify against them. Matthew relates that the chief priests took the blood money, the reward of the traitor, and purchased with it the potter's field, from which it was named the field of blood. He was perfectly entitled to say that by this act was fulfilled the saying of the prophet, according to which the price at which Israel valued its Shepherd was to receive at God's command the destination אֶל הַיּוֹצֵר. Notwithstanding the *χωνευτήριον* of the Septuagint, and the "treasury" of the Syriac, Matthew has rightly rendered the Hebrew word. Grammatical reasons, as well as the passages in Jeremiah, entirely justify the translation of the evangelist, which undoubtedly possesses the proper seal of its accuracy in the fulfilment of the prophecy which followed. It behoves the theologian who believes the Scriptures to see in a case where the mere natural eye must recognise a remarkable coincidence, a confirmation of the saying, "This is the finger of God."

one to attribute them to the evangelist. But the authority of Mark (ch. xiv. 29) inclines us to the conclusion that they are to be included in the statement made by Christ Himself. If this assumption be correct, we may perhaps regard them as part of the announcement made by Jesus (Luke xxii. 52, 53) to the spiritual leaders of the people. But, however this may be, so much is clear, that the fulfilment of Scripture, to which Jesus here bears testimony, is to be referred to the arrest alone. The expression, "all this *was done*," cannot possibly be understood of anything but that which had already been accomplished. (The "all" is used in relation to the whole of the circumstances with which the arrest was attended, just as the word "all" in ch. i. 22 embraces the whole of the circumstances which, according to prophecy, had to co-operate, so that the Virgin should conceive, and, as a virgin, bring forth the Son who was to bear the name Immanuel.) We are not put in any perplexity, then, by the question, Was the arrest of Jesus the subject of any special prediction? When our Lord, according to Luke (ch. xxii. 37), says to His disciples on the way to Gethsemane, that this Scripture, "And He was reckoned among the transgressors," must be fulfilled in Him, we might feel ourselves impelled on various grounds to think specially of His bonds. But the fact that Mark (ch. xv. 28) sees this Scripture fulfilled only at the moment when Jesus hung upon the cross between the two thieves, at once forbids the supposition. But, on the other hand, we feel that we are entitled to assume that what is said in Matt. xxvi. 31: "All ye shall be offended because of Me this night: for it is written, I will smite the Shepherd, and the sheep of the flock shall be scattered abroad," is to be referred to the arrest of Jesus. We pass by the fact that the "sword" which was to awake (Zech. xiii. 7) shows itself on the same occasion ("*with swords*," Matt. xxvi. 47, 55); but it was just by it that the fellowship between the Shepherd and the sheep was dissolved, and the little flock scattered. ("All the disciples . . . fled," Matt. xxvi. 56; "scattered, every man to his own," John xvi. 32.) Peter also appears to have understood the words of His Lord in that sense, when he said to Him, "I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and to death" (Luke xxii. 33). But if the arrest of Jesus was a subject of prophecy,—of *the* prophecy which, in its sum and substance, was concerned with the atoning death of Jesus,—then

just as it was historically a preliminary step to the death of Jesus on the cross, so also it must have stood in an inward relation to the divine purpose which was accomplished in this death. What is this relation? Those who resolved on and carried out the arrest of Jesus—of Him who alone was truly free—did so because they themselves were fettered and bound, because they themselves were the servants of sin.[1] The Father gave His Son into their hands, because it was a step towards the accomplishment of the end contemplated in His eternal counsel, viz. that Jesus by dying should break the bonds of human sin. The command to "preach deliverance to the captives," was to be issued from the cross. What shall we say of the picture presented to us, when the hands of sinners bound our Lord, and thus fulfilled prophecy? This we may venture to say, nay, must say, while comprehending in one view the act of sin and the purpose of God,—by virtue of this part of His Passion, the Saviour *bore the sin of the world.*

### 2. THE TRIAL OF JESUS.

The attitude which Strauss takes up in regard to this part of the Passion history of Jesus is not altogether clear. While in the first or positive part of his work he does not appear to discover anything historically improbable in the essential contents of the narrative, and even in the later or critical part, which he calls the "mythical history of Jesus," declares the differences in the evangelical accounts to be insignificant and non-essential; yet he appears again to withdraw his admissions for the greater part. For he attributes to the writers a *tendency* influencing them to give a turn to the facts which they were setting forth, so that they might not include anything which could prove a stumbling-block to faith. And he maintains that the author of the fourth Gospel, who, moreover, was very ill informed as to the persons concerned with trying our Lord, and makes entirely erroneous historical assumptions in regard to them, undoubtedly invented

[1] Our Lord's own statement (John viii. 34 sq.) points in this very direction: "Ye seek to kill Me." With these words He turns to those whom He had described as the "servants of sin," as persons who required to be set free by the power of the free Son of God. "Ye seek to kill Me," He says, with evident allusion to the order for His arrest which had been issued by the chief priests and Pharisees (ch. vii. 32), an order which the officers were at that time unable to execute (ch. vii. 46).

the trial before Annas, for the special purpose "of representing Jesus as having been repudiated and maltreated by two Jewish high priests;" while he has nothing left to say of the trial before Caiaphas, which is reported by the Synoptists, from having already used up its materials. By means of these assertions, Strauss has gone far beyond all previous criticism. Even Schleiermacher shares the conviction, which is immediately forced upon one's mind, and which is confirmed on all sides, that John assumes the trial before Caiaphas as already known; and almost all interpreters have received from this very part of his narrative the impression that the author is recording what he had witnessed with his own eyes. No doubt the evangelists had a particular purpose in view when describing the trial of Jesus, but only one, namely, to tell *what had occurred;* Christendom had to be made acquainted with it, and it is the office of exegesis to apply itself to the understanding of that which they relate as fact.

The SUFFERING which our Lord endured on account of His trial is the feature which immediately and chiefly comes under our notice. His trial, considered even in itself, was an especial cause of suffering. At least those must so judge who believe in His divinity. He was subjected to man's judgment (*ἀνθρωπίνη ἡμέρα*). An apostle, a servant and steward, declares that it was a small thing for him to be judged by man's judgment (1 Cor. iv. 3), and in various ways he gave very decided expression to his feeling that it was a small thing (comp. Acts xxiii. 3), but now He who is Lord over all must needs submit willingly and meekly to such a judgment. He is accused of sin who never committed sin. He is called to answer for Himself who is answerable to no one save to His heavenly Father. Sentence is passed upon Him, and yet it is He to whom God has given "authority to execute judgment because He is the Son of man" (John v. 27), and by whom God has determined one day to judge the world in righteousness. Again, it is a spiritual court before which He is called to stand, a court whose judgments must rest on the basis of divine truth, and He is this truth itself; through Him it existed upon earth, He bore testimony to it, and His lips never spoke anything save it alone. It is, finally, a court composed of the shepherds and guides of the people of Israel before which He is to answer: He who is the true Shepherd, whom the Father sent into the world to take charge of His sheep, is called

to account for entering the sheepfold. They whose duty it was to open the door for Him, make it a ground of accusation that He had come to His own. But there are accessory circumstances which add to the already heavy burden of suffering. There is a common tendency to regard the pain and shame of bodily maltreatment to which our Lord was subjected on two several occasions during the course of His trial (John xviii. 22; Matt. xxvi. 67, 68), as a feature of His experience to which no particular significance is to be attached, especially as none of the evangelists, in relating these circumstances, mentions the prophecy (Isa. l. 6) which refers to them. It has been left chiefly to Christian hymnology to commemorate the *facies sputis illita.* Just as an apostle, when giving a comprehensive description of the sufferings of his condition ("we are made as the filth of the world, the offscouring of all things"), gives prominence to the experience of "buffeting" as one which was peculiarly felt; so, doubtless, the first experience of bodily maltreatment which our Lord endured would heavily oppress His consciousness. If His whole bearing hitherto has been such that He seemed to say, "Touch me not," He has now to say, but in a very different sense from that in which He once used the words, "Who touched me?" Now they do violence to the countenance which was the express image of the Father's person, and the brightness of His glory. What we see is not a swift, impulsive emotion, issuing in a hasty and inconsiderate act, but an inveterate and long-cherished hatred obtaining the gratification it had longed for. No one takes His part as He stands there before the judgment-seat of Israel. "At my first answer (defence) no man stood with me," says Paul (2 Tim. iv. 16) at a later time, "but all forsook me;" and he addresses to Timothy the admonition, "Be not thou, therefore, ashamed of the testimony of our Lord, nor of me His prisoner." Our Lord Himself had no need of human assistance, nor did He desire it: "Ye shall leave me alone; and yet I am not alone, because the Father is with me," John xvi. 32. The disciple whom we see appearing upon the scene does not aim at accomplishing anything. Peter forces his way into the court of the high priest's palace, with the view, as is expressly stated, of watching the issue of the matter (Matt. xxvi. 58). This was an interest which, considering *his* relation to Jesus, he was not able to repress. Consequently, he can neither be praised for courag-

eously facing the peril which the step he took seemed to involve, nor be blamed because, instead of availing himself of the opportunity of retiring from observation, secured for the disciples by Jesus at the time of His arrest, he forgot the express warning which he had received, and entered into a situation which was full of temptation,—a situation which was too much for his strength. Christ had foreseen and predicted Peter's fall, and had also warded off the consequences which might have followed from it by His intercession. Yet the error of His disciple gave Jesus a severe pang. As the suffering caused by the arrest was intensified by the circumstance that Judas was the agent of it, so the suffering which Jesus endured on the occasion of His trial was intensified by Peter's denial. In both cases the connection is not merely historical, it is inward. While Christ witnesses His "good confession" before the rulers of the people, the chief of His disciples does the very reverse before the crowd of servants.[1] The Lord bears solemn testimony to the truth, and maintains its claims with unshaken mind; Peter cuts himself adrift from the honourable position of a disciple in consequence of his thrice-repeated protestations, and absolutely denies, confirming his denial with an oath, that he stood in any kind of relation to Jesus, or that he was even acquainted with Him, as if it were a matter of which one could not but be ashamed. But such a denial comes dangerously near being a direct confession to him who asked Jesus regarding His disciples (John xviii. 17–21). This it was, and nothing else than this, which gave its sting to the glance which Jesus cast upon His disciple, and it was the source of the bitterness which marked his repentance.

[1] This view still remains valid, even if the denials of Peter should all have taken place, as some expositors think, *previous to* the procedure before Caiaphas. For all that is required is to refer them to that phase of the Passion of Jesus which is concerned with His trial before the rulers of the people. In other respects the diversities which appear in the evangelical accounts of the fall of Peter are of no importance. The real order of events was probably this, that the first denial took place before the maid-servant who kept the door; the second, before the servants beside the fire of coals, who, on their attention being called to Peter by the portress, or on their suspicions being aroused by the disciple's own behaviour, recognise him by the shibboleth of his Galilean accent; while the third took place in consequence of the charge made against him by the relative of Malchus. If Matthew speaks of an ἄλλη παιδίσκη, and Luke of a ἕτερός τις, who occasioned the second act of denial, the inconsistency disappears in presence of the obvious intention to emphasize the quality of the persons before whom and for whom the disciple of truth cast away his honour—they were ignoble servants or female slaves.

The suffering involved in the very fact of being tried appears in a still clearer light when we look at the *sin* which was its procuring cause. The object of a trial is to bring out the truth in regard to the subject under investigation; any such judicial proceeding must be conducted with this single aim. In the present case, however, the narrative shows us nothing but the action and tendency of falsehood. The persons who here appear before us propose to keep their Passover with the "malice and wickedness" which stand in direct contrast to "sincerity and truth" (1 Cor. v. 8). We recognise once more the persons who on many occasions and in many ways laid snares for our Lord's feet. It is true that devices *of the same kind* are no longer required, but whatever is needed the ingenuity of deceit will be able to provide. The falsity of the Sanhedrim considered in general consisted in this, that its decision was arrived at beforehand, so that legal forms were observed simply with the view of justifying and carrying it out. This is evidenced by the allusion which John makes to the opinion of Caiaphas, and which he prefixes to his narrative of the Passion, namely, that the removal of Jesus was a matter of necessity,—an opinion which influenced the Council to adopt a resolution in accordance with it (John xi. 49 sqq.). And the same fact is emphasized in the statement made by our Lord Himself, and which Luke has preserved (ch. xxii. 68), that, notwithstanding anything He might say or anything that might arise, He could not expect to escape out of their hands. Consequently, all the subsequent proceedings at each successive step of their progress were characterized by deception and falsehood. This holds, in the first place, even of the trial before Annas, for we speak of a trial conducted before and by Annas. The chiliarch had brought Jesus as a prisoner to the palace of the high priest. The conjecture of Euthymius Zigabenus, that Annas and Caiaphas may have occupied this palace in common, will always have probability in its favour, although it does not admit of being absolutely proved. But why was Jesus not brought at once into the presence of the reigning high priest, in whose name the order for His arrest had been issued, and with whom rested the further conduct of the matter? The hypothesis that Annas was invested with an official authority, whether as the סָגָן of the high priest, or as the נָשִׂיא of the Sanhedrim, or as the head of the judicial faculty,—however

satisfactorily the last of these suppositions would explain the circumstances of the case,—is not possessed of sufficient archaeological support, nor does it harmonize with the narrative of John. But the representation given by the evangelist also excludes the view that Caiaphas, out of a feeling of respect towards his father-in-law, caused Jesus to be conducted, in the first place, into the apartments of Annas, and there, in his presence and hearing, subjected the Prisoner to a preliminary investigation. When we read in John xviii. 13, that they "led Him away to Annas first," the high priest mentioned in ver. 19 can be no other than Annas himself,[1] and, in the light of the statement in ver. 24,—"Annas had sent Him bound unto Caiaphas,"—the presence of Caiaphas during the previous proceedings becomes almost unimaginable. (Had Caiaphas been on the spot during this first investigation, or had it been conducted by himself, Annas merely standing by as a passive spectator, the evangelist could not have expressed himself as he has done in ver. 24. The words "Annas had sent Him" presuppose that Annas had been the really acting person up to that time; in the opposite case, it would not be possible to speak of a "sending" at his instance. And undoubtedly the only meaning that can be attached to the words, "unto Caiaphas the high priest," is that, after his dialogue with Jesus, Annas dismissed Him to the reigning high priest, who had up to that time taken no share in the proceedings.) It is even in itself probable, and it becomes quite clear from vv. 13, 14, that in the bosom of the high-priestly family — undoubtedly, however, from motives altogether different from those which influenced the party of the Pharisees—the destruction of Jesus had

[1] The objection, that ὁ ἀρχιερεύς with the article is inappropriate, as applied to Annas, is not a valid one. No doubt, in the cases where this designation is found in the Gospels, we naturally think of no one else but Caiaphas, unless there be some intimation to the contrary. But in the present instance the argument loses its plausibility, from the circumstance that ver. 19 points back to the statement in ver. 13, that Jesus was brought to Annas first, and, further, that Annas, the ex-high priest, as the head of the γένος ἀρχιερατικόν and the soul of the Sanhedrim, had a higher right to the title than had the prominent members of the Council, such as the chiefs of the priestly class, whom the fourth evangelist is also in the habit of designating ἀρχιερεῖς (ch. vii. 32, 45, xii. 10). Luke consequently (Acts iv. 6) expressly calls Annas ὁ ἀρχιερεύς, and in his Gospel (iii. 2), as well as in the Acts, always places him before Caiaphas. This usage of the third evangelist sweeps the foundation from under the confident assertion of Hengstenberg (*l.c.* p. 165), that we must undoubtedly think of Caiaphas as the person referred to.

been a subject of consideration. The resolution which was adopted is unquestionably to be traced back to the influence of Annas, whom age, reputation, and experience placed at the head of the priestly class. The judgment expressed by Caiaphas, to which reference is made in ver. 14, was probably "not of himself" in an additional sense to that in which the evangelist so described it in an earlier passage; the words "not of himself" (comp. John xviii. 34) are appropriate, inasmuch as the opinion to which Caiaphas gave expression also embodied the views of his father-in-law. If some kind of preliminary process was necessary in order to pave the way for the final disposal of the case by the assembled Sanhedrim, the only person fitted and called to conduct this process was Annas (this and nothing more is implied in the intimation, "for he was father-in-law to Caiaphas," John xviii. 13); and, in point of fact, such a preliminary process was necessary. The different character of the trial before Annas, as compared with the later one, appears at once on its being examined. But the opinion that it was "a result of mere curiosity," as if the high priest resembled a Herod, does not rightly apprehend its distinctive peculiarity, nor yet is it correctly described by the statement that its object was "to procure material for our Lord's impeachment before the supreme tribunal." By means of a comparison with John vii. 50 sqq. we succeed in arriving at a more satisfactory view of the matter. There Nicodemus asks them the damaging question: "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doeth?" The proceeding before the Sanhedrim was, from the very beginning, nothing else than a "judging." That which Annas does, on the other hand, corresponds exactly to that which was desiderated by the "secret disciple." By his agency is accomplished that which must take place *before* judgment is passed. Undoubtedly the questions asked by the high priest were mere concessions to the forms of law. As to the doctrine and the followers of Jesus, the hierarchs were already perfectly well informed. The Pharisees and Sadducees entered the field of controversy in opposition to the doctrines promulgated by our Lord, and they had dealings with His disciples also on many occasions. The fact that His doctrine was beginning to work as a leaven in the minds of the people, and that the crowd of His adherents was increasing, even in Judea, to a

threatening extent, was the acknowledged reason for their interfering with Him (John xii. 19). But in the very circumstance that Annas asks Him questions merely for the sake of appearances, without having any true and honest reason for doing so,—asking only for the sake of asking,—in this consisted the insincerity which our Lord reproves in His answer, "Why askest thou Me?" The "why" is emphatic.[1] "Why dost thou ask Me as to facts which are notorious and well known? Hast thou any reason for so doing? Canst thou be in earnest? Thy question is a mere pretence." But the falsity of the enemies of Jesus becomes much more conspicuous on the occasion of the trial before Caiaphas. It brings to light that connection between falsehood and murderous thoughts, between the "liar" and the "murderer," which has its origin in Satan (John viii. 44). It is the obvious intention of Matthew's narrative to draw the attention of his readers to this (ch. xxvi. 59). They "sought false witness against Jesus *to put Him to death.*" This was the result which was to be accomplished at all hazards. The means were *sought.* The remark of Euthymius touches the very root of the matter: *ὡς μὲν ἐκείνοις ἐδόκει, μαρτυρίαν, ὡς δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ψευδομαρτυρίαν.* It was not testimony which they sought, but *false* testimony, for nothing else would have served their purpose. Consequently Mark speaks of a bearing of false witness, even where a truth underlay the thing stated (Mark xiv. 57); and he was entitled to do so, both in relation to those who instituted the search, and to those who were found willing, or who were possibly bribed to testify, and who therefore were "false witnesses" in the sense of Ps. xxxv. 11. The members of the Sanhedrim vie with each other in their eagerness to procure such witnesses ("*all* the Council sought," Matt. xxvi. 59), and they assemble a great number of them (*many,* Mark xiv. 56). Our Lord is surrounded by "bloody and deceitful men." But He is silent, and maintains His silence unbroken (see Mark's striking way of emphasizing this circumstance: "But He held His peace, and answered nothing," ch. xiv. 61), however much the judge urged Him to

[1] The word *τί* in the Gospel of John is used for the most part to introduce a question of a very grave character addressed to the conscience,—a question which insists on being considered and disposed of. Comp. ch. vii. 19: "Why (*τί*) go ye about to kill Me?" What is your real motive—not your pretended one? what is the essential ground of your determination to do so? Similarly ch. xviii. 23, etc.

break it. He keeps silence, not in a spirit of "lofty self-consciousness," but because the circumstances of the case, to wit, the discrepancies between the testimonies which were adduced, constituted His proper defence. Even in the case of the later testimonies, which corresponded best with the wishes of the accusers ("*neither so* did their witness agree," Mark xiv. 59), the prerequisites to a sentence of condemnation required by the law were not supplied. He keeps silence, and that, no doubt, partly with the view of bringing out in an additional respect the corrupt character of the tribunal before which He was placed, so that it might be reproved by the light. But the narrative reveals the malice and falsity, not only of the persons who were the principal actors in connection with the trial, but also of those who co-operated to increase the sufferings of Jesus during its progress. This holds, in the first place, of those who maltreated the person of the Accused. The servant of Annas was not simply obeying the impulses of a rude and cruel nature in his treatment of the defenceless Prisoner; nor were the members of the Sanhedrim, who heaped insult upon Him when He was condemned to death, influenced merely by a bitterness originating in fanaticism. The former acted in a spirit of sycophantic eye-service as evidently as the latter hypocritically pretended to an indignation which they did not feel. Annas was unable to meet the convincing reply of our Lord. The slave takes upon himself the shattered cause of his perplexed master, calculating that such a service will not remain unacknowledged and unrewarded. "Why smitest thou Me?" What is thy motive for an act for which the circumstances themselves afford no warrant? And the priests, accompanying the utterance of the sentence of condemnation, "He is guilty of death," with an outburst of indignant and excited feeling, follow in the steps of him who stood at their head and gave them the example. Caiaphas made as if he were deeply surprised, even shocked, at the unexampled claim which he heard, and yet it was well known to him. His own question implied that our Lord made such a claim. In the feeling which he assumes, for the sake of appearances, certain of his associates profess to share. They exhibit the signs of an emotion which they did not in reality feel, and which they succeeded in exciting in themselves only by their own deed of violence. The circumstance that our Lord withholds, in relation to them, that manifes-

tation of the meekness of His character which shone forth so conspicuously in the words He addressed to the servant of Annas, is explained by the prophecy which "went before." It was left to the mockers to make that application of it which Bengel has pointed out: "olim videbitis, quis quem verberaveritis." Had Christ Himself spoken in the line of this application, a threat would have proceeded from His lips; but, "suffering, He threatened not," says the apostle of Him (1 Pet. ii. 23), and, as we believe, with special allusion to this particular occurrence.

As to Peter, finally, the soul of this disciple was undoubtedly a stranger to the falsity and insincerity of the enemies of Jesus. But he shared their sin, inasmuch as lying was found in his mouth also. In describing the sin of Peter, the Scripture invariably uses the expression ἀρνεῖσθαι, or ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. In that sense in which the expression is employed in other passages, the apostle does not appear to have been guilty of denying His Lord. The "denying" which is spoken of in 2 Tim. ii. 12, 1 John ii. 22, presupposes a shipwreck of faith; but as Peter stood beside the fire of coals, he was very far from casting out of his heart the confession which he had once made in the presence of Christ! To such a result his act *could* have led him; it contained the germ and involved the possibility of apostasy: but "I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not" (Luke xxii. 32). Even the case contemplated by our Lord's statement in Matt. x. 33: "Whosoever shall deny Me before men," when regarded strictly, was not quite exemplified by the sin of Peter. What he was guilty of was simply a lie, but a lie streaked with the lurid light of apostasy, partly on account of its being confirmed by oath, and partly because of the subject with which it was concerned. The contrast between the protestation: "I know not the man," and the earlier utterance: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," is one to which interpreters have justly drawn attention. But this lie is described as a denial of Jesus, for this reason, that by means of it the disciple was in a certain sense made a participator in the guilt of those to whom he himself testified at a subsequent time: "Ye denied (ἠρνήσασθε) the Holy One and the Just" (Acts iii. 14).

The Sanhedrim did not attain its purpose in the manner contemplated by its cunning scheme. The attempt to bring Jesus in guilty and to pronounce a sentence of condemnation upon

Him in the name of the law, on the ground of testimony borne against Him, failed. And it was bound to fail. This was ordained from above; God did not permit lying and malice to bear away the victory: "for it is written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness" (1 Cor. iii. 19). And with the view of providing scope for this action on the part of His Father, Jesus persists in His silence, notwithstanding the earnestness with which the high priest endeavoured to induce Him to open His lips. But the attempt was destined to break down, that it might become clear that the claim which Jesus preferred was the solitary ground of His condemnation,—the builders rejected the corner-stone, the husbandmen cast the heir out of the vineyard. Undoubtedly the tribunal submitted to the necessity of admitting this as their true motive with extreme reluctance. Even before Pilate the accusers hold it in reserve as long as possible. Matthew, in making the high priest ask his solemn question at Jesus, immediately after the failure of the attempt to obtain concurrent testimony against Him, is influenced probably by the wish to bring into immediate juxtaposition the pretext and the actual truth ("the truth of God hath more abounded through *their* lie"); but Luke gives us the more exact view of the historical order of events. According to the narrative of the third evangelist, the question as to the Messiahship of Jesus was put, in the first instance, only in a general sense ("if thou art the Christ"). Our Lord declined the discussion of the question as useless, in the same way as He had done before, according to John x. 25; but He gave them clearly to understand in what sense He claimed for Himself the Messianic dignity (*υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Bengel: *colligebant ex praedicato*, V. 69). And then only does Caiaphas utter the solemn and comprehensive formula of adjuration: *εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The outspoken reply of the accused (Paul calls it a "good confession") places the high priest in circumstances to declare further testimony unnecessary. But the question was, whether a sentence of condemnation could be grounded upon it. The Sanhedrim, as a matter of fact, maintained the affirmative: "they all condemned Him to be guilty of death," Mark xiv. 64. Thus far, therefore, their plan had succeeded, and *in this manner* it was to succeed, "according to the counsel and foreknowledge of God;" from the hands of *God*, therefore, Jesus received the suffering involved in His condemnation. We have already stated that we refer the passage

in 1st Peter (ii. 23) to the circumstances of Christ's trial. The "reviling" which was heaped upon Him consisted in this, that His "good confession" was characterized as blasphemy (Matt. xxv. 65), and Jesus refrained from "reviling again," to the extent of not even replying to His calumniators with such words as He used in John viii. 55, that He should be a liar *like unto them*, if He were to refrain from bearing testimony unto Himself. But as for the words, "committed Himself to Him that judgeth righteously," they are to be understood, not according to the analogy of Rom. xii. 19, but only of a humbling of Himself under the hand of God, from whom He accepted what He here endures.[1] When we say, then, that the sentence of condemnation which was passed upon our Lord came *from God*, we do not mean that it came from Him merely in the sense already pointed out at an earlier stage. Undoubtedly we adhere to the view then stated, that a sentence passed by this tribunal cannot possibly be regarded as the result of mere human arbitrariness. The Sanhedrim was still invested with a divine authority: "The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat" (Matt. xxii. 2); and causes like the present belonged properly to those which that body was empowered to decide. We have referred, it is true, to the corruptness which characterized the whole proceedings; however, no one can say that they were informal or tumultuary. The members of the judicial body were all assembled together (Mark's carefulness to emphasize this fact is to be noted: "all the chief priests and the elders and the scribes," ch. xiv. 53), and whatever else the law prescribed was duly observed. Accordingly, the high priests, in the presence of Pilate, lay stress on the fact that their sentence was passed in accordance with the law, and pronounced in the name of God. However, we do not fall back exclusively on this somewhat external aspect of the matter, but will be at pains to look into it more narrowly. That the associates of the Sanhedrim (individuals like Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus excepted) were filled with a profound hatred of Jesus—so much is evident. Whether this hatred proceeded from envy, as Pilate thought (Mark xv. 10), or from some deeper root,

[1] The very remarkable translation of the Vulgate: "tradebat autem judicanti se *injuste*," which is also found in Cyprian, can scarcely rest upon a different reading, but must have originated in the wish to give a more satisfactory interpretation.

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it is enough that it undoubtedly existed. But for all that, the question still remains an open one, whether or not those who were assembled, or even the majority of them, pronounced the sentence: "He is guilty of death," in perfect calmness of mind and under the influence of complete conviction. Caiaphas, Annas, and other Sadducean members of the Supreme Council seem to have entirely abandoned the Messianic expectations of Israel, in so far as these expectations rested on the promise of God and were animated by a religious spirit. At all events, their conceptions of the Messiah were of such a character, that the claim which Jesus put forth, altogether apart from the fact of its proceeding from His hated lips, seemed even in itself to be blasphemous. Undoubtedly this was the state of mind of many Pharisees as well. At least the incidents which are narrated in the fifth, and especially in the tenth chapter of the fourth Gospel, can be understood only on this assumption. There the Jews crowd upon our Lord, with the urgent request that He would put an end to their painful uncertainties by making an unambiguous declaration regarding Himself. A simple affirmative answer to their question ("if thou be the Christ, tell us plainly," John x. 24) could not possibly have occasioned the violent outburst of wrath which brought them to the point of stoning Him. But the words which embodied the self-testimony of the omnipotent Son of God, "I and the Father are one," well account for the intense degree of their exasperation; and that which they regard as a blasphemous assumption is to them sufficient evidence that Jesus is not the promised Messiah. To others, again, the fact of His coming from Galilee, and not from Bethlehem, may have occasioned strong and sincere doubts of His Messiahship (John vii. 41, 52). But still the number of those who were more or less firmly persuaded that He was the expected Messiah, was always considerable. Comp. John xii. 42: "Nevertheless among the chief rulers also many believed on Him." This conviction was forced on them by His miracles.[1] The remark added by the

[1] This explains why the Sanhedrim omitted to adduce at the trial of Jesus a charge which was immediately available, and which appeared to promise certain success. It was notorious that our Lord had transgressed the Sabbath law, according to Jewish conceptions of it. This was the first substantial ground of the hostility of the Pharisees to Him (John v. 16), and it was believed that it might be certainly inferred therefrom that He was not sent from God ("This man is not of God, because he keepeth not the Sabbath day," John ix. 16), and it

evangelist sufficiently explains, indeed, why they did not openly acknowledge their views; but neither this nor any other psychological mode of explanation is adequate to resolve the difficulty, that, nevertheless, they too voted Him "worthy of death." The fear of man is undoubtedly an important factor, yet by itself it does not make any one an "unjust judge." The majority, under the leadership of an Annas and a Caiaphas, may have concussed and intimidated the minority, or may have influenced them to abandon their opposition, but they did not compel them to pass a unanimous sentence of condemnation. When such a sentence proceeds, nevertheless, out of the mouth even of those who were believers, in a more or less decided sense, we feel it all the stranger since the bearing of Jesus in this hour was far more fitted to fan a glimmering faith into a flame, than to extinguish its feeble sparks. It is not necessary, nor is there any occasion to magnify the answer of Jesus to the question of the high priest, so as to give it the character of a modified oath. By doing so we lose in substance what we gain in appearance. "Thou hast said," so Matthew reports His statement; and thus we believe He answered in reality, precisely as He had done to Judas Iscariot (ch. xxvi. 25). But Mark indicates to us the sense in which the answer was made, when he translates it into the simple affirmation, "I am" (xiv. 62). The assumption of an oath is not justified by the circumstances of the case. One may assert by oath what one has done or suffered, but it is *impossible* to affirm by oath what one *is*. But Caiaphas put the question in this form: "Tell us whether thou be the Christ?" (and He was *compelled* to put it thus), not in the form, "whether thou hast made or constituted thyself the Christ?" Just as a believer can merely *confess* that He is a Christian, but cannot swear it, so also the "good confession" of Jesus Christ excludes the idea of an oath. But this very testimony, borne by Jesus to Himself at a decisive moment, plain and simple as it was, contained a

would have been easy to procure harmonious testimonies to support this charge. Sentence of death might then have been passed, on the ground of it, in accordance with Ex. xxxi. 14. However, the Sanhedrim was scrupulously silent as to this matter. Had the opposite course been pursued, it would have come out inevitably that our Lord never broke in on the Sabbath stillness, except to work beneficial miracles. But it was indispensable to avoid all reference to the signs which He wrought, out of regard to those members of the Council who had been influenced by them to believe in Him.

force of truth[1] which was capable of banishing even firmly-rooted doubts, and which must have tended, if we may judge by universal experience, to advance faith where it existed to a higher stage of development. How happened it, then, that those in whom the words of Jesus had fulfilled their mission coincided, on the ground of these His words, in the sentence, "He is guilty of death"? The apostles abandon from the outset all attempts to give a psychological explanation of the condemnation of Jesus. Paul has nothing else to say except that the Jewish rulers did not know the hidden wisdom of God (1 Cor. ii. 8); he speaks of their being blinded, and of their being hardened. Those who here sit in judgment upon Christ, are themselves the subjects of a divine judgment; those who see are made blind, and they act under the influence of their blindness. This is the only key to unfold the mystery of the unanimity of the sentence passed by the Sanhedrim, on which account we are not only entitled, but even necessitated to come to the conclusion that its sentence proceeded from God Himself.

If, then, a higher will was thus accomplished, *what end* had God in view in thus determining in His eternal counsel? In regard to this point, the least satisfactory of all expedients is the ordinary one, that a formal condemnation was the indispensable preliminary to the further procedure before Pilate. It was in itself quite imaginable that Jesus should be cast out of the city and put to death by stoning, as was afterwards done to Stephen, in defiance of the forms of law. True, indeed, this might not be, nor was it fitting that it should be; but what special definite end was served by this arrangement of the Divine Providence? The explanation appears to be given by the words spoken by Jesus immediately before His condemnation. He does not rest content with answering the question of the high priest, but He appends to it a prediction (Matt. xxvi. 64). The transition particle πλήν (Matt. xxvi. 64) prevents us regarding the prophetic announcement simply as the necessary consequence of the foregoing self-testimony, or even only as its development; it introduces a new feature. Our Lord points to the judicial authority with which the Father was on the point of investing Him, and which was thenceforth to be recognisable by every one.

[1] Even Strauss has not been quite able to deny its force. Dorner has therefore been able to carry out a successful criticism in opposition to Strauss, from the point of view of this passage. See his *Gesch. der prot. Theol.* p. 839.

The relation between the "sitting" and the "coming" is as follows. The former denotes the possession of the authority received (the "authority to execute judgment," John v. 27), the latter its manifestation before the eyes of men, which was to begin from that hour (*ἀπάρτι; ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν*; Luke, and precisely and definitely in John viii. 28: "when ye have lifted up the Son of man"). The expression *ἀπάρτι ὄψεσθε* (comp. John i. 51), as well as the position given to the principal ideas, decidedly excludes the idea of a reference to the second coming of Christ to judgment, or to those incidents which may be regarded as types of it.[1] The prediction refers entirely to the succeeding intermediate period, when the Father so manifestly exalts His Son to the position of Lord and Christ (*κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν ἐποίησεν*, Acts ii. 36) that every tongue must confess Him, and every knee bow before Him,—"then shall ye know that I am He," John viii. 28. But the words being thus clear in themselves, we ask what was our Lord's purpose in making the announcement, which He introduced by *πλήν*? The contrast between Him who was here judged and condemned and Him who was thenceforth to bear the sceptre of dominion in His judging hand, as the "Lord God Almighty," occurs undoubtedly to the mind of every observer. Yet the mere establishing of this contrast does not answer the question which has been raised.[2] The conjecture, on the other hand, that Christ may have uttered the prediction in the tone of a threat, is entirely inconsistent with the express declaration of the apostle: "when He suffered, He threatened not." But the words themselves also, notwithstanding the persons before whom they were spoken, do not at all produce on our minds the impression of a threat, when we consider the nature of the governmental position which our Lord says He is to assume from that time onwards. Just as the fourth evangelist is not contemplating a retributive visitation when he quotes the words of the prophet: "they shall look on Him whom they have pierced," but is pointing to the fountain opened for sin and un-

[1] In such cases *ἔρχεσθαι* stands first and *καθῆσθαι* follows. Comp. Matt. xxv. 31: "When the Son of man shall *come* . . . then He shall *sit* upon the throne of His glory."

[2] This is the view taken by Baumgarten in his thoughtful investigation of the trial of Jesus (comp. *Gesch. Jesu*, p. 372): "Jesus Himself is oppressed by this contrast, and He Himself requires to be sustained by glancing into the future which is worthy of His character and nature. Those who were present also—His judges—He wishes to lift up to a view of the same contrast."

cleanness, so a like application is to be made of the prediction of a kingdom whose Ruler is at the same time a high priest after the order of Melchisedec. For the true and proper object of His rule is not the vanquishing of enemies, but the rescue and salvation of the world. Amid all the severity of judgment against sin, access to the throne of grace is open for sinners. The weight of the prophecy of Jesus, therefore, rests not on the *contrast* between the condemned One and the future Judge, but upon the *connection* between the condemnation and the sovereignty which was about to be inaugurated. The death which followed as the result of Christ's utterance was designed by God to be an atoning death, and the sentence which preceded it was also intended by God in a corresponding sense. It became Him, writes the apostle, who brings many sons to glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings, and to crown Him with glory and honour by the suffering of death. According to the principle here laid down, we may venture to say that it behoved Him whose will it was to justify many children, to elevate the Mediator of their righteousness to judicial dignity through the indignity of condemnation. The question was to be asked from the cross, Who shall accuse? who shall condemn? Therefore it was fitting that He who forbids all accusation and condemnation, as He sits on the right hand of power, should first have been Himself accused by the lips of sinners and condemned. But if that which our Lord suffered before the tribunal of Israel was arranged by God with this view, then the proposition is true, that by virtue of His trial and condemnation Jesus *bore the sin of the world*,—that He *carried* it to the cross, on which He was called to atone for it by His death.

### 3. THE SURRENDER OF JESUS TO THE GENTILES.

The Sanhedrim did not at once proceed to the praetorium of Pilate after pronouncing Jesus "guilty of death." The assumption of certain expositors, that in the early morning Jesus was subjected to a second trial before Caiaphas, is, however, entirely erroneous. This has been assumed because the unquestionable identity of the two passages, Luke xxii. 66–71 and Matt. xxvi. 62–65, has been overlooked, and because the indefinite notification of time given by the third evangelist: "as soon as it was day" (Luke xxii. 66),

has been taken in too rigid a sense. At the same time, some kind of further negotiation was necessary on the part of the Supreme Council even after sentence of death had been pronounced. They required to come to an understanding as to the manner in which they might induce the governor to carry out their decision. Owing to the strained character of their relations to him, they were unable to calculate on his willingness to do so. They knew full well that he was not the man to aid them in carrying out their resolutions by freely placing the executive arm at their disposal, and that they could only hope to gain his consent as the result of a conflict. It was necessary, therefore, to devise a likely plan for the accomplishment of this result. Towards daybreak (*πρωΐας γενομένης, ἐπὶ τὸ πρωΐ*) they engage in deliberations on the subject. This was the "taking counsel," the "consultation" alluded to in Matt. xxvii. 1 and Mark xv. 1. They arrive at a unanimous (*πάντες*) finding as to the manner in which the execution of their sentence of condemnation is to be urged, and they expect to gain by means of it the wished-for result (*ὥστε θανατῶσαι αὐτόν*). Now, therefore, they hesitate no longer; "straightway" (Mark xv. 1) the whole Council proceeds to the residence of the governor, and Jesus, who had been placed under guard meanwhile in the court of the high priest's palace, is led with them in bonds. Strauss attributes historical probability to the narrative of the proceedings before Pilate only in its most general features. The attitude taken up by Pilate, according to the evangelical accounts, he regards as unhistorical, and he believes that the origin of these representations may be discovered in the circumstance that Christianity was turning away from Judaism more and more, and turning towards heathendom with hope. In the state of feeling which obtained in regard to this question at the time when the individual Gospels were written in those quarters where they originated, he seeks for the genesis of the different narratives of this phase of the Passion history of Jesus. True, indeed, there are no discrepancies, properly so called, in the four narratives; they are mutually complementary, and the various features fit into each other in such a way that they remove apparent difficulties instead of creating difficulties which are real. Nothing remains which can be felt in the slightest degree disturbing by the reader, or which he could wish removed. But undoubtedly

we do find here and there statements of a peculiar character, and these have supplied criticism with a pretext for assuming that the authors were influenced by "tendencies" which coloured their narratives. Here the author of the fourth Gospel is an object of peculiar disfavour. In his time, it is said, the Greek-Roman world was the appropriate field for the diffusion of Christianity; consequently the process conducted before the heathen tribunal was depicted in a manner which harmonized with the feelings of the Christendom of the period, but scarcely so as to harmonize with the actual facts of the case. It is at once apparent how little this assumption accords with the views of the Apocalypse, and particularly how far it is from according with the fact that the Christians were visited with bloody persecutions in the first and second centuries by the heathen powers. On the other hand, the principal objection raised by Strauss against the historical credibility of the transactions said to have taken place before Pilate is certainly worthy of consideration. He makes the remark that Pilate could only have acted as he is represented to have done in the Gospel narratives, and particularly in that of John, from motives of profound sympathy with Jesus; and that while it is not easy to see how this sympathy should have arisen in the Roman, it is easy to understand how the evangelist might have been induced to attribute it to him out of his own Christian consciousness. We hope to be able to set aside this objection, while, keeping in view the task which we have undertaken, we endeavour to solve the problem in how far our Lord, when suffering before Pilate, bore the sin of the world.

When we deal with the question of the *suffering* of Jesus Christ before Pontius Pilate, we confine our attention to that which our Lord endured in connection with His appearance before Pilate alone, and leave out of account all the manifestations of enmity with which the Jews still continued to pursue Him. Unquestionably it occasioned Him the acutest pain that His own nation had delivered Him up to the Roman governor. Through this act Israel became a Judas Iscariot on a large scale—a betrayer of its Messiah. "Whom ye delivered up" (παρεδώκατε), says Peter, when he preached repentance to the Jews in Solomon's porch, Acts iii. 13; "of whom ye have been the betrayers" (προδόται), says Stephen to the exasperation of the zealots, Acts vii. 52; and it is probably not an accidental coincidence that

Matthew, who begins by saying (ch. xxvii. 2), "they delivered (*παρέδωκαν*) Him to Pontius Pilate the governor," immediately adds (ver. 3), "Then Judas, which betrayed (*παραδιδούς*) Him, when he saw," etc. (The expressions in Matt. xx. 18, 19 are also to be compared: *παραδοθήσεται . . . καὶ παραδώσουσιν.*) In announcing His Passion beforehand, our Lord said, not without perceptible emphasis: "The Son of man shall be delivered (*παραδοθήσεται*) into the hands of the Gentiles" (Luke xviii. 32); and if we consider that the Jews had as little hesitation in proceeding to the praetorium as in making the serious admission, when they were in Pilate's presence, "we have no king but Caesar," we feel that their conduct in casting away so contemptuously the hopes cherished by their fathers, and trampling under foot pearls so precious, could not but cause the Messiah the profoundest suffering. He characterized the act of Israel in express terms as the baser act of the two when compared with that of Pilate; "He that delivered (*παραδιδούς*)[1] Me unto thee hath the greater sin," John xix. 11, and consequently it would occasion Him the greater pain. However, the action which the high priests took before the procurator was only the continuation or the consequence of that which had already been done by them in their own council chamber. By virtue of their sentence of condemnation they had *already* cast the heir out of the vineyard, and Jesus had *already* borne that which He had been appointed to endure at their hands. The Jews are instrumental in introducing a *new* element of suffering into our Lord's experience in the present phase of His Passion, only by means of the resolution which the *people* (*ὄχλος*, *λαός*, Mark xv. 8; Matt. xxvii. 25) formed in regard to soliciting the release of Barabbas. It cannot be doubted that Jesus felt this ingratitude on the part of those who had always hitherto recognised His beneficent acts, and on account of them had really adhered to Him, as a peculiarly bitter drop in His cup. May not this choice have been the reason why the people smote upon their breast with feelings of bitter repentance when they were returning from the cross, just as the

[1] The singular *ὁ παραδιδούς* undoubtedly requires us to think of Caiaphas. However, Jesus could scarcely have had in His mind the person and guilt of the high priest alone. It is to the Jews essentially that reference is made. The previous words, ch. xviii. 36: "that I should not be delivered *to the Jews*," place this beyond doubt.

apostle subsequently applies it in his preaching to the people as a principal reason for repentance, Acts iii. 14: "Ye desired a murderer to be granted unto you." A very clear light is shed upon the matter if a conjecture may be made use of which we here venture to submit, because we are persuaded of its accuracy. It was a custom among the Jews to postpone the execution of prominent criminals until the time of one of the feasts (the Rabbins refer to the passage in Deuteronomy (xvii. 13) for an explanation of this usage: "and all the people shall hear and fear, and do no more presumptuously"). *It was probable, then* (we believe that this may be inferred also from Matt. xxvii. 16: "and they had then a notable prisoner called Barabbas"), *that it was intended that Barabbas should be executed at the time of the approaching Passover.* But it was also a custom that the people might ask the pardon of a condemned criminal at the Passover time. Not that the Romans had introduced this usage, which had an evident reference to the significance of the paschal feast, but it was a Jewish custom,—"ye have a custom," John xviii. 39; it was a privilege belonging to the people which the procurator was bound to respect,—"for of *necessity* he must release one unto them at the feast," Luke xxiii. 17. The people accordingly proceed to exercise their right, by making choice between two on whom sentence of death has been passed. And they decide in favour of the man on whom was the mark of Cain, "who for sedition and murder was cast into prison" (Luke xxiii. 19; "now Barabbas was a robber," John xviii. 40), and give up their King to be crucified in his place; nay more, they accept without hesitation the responsibility of this choice. However, the evangelists have taken care that the people should be placed somewhat in the background even in regard to this incident, and that the preponderating burden should rest on the shoulders of those who influenced the easily moved crowd towards the choice which they made: "the chief priests and elders persuaded the multitude," Matt. xxvii. 20; "the chief priests moved the people," Mark xv. 11. These chief priests and elders here exhibit themselves in a character entirely consonant to that which they had already shown clearly enough in their council chamber. Consequently we have henceforth to examine not the circumstance that *they* betrayed the Lord, but the question into *whose hands* did they surrender Him whom they betrayed. If we were to

judge by appearances, the actual impression we should receive would be that our Lord was withdrawn from the fanaticism of His persecutors, and placed under a juster and more humane ἐξουσία, and that the terms in which the apostle afterwards acknowledged the goodness of God were applicable to His circumstances also: "I was delivered out of the mouth of the lion."[1] But the question is, how must we describe the situation in which we see Jesus when He appears before the tribunal of the governor? The answer usually given, that He was delivered over to the Gentiles, is justified generally, no doubt, by the expression παραδοθήσεται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, but in any case it requires to be stated in a more detailed and definite form. It is not appropriate, if taken in the sense in which the Apostle Paul contrasts Judaism and heathenism (1 Cor. i. 22, 23). Our Lord was not handed over by those who demanded a sign to one who was a seeker after wisdom, but those who pass sentence of death upon Him in the bitterness of their hatred apply to him with whom it rested to execute, or to refuse to execute, their sentence. Jesus stands, therefore, before the possessor of earthly authority, before the tribunal of the civil power. The idea of the "Gentiles" in the prophecies of the Passion is not to be understood from the religious side, but in the sense of the expression, "the princes of the Gentiles," Matt. xx. 25. Jesus Himself experiences here, in the first place, that which He told His disciples to anticipate: "Ye shall be brought before rulers and kings." Pilate, as we know, sent Him to King Herod. But the scene before the latter and the procedure before the former not only belong historically to the same phase of the Passion of Jesus, but in both cases our Lord finds Himself in a similar situation, and subjected to the same kind of suffering. For it was not to the Jewish king, but to the tetrarch of Galilee, that Pilate sent the accused. That Herod was a Jew only "outwardly, in the flesh," but in no sense "inwardly," and that it could not be said to him, as Paul afterwards said to Agrippa, "Believest thou the prophets? I know that thou believest,"—this is a matter foreign to the subject

[1] That the expression στόμα λέοντος (2 Tim. iv. 17) can be understood only of Jewish fanaticism, has been convincingly shown by Otto in an admirable treatise, which has not received the attention which it deserves, *Die geschichtlichen Verhältnisse der Pastoralbriefe*, p. 244 sqq. The different view, recommended by Hofmann (*Ausleg. der Hirtenbr. Pauli*, p. 302), we regard as erroneous.

before us. Here the idea of the Jew in the case of Herod, as of the Gentile in Pilate's case, is subordinate to that of the earthly Ruler. The first congregation of believers at Jerusalem regarded this portion of the Passion history of Jesus from this point of view, as is evidenced by the prayer which they offered up, Acts iv. 24 sqq. They recall the words of the Psalm, "The kings of the earth stood up, and the rulers were gathered together against the Lord," and recognise their fulfilment in the circumstance that "Herod and Pontius Pilate were gathered together against Jesus." The Lord, then, is given up to the custody of earthly authority, that it may proceed against Him. It is the first time that He has come in contact with the possessors of worldly power. He had heard of Pilate. He was informed of a cruel and barbarous act which he had done (Luke xiii. 1), and He had also made a statement regarding it. But He spoke of the act exclusively from a religious point of view, and scrupulously refrained from passing any judgment upon the actor; with the procurator He had no concern whatever. Pilate himself, on the other hand, could scarcely have known of Jesus up to this time. There is no evidence whatever that he possessed any such knowledge. Reference is made, it is true, to the anxious dream of Pilate's wife during her morning sleep, and it is thought that it justifies one in inferring the knowledge which is in question. But the representation of the evangelist (Matt. xxvii. 19) appears rather to exclude than to support the opinion that the dream was the result of an already existing interest in the accused; at least we dare not confidently assume the contrary on grounds so precarious. It is true that Herod was in a different category. Our Lord repeatedly spoke of the persecutor of John the Baptist. He bids His disciples beware of the leaven of Herod (Mark viii. 15). He calls him the destroyer of the vineyard. To the king, again, Jesus was an object of interest (Luke ix. 7–9), and he had expressed a wish to see Him (Luke xxiii. 8). But Jesus avoided him,—not from fear, for He knew well that it was not from him, but from a totally different quarter, that danger was to be apprehended (Luke xiii. 31–34),—but He avoided him because He had just as little to do with the tetrarch of Galilee as with the Roman procurator. It was meet that the King of the heavenly kingdom should shun contact with the possessors of earthly power. But now He is brought into this contact perforce,

and it occasions Him deep suffering. Is the ordinance of the State, then, and the authority at its head, to be regarded as impure, so that the very circumstance of being brought into any kind of contact with it must necessarily have been felt as an injury by Him who was pure? One may appeal to the fact that the directions given by the apostles to the members of the Christian church to be subject to the tyrannical heathen authorities who were placed over them, and the confessions of the later apologists,—of a Theophilus and a Justin,—that they honoured the emperor, prayed for him, and paid tribute to him, proceeded from the Spirit of Him who said: "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's." If our Lord, then, it may be argued, assumed the form of a servant, no special and outstanding humiliation was implied in His appearing before Pilate, at least it involved no new or deeper indignity than did the fact of His appearing before the bar of a Caiaphas. And yet it affects us in one way when we see Him who was born of a woman and made under the law appearing before the guardians of the law, and in quite another way when we see Him subjected to the authority of an "ordinance of man" which was different from the ordinance of God; it even shocks us to see this "ordinance," whose territory was bounded, from the nature of the case, by definite limits, performing in a region foreign to it an act of monstrous usurpation. If there is exhibited anywhere in history the shameful spectacle of the civil power acting the part of a judge in the realm of the Spirit, it is exhibited here in the highest degree and in the most offensive form,—here, where a "heathen man" and a "publican," to speak in the sense of Matt. xviii. 17, v. 46, 47, determines, as ultimate arbiter, the fate of the King of truth. And all who have ever suffered by arbitrary sentences of this kind have Jesus as their leader on this path of suffering.

All who took part in this scene, as was inevitable, were impelled to show in some way or other that they were conscious of the sacrilegious character of the transaction. The high priests, of course, felt themselves necessitated, on various grounds, to refrain from communicating to the procurator the real origin of their complaint against Jesus. But when they request him to regard the Prisoner as a "malefactor" on their warrant, and to deliver Him up to death without further investigation (John xviii. 30), their request was especially influenced by the feeling that

*this* was a cause which did not fall under the cognizance of the Roman procurator. As to Pilate himself, his ambiguous question, "What is truth?" has been variously explained by interpreters. If, however, it is connected with the previous question (John xviii. 35): "What hast thou done?" then it is, in the first place and essentially, an acknowledgment on his part that such matters did not belong to *his* tribunal, that it was his function to pass judgment only on a man's acts. And yet that which was unexampled and incredible took place—he sat in judgment on the Christ of God; so that we can speak, in the strictest sense, of Jesus suffering under Pontius Pilate. The suffering endured by Jesus at the hands of the civil power found outward expression in acts which are sufficient to support our view of it. We refer to the scourging which was commanded by the procurator, and the mocking to which our Lord was subjected by Herod and his courtiers. The former differed in its significance from the maltreatment which Jesus endured in the hall of the Sanhedrim, just as the latter differed essentially from the mockery of His prophetic office, which He endured in the same place. The clause of the Passion prophecy, "and shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to *mock* and to *scourge*" (Matt. xx. 19), which evidently refers to the incidents narrated here, entitles us and requires us to dwell on them. But they must be rightly regarded. And it is to be noted, at the outset, that the emphasis rests not on the pain and ignominy of the scourging considered in itself, but on the circumstance that it was inflicted by the civil power. The very reverse was the case with the similar punishment inflicted upon Paul. He notes that it was at the hands *of the Jews* that he had suffered this punishment on five different occasions (2 Cor. xi. 24). In other respects, however, the historical position of the scourging of Jesus is a disputed point. Some regard it as an integral part of the punishment by crucifixion, and infer from this, that when Pilate ordered it, he must already have passed the sentence: "*ibis ad crucem*," and have given his assent to the demand of the Jews. Others, again, and among them Strauss, hold the view that this act of severity is to be considered by itself, and that the procurator's design in it was of a directly opposite kind. The latter opinion is the right one.[1] The transactions which took place

[1] The words of the Passion prophecy, "to mock, *and* to scourge, *and* to crucify," require us to separate the scourging very decidedly from the crucifying, and to

between the governor and Jesus on the one hand, and between him and the high priests on the other, *after* the scourging, make the assumption that a decision had already been arrived at which was favourable to the views of the latter parties exceedingly improbable, nay, they entirely exclude it. They do not produce the impression that he was anxious to recall something which he had already conceded, but rather that he was persisting in a view which he had cherished and maintained up to that

regard the former as a distinct element of the Passion of Jesus. The undeniable Roman custom of scourging those who were condemned to die by crucifixion, previous to the execution of the sentence, is, however, misunderstood when it is assumed, as is done by Jerome, that it was based on a direct instruction of the criminal code ("Sciendum est, Pilatum Romanis legibus ministrasse, quibus sancitum erat, ut qui crucifigerentur, prius flagellis verberarentur," Jerome). J. Gerhard, in his *Annotationes posthumae in Evangel. Matthaei*, p. 1198, has rightly protested against this misunderstanding. A careful comparison of the passages in Christian and heathen authors which bear on the subject, gives a different result. The scourging which preceded crucifixion was the act of an especial exasperation, such as was felt by a master towards a wicked, disobedient, or rebellious slave (see the passages in Livy, Lucian, and Arnobius), or by a conqueror towards a stubborn enemy, whom he had overcome only after a severe conflict, in which he had suffered heavy losses. In such cases, death in itself, even though endured under the painful form of crucifixion, did not seem to be an adequate punishment, and accordingly the offender was doomed to suffer a double death (comp. Joseph. *de bello Jud.* v. 11. 1, ed. Bekker, VI. p. 54: *μαστιγούμενοι δὲ καὶ προβασανιζόμενοι τοῦ θανάτου πᾶσαν αἰκίαν, ἀντασαυροῦντες*). But Pilate certainly did not act under the influence of any such feelings of bitterness against our Lord; and unless he had had some other purpose in view in commanding Him to be scourged, undoubtedly he would have issued no such command. The only persons who were embittered against Jesus were the Jews. Had they regarded the scourging of Jesus as a preliminary step to His crucifixion, implying that it was a matter already decided upon, and which they might proceed to carry out, they would have accepted it with much satisfaction. But this was not the feeling which they evinced. On the contrary, scarcely have they again come in sight of the governor and the Prisoner, when, unsatisfied, they break out into tumultuous cries, demanding His death: "Crucify him! crucify him!" This can be explained only on the assumption that it was the intention of Pilate to make the scourging a substitute for the crucifixion. It is exceedingly improbable that the two thieves, who were crucified along with Jesus, were previously scourged. At all events, the narratives of Matthew and Mark in regard to this matter, being obviously of a merely summary character, cannot be appealed to in favour of the view which we are controverting. Neither evangelist gives any proper account of the scourging as John does, but they merely note that our Lord, as had been predicted of Him, really endured this suffering also. It is true that in Matt. xxvii. 26, Mark xv. 15, the words "when he had scourged" stand immediately before the statement "he delivered *Him* to be crucified;" but no inferences can be based on this circumstance which cannot be sustained by the representations of Luke and John. The allusion to the scourging is a mere retrospective notification of the fact, not implying any coincidence in point of time between it and the crucifixion.

time. The third Gospel throws on the matter the desired light. Pilate had made to the Jews a proposal to subject their Prisoner to the punishment of scourging (the word παιδεύειν, Luke xxiii. 16, cannot possibly be understood of anything else than scourging). It is true that they rejected the proposal, but Pilate repeated it, and in point of fact carried it out. He hoped that the "envy" which he assumed them to feel (Mark xv. 10) would be sufficiently satisfied when they saw Jesus subjected to maltreatment, and that they would abstain from making any further demands. Augustine: "Non persequendo flagellavit Dominum Pilatus sed Judaeorum furori satisfacere volens, ut sic mitescerent et desinerent velle occidere, cum flagellatum viderent." We may regard it as exceedingly strange that the procurator should have at all anticipated any such result. For the experiences which he had gained in his previous intercourse with the Jews by no means warranted him in cherishing any expectations of the kind. However, the difficulty can be solved more simply than by the assumption of Strauss, that the two later evangelists invented this feature of the narrative with the view of exhibiting, in a more lurid light, the obstinacy of the Jews. It is explained by means of the consideration that the civil power was required to decide in a region which lay outside its jurisdiction (comp. Acts xxv. 20: "and because I doubted of such manner of questions"). The proceeding of Pilate is the expedient of one who is in perplexity. The question to which he subsequently gives utterance: "What shall I do then with Jesus which is called Christ?" (Matt. xvii. 22; it can obviously be understood also as a meditation spoken aloud), supplies the explanation of an act which was the result neither of unfeeling severity nor yet of unskilful calculation. The same holds of the choice between Jesus and Barabbas, which the governor submitted to the people.[1] He was too well aware of the influence which

[1] In any case, we can speak of a proposal made by PILATE, whether the initiative was taken by himself or whether the *people* supplied him with the opportunity of doing so. Hengstenberg appeals to the narrative of Mark (*Comm.* III. p. 231) for justification of the view that the initiative was taken by the *people*. "The demand for the customary release of a prisoner was an incident altogether unconnected with the proceedings in hand, of which Pilate merely availed himself in a skilful way." Similarly also Klostermann, *das Markusevangelium*, Göttingen 1867, p. 290. But it is in itself an exceedingly improbable thing, that in the midst of negotiations regarding Christ, which occupied all Jerusalem and set it in commotion, an incident should have been interposed which had no manner of connection with it. But, besides,

the Sanhedrim had over the multitude to place any measure of confidence in an expedient by virtue of which, besides, he permitted the determining power to pass out of his own hands. But he was influenced by a wish to avoid coming to a determination which he felt himself neither able nor called upon to take up. We entirely agree with all that Hengstenberg has said regarding the inconsistencies in the conduct of Pilate, only we do not account for these inconsistencies on the theory of a sin-laden conscience, but we see in them the evidences of Pilate's perplexity. Placed in a region which was strange to him, and in an entirely unwonted situation, he seeks for some expedient, and feels after some pretext which may spare him the necessity of personally pronouncing judgment. This co-operated, at all events, to induce Pilate to send the prisoner to Herod,—we say co-operated only, for the principal motive was undoubtedly the wish of the procurator to confer an obligation on the tetrarch of Galilee. As to Herod himself, the mockery which he heaped upon our Lord can be judged only in the same way as the scourging which was ordered by Pilate. Many an infamous act has been thoughtlessly committed by unbelief. And yet, when we see the Jewish king descending to the level of the heathen soldiery,—their acts were not essentially

this is a view which is not permitted by the narratives of the remaining three evangelists. For example, the words "therefore when they were gathered together" (Matt. xxvii. 17) afford a basis for the supposition that the procurator had expressly summoned the *people*, and assembled them around his βῆμα for a purpose definitely formed by him. It was his intention to *appeal* from the hierarchy, from whom he could gain nothing further, *to the people*, who were not dominated, like their ecclesiastical superiors, by "envy." Undoubtedly, however, Pilate's act was an arbitrary one. The people had the right to request the liberation of any condemned person whatsoever, in the exercise of an untrammelled power of choice ("whomsoever they would"); and the fact that two thieves were crucified along with Jesus shows that there was at that time no lack of persons on whom the law had passed sentence of death. The freedom which belonged to the people is circumscribed by the governor, inasmuch as he asks them to make their choice as between Jesus and Barabbas. This is explained, on the one hand, on the supposition that it had long been a fixed matter that Barabbas was to be executed at this Passover; and, on the other hand, by the fact that Pilate calculated that if the people were asked to choose between Jesus and Barabbas, they would probably decide in favour of the former, as no one could feel any sympathy for the latter. And if the decision were so made in reality, Pilate would be placed in circumstances to reject the demands of the hierarchy without further ado, since they would be entirely helpless against this plebiscite. We read, therefore, at the close, that the governor did according to the wish of the *people* ("willing to content the people," Matt. xv. 15; "Pilate gave sentence that it should be as they required," Luke xxiii. 24) when he finally gave commandment that Jesus should be crucified.

worse than his (John xix. 2, 3),—we willingly look around for some more general ground of explanation. We find it in the position of the worldly ruler as such. He, as the actual possessor of a dignity which, according to his opinion, was possessed by Jesus in imagination only, regards mockery as the only appropriate weapon to employ against the enthusiast who silently stood before him. He, a king of this world, does not know how to deal seriously with the King of truth, and so he seeks refuge in expressions of scorn, for the situation was eminently embarrassing to a frivolous mind. Probably the accuracy of this mode of view would be proved by the character of the numerous questions which Herod, according to Luke xxiii. 9, addressed to our Saviour. But the evangelist has not recorded them. We are thankful to him for it. Criticism would have known how to employ them for its own purposes.

We have limited ourselves in the present section to the consideration of the sufferings which came upon our Lord through the agency of the civil power, without taking into account the persecution with which the Jews continued to assail Him. Under a like limitation we also consider the question, In how far was SIN the cause of His experiencing this suffering? We are concerned, consequently, with the guilt of *Pilate* exclusively. But if the question be thus limited, the answer to it does not appear difficult. One of the evangelists, in addition to supplying us with a very complete account of the facts themselves, has thrown many side lights on the character of Pilate. The objection of Strauss, that it is scarcely possible to imagine how John could have become acquainted with these details, can scarcely excite any serious uneasiness. The apostle, who relates throughout nothing except that which he had heard and seen with his own eyes, was a personal witness of the proceedings. Just as he found it possible to be present at the trial before Annas, so would he find means to push his way into the interior of the praetorium, even although very special exertions should have been necessary. The further remark made by Strauss, in a detractive tone, that the representations of John have a theatrical character, will not avail to shake any one's faith in their reality. On the contrary, his expression is one which we willingly adopt, in the sense, to wit, in which Paul says of himself: "we are made a spectacle (*θέατρον*) unto the world, and to angels, and to men" (1 Cor. iv. 9), or in which

another apostle writes: "whilst we are made a gazing-stock (θεατριζόμενοι) both by reproaches and afflictions" (Heb. x. 33). There is another objection raised by the critic, however, which requires, as we have already admitted, the most careful consideration. Strauss repeatedly asserts that the steady interest displayed by the procurator in the rescue of Jesus, which is amply testified to by all the Gospels and by the apostolic preaching ("when he (Pilate) was determined to let Him go," Acts iii. 13), is all the less conceivable from the circumstance that at best Pilate could have regarded Him only as a Jewish enthusiast. It is easy to reply by saying: "the description of Pilate's conduct is so true to psychological principles," or "the representation of John bears the unmistakeable stamp of originality;" but the force of this objection cannot be met and overcome by these or any similar phrases. So far as we can discover, it can be set aside only by reducing the interest felt by the procurator to its proper proportions, and by placing it in its true light. In order to do so, we must, of course, first arrive at a well-grounded judgment as to the character of Pilate,—a preliminary condition which it is hard to fulfil. The scanty notices for which we are indebted to profane writers, even the oft-quoted complaint of Philo (*leg. ad Caj.*) in regard to the pride and stubbornness of the Roman, are wholly irrelevant to the subject in hand. We feel ourselves limited to such conclusions as may be drawn from the conduct of Pilate, as recorded in the evangelical history. But the uncertainty of such conclusions is apparent from the exceedingly diverse results arrived at even by those interpreters who have not, like Lavater, employed the psychological plummet alone. While some (influenced especially by Olshausen) all but idealize the Roman governor, and assume that he was profoundly impressed by Jesus, so that all that was best in his nature was stirred into life, others describe him as one in whom an evil conscience was allied with the spirit of scepticism. According to the former writers, he is not much inferior to a Nicodemus; according to the latter, he resembles an Ahab, who sold himself to do evil. Tholuck, who long persisted in regarding Pilate as a superficial child of this world, afterwards inclined to the view of the Apostolical Constitutions, without formally retracting his former opinion. The views that have been maintained traverse each other in such a manner, and accusing and excusing thoughts alternate so rapidly in the mind

of one who is studying the question, that the well-known sentence of Kleuker may well seem entirely appropriate: "As to Pilate's philosophico-judicial temper of mind, nothing has yet been canonically decided." But what we have to do is to take up a fixed standpoint at the outset.[1] If isolated statements made by Pilate are pressed, while others are ignored; if some are overloaded with significance, while others are deprived of their import, then certainly one may succeed in constructing a Pilate for himself, and fail to behold the Pilate who really existed and acted. Our proper task is not to bring out the individual peculiarities of Pilate's character. Even although we were to succeed in doing so, we should not be one step nearer our object. Had some other man exercised the supreme power in Judea in "that same year,"—a Felix, a Festus, a Gallio, or even one as noble in character as Pliny the younger, who was the agent of Trajan in carrying out the persecution of the Christians in Bithynia,—each one of them would have pursued substantially the very same course as Pilate. The procurator must be judged in this his official position as the servant and representative of the emperor, and from this point of view his interest in the rescue of our Lord, in so far as it really existed, is perfectly intelligible. This interest has its own proper history. In a certain degree it existed from the very outset, but it was intensified by additional motives afterwards introduced. As soon as the Jews placed their Prisoner before Pilate, the judge at once took the part of the Accused; not, however, in the first place, from sympathy for Him, but from antipathy to His accusers. The relation between the procurator and the Sanhedrim was throughout that of hostile mistrust, and, under the existing circumstances, nothing else could well have been expected. According to the unanimous testimonies of witnesses, Tacitus, Suetonius, and others, no nation was so unfavourably disposed towards the Romans, so prone to disloyalty and revolt, as the Jewish; while, on the other hand, no race was so thoroughly detested by the Romans. Now and then, it is true, sin might bring about compromises between the heathen ruler and the rulers of the Jews, but a sincere mutual understanding, even in a single

[1] The Scottish theologian Hanna appears to us (in the popular work formerly referred to) to have sketched the character of Pilate more successfully than many a learned treatise which deals with the same subject.

instance, was impossible. Every wish, therefore, every petition, every complaint presented by the Sanhedrim, awakened suspicion in the mind of the governor; and he expressed this suspicion in as marked a manner as possible, because it was a pleasure to him to make the subject Jews feel their dependence, and he felt a satisfaction in gratifying his discontentment at being required to respect their religious sensibilities. All this is apparent even at the beginning of the negotiations. Pilate was obliged to come out to the complainants, in order that their ceremonial purity might not be infringed, and he was obliged to admit that they had a law of their own by which to judge. On the other hand, it gratified him that they acknowledged the limitation of their authority, and that they were obliged to submit to the regulation of the Roman law which required them to lay a formal charge against the prisoner (Acts xxv. 16). Much of what he did at a later period of the negotiations is also to be looked at from this point of view, and seems not so much to testify to a dim presentiment of the dignity of Jesus, as to a feeling of contempt for the priests.[1] But if Pilate entered on the negotiations under the influence of prejudice against the accusers, his distrust of them was necessarily intensified when he listened to the terms of their "accusation" against Jesus. "We found this (fellow) perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, saying that he himself is Christ a king" (Luke xxiii. 2). As loyal subjects of Caesar, as zealots for his rights, as upholders of his interests, the procurator had not hitherto known the high priests. They to whom it was questionable whether a Jew could pay tribute without wounding his conscience, they whose theocratic sensibilities were touched to the quick by this imposition, appear here as the denunciators of a member of their own nation on the ground of His having propagated an opinion to which they themselves clung fondly and tenaciously; assuredly, the procurator would say to himself, there must be something else behind. Up to this point Pilate had taken the part of Jesus without feeling,

[1] We explain the repeated allusions to the Kingship of Jesus in this way: "Behold your king!" "Shall I crucify your king?" So also we explain the inscription on the cross. This can be recognised without our thereby denying the operation of an overruling providence in the conduct of Pilate. It is to be judged in the same way as the prophecy uttered by Caiaphas the high priest.

however, any proper interest in Himself. But, as the result of his colloquy with the Prisoner, such an interest was really awakened in him. The only question is, of what nature was it? The concluding declaration of the governor: "I find no fault in him," arrests our attention by the very circumstance of its frequent repetition (John xviii. 38, xix. 4, 6). The emphatic *I* which is placed in front (comp. especially John xix. 6: *ye—I*, "I, from my standpoint; I, in my position") puts the significance of his statement in its right light. He has become thoroughly persuaded that the accusation of the Jews is a groundless one, that this Jesus cherishes no design of grasping the sword of the Maccabees. True, indeed, our Lord assured him with all emphasis that the royalty which he claimed was real, "Thou sayest that I am a king"—with all emphasis, and not in a "dry," "monosyllabic" manner, as Strauss is fain to say; but, nevertheless, Pilate was confident that a claim of this character did not threaten the supremacy of his Caesar.[1] He felt that he would be guilty of injustice, and that he would show himself an unrighteous judge, if he sacrificed to the hatred of the priesthood One who was obviously an object of persecution for entirely different reasons. The Gospel history does not seem to bear us out in making any further concessions.

It is easy to understand how interpreters should have drawn certain inferences as to the deeper religious sensibilities of the man from his various statements and acts. They were unable to see how words such as those spoken to him by our Lord when they were face to face could fail to impress him even more profoundly than Felix was impressed by the preaching of Paul, when he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come.

[1] According to our view, the kingdom of Christ undoubtedly supplanted the Roman power, and a solicitude on the part of the procurator would have been as well founded as the fear which was expressed by Caiaphas. And this view would not be invalidated, even although Daniel's fourth kingdom were not identified with the Roman power, and Dr. Kramchfeld (in his treatise, *über das Buch Daniel*, Berlin 1868) were right in the conclusion which he draws, namely, that this opinion is a "consuetudo sine veritate, a vetustas erroris." But such considerations were beyond the statesman's horizon. Like all Romans, he was persuaded that the Roman empire was imperishable. Comp. Virgil, *Aen.* i. 278 ("His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono; imperium sine fine dedi"). Besides, it was just by the death of Jesus that His kingdom was founded, just as it was His death which brought that to pass which excited apprehensions in the mind of the high priest.

If we withhold our assent from this view, we do so, not on account of the picture which history presents of the religiosity or rather the irreligiosity of the Roman dignitaries,[1] nor yet from the fear of exposing ourselves unnecessarily to the attacks of the negative criticism, but on the ground of the Gospel history itself. The assumption that Pilate's sympathy for Jesus was only that of the judge who recognises the innocence of an accused person, is justified not only by numerous particulars in the narrative, but is consistent with the import of the whole: no residuum of facts remains unaccounted for. This appears most clearly and distinctly as the real state of the matter on the occasion of the first interview between Pilate and Jesus. His first anxiety was to get hold of the facts of the case, so as to be in a position to come to a well-grounded judgment. He was displeased, therefore, when our Lord appeared to put an obstacle in the way of his doing so. Pilate did not repel the preliminary question of Jesus regarding the origin of his inquiry as to His Kingship, "indignantly" or "haughtily," but merely with the impatience of one who wished to reach a definite conclusion with all speed. And yet the question was indispensable. Its object was not to maintain "the right of the accused to know the author of the accusation" (Meyer), and it could scarcely be to fill the judge's mind with mistrust in regard to the accusation of the Jews (Grotius); but Jesus wished to make sure that His answer to the question: "Art thou a king?" would be properly understood. For it could be answered in one sense in the negative as decidedly as it could be answered in another sense in the affirmative. True indeed, as men use the term in the world, "I am not a king (Matt. xx. 25), but yet I have a kingdom, and I am in reality a King." The emphasis rests undoubtedly on the positive part of the statement. We hear a confession. Thrice over the words "My kingdom" are emphatically uttered. And although the first three evangelists content themselves with merely stating that Jesus answered "Thou sayest," they do so, because therein consisted the sum and substance of His reply. But although the negative element in the reply was merely a foil for the positive claim which was made: "How can I be an earthly king, I the *βασιλεὺς ἀληθινός*, who have come from above to this world in order to establish in it a new, real kingdom,—the kingdom of heaven,"—yet it was so

[1] Comp. Döllinger, *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, p. 584 sqq.

distinct and obvious that even a Pilate could entertain no further doubt on the matter. An earthly king requires his subjects to defend his person, but Jesus had interdicted and rejected any such defence, and, in addition to reproving, undid that which one of His disciples had done in this direction. (He could therefore, even in spite of the sword-stroke of Peter, appeal to the passivity of His attitude; for, so far as *He Himself* was concerned, the miracle of healing which He had wrought on behalf of the wounded servant of the high priest made this act as if it had *never* been. Any stain still remaining adhered solely to the person of the disciple, and no one was entitled to go back upon the incident except in regard to *Peter,* comp. John xviii. 26. From this point of view, however, we see in a new light how displeasing to our Lord the arbitrary conduct of His officious defender must have been.) But even admitting that a slight tinge of suspicion may be detected in the procurator's further question: "Art thou a king, then?"—a feeling which might possibly be excited in his mind by the circumstance that Jesus had spoken of the servants and of the order of His kingdom,—the declaration made by our Lord in ver. 37 must have removed any lingering remains of suspicion. The words look back to a question asked by Pilate, and which up to this time has remained unanswered—the question, "What hast thou done?" ver. 35. "What have I done? I have done that which beseemed a King who came from above; I have borne testimony to the truth, the truth which is in heaven, and which is to shed its light upon the earth through Me and in Me. And by this testimony I have enlisted the subjects and servants of My kingdom,[1] for he that is of the truth hears the voice of the truth, follows Me, and recognises Me." Comp. John x. 26, 27. A comparison with the history of Nathanael, who, as an "Israelite indeed," was of the truth, and who, on hearing the voice of Jesus, gave utterance to the exclamation: "Thou art the King of Israel," entirely confirms our view of the connection, and satisfactorily answers the question as to the scope of the concluding words of Jesus (ver. 37). The

[1] Accordingly, the ὑπηρέται, John xviii. 36, cannot be understood of the servants which our Lord *would* have had in the case supposed, but to those whom He really had, only that they did not manifest their attachment to Him as the servants of an earthly ruler would. Their mode of action is indicated by the Apostle Paul, 2 Cor. vi. 4 sqq. (the expression in ver. 7 is to be noted: ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας). Moreover, this apostle purposely chooses the expression ὑπηρέται Χριστοῦ in 1 Cor. iv. 1.

assertion that our Lord in using these words intended "to appeal to the Roman's own religious consciousness," that He "turned from the judge to the man," will not gain the assent of any one who considers the facts of the case with a calm and unprejudiced mind. It is open to the very same objection as the assumption that the words exerted a corresponding influence on the mind of Pilate.[1] Undoubtedly they made a *certain* impression upon the governor's mind, for he immediately breaks off the negotiations. But what ground have we for believing, or where can we find any intimation, that he broke the threads for the same reason as a Felix brought to a termination the conscience-awakening reasonings of Paul? Most that is said in regard to the question with which Pilate turned his back upon Jesus is *imported* into it. Sadness, contempt, profound earnestness, shallow sarcasm,—"the deep disconsolateness of the noble friend of truth," "the godless jesting of a corrupt conscience,"—all this, under numerous modifications, has been discovered by interpreters in Pilate's "What is truth?" And yet there is only one thing which can be certainly drawn from the Gospel narrative. The words: "when he had said this" (John xviii. 38), show a connection between the question of the governor and the declaration made to the Jews which is mentioned immediately afterwards; the former contains a reflection which supplied the motive for the latter. Pilate neither expressed a wish that our Lord should explain what truth was, nor yet did he adopt the language of scepticism and intimate that this was a problem which could never be solved, but he merely characterized the discussion as one which was irrelevant. In the schools of philosophy it might be appropriate, but not before the tribunal of the judge. He no longer entertained a doubt that the controversy pertained entirely to the airy region of pure speculation, with which civil authority has nothing to do, and by which its interests are in no way affected. He brought the interview to an end, because he was sufficiently informed. He saw quite clearly that the formal accusation of the Jews was a mere pretext behind which were "certain questions of their

[1] The circumstance that our Lord entered into discourse with Pilate, while He kept silence towards others, is entirely irrelevant to the question in hand. The speaking or the silence of Jesus does not admit of being judged in every case by the same rule, any more than His repeated prohibitions of blazing abroad His miracles admit of one stereotyped explanation. The Holy Scriptures do not admit of being pressed into exegetical moulds in this way.

own superstition" (Acts xxv. 19). So far as he was concerned, therefore, there was no ground whatever for proceeding against this Jesus. The conduct of Gallio, the proconsul of Achaia, towards the Corinthian Jews, presents an analogous case. "If it were a matter of wrong or wicked lewdness, O ye Jews, reason would that I should bear with you: but if it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look ye to it; for I will be no judge of such matters," Acts xviii. 14, 15. What Gallio dared, —"and he drave them from the judgment-seat,"—the high priests, it is true, did not permit the procurator to attempt in Jerusalem. Nevertheless he was firmly resolved to bring the matter to a favourable issue, and to devote all his energies to the protection of the interests of the Accused. Nor do we meet with anything in the further progress of the history which requires us to modify the representation of Pilate which has been submitted. With some show of justice two incidents may be pointed to in opposition to it, the symbolic washing of hands, and the second conversation between the judge and the Accused as recorded by the fourth evangelist. We confess to a feeling of amazement at the statement of Strauss, that that act of the governor is exceeded in improbability only by the statement that the assembled Jewish populace solemnly and expressly took upon themselves the guilt of the blood of Jesus. The conduct of the Jews is more than adequately accounted for by their rapidly culminating fanaticism. It was in itself a natural result of the decision in favour of Barabbas, and it was by no means ill adapted to overcome the hesitation of the unwilling procurator. But neither was the conduct of the latter inconceivable. It was not so in regard to its form; for it has long since been proved (particularly in Thom. Steger's *de veterum lotionibus*, by means of numerous quotations from Roman authors) that this Jewish usage was not unknown to other nations. And still less was it so in regard to its meaning. The act would appear strange to us only if Pilate's object had been to exculpate himself before the gods.[1] But in his mind it had no connection whatever with the gods.

[1] Such a degree of folly and blindness on the part of any educated heathen would certainly be unintelligible. Comp. Cicero, *de Legib.* ii. (ed. Klotz, p. iv. vol. IV. p. 371): "animi labes nec diuturnitate evanescere, nec amnibus ullis elui potest." Ovid, *Fast.* ii. 45, 46 (ed. Merkel, p. 222): "A! nimium faciles, qui tristia crimina caedis fluminea tolli posse putetis aqua!"

He fixed his attention on the excited multitude crowding around his judgment-seat. He opposed to their "uproar," and to the deafening cry, "Crucify him, crucify him," an action which could not fail to arrest their attention, and induce them to watch the progress of events more calmly. The proper commentary upon this act is supplied by the words which have been preserved by John, and which undoubtedly belong to this precise point of time: "Take ye him, and crucify him: for I find no fault in him" (John xix. 6). This, and nothing else than this, is the meaning of the symbolical action. The judge declares that truth and righteousness demand that the accused be discharged from his judgment-seat. We need not try to find anything further in it. Nor does the last interview between Pilate and Jesus lead us a single step beyond this result. No doubt it exercised a determining influence upon him, for from that time (ἐκ τούτου does not here mean "on this account," but denotes time, as in ch. vi. 66, where it is immediately followed by the explanatory οὐκέτι) he "sought (ἐζήτει) to release Him." Ἐζήτει is not equivalent to "he tried still more anxiously than before," as if a μᾶλλον accompanied it, and as if the judge—to adopt the language of Lücke—had hitherto merely trifled with our Lord; nor yet does it mean that "he made a fresh attempt" (not further described).[1] The most skilful imagination can suggest nothing of which Pilate could have still made trial after all that had already taken place. But now he peremptorily *demands* the release of the Prisoner whom he had all but abandoned to the people when they made choice of the murderer. (Ζητεῖν is not unfrequently used in the N. T. in this sense. Thus σημεῖον ζητεῖν, Mark viii. 11, etc., by no means signifies to be desirous of a sign, to be eager to see one, but to *request* or *demand* a sign. In the passage 1 Cor. i. 22, ζητεῖν in relation to σωφία has the very same meaning as αἰτεῖν in relation to the σημεῖα.) But a point very much debated is, whether a feeling of the higher dignity of Jesus had any share in bringing Pilate to this definite determination; whether it was in any sense influenced by religious motives. "When Pilate, therefore, heard that saying, he was the *more*

[1] Meyer infers from the imperfect being used that the assumed new attempt was not fully carried out. But its use can be explained without the aid of this peculiar expedient. It characterizes the demand as a decided and persevering one, which was not abandoned.

afraid,"[1] says John, ch. xix. 8. It is usual to limit the reference of "that saying" to the immediately preceding words: the "Son of God;" and accordingly the conclusion is drawn that he was overcome by a feeling of religious awe, that he dreaded lest he should be found "fighting against God," that he was afraid of the avenging Erinnys. But the correct view is a different one. The Jews perceived that the ground on which they had based their complaint would not enable them to attain their object. Just as the attempt to procure false witness to support the accusation made before Caiaphas miscarried, so here also they were obliged to produce the true ground of their demand. The "we" which stands in the forefront of their statement (ver. 7) corresponds to the "I" which occupies a similar position in ver. 6. "Thou, according to thy laws, mayest call him innocent, but we too have a law, and according to its determinations he *must* die, for he has been guilty of blasphemy." If Pilate had up to this time remained unshaken in his opinion that the political charge made against Jesus was a mere pretext, his opinion now received explicit confirmation. And if he had hitherto scrupled to condemn One who was in all probability guiltless, he would now feel an increased shrinking from passing sentence of death, in opposition to all justice, against Jesus, whom he saw to be the object of calumny. That is the meaning of the statement "he was the more afraid," and in this mood of mind he returned to the pretorium for the purpose of interrogating Jesus afresh.

We are of opinion—as we cannot but be, considering the results at which we have already arrived—that Pilate's purpose in this new interview was partly to collect materials and partly to gain confidence for a final repulse of the accusers. Other expositors, and among them Heumann in particular, maintain the view that Pilate, like a Nicodemus, being impressed with a sense of the majesty of Jesus, forsook his profane audience outside in order to satisfy the religious emotions of his soul. In defence of this view they appeal to his question. Now it is a bold thing, to say the least, to take this question in the sense of the alternative—Dost thou belong to heaven or to earth? art thou

[1] It has been rightly remarked that the word "more" indicates merely the intensification of an already existing "fear." But is it allowable to reason backwards from the view taken of his present shrinking, and infer that the character of his former timidity was the same? Is not the opposite process the only one which is justifiable?

divine, or a mere man? But it is something more than merely bold even to compare the "whence art thou" in the lips of Pilate with the "whence I am" uttered by the lips of Jesus Himself (John vii. 28, viii. 14). This has been felt, and accordingly there has been attributed to the expression of the procurator the predicate of "timidity," or of "generality." Undoubtedly its meaning is very general and indefinite; as general, for example, as the statement of the Pharisees in John ix. 29: "We know that God spake unto Moses: as for this (fellow), we know not from whence he is;" so general that we can only regard it as tantamount to: what is the state of the case regarding that which the Jews have just spoken concerning thee? "What sayest thou of thyself?" Had the question of the procurator proceeded from a deeply-moved heart, he could not possibly have turned upon the silent Saviour in so imperious a fashion as the mere civil ruler. And had the Searcher of hearts detected any religious anxiety in him, His silence would have been unintelligible; none of the strained explanations which abound in commentaries would suffice to account for it. Our Lord engaged in discourse with Pilate throughout only as seeing in him the possessor of judicial power; consequently the words by which He broke his silence in the second interview are also directed to him in that character. We admit, then, that Strauss is perfectly right in asserting that it is difficult to understand how a profound sympathy for Jesus could have arisen in the mind of the Roman governor. In reality no such profound sympathy is certified to by the Gospel history, which only entitles us to attribute to Pilate a natural interest in an innocent prisoner, and a wish to secure his release—feelings which no judge can wholly exclude from his mind.

From this point we may gain an insight into the SIN which laid a burden of suffering upon our Lord before the judgment-seat of Pilate. "He that delivered Me unto thee hath the greater sin," said He who held in His hand a just balance. "*Greater*,"—therefore He attributes some measure of guilt to the procurator also. But what was his sin? Even at a very early time (*Ap. Constitut.*) the charge of weakness of character was made against Pilate, inasmuch as, in spite of his own decided declaration, he ultimately yielded to the wishes of the importunate Jews (saying to himself, perhaps, like the judge in the parable:

"because they trouble me . . . lest by their continual coming they weary me," Luke xviii. 5). Again, he has been accused of cowardly fear, because he seemed to yield when the high priests threatened him with the displeasure of the emperor. But Pilate's sin, properly so called,—that which our Lord laid upon him as his burden,—cannot consist in either of these. The answer must be reached by a comparison. Caiaphas urged the condemnation with the whole energy and regardlessness of hatred (comp. especially the close of ver. 15); Pilate merely consented to it, under the pressure of the overpowering urgency of the high priest. The procurator plumed himself on his power to ordain the crucifixion or the liberation of the accused. The form of the alternative is to be carefully considered. We do not read *ἐξουσίαν ἔχω ἢ σταυρῶσαί σε ἢ ἀπολῦσαί σε* (the power of life and death), but *ἐξουσίαν ἔχω σταυρῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχω ἀπολῦσαί σε.* The first half of ver. 11 applies to the former, and the second to the latter part of this statement: "As regards thy power to crucify Me (the power *against Me*), it is given to thee from above, else thou couldst in no way (*οὐκ . . . οὐδεμίαν*[1]) assert it. Thy power to release Me, on the contrary, is as good as taken out of thy hands by 'him that hath delivered Me unto thee.' On this very account, however, *thy sin* is the less." But it is still *a sin.* While Caiaphas cherished in his heart the most deadly hatred to Jesus, Pilate is open to the charge of absolute indifference. The fact of the judge having taken the part of the Accused does not conceal the indifference which the earthly ruler felt towards the Ruler of the kingdom of heaven, but it is precisely on account of the former that the latter is so marked. True, we do not exactly perceive that *Roman* pride to which everything foreign was an object of contempt (comp. Acts xvi. 21: "they teach customs which are not lawful for us to receive, neither to observe, *being Romans*"). And still less does Pilate create the impression that he regarded the dreaming Idealist in a mocking spirit. Mockery he reserved for the high priests only. We have no occasion whatever to attribute to him in regard to Christ the feelings

[1] This settles the question whether the high priest was not also possessed of an *ἐξουσία* from above, whether our Lord did not appear before an *ἐξουσία* when He was tried by Caiaphas. That is in itself incontrovertible. Only the "power to crucify Him" was not possessed by the Sanhedrim, a fact which is expressly admitted in John xviii. 31, and which is applied by the evangelist in the succeeding verse.

which made Festus say to the Apostle Paul: "Thou art mad" (Acts xxvi. 24). But all the more does he seem to us to bear the stamp of one to whom earthly things, honour, power, reputation, wealth, are the only real possessions, and to whom the true good things, the *ἅγια*, the *ἀληθινά*, are mere "names" (Acts xviii. 15), which are worthy of no more than a transient, passing regard. He who has no eye to see goodly pearls has no heart for the one pearl of great price. "The world hath not known Him:" that saying was verified, and could not but be verified, in the highest degree in a Pilate. The Apostle Paul writes (Gal. vi. 14): "God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world." We shall find occasion elsewhere to unfold more fully this profoundly significant utterance. Meantime we deduce from it this thought only, that the whole world had become an object of indifference to the apostle through that same cross, to which the world, in its indifference, had adjudged the Lord of glory. This is the sin which occasioned the suffering which the Saviour endured before Pontius Pilate.

Pilate possessed the supreme authority in Judea. Everything depended ultimately upon his will; and yet in the present instance the result was entirely contrary to his wishes. He "delivered Jesus *to their will*," says the third evangelist (ch. xxiii. 25). It is true that one who is indifferent cannot be properly said to have a will; but even when the power is in his hands, he is the instrument and the executor of a foreign will. In the present instance this was the will of the Jews. (The Synoptics emphasize the fact that the governor yielded to the will of *the people*, "to content the people," although in reality it could be said of the Sanhedrim only, that it had a will and steadily maintained it. But it was necessary to show that the rejection of the Messiah was a national act.) On the Jews rested, therefore, the greater and the heavier part of the responsibility, —a responsibility which they were certainly not afraid of, but which, on the contrary, they expressed themselves willing to bear in their own name, and in the name of their children. Nevertheless, it was just at this point that our Lord testified in the most explicit manner that no earthly authority, deciding in a merely human way under the influence of circumstances, was bringing His career to a termination: "Thou couldest have no

power at all against Me, unless it were given thee from above" (John xix. 11). Consequently *from God* came the sentence of crucifixion, which was pronounced upon Jesus at Pilate's bar. The sense of the words above quoted is missed when the statement of the apostle, "The powers that be are ordained of God" (Rom. xiii. 1), is employed to explain them. The public official position of Pilate, whereby he was the representative of a "higher power," or, as a "governor sent by the king" (1 Pet. ii. 14), possessed undoubted authority to exercise judicial functions,—this is a matter lying entirely outside the subject here treated of. Our Lord does not say *εἰ μὴ ἦν σοι δεδομένη*, but *εἰ μὴ ἦν σοι δεδομένον*, whereby it is stated that this particular, definite act of the governor—the pronouncing of sentence of death upon Jesus—was one ordained *ἄνωθεν*, and was no act *ἐντῶθεν*. It has been said that the God who accomplished the work of redemption "in His own times," "when the fulness of the time was come," chose the hour at which His Son was to die, just as He had ordained the time of His birth; that by the arrangement of an overruling Providence the Redeemer died at the time when Rome held the supreme power in Judea, so that the divine purposes in their whole extent, and in the smallest detail, were fulfilled. It is not necessary to undervalue this view of the case, but it is not adequate, as a means of placing in its true light the "determinate counsel" of God in relation to the phase of the Passion of Jesus which is now under consideration. The postulate is this, that the "power to crucify Jesus" must have been specially and expressly given to Pilate,—an *ἐξουσία* not of the same, but yet of a similar character to that referred to by Jesus, when He said of Himself, "I have power (*ἐξουσίαν*) to lay down My life . . . this *commandment* have I received from My Father" (John x. 18),—an *ἐξουσία* which here also justifies the expression,—it must needs so be, that the Scripture might be fulfilled. But there is, in truth, no necessity to appeal to dogmatics in order to meet this demand, for nothing more is required than a calm consideration of the narrative. We assumed, on grounds which have been already stated, that the high priests were the victims of judicial blindness and hardness of heart; but a like assumption in regard to Pilate we would reject, as one for which there is no proof, and which, moreover, may be dispensed with. He did not walk in the footsteps of a Pharaoh. He acted

in a way which was entirely natural in the circumstances, and any other person in his position would have acted substantially in the same way. We could conceive of Pilate acting in a contrary manner only on the supposition of God's having interposed to prevent him pursuing the course which was natural to him, by presenting an actual hindrance, or by sending an overpoweringly impressive warning. But God withheld His hand; for that which took place was in accordance with the counsel of His will. We have been surprised at the remark which we have met with now and again, that no man could well be warned more impressively than was Pontius Pilate before he took the decisive step. This opinion obviously results from the ground being changed. It certainly finds no support in the Gospel narrative. It records one fact only which can be regarded from this point of view. We refer to the message sent to the procurator by his wife, when he was sitting on the judgment-seat. Strauss asks, "Who, on reading of this warning dream, does not remember the pretended dream of Calpurnia, Caesar's wife, on the night before his murder?" His fondness for adducing parallels from profane history on all possible occasions is well known. But the parallel before us excites our astonishment, just as the comparison which he introduces elsewhere cannot but arouse a sense of indignation; we mean that between the utterance, "I am He," in the lips of Jesus, and a similar utterance on the part of the Roman Marius. Unless the critic had suggested it, a recollection of the wife of Caesar would scarcely have come into any one's mind. For when the cases are narrowly looked at, they are found to have nothing in common except this, that two wives had a painful dream. Still more do we protest against placing the story in the same class with the "suggestive dreams of the history of the infancy." We know from the express declarations of God (Num. xii. 6), as well as from Scripture history, that the Lord made Himself known to those who held an official position in His kingdom by means of dreams; but we are not aware that He spoke in a like way to individuals who did not stand in any relation to His household, otherwise we should require to elevate "Claudia Procula," on the authority of the Gospel of Nicodemus, to the rank of a pious Jewish proselyte.[1] We entirely agree with

[1] If one begins by giving an erroneous representation of Pilate, the next step, naturally enough, is to place his wife on a correspondingly high platform. Comp.

Meyer in holding that it was not the intention of Matthew to represent it as the result of a *divine* influence; but we go a step further, and that on the ground of the evangelical record itself, and maintain that the procurator himself had no such thought, nor the faintest approach to it, and that he did not take the slightest notice of the message sent him by his wife. But why then, it is asked, did the evangelist record the circumstance? Had it not some kind of pragmatic value in his view? Now, the answer to this question is, that this was all and everything which Pilate met with in the form of an obstruction or warning. From God's side he was entirely unrestrained in his freedom of action; he possessed "ἄνωθεν" complete power (ἐξουσία) to bring about the crucifixion of Jesus. But if God left him thus entirely to himself, and permitted him to decide in the way which was natural in the existing circumstances from his standpoint, then we may conclude that it was the will of God that matters should so result, consequently the sentence passed on Jesus by the Roman came *from God.*

The question, *for what end* was it so determined in the counsel of God, is undoubtedly answered in the Gospel history itself very definitely and expressly. The Roman procurator was to pronounce the sentence of death, so that a *cross* might be erected for Jesus, and that the Saviour should taste death in the form of crucifixion. The fourth evangelist, when reporting the confession of the Jews, that they were not empowered to put any one to death, adds the reflection, that thereby the prediction of Jesus as to the manner of His death was fulfilled,—the prediction, namely, that it was necessary that the Son of man should be lifted up (ch. iii. 14, xii. 32, 33). However, this general answer merely indicates the line of thought which is to be pursued; it does not go so far as to indicate the divine intention itself. Why, it is still asked, was it necessary that our Lord's death should be a death *on the cross?* What interpreters have said as to the "profoundly instructive meaning of the death on the cross" is unquestionably correct. Tholuck's statement, that it creates an impression of "victory in defeat, and of native spiritual power," is still more correct, and may count on acceptance, like the substantially similar interpretation of Hengstenberg (*Comm. on John, in loc.*).

Hengst. *l.c.* p. 227. The result is nothing more than an imaginary picture, bearing the mark of arbitrariness.

But such expressions deal only with the circumference of the subject, without touching its centre. Again, the view of the last-named theologian, namely, that "the heathen also had to take part in the death of Christ, in order that it might be shown to be the sin of the human race as a whole," is one which we cannot adopt, because we can by no means regard Pilate as the representative of heathendom. He never comes before us in the character of the heathen as such, but invariably as the Roman, the judge, the ruler; and, accordingly, he is careful to emphasize his supremacy, his power to crucify and to release. This is a view also to which the apostle would scarcely have assented; for at the very time when he contemplates Christ especially as the *Crucified*, he leaves heathendom, in its religious aspect, out of account, and dwells rather on the relation of the crucifixion to the law. The Crucified One, he says in Gal. iii. 13, was "made a curse for us" ("Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree"), that we might be redeemed from the curse of the law; and he shows in Eph. ii. 14–16 that our Lord had slain the enmity by His cross, having broken down the middle wall of partition, the law of commandments contained in ordinances; and having nailed it to His cross, as we read in Col. ii. 14, He blotted out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us. What then? Can we discover in these passages, and others of similar import, the answer to the question with which we are occupied? We are not quite able to satisfy ourselves that we can. For although the expression with which we are concerned is found in each one of these utterances, yet the apostle makes the emphasis to rest less upon the circumstance that it was *on the cross* that our Lord died, than upon the fact that *He suffered death* on His cross. The *manner* of His death is not emphasized at all; it scarcely receives a passing notice. Even the expression "nailing" (Col. ii. 14), however clearly it seems to bring before us the act of crucifixion, does not alter our opinion; we believe that it is employed rather for the purposes of homiletical application than in a didactic sense. The utterance of this same apostle on which we fall back for our purpose is an entirely different one, and one to which we have already made a passing allusion in another connection. Before proceeding to examine it, however, it is necessary that we should recall a result formerly arrived at. We recognised in Pilate the possessor of earthly power. The

power of this world decreed that Jesus should die on the cross. All who at that time had this power in their hands—Pilate, Herod, the high priests, for we do not exclude even them *here*[1] —co-operated to bring about this result. Of course we do not mean world-power, in the sense of material power merely. But just as the apostle has in view the "rulers of this world" (1 Cor. ii. 6), especially in respect of their "wisdom," a wisdom which knew not God; so here, also, we think especially of the mind (*φρόνημα*) which guides the hand which possesses the power. The kingdom of this world, with its wisdom and its interests, comes in contact with the kingdom of the true King. Being partially hostile and partially indifferent, it necessarily assumes a negative attitude towards it. The mighty ones of the former determine to crucify the Head of the latter kingdom. And this having been done, how speaks the apostle of the matter? He says: "I glory only in the cross of Jesus Christ, by which the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world" (Gal. vi. 14). So much he asserts as a fact, that between him and the world there is no longer any room for a relationship or for fellowship. And he states, as a matter of personal experience, that every link which formerly connected him with the world had been broken by means of the cross of Christ. The more steadily we keep in view that it was not the death of Christ considered generally, but His *cross* (therefore the word "crucified") which brought about this result, the more intelligible will the experience of the apostle appear. The world which pronounced upon Jesus the sentence, "let Him be crucified," must cease to be anything (*κατήργηται*) to one who has entered into fellowship with Him whom it condemned, and who has learned to bow the knee before the King of truth. The disciple of Christ regarded himself as condemned by the world along with Him, while the world again appeared to him, on this very account, as judged and condemned. They were entirely apart from each other. All that was in the world—its joy and its sorrow, its wealth and its resources, its interests and its tendencies—was counted but "loss" by him who had become a member and an organ of

[1] If we regard them also from this point of view, because they threw the weight of their authority into the scale before the tribunal of Pilate, we do so on the ground of an express declaration by the apostle. He undoubtedly comprehends among the "rulers of this world" (1 Cor. ii. 8) the high priests; but thereby he gives it to be understood that as such, as mighty ones in this world, they crucified the Lord of glory.

the true kingdom. This was Paul's own experience, and he wished to lead others to share in it. Accordingly, he set forth Jesus as the Crucified One before the eyes of the Galatians, with the view of breaking the spell which the world had cast upon them, and thus freeing them from its unhallowed dominion. But in pursuing this course, not only with the Galatians, but in all the places to which he went preaching the gospel, he was carrying out the intention of God Himself, for this was the *object* which *God* had in view in adjudging Jesus to die on the *cross*. Here the kingdom of light was divided from the kingdom of darkness. All who were of the truth felt themselves called and impelled to come forth from the "power of darkness," from "this present world," and to enter in by the gate of the true "kingdom." The remark has often been made, that it was only while Jesus was suffering before Pilate that He really asserted His royalty in explicit terms. But that was, in point of fact, the proper place for making this claim. Not, however, for *this* reason merely, that the "ibis ad crucem" with which Pilate dismissed Him was for Jesus the pathway to kingly glory, but much more, on account of the significance which the sentence of condemnation had for the members of the kingdom. It was the signal for those who were called, to go forth from the "crooked nation" which had pronounced it, and to enjoy the light of life in the true kingdom.

Our Lord has suffered before Pontius Pilate, and that which He has endured has come upon Him from the side of sin. And yet, on the other hand, it has come upon Him from God in order that a divine purpose of grace might be fulfilled. That is to say, in this phase of His Passion also He bore the sin of the world. In this, as in those that went before. "And He, bearing His cross, went forth" (John xix. 17)—that is the substance of the conclusion to be drawn from the whole previous history. But we have in it a mere symbol of that which took place in spirit and in truth. Jesus has borne, during the hours of His Passion, the sin which He took upon Himself in the garden: He stands at the spot where He is to atone for it by dying.

# PART THIRD.

## THE DEATH OF JESUS.

WHILE criticism admits the historical credibility of a number of the scriptural statements which we have referred to in connection with the Passion of Jesus, it passes the harshest judgment on the accounts of His death. Under its treatment scarcely an item of the Gospel narrative survives, except the bare fact of the crucifixion. All that the narrators have laid stress on, or at least which they have recorded with perceptible interest, is on that very account at once regarded with suspicion. The relative liberality exhibited by criticism in the region of the sufferings of Jesus is not by any means due to the promptings of the historic conscience,—that faculty is deprived of its rights when a subjective feeling as to probability or improbability is made the ultimate ground of decision,—but criticism had no purpose to serve in throwing doubt upon features of the narrative which it could not but acknowledge to be in themselves possible, provided its main object was not thereby imperilled. On the contrary, it was by no means unfitting that criticism, while usually exhibiting an opposite character, should here and there show itself somewhat conservative. But again, that revolutionary mode of procedure, which entirely sweeps away all that belongs to the history of the death of Jesus, does not rest upon any grave historical objections, as, for example, discrepancies in the different narratives. Scarcely once is an objection of this nature even mentioned, far less proved; but it shows itself throughout as the consequence of a fixed preconceived opinion. Nothing more is required than a glance at the manner in which Strauss explains the "genesis of this group of myths," in order to comprehend at once the "genesis" of his critical operations. "By enduring the death of a criminal, Jesus lost, according to traditional Jewish ideas, all claim to

recognition as the Messiah. If the disciples wished, however, to maintain and to justify their belief in Him, no other resource remained to them except to modify their ancient Jewish conceptions in accordance with that fact, and by the aid of misunderstood or misapplied passages of the Old Testament, to adopt into their idea of the Messiah the characteristic of an intercessory, sacrificial death. "Accordingly, the evangelists endeavoured to point out, feature by feature, that Jesus had experienced nothing except that which had been foretold in the Scripture concerning the atoning sufferings of the Messiah." Criticism could not have betrayed its tendency more clearly. It does not conceal the fact that it is not concerned, in the present case, with the bringing out of historical truth. The historian, Strauss tells us, has also his philosophy. Here, then, the philosopher is not content to press the historian into his service, and to compel him, as often before, to pass over many a weary mile for him, but he thrusts him entirely aside, because on the present occasion his assistance is not available. The thing required was to deprive the belief in the atoning death of our Lord of its historical basis. Consequently, whatever seemed to afford any kind of support to this belief was without more ado declared to be a mere phantom of the imagination. It was alleged that there was not a single word of truth in the accounts of what took place before the crucifixion and beneath the cross, or of the events said to have happened after the death of Jesus, but that the narrators invented the whole in the interests of a preconceived opinion, being impelled to do so, partly on the ground of passages of the Old Testament, and partly by the utterances of Jesus Himself. This charge, for which no proof is adduced, and which is a mere dogmatic assertion, returns upon the head of the criticism by which it is made. Inasmuch as it summarily and decidedly sets aside as inventions which are the offspring of tendency, historical communications against which no objection can be raised from a historical standpoint, it thereby characterizes itself as tendency-criticism, and abdicates all claim to serious consideration. However, there is one respect in which we have every reason to take note of this radical mode of procedure. The history of the death of Jesus, as it lies before us, must present a very solid foundation for the belief that it has a sacrificial meaning when Strauss felt Himself compelled to relegate it unreservedly, and

in all its details, to the region of the mythical. It suggests to the apologist his course and his goal. So much we concede to the critical editor of the *Life of Jesus*, that the manner of treating history will always be modified by the general view which is held regarding it. With such a "general view" we proceed to consider the evangelical narrative of the death of Jesus Christ. We shall take care that this "view" shall not deal arbitrarily with the history, nor assert itself on any occasion in opposition to the history, or at its expense. If, however, it shows itself to be a key opening up the facts to the understanding, making them clear and intelligible, resolving difficulties, unfolding riddles, and removing stumbling-blocks, then we may venture to say that faith and history have been vindicated before each other and by each other. There being on the one side not "cunningly devised fables" (*μῦθοι*), but real facts, and on the other, not an airy theory, not "enticing words of man's wisdom," but a well-grounded doctrine, each supports the other, and together they afford firm footing, by which we may attain to the calm and rest of assured conviction.

### 1. THE CRUCIFIED CHRIST.

According to the representations of the evangelical history, Jesus suffered crucifixion in the same manner as did ordinary malefactors who were condemned to endure this punishment. He was subjected not only to the tortures, but also to the ignominy associated with it, as well in Gentile as in Jewish estimation. Here, too, the word of the prophet was so far fulfilled in Him: "He was numbered with the transgressors." Accordingly the proclamation of Christ Jesus as both Lord and Christ notwithstanding the cross, was to the Gentiles foolishness, and to the Jews a stumbling-block. Only to those who were called was the spectacle of His ignominy a fountain of divine wisdom and divine power. The evangelists have mentioned in their order the elements of which the punishment consisted in accordance with the requirements of Roman custom, and partly also of the Jewish law. Their narratives differ in being more or less full, and they emphasize different parts, but the harmony between them is complete. These elements are expressed in brief by Peter in his preaching: "Ye men of Israel: Jesus of Nazareth, being delivered,

ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" (Acts ii. 22, 23). Our Lord was led outside the city, "made as the filth of the world" and "the offscouring of all things" (1 Cor. iv. 13), in order to die the death of a transgressor at the ordinary place of execution in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem,[1] "outside the camp" (Heb. xiii. 13). Like all others who were condemned to this punishment, He too was compelled to bear the cross on which He was to be suspended to the place of execution.[2] There was offered to Him that same bitter draught which it was customary to present to malefactors before their

[1] Golgotha, "the place of a skull," denotes the place of execution, and nothing more. Thus Vorsius has correctly explained the expression. We are certainly not to imagine skulls lying about, and still less to suppose that it is the object of the evangelist to state that the place resembled a skull in its form. It is not a descriptive expression adapted to the popular mind. Strabo's Κιφαλαί is no argument in favour of this view, and is not even a plausible analogy. The narrators in each case add the Greek translation of the name Golgotha, which dates *perhaps* from Jer. xxxi. 39 (the hill Goah or Goatha, a defiled spot on the west side of the city of Jerusalem). They must have had some object in view in so doing. Had it been done by John alone, one might appeal to the usual habit of this evangelist, and put it on the same level with the immediately preceding remark, "a place that is called the Pavement, but in the Hebrew Gabbatha." But the representation of Mark, namely, "which is, being interpreted, the place of a skull," makes it necessary for us to assume something further. There would have been no reason for translating the word if nothing more than the configuration of the place was in question. But, on the other hand, there was an adequate reason for it if the name was derived from the purposes to which the place was applied (εἰς τὸ σταυρῶσαι, Matt. xxvii. 31). We suggest the conjecture that the evangelist had in his mind Isa. liii. 9: "And He made His grave with the wicked." It was the wish and desire of the Jews that their King, having been cast off by them (John xix. 15), should terminate His career here at the gallows (John xix. 17, 18), that He should be buried where the condemned were interred, that the lot of Jezebel (2 Kings ix. 35) should be His.

[2] Comp. Artemidor. *Onirocrit.* ii. 56 (p. 153, ed. Hercher): ἔοικεν ὁ σταυρὸς θανάτῳ, καὶ ὁ μέλλων αὐτῷ προσηλοῦσθαι πρότερον αὐτὸν βαστάζει. Plutarch, *de sera num. vind.* (ed. Hutten, X. p. 235): τῷ μὲν σώματι τῶν κολαζομένων ἕκαστος τῶν κακούργων ἐκφέρει τὸν αὐτοῦ σταυρόν. The words of Plautus also involve a like assumption: "patibulum ferat per urbem, deinde affigatur cruci." The statement made by the fourth evangelist, that Jesus went forth bearing the burden of the cross Himself, is regarded by Strauss as a correction of the older synoptical representation, according to which it was borne by Simon of Cyrene. But he regards even the latter representation with suspicion, as one that might easily have originated from the demand contained in Matt. xvi. 24, in which those that would come after Christ are commanded to take up the cross and follow Him. He would prefer that the question as to the person who carried the cross should be left altogether undecided, rather than admit that the evangelists have accurately recorded even the smallest particular. The remark made by Mark and Luke, that the Cyrenian was coming out of the country, has sufficiently guarded us against the mistake of supposing that he had been compelled to perform

execution.[1] And even *His* raiment, according to the right of custom, fell to those by whom the sentence of death was carried

that service from the pretorium onwards. As far as to the outside of the gate Jesus Himself bore His cross. Only there—ἐξερχόμενοι, Matt. xxvii. 32—does the returning stranger meet the procession, and receive the command to take up the burden of the exhausted sufferer.

[1] The custom which was prevalent at that time of handing to criminals immediately before their execution a bitter, stupefying draught, by which feeling was deadened, is abundantly certified to by history. But even supposing that the custom may have been introduced originally from motives of humanity, the draught, on account of its connection with the punishment of crucifixion, is to be placed in the category of suffering. As it was bitter in the extreme to the physical sense of taste (רֹאשׁ, the head of bitterness—רֹאשׁ used metaphorically, somewhat in the same manner as כָּנָף, πτερύγιον, a figurative term for the pinnacle, the outermost part), so it was essentially a veritable wormwood potion. Now our Lord must have felt the presentation of such a gift as a despite done to Him. At the moment when He was on the point of emptying the cup which the Father had prepared for Him, what would a potion have been to Him by which His consciousness would be clouded? Nothing else than a "cup of devils!" (1 Cor. x. 21). He tasted it,—bodily refreshment would have been grateful to Him,—but no sooner did He perceive its nature and design than He refused it. Consequently there can be no objection to one's recalling, in connection with this incident, the description given in Ps. lxix. 21 of the righteous man's sufferings: "They gave me also gall for my meat; and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink." And we can easily understand, to say the least, how some should have found in Matthew's statement, "they gave Him vinegar to drink, mingled with gall," a modified and tacit citation of the Psalm passage in question. The assertion of Strauss, however, that the whole narrative was invented, on the ground of that poetical complaint, requires closer examination. If we possessed nothing beyond the account of Mark ("and they gave Him to drink wine mingled with myrrh," ch. xv. 23), no one would have assumed any allusion to the words of the Psalm. But how, if it appears that the text of Matthew is absolutely the same as that of Mark, or, at all events, not really different? It is true, on the one hand, that we read in the first Gospel, "they gave Him ὄξος,"—not οἶνον. However, this reading is found in the *Rec.* only; the reading of the best critical authorities (also of the *Cod. Sin.*) is οἶνον, which ought unquestionably to be substituted for the common reading, the origin of which is not hard to account for. On the other hand, again, we undoubtedly find in Matthew the expression "gall" (χολή). But we ask what difference is there between "wine mingled with gall" and "wine mingled with myrrh"? There is absolutely none. That the word χολή was employed by the Seventy as an abstract term for bitterness (synonymous with πικρία, therefore the combination "gall of bitterness") is an opinion that may be maintained, notwithstanding the strong assertion which Meyer makes to the contrary, as the result of his comparison of all the passages bearing on the point. Similarly, in the word σμυρνίζειν the idea of the vegetable product itself is entirely subordinate to that of its effect; σμυρνίζειν = to make bitter. (The Hebrew is מֹר, *myrrh*, from מָרַר, *to be bitter*, from which מְרֵרָה, *gall*, is also derived.) The expressions wine mingled with myrrh (ἐσμυρνισμένος) and wine mingled with gall are therefore in no sense different; the former, like the latter, denotes a bitter hippocras. There is no reason and no pretext, then, for connecting this feature of the narrative with the passage in the Psalm. If there be an element in the Passion history in which there

out.[1] At the same time, the treatment which He received was not entirely the same as that which every other crucified person experienced. The intention of men and a combination of circum-

is a possible allusion to it, that can be found only in a later passage, which has no connection whatever with the one to which we are referring at present, where our Lord is represented as actually receiving the vinegar draught in answer to His saying, I thirst. Whether or not there is such an allusion even there, is a question which we leave undecided in the meantime.

[1] Archaeologists have so conclusively proved that those who executed a sentence of death in those days had a right to the clothing of the condemned, that the supposition of Strauss, that the incident was excogitated from Ps. xxii. 18, is deprived of all foundation. The charge, however, which he has ventured to make against the fourth evangelist of having misunderstood the complaint of the Psalmist, is one which requires to be examined. Strauss affirms that in the second half of the verse neither a different act nor a different subject is spoken of from those in the first, but that what is said in the first half is only more accurately defined in the second. He adds that the passage was thus understood by the Synoptics, and that their narrative corresponded with their understanding of it; while John, misled by a mistaken view of the prophecy, tells us, in the first place, of a division of the clothes, and then of a casting of lots for the coat, as two different acts. We can grant so much, that the Psalmist may have employed the word בֶּגֶד as well as לְבוּשׁ (ἱμάτιον and ἱματισμός) in a somewhat general sense, as indicating raiment or covering (somewhat like ἔχοντες σκεπάσματα, 1 Tim. vi. 8), without intending to distinguish definite *articles* of clothing. (In cases where this latter is designed, the customary expressions are כְּתֹנֶת and שִׂמְלָה.) But unquestionably, in the Psalm no less than in the Synoptics, the ideas of distribution and of casting lots are sharply distinguished from each other, and both are equally emphasized. There was a twofold proceeding, a dividing and a drawing lots. And when John, before whose eyes the whole circumstances took place, perceived that both *things* were done in *immediate succession*, the thought would very naturally occur to him (he is the only one also who makes an explicit quotation) how completely and how exactly that was fulfilled in Jesus which David had seen in spirit. The appropriateness of speaking here of *successive* acts, notwithstanding the circumstance that the soldiers had no articles to deal with except the coat and the upper vestment, may be made apparent without our requiring to fall back on the impossible expedient of including among the articles of clothing belonging to Jesus the girdle, the head-covering, and sandals (Tholuck even suggests in addition a shirt of linen). The matter is simpler. The "τὰ ἱμάτια" of John xix. 23 (notwithstanding the plural form, comp. ch. xiii. 4, 12) denotes the upper garment merely. This, which was an ample plaited robe that could be employed as a covering for the whole person, was divided by the soldiers into four parts, so that each of them received one part. And it was with allusion to this rent, שִׂמְלָה, that they said they would not so divide the χιτών, but decide by lot which of them should receive it entire.—By the concluding words, "these things, therefore, the soldiers did" (ch. xix. 24), John calls the reader to linger at this point. Not that he may dwell on the prophecy which is quoted, but on the incident which is related, and on the suffering which it involved for Jesus. Whether Luther has rightly explained this latter in making it arise from the soldiers making sport of the transaction, or whether we are not rather to think of their coarse greed, may remain an open question.

stances co-operated to set Him forth as pre-eminent above all—richer in sufferings, and the endurer of more abundant ignominy. It is not at all necessary to enter upon the region of conjecture in order to establish this opinion.[1] It is entirely justified by the facts which are expressly recorded, and which, we are firmly persuaded, were referred to by the narrators *for this very end.* It is at the same time true that they allow the idea to suggest itself that a divine purpose was concealed behind, a witness of the Father to the Son, but they show in the forefront the Man of sorrows. The goal which was reached did not entirely satisfy the hierarchical enemies of Jesus, nor allay their bitterness; even as the Crucified He was still the object of their persecution, and up to His last breath they tried to inflict wounds upon Him. It is from this point of view that a circumstance is to be considered which is touched, indeed, by the whole of the evangelists, but which is especially emphasized by John, viz. that our Lord was crucified between two other condemned persons (*and Jesus in the midst,* John xix. 18). True, interpreters are divided as to the question who is to be regarded as the acting subject in the Johannine representation (ch. xix. 16–18, "*they* took Jesus," etc.). Most of them are of opinion that the soldiers are here

[1] To this region belongs the entirely groundless assumption that our Lord was put to death in a more painful manner than were other persons who were condemned to die by crucifixion. This is an assumption which appears to be favoured even by so early a writer as Tertullian, for it is only so that his assertion can be understood, "Christum *insigniter* crucifixum esse" (*adv. Marc.* iii. 19). The conjecture, for instance, that the church Father may have meant by this statement that the feet of our Lord were also nailed to the cross, is without foundation. It is true that this was really the case; it is put beyond all doubt by Luke xxiv. 40. But this was the customary and ordinary mode of procedure among all nations where crucifixion obtained, except among the Egyptians. Consequently the fact is not disputed even by Strauss, although the passage Ps. xxii. 17 (only, indeed, according to the inaccurate translation of the Seventy, which, however, would have been no barrier in the way of the critic) gave him the opportunity of tracing this feature of the narrative also to a mythical source. He had no interest in doing so at the time. The treatise of Dr. Paulus, *zwei Nägel weniger in den Sarg des Rationalismus* (our critic has quoted it on two occasions in his *Leben Jesu,* and again in his critique of Schleiermacher, p. 153, with evident satisfaction; he must have had special reasons for rescuing it from the oblivion which it deserved), was a failure in regard to the means which it employed no less than in regard to the object at which it aimed. On the one hand, it could not get over the results of archaeological investigation; and, on the other hand, it saw the light at a time when the feet of those who were commissioned to bury rationalism were at the door. That Schleiermacher also, as has been asserted, coincided with the results at which Dr. Paulus arrived *is by no means apparent* from his *Lectures on the Life of Jesus.*

referred to, as in Matt. xxvii. 32 sq., because it is of them alone that the words "they crucified Him" (ver. 18) could be used. But as this view is one which cannot be maintained on grammatical grounds, so also it takes from the force of the narrative. Just as Peter in Acts ii. 36 (also ver. 23) makes the charge, "*ye* have crucified Jesus," so it is the intention of John also to bring the Jews into prominence as essentially the acting persons. The procurator surrendered the person of Jesus to *them* (παρέδωκεν αὐτοῖς, John xix. 16): *they do* to their King according to the desire of their own heart (τῷ θελήματι αὐτῶν, Luke xxiii. 25). They *superintend* the act which is of course carried out by the hands of the soldiers. And thus it was by *their* arrangement that Jesus was not crucified *by Himself*, but in company with two others, who were probably, like Barabbas, notorious criminals (κακοῦργοι, λησταί);[1] and it was by *their* arrangement that He was lifted up *before* the other two (comp. Matt. xxvii. 38, τότε), and that He finally occupied the middle place between them. Their intention was to single out the βλάσφημος as the offender who merited the heaviest condemnation of all. But thereby Jesus was distinguished in an entirely different way. He was set forth as the King who should one day gather all nations on His right hand and His left; nay more, He thereby received an opportunity of exercising His high-priestly functions. So much we may regard as purposes of God to which the counsel of men was compelled to be subservient.[2]

[1] There was no difficulty in their so arranging; it would not even be necessary for them to come to a previous understanding with the procurator. The two malefactors were Jews. They were condemned to death by the Jewish tribunal itself, and Pilate had confirmed its judgment. The Sanhedrim, therefore, held them in its own custody, and had perfect liberty to execute at any time the sentence of death passed upon them. Barabbas also was confined in the Jewish prison, for we read in Matt. xxvii. 16: εἶχον δὲ τότε δέσμιον, *they*, the Jews, had him as a prisoner in *their* prison. The singular translation of the Vulgate, "habebat," which Luther also has followed, "*he* (Pilate) had," etc., is perfectly explicable as to its motive, but it is opposed not only to the reading of all MSS., but also to the *Receptus* itself. Should we follow Meyer in explaining the εἶχον as meaning "the prisoner *was* a Jew, thus they *had* him, he *belonged* to them," then certainly the view could be brought out that Barabbas was kept in custody by Pilate; but it is rather much to ask us to render words as clear as εἶχον τότε δέσμιον by: One of their people was then a prisoner of the Romans!

[2] That Luke intended to typify by the two thieves, as has been asserted, the opposition between the relation of the Jews and that of the heathen to Christianity, the unbelief of the one, the faith, combined with repentance, of the other, is a fancy

The fanatical hatred of the Jews becomes still more apparent in its whole intensity in connection with the negotiations carried on between the high priests and the procurator as to the inscription on the cross. When the writing attracted their notice, during the progress of the crucifixion of Jesus,[1] the joy they felt at the success of their efforts was rudely interrupted, and they had no longer any pleasure in looking up at the victim of their persecution. We have already, in another connection and in a passing way, given expression to the conjecture that Pilate erected this inscription in mockery of the Sanhedrim. But the revenge which he took on them is to be sought not so much in the definite terms of the inscription, which the Jews felt so keenly, as in the thing itself. Archaeological investigations do not lead to the conclusion that the practice of displaying a written "accusation" on the occasion of an execution was an invariable one, or that it was required by the law. The passages which are usually adduced from Suet., Dio C., and Eusebius only show that this was done in particular cases, as caprice or inclination dictated.[2] If, then, the thought of doing so in the present instance occurred to Pilate after he left the procession which was moving on towards Golgotha, and when the impression made upon his mind by all that had just taken place was still fresh, the contents of the inscription require no explanation, as they would be determined by the "accusation" brought against Jesus by the Jews, and on the ground of which sentence of death had

which even Strauss rejected. But, of course, he does not fail to attribute to it the predicate of "an acute conjecture," from a regard to party solidarity.

[1] The narrative of Matthew admits of no other view than that the inscription was not sent at first, but only at a later time, in order to be placed above the head of the Crucified. The thought of adhibiting such an inscription occurred to the mind of the procurator only after Jesus had already been led away from the pretorium. The narrative of John harmonizes throughout with this view. It is only thus, for instance, that its true value is given to the word ἔγραψεν (ch. xix. 19), which can neither be taken as a pluperfect, nor be understood in the sense of mere contemporaneousness with what is stated in the previous verse, the idea of subsequency being excluded. When the high priests noticed the sudden appearance of the inscription, which was even in itself so damaging to them, and perceived besides that all the Jews read it with interest, and that the circumstance of its being written in the languages of all who were assembled made it intelligible even to the proselytes who had come from foreign countries to the Passover, they hastened back to Pilate, and begged him to change its terms.

[2] The remark of Hesych. has of course no conclusive force: σανὶς λευκή, λεύκωμα, ἐν ᾧ αἱ γραφαὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἐγράφοντο πρὸς τοὺς κακούργους· τίθεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σταυροῦ.

been passed upon Him.[1] The actual intention of the procurator was that the words with which he had concluded his negotiations with the high priests: "Behold your King! Shall I crucify your King?" in the sense in which he used them, and in the tone in which he uttered them, should flash upon their gaze from the summit of the cross. That which they had been most reluctantly compelled *to hear* from Pilate's lips, obtains an enduring record in the *litera scripta*. It is probable that they detected in it something more than the scorn of the Roman. Their thoughtless words: "We have no king but Caesar," by which they renounced the hope of Israel, and abandoned their claim to be a theocratic covenant-people, were by this inscription proclaimed to all the world. And not only so. For, while we can never persuade ourselves that Pilate embodied in the writing which he prepared an expression of his own belief, yet as the incident was accomplished subject to the overruling hand of God, and was a prediction that every knee would bow to Jesus, and every tongue confess that He is Lord (Phil. ii. 10), the Jews would feel it in some degree as a testimony borne against them by God. Our Lord Himself had announced to them at an earlier time that His crucifixion would be the moment of "His being lifted up" (ὑψοῦσθαι), John viii. 28, and He had done so still more recently when tried before Caiaphas, by the use of the expressive ἀπάρτι.[2] It is exceedingly characteristic that they try to shelter themselves behind words and phrases. But it availed them nothing. The refusal of the procurator is also to be explained without assuming that he was the subject of some wonderful experience. It was, however, a testimony borne to the fact that

[1] This becomes especially evident if—as must be assumed from the account of Matthew taken in connection with that of John, which completes it—the inscription ran thus: οὗτός ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων. Instead of the ἐστιν the Jews asked Pilate to write an εἰμι. An analogous form of inscription is found in Euseb. *H. E.* v. 2 (p. 345, ed. Laemmer), where we read in the account of the martyrdom of Attalus, drawn up by the churches of Gaul: "and being led about in the amphitheatre with a tablet before him, on which was written in Latin: *This is Attalus, the Christian.*"

[2] The singular circumstance that the early preaching of Peter, as recorded in the Acts, makes very frequent use of the designation "Jesus of Nazareth," a designation which is elsewhere absent from apostolic preaching, is to be explained on the assumption of a reference to the inscription upon the cross. This is suggested by the following passages, for example, Acts ii. 22, iii. 6, and particularly iv. 11: "This is the stone which was set at nought of you builders, which is become the head of the corner."

in no circumstances would their protest against the truth be of any use.

It is possible that the enemies of Jesus, in consequence of the refusal they received, became more unbridled in their mockery of the Sufferer. This was a weapon with which they could still wound Him. "Their tongue is a sharp sword; the poison of asps is under their lips; their mouth is full of cursing and bitterness." And their bitterness hailed the mournful victory which it had gained with all the tokens of satisfaction. They draw the language of their mockery from the words of the inscription, and point it by alluding to the contrast between the picture and the writing. The gestures of those who pass by (the shaking of the head was the token not of dislike, nor yet of satisfaction with the Sufferer's misfortunes, but of denial) expressed the thought that this man could not possibly be a king; and the high priests, whose interest it was to weaken the force of the inscription as far as possible, confirmed this judgment by their official seal, and by the reflections which they added. Criticism denies the credibility of this part of the narrative, on the ground that men who were skilled in the Scriptures would scarcely have used words which they knew to be recorded in the Psalms (xxii. 8) as the language of the ungodly; while, at the same time, it is easy to see why the evangelists should have put them in the lips of the opponents of Jesus. The objection has no weight whatever, for it overlooks the fact that it was a deeply-rooted tendency of the Jewish mind to judge of the moral worth of any one from observing what befell him. A recollection of the relations of parties in the Psalm could not, therefore, restrain the mockers from making use of an argument against the Crucified, which seemed, from their point of view, so striking and unanswerable. "*We did esteem* him stricken, smitten of God and afflicted." And He *was* smitten of God, but in a sense which they did not understand. *His* task was patience, and this task He fulfilled.

There is, in truth, no expression by which we can better characterize the manifestations of the crucified Saviour than that of perfected *patience*. It is justified not only by the persistent silence maintained by our Lord from the time He left the pretorium, notwithstanding all that happened to Him (as the Lamb *brought to the slaughter*, He opened not His mouth, Isa. liii. 7), but also by the attitude which He expressly assumed at

the moment when He entered upon the *via dolorosa*. We see this in His address to the daughters of Jerusalem, who were giving utterance to their sympathy in lamentations and in tears. We have the strongest reasons for specially noting this utterance, for it is the only one which proceeded from His lips from the time when He was condemned until He began to suffer the pains of death upon the cross. Admitting that the sympathy of the "daughters of Jerusalem" was sincere and profound, and that, as being a ray of light in the midst of thick darkness, it had some claim to be noticed by our Lord, it still remains very doubtful in what tone His reply was given, and what emotion it reveals to us. The words sound, on the whole, as if that which was offered was being rejected or declined. No doubt at this awful moment, so decisive for world-history, mere effeminate commiseration deserved to be repelled, like the shallow sensibility which characterizes modern observance of the day which commemorates His death. He who has nothing to offer in presence of this spectacle, except tears of sympathy, does not yet know what the real facts of the case are. Our Lord withdraws the gaze of the mourners from His pain as such; He puts them in a condition to enlarge their field of vision, and so to learn something of the *meaning* of His fate. The obvious allusion to the destruction of Jerusalem, and the terrible scenes which would accompany it (Luke xxiii. 30), is to Strauss a sufficient reason for doubting the historical truth of the whole narrative. "Luke betrays an especial tendency to represent the destruction of Jerusalem as a punishment for the guilt of the inhabitants towards Jesus." The utterance in question, however, does not breathe the spirit of threatening, a view to which its terms gave no countenance whatever. The grounding statement which follows ver. 30 says nothing of retribution for the rejection of the Messiah,—much rather is it a statement containing the germ of the thought which Peter subsequently developes, namely, that judgment begins at the house of God; so that, if the "*beginning*" be at the house of God, what an *end* that must portend for the world! But although our Lord was the occasion of the Rachel-lamentations in which the wailers poured forth their feelings, we do not propose to infer from this circumstance that He Himself, when on the way to the place of execution, indulged afresh in those tears which He had shed not long before when gazing upon Jerusalem from the brow

of Olivet. We may not attribute to Him in this phase of His Passion any such exhibitions of sympathy. The conclusion which we draw is a different one. If Christ did not permit the daughters of Jerusalem to dwell upon the spectacle of His sufferings, if He asked them to consider especially what His fate involved *for them*, seeing it was a sign of the judgment which was brooding over their city, then we are entitled to draw an inference with regard to Himself, and we believe that this inference is supported by the *tendency* of His words. He has withdrawn even His own eyes and His own consciousness from His sufferings as such, and He dwells on the bearing of His cross and the divine purpose in it. This and nothing else is the ground of the patience which we have seen Him display from the time when the sentence of death was passed,—a patience for which there is not only no analogous instance in the whole domain of history, but which also differs specifically from those manifestations of patience which we have formerly observed in Jesus Himself. No one will say that, during the sufferings which our Lord endured up to the time He spoke His last word, He ever abandoned it for a moment. It did not desert Him when He stood before the servant who maltreated, or the high priest who interrogated Him. Even then we see Him "enduring the contradiction of sinners against Himself" (Heb. xii. 3), a point of view under which the matter has been expressly placed by the Apostle Peter. And, at the same time, no one will refuse to admit that it was only after He began His progress towards Golgotha that He was rightly recognisable as the subject of the prophecy: "He was oppressed and He was afflicted; and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so He openeth not His mouth." Only now is His soul surrendered to patience, only now does He manifest Himself as patience incarnate. At the moment when He takes up His cross, and comes into immediate contact with it, knowing that He is to be made a "curse" thereon for the world in order that He may redeem it from the "curse," all other thoughts, even all feelings, are overpowered by the contemplation of the divine purpose. We may even venture to say that from this time forth our Lord was wholly in the spirit, to the exclusion of all psychical emotions. As He formerly lifted up His eyes upon His Father's harvest field in Samaria, and replied to the entreaty of the disciples, "Rabbi, eat," by saying, "I have meat to eat which ye

know not of; for my meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, and to finish His work," so now also every other thought, every painful feeling, is overmastered by the one supreme thought: "I come to do Thy will, O God." *We*, on our part, may find it impossible not to dwell on the contrast between His entrance into the city and His departure out of it. Then the saying of the prophet was fulfilled: "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee." Now nothing is to be heard beyond the expressions of a transient sympathy on the part of the women who bewailed Him, and cursing on the part of the rulers and the people. But *He Himself* was not disturbed by this contrast. He did not accept the sympathy as a solace, nor yet regard the mockery as a trial. He has meat to eat of which no one knew. This is the explanation of His supernatural patience. It has often been maintained that the designation of Jesus as the Lamb of God denotes the patience with which He bore His life-sufferings. We have no reason whatever for rejecting this view, for it is one to which prophets and apostles have borne witness. But how is it possible for us to rest content with it? Unless we make some other assumptions, this is a representation which is deprived of all proper foundation, and even the *fact* of our Lord's patience leads to a conclusion which is unavoidable. A patience for which there was no solid reason would not be worthy of admiration; it would be an abnormal phenomenon, a form of stoicism or apathy. But the apostle tells us *what* are the inferences which must be drawn from the patience of Jesus, when, immediately after describing it, he adds: "Who His own self bare our sins in His own body on the tree" (1 Pet. ii. 24).[1] This "enduring," this "taking it patiently" on the part of Him who was "suffering wrongfully" (ii. 19), to an extent which was wholly unparalleled, draws our attention to a dying such as was never before witnessed on earth,—not to the innocent death of a righteous man, an Abel, or a prophet, but to an atoning death for the sin of the world. The more we are enabled to fathom the depths of this wondrous

[1] We entirely disagree with the usual interpretation, which refers this third ὅς (ver. 24) also to the sufferings of Christ, considered in their exemplary character, and regards the verse as showing, like the two previous ones, our obligation to imitate Him. How can we speak of imitation in this region! Atoning suffering as such excludes the idea of imitation.

patience, as exhibited in the bearing of Jesus when He was carrying His cross, and to comprehend the incomparably glorious expression of it embodied in His address to the daughters of Jerusalem, the better shall we be prepared to understand the meaning of the death of the Redeemer.[1]

### 2. THE DYING CHRIST.

The standpoint assumed by Strauss made it entirely unnecessary for him to cast any doubt on the reality of the death of Jesus. On the contrary, as he did not believe in the resurrection, holding that the risen Christ existed only in the imagination of the disciples, and in that of a Paul, a man who never saw Him in His literal historical personality, but beheld Him merely through the medium of the enthusiasm of His disciples, and then in the mirror of his own heart's imagination,—the statement which he makes on the subject is perfectly intelligible, namely: "If he is to be regarded as really dead, concerning the continuance of whose life there is an absence of all historical information, then the death of Jesus on the cross is to be regarded as a literal death." However, he has not closed the door altogether, but has left it ajar. He refers with suggestive frequency to the circumstance that Pilate expressed surprise at the speedy death of Jesus,[2] and notwithstanding the bitter tone which he uses towards Schleiermacher (comp. *der Christus des Glaubens*, p. 151 sq.)—unfortunately not without reason—in discussing this part of the narrative, he is not quite able to refuse his assent to the finding arrived at by this theologian, namely, that the necessity for the death of Jesus does not admit of being proved dogmatically, nor its reality exegetico-physiologically. He is most earnest, however, in his attempts to evacuate our Lord's departure out of the world

[1] We confess that we are absolutely unable to discover how Ritschl can rest satisfied with the idea of mere patience in regard to the suffering and dying Christ. On this one ground alone we should feel his theory of the reconciliation accomplished by Christ to be entirely inadmissible.

[2] The clearing up of the fact that our Lord died on the cross much sooner than was expected, does not depend on the peculiar reflections which have been adduced by Schleiermacher (*L. J.* pp. 446, 447). The Sinless One, in whom there was not the germ of death, who consequently could not die *αὐτομάτως*, was bound to succumb to a violent death all the sooner on that very account. The assertion of Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre*, II. p. 90): "he who cannot die naturally can neither be put to death violently," is entirely erroneous, and rests upon a fallacy.

of all that appeared to differentiate it from the death of an ordinary man. In applying the destructive criticism, with this object in view, to the seven last sayings of our Lord, he is by no means influenced by a perception of weak points which expose these sayings, so to speak, to its assaults;[1] but by perceiving that these utterances of the dying Saviour shed light upon the character and meaning of His death in such a way as to afford a strong support to Christian faith, while at the same time involving unbelief in helpless perplexity. For it is not as if these sayings were mere accompaniments of the death of our Lord, bearing testimony simply to the mood of mind in which He gave up His life; notwithstanding their verbal similarity, they do not admit of being compared with the expressions of the dying martyr (Acts vii. 59, 60); but in these words,—*by virtue of* these words themselves, Jesus gave Himself up to death. If we wish to justify the statement of the apostle (Gal. iii. 1): "before whose eyes Jesus Christ hath been *depicted*, crucified among you," we might liken the words spoken from the cross to the pencil of the painter. They hear, that is to say, they see Jesus die.

Our Lord's dying begins with His being fastened to the cross.

[1] That which Strauss asserts on the side of their internal improbability is entirely destitute of weight; and his way of accounting for their origin is highly peculiar. The objection which he raises on harmonistic grounds winds up with the very characteristic reflection: "If we could now ask each of the evangelists separately, we do not know what the two first might say to the words from the cross, reported by the two others." No doubt if we were to assume that the four evangelists were inventors, each one of whom wrote a tendency-romance on one and the same subject, the question is one which we could not answer. But such a question would never occur to the minds of those who do not accept this assumption as a foregone conclusion. Many a century has passed by without any reader of the Passion history stumbling on the inquiry whether or not these seven dying sayings proceeded from the lips of one and the same Person. They have always been regarded as combining to form a harmony, in which the slightest discord cannot be detected. And as regards their being unequally divided among the four evangelists, it has been rightly held as a sufficient explanation, that Matthew and Mark record the principal utterance of the dying Saviour, the one which stands in the closest relation to His death, and which specifically characterizes it; while the two later evangelists pursue the course which they follow elsewhere, and fill up or complete the narrative. Moreover, Strauss proceeds quite peculiarly in this region. While always standing up at other times for Matthew especially, he here assumes an opposite attitude, and says that if he could admit as historical any of the words attributed to the Crucified, they could only be those recorded by Luke and John. But, of course, even these would fall under the ban, owing to the fixed opinion maintained by him in regard to the fourth Gospel.

When this act of violence was completed, the threads of His life began to loosen. Consequently we regard even the *first* of the seven sayings as an utterance of the *dying* Saviour. It is preserved for us by Luke (xxiii. 34) as follows: *Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.* The difficulties which stand in the way of the interpretation of this passage are not so much admitted in express terms, as suggested by the assumptions made by expositors, whereby they betray their perplexity of mind. But there is a standpoint from which they substantially disappear. The words have been explained as meaning that our Lord desired that His enemies should obtain forgiveness for the great wrong which they had done to Him; and, accordingly, admiration is expressed at the spectacle of that perfect love which not only fulfils the new commandment, "Pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you," but which also searches out grounds of forgiveness, thus "hiding a multitude of sins."[1] Only it is questionable whether this standpoint can be maintained, and whether this view may not be charged with weakening the force of the words to an unjustifiable extent. Undoubtedly the glory of the love of Jesus, as it shines forth in this utterance, is fitted to rivet our gaze, and no one can deny that it stimulates us to imitation; but to elevate to the rank of an interpretation a thought which is merely a deduction from the passage, and which belongs entirely to the region of application, is of a piece with exhibiting the death of Jesus under the aspect of a typical martyrdom by a misapplication of the Johannine statement: "Hereby perceive we the love (of God), because He laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." It is at once apparent how decidedly the words of the Suppliant are opposed to this superficial view. We do not wish to lay stress on the circumstance that it makes the emphasis rest almost exclusively on the procedure of Jesus as exhibited before the eyes of the world, and as good as overlooks the idea of the Son's speaking to the Father. For, however difficult it may be to see how it should have been the design of the one literal prayer which our Lord offered from the

[1] So Meyer: "There breathes forth from the depths of the heart of Jesus that profoundest love which sees transgression in the mildest light." This is said after Grotius, who remarks: "Omissio quod solet aggravare delictum, id affert, quod ad minuendam aliquomodo culpam pertinet."

cross, to commemorate His love to His enemies rather than to exert an influence upon God, — this difficulty is relieved by appealing to analogous cases (John xvii.; xi. 42; Luke x. 21, 22). However, there are other and weightier objections still remaining. Christ never could have characterized the violent act committed against Him by His opponents simply as a wrong done to His own Person. And He has not done so. But He enlarges the circle of their offence, and on the ground of the axiom, "He that hateth Me hateth My Father also," draws the condemning inference, "They hated both Me and My Father," and finds therein a vindication of the saying, "They hated Me without a cause" (John xv. 23-25). If, then, the matter in question was the forgiving of the sinful act which had been committed, the point was not whether He who was persecuted and maltreated had love enough to forgive the wrong (to forgive from the heart, in the sense of Matt. xviii. 35), but whether the nature of the wrong was such as to admit of its being forgiven. And should any one maintain that this dying One, who had so often said in other days, to the exasperation of the Pharisees, "thy sins be forgiven thee," must still have been in possession of like power, we reply, that what the words before us bear testimony to is neither His forgiving them from His loving heart, nor yet His imparting to them remission of sin by virtue of His divine authority, but His turning towards His Father with the petition, "Father, forgive them." But even this requires to be explained, and the explanation of it is as follows. Our Lord felt that He was about to enter upon His high-priestly glory, and acted under the influence of that feeling. At the moment when He was laying the foundations for it, He permitted the first prophetic beam of the glory which was afterwards to be exhibited in its fulness to burst forth. While He was pressing into the holy place by His own blood . . . to appear in the presence of God for us (Heb. ix. 12, 24), He assumed by anticipation, through this prayer, that which He was to execute in the future as His perpetual office, when, having been perfected as the Author of eternal salvation, He was to intercede for us as our Advocate with the Father, in the true tabernacle, seated on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens. Had He not been fully aware that He was enduring a sacrificial death for the sin of the world, and that its merit could be made good before His

Father, He might still have declared that He would not accuse them to the Father (John v. 45), or have expressed a wish that God would not requite them according to their deed, nor impute it to them; but we could not understand the presentation of an explicit prayer such as this, which requests an answer, and even asks it in the sense of the "Father, I will" of John xvii. 24. This prayer becomes conceivable and intelligible only on the assumption that our Lord was at this very time pouring forth His blood for many for the remission of sins—the blood which speaketh better things than that of Abel. The interpreters of Isaiah have for the most part objected to the idea that the prophetic statement: "He made intercession for the transgressors," refers to the prayer of the dying Saviour. And, in truth, this cannot be its proper fulfilment. The prophecy of the intercession undoubtedly points to the whole high-priestly office which the servant of the Lord was to assume on the ground of His sufferings. But in so far as the prayer of our Lord anticipated the authority of this office and made the first application of the power vested in it, the exegesis of Strauss is correct when he asserts that the evangelist here regards as already accomplished in Christ that which the prophet has there stated of the suffering Messiah.

We now proceed to examine particularly the bearing of the grounding statement appended to our Lord's saying, with the object of vindicating the view we have just expressed. Altogether apart from its contents, it demands, for its own sake, careful consideration. It was not the way of the Suppliant on other occasions — a circumstance which we have already dwelt on more than once—to give a reason for the petitions which He presented to the omniscient God. In the so-called high-priestly prayer we find, indeed, that reflections of this nature are interwoven with the petitions. They are to be explained, however, by the circumstance that this prayer aimed at the edification of the disciples as one of its objects. A ground, properly so called, is not stated, except in the present instance, in any prayer presented by our Lord, nor yet in the prayer which He taught His disciples. Now, the peculiar manner in which it is motived corresponds to this anomaly. Even the task of showing the actual meaning of the statement has occasioned commentators much difficulty. The attempt, which has been repeatedly made,

to limit the application of the petition of Jesus to those who were the immediate agents in the crucifixion, could not long produce any impression, except that it was a failure.[1] The force of the declaration of Peter, "I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers," is all the harder to evade, the more apparent it becomes that he is referring to the utterance from the cross. And even in the event of its being doubted whether there is such an allusion in the analogous expressions of Paul (they *knew* Him *not* . . . they desired Pilate that He should be slain, Acts xiii. 27, 28; "*had they known*, they would not have crucified," 1 Cor. ii. 8), yet we have the direct authority of this apostle for the statement that the "princes of this world" who took part in the crucifixion of Jesus did not know, in point of fact, what they were doing. Any one who examines the account of what took place between Pilate and Jesus, or who considers the details of the trial of our Lord before Caiaphas, may well ask with surprise how this "ignorance" can hold in regard to them. But this feeling does not justify us in resorting to the view of Calvin, that Christ did not pray for all promiscuously, but only *pro misera plebe;* nor yet to the expedient of a more recent interpreter, who maintains that there were exceptions, and who insists, in any case, on excluding Caiaphas. Still more inadmissible is it to cut the knot by means of the maxim which is here introduced into the most inappropriate of all places,—that sin can never become clearly conscious of itself, that there is only one (sinful) will which knows quite clearly what it is doing,—the will of him who was a liar and a murderer from the beginning. At the same time, even for him who accepts the saying of our Lord simply and without any reservation, there springs up the new question, in how far could the presupposed ignorance (ἄγνοια) supply a ground for the petition: "forgive them"? The words of Paul to Timothy, "I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief" (1 Tim. i. 13), undoubtedly present a very appropriate parallel, but they do not supply us with any explanatory element. It is usual to regard

[1] Still more erroneous is it to withdraw the soldiers altogether from the field of vision; particularly on the ground stated so rashly by v. Gerlach in his familiar *Bibelwerk*, that they had fulfilled the duty of obedience, and, in this sense, had done a good work. Those who appear as the immediate "doers" were also the immediate objects of the prayer; the beam of grace fell especially on them.

our Lord's statement in the light of an exculpation. But even were we to grant that the presence of extenuating features qualifies a sin for forgiveness, while their absence excludes it (both of which positions we are disposed to dispute rather than to admit), it would still remain a very doubtful question whether ignorance, *this* ignorance, was really sufficient to excuse the enemies of Jesus. J. Gerhard distinguishes between an *ignorantia* which lessens sin, and an *ignorantia* which aggravates it, and adds that the sin of which the Jewish opponents of our Lord were guilty belonged to the latter category. And in this he is right. It is a view to which the declarations of Jesus Himself directly point. In the course of His farewell addresses to His disciples, He says of the Jews the very same thing which He has interwoven with His prayer on the cross: "they know not Him that sent Me" (John xv. 21); "they have not known the Father nor Me" (xvi. 3). And what does He add notwithstanding this, yea, on this very account? "Now they have no cloak for their sin" (xv. 22). So far was their "ignorance" from excusing them, that the saying of the apostle was exactly applicable to their case: "they are without excuse" (Rom. i. 20). If we wish, then, to understand the grounding γάρ in the prayer of Jesus, we must not seek the "ground" in elements which would place the sin of the individuals concerned in a milder light, making them, as it were, deserving of forgiveness,—worthy of it (worthy in the sense of the well-known parables),—but it must consist in a circumstance which leaves the moral merit or demerit of the persons referred to wholly out of account, and which excludes every thought of the relative guilt of the separate individuals. Now the circumstance is this,—the words "they know not" expressly point to it,—that the sin of the murderers belonged to the period which is denominated by the apostle "the times of this ignorance,"[1] at which, he says, "God winked, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent" (Acts xvii. 30). This period was then "ready to vanish away," and in a very short time it belonged to the past; and it was by the guilty act of the

[1] An explanatory analogy from the individual life may be found in those transgressions committed in the period of early youth, and which are frequently in a literal sense ἀγνοήματα, without the idea of guilt being thereby excluded. "Lord," says the Psalmist, making an instructive and well-grounded distinction,—"Lord, remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions."

Jews, whereby they filled up the measure of their fathers, that it was brought to a close. However, this supreme transgression belonged also to the "times of ignorance," and therefore to all who shared in it the saying of Matthew was applicable (Matt. xii. 31), that all manner of sin and blasphemy, even sin against the Son of man, would be *forgiven unto men.* And this result was certain, subject to the presupposition which is emphasized by Paul in various passages, and by Peter in Acts iii. 17 sq.: "Repent ye therefore and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord." And on account of the sacrificial death of Jesus, a place for this repentance existed,—he who sought it found it. The opposite of this "ignorance" was "knowledge." And the doctrine laid down by the apostle is, "If we sin wilfully after we have received the *knowledge* of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins." When our Lord makes intercession for sinners from the cross, a scene is presented to our view which was typified in the Old Testament. The type is made use of by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews when he says (ix. 7) that the high priest entered into the tabernacle, not without blood, which he offered for the errors (*ἀγνοημάτων*) of the people. The *ἀγνοήματα*[1] were entirely covered by the terms used by Jesus in His prayer, "they know not what they do." But it was for the very purpose of atoning for these "errors" that the high priest entered into the Holy Place with blood. And so if our Lord, when He was about to shed His blood, presented a petition which was thus grounded, nothing is left for us but to admit that the first utterance spoken from the cross shuts us up to the conclusion that the death of Jesus was an atoning death.

The SECOND of the seven last sayings is also reported by Luke, and it leads to a similar conclusion. It is true that the two are

[1] In the fundamental passage, Num. xv. 25, a distinction is drawn between sins committed בִּשְׁגָגָה and those committed בְּיָד רָמָה (*ἀκουσίως* and *ἐν χειρὶ ὑπερηφανίας ἁμαρτάνειν*). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, does not avail himself of this distinction. To him *all* sins are *ἀγνοήματα*, and rightly so, inasmuch as they had been committed in the times of *ἄγνοια*. Yet he is also familiar with the idea of *sinning wilfully*; but, according to him, it is applicable only after the knowledge of the truth has been received, and he understands by it apostasy from Christ,—trampling the Son of God under foot, and counting the blood of the covenant an unholy thing.

separated from each other by a greater or less interval of time. The mocking speeches of the Jews come between. It was by these that one of the malefactors was incited to speak blasphemous words against Jesus, and these again induced his companion in suffering to make his contrasted confession. Yet this interval must not make us overlook the close connection which obtains between the first saying and the second. When Strauss says that it is inconceivable that a criminal, who undoubtedly came now for the first time into contact with Jesus, should have understood, without any preliminary instruction, the doctrine of a suffering and dying Messiah; and again, that he should have accepted the answer of our Lord in the sense which corresponded exactly with what he (the critic) regards as the fundamental feeling of Jesus, he misses the point at which an objector might raise a question. For no one can regard it as an improbable thing that a criminal, especially amid his dying necessities, should have been led to a believing repentance—(this is the *only* thing which is here in question, and not at all the "comprehending of a doctrine," as, for instance, in Acts viii. 31)—through an immediate vision of the crucified Christ, save he to whom the analogous cases in the Passion history itself (comp. Luke xxiii. 47, 48), and the innumerable later testimonies of a similar character belonging to every century of the Christian era, are non-existent. But, for all that, the answer given by our Lord to the appeal of the suppliant undoubtedly presents many difficulties. It has been characterized as a *kingly* manifestation on the part of Jesus discovering to us the acting of Him to whom the Father gave "power over all flesh," and into whose hands He gave all things. In the consciousness of this, it is said ("Jesus knowing," John xiii. 3), our Lord already justifies the saying, "All power is given unto Me in heaven and in earth." No doubt this mode of view is so far correct. We have already laid emphasis on the fact that the spectacle of the Crucified, the inscription over His head, the two malefactors on His right hand and His left, set Him forth prophetically as the King who was one day to appear and to accomplish what was parabolically represented in Matt. xxv. 31 sq. But yet the explanation in question cannot be regarded as adequate. True, indeed, the thief betook himself to the future King. As Joseph said to Pharaoh's butler, "Think on me when it shall be well with thee, and show kindness, I pray thee,

unto me" (Gen. xl. 14), so he asks our Lord to remember him when He attains to His royal glory. But *this* petition of his receives a promise just as little as the analogous one presented by the sons of Zebedee, that they might be permitted to sit on His right hand and His left in His *kingdom*. "It is not Mine to give," was the answer, "but (it shall be given to them) for whom it is *prepared*." (Comp. the similar expression in the parabolic delineation, Matt. xxv. 34: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom *prepared* for you.") The remark is usually made, that our Lord accorded to the malefactor more than he asked, since He substituted for the indefinite future "when Thou comest" the day then present, and for the no less indefinite "remember," a promise of most gracious import, confirmed by the attesting *ἀμήν*. It is unnecessary to dispute over the question of more or less. But so much is certain, that the solemn promise of Jesus was not entirely covered by the petition which the malefactor addressed to Him. The relation between them is similar to that which obtains between what Jesus said to the Jews: "If a man keep My saying, he shall never see death" (John viii. 51), and the words He addressed to His disciples: "I appoint unto you a kingdom," etc. (Luke xxii. 29, 30); or, still more appropriately, to the relation between the apocalyptic beatitude: "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth" (xiv. 13), and the later one: "Blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb" (xix. 9). For what is the true and proper import of the promise made to the thief? Many interpreters, for reasons which are entirely intelligible, dwell principally on the expression "in Paradise." It seems to lift the veil from a mysterious region into which the eye desires to look. But not less intelligible is the course pursued by others, who turn away their attention from the local designation, and make the emphasis rest on the words, "thou shalt *be with Me*." In taking this course they have Christ's own authority on their side. For, when our Lord prays, saying: "I will that they also whom Thou hast given Me be *with Me* where I am" (John xvii. 24), or when He makes the announcement, "*where* I am there shall also My servant be" (xii. 26), the idea of locality is in both cases entirely absorbed in the prominent idea of fellowship. No doubt it is the business of exegesis to see that the expression "thou shalt be with Me," no less than "thou

shalt be in Paradise," obtains its due force; only this duty is certainly not fulfilled in regard to the latter expression when we avail ourselves as much as possible of material conceptions. Meyer accuses Hofmann of rationalizing the representation of Paradise. Others, again, have charged this investigator with seeming to deny the descent of Jesus into Hades. They have been those to whom this descent meant something more than the reality of His death, and who thought of an activity exercised by the Saviour after His decease, in the death world. But it is only in the apocryphal writings that we read of any such activity; the canonical Scriptures neither speak of nor yet presuppose it. The exegesis which imposes this doctrine on them is both arbitrary and erroneous.[1] If, then, we know nothing else, and have nothing further to say of the condition into which Jesus entered after His death, than that which may be drawn from His own words when dying: "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit," assuredly no one is liable to the charge of rationalizing who tries to understand the words "thou shalt be in paradise" *by means of* the words "thou shalt be with Me." On the contrary, the charge is one which falls back with redoubled weight upon those by whom it is made. Since Meyer understands by Paradise the part of Hades in which the souls of the righteous remain after death until the resurrection, he cannot evade the consequences which Schleiermacher frankly acknowledges to be involved in this view, when he says (*L. J.* p. 453), that this was not the time, nor yet the place, for removing false conceptions of the future state, but that Christ acquiesced in an erroneous view of it. Consequently, there was an accommodation on the part of our Lord! The remembrance of the mischief which has been done by this theory is still sufficiently fresh to warn us against having anything to do with it. Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judenthum* is therefore not the proper source from which to draw materials for explaining the utterance of Jesus which we are considering. It is a pity that so much learning has been expended in attempting to gain insight into its meaning by this path. When our Lord speaks of Paradise, it is not His wish to excite any other thoughts regarding it than those which the Scriptures of the Old Testament would

[1] The interpretation given by Calvin of the passage in the first Epistle of Peter (iii. 19) is one which we may reasonably hesitate to adopt, but the method pursued by this expositor in dealing with the passage is entirely sound and just.

suggest.[1] Every Jew knew of Paradise from the Scriptures, and he knew from them also what was the meaning of "being in Paradise," just as every child knows it in our own day. It means, on the one hand, a condition of innocence; and, on the other, a condition in which immediate fellowship with God is enjoyed. Into this condition our Lord's promise to the thief said that he should enter, that same day, through the gate of death which was then opening to receive him. It meant that, when he should have died, sin and guilt would lie behind him, forgiven and forgotten (just as the state of innocence lay behind our first parents when they were driven forth from Paradise), and that on this account his departure from the world would be a transition to the vision of God (comp. Rom. vi. 7, 11: "He that is dead is freed from sin . . . dead unto sin, but alive unto God"). But on what does the promise rest? We can fall back on the common expedient, and say that this malefactor died in the Lord, and that those who die in the Lord, or, as it is elsewhere put, those who sleep in Jesus, are blessed in the full sense of the word, including all that it presupposes and involves. However, the expression of Jesus makes a more definite answer possible for us. "Thou shalt be with Me"—*that* also Jesus said in His reply to the suppliant. It is certainly quite inadmissible to take the words "with Me," and then simply to declare, with a recent interpreter, that they are equivalent to "*through* Me." But we are just as little entitled to understand the preposition in the sense of mere co-existence.[2] The reason for choosing it is not difficult to discover. Thou shalt be with Me, said our Lord, in relation to the future. But there was a sense in which a "with" applied even to the present. The circumstance that the thief himself made the sharpest distinction between himself, a criminal, and the Innocent One, who had done nothing amiss, suggests to our minds all the more forcibly the saying of the prophet: "He was numbered with the transgressors," especially as the evangelist Mark saw a fulfil-

[1] The same holds of the two other passages in the New Testament in which the expression occurs, 2 Cor. xii. 14; Rev. ii. 7.

[2] Whether or not the assertion of Krüger (*Synt.* p. 287), that σύν τινι denotes coherence and μετά τινος co-existence, is a well-founded one in regard to classical Greek, we leave others to decide. As regards the New Testament, however, it breaks against numerous instances of a contrary description. Between the saying before us, "thou shalt be *with* Me," and the Pauline statement, "and so shall we ever be *with* the Lord" (1 Thess. iv. 17), undoubtedly no difference can be affirmed.

ment of this prediction in this very association of Christ with malefactors when He was dying on the cross (Mark xv. 27, 28).[1] Jesus suffered the death of a malefactor, dying with them in order that He might make the lawless partakers of His own innocence and blessedness. "Father, forgive them," said the first utterance from the cross; forgiveness is the burden of the second also. Here the Saviour presents no *petition;* the appropriate prayer was offered *already:* "Father, I will that *they also* whom Thou hast given Me be *with Me* where I am," for even this thief was given to Jesus, and drawn to Him by the Father. Accordingly, instead of intercession we have announcement. And not mere announcement, but a solemn asseveration, a sure promise: "Verily, I say unto thee." For the presupposition necessarily implied in the prayer "forgive them," which was presented for the Jews, was most manifestly complied with in the present case, by virtue of the malefactor's believing repentance. We see, therefore, in the answer which Jesus gave to the thief, not a manifestation of His power as the Son of God, but an application of the benefits of His sacrificial death to a repentant soul; consequently, the second saying from the cross also leads us to the conclusion to which we were conducted by the first.

The line of thought which we have pursued in examining the first two of our Lord's dying sayings is one from which the *third* seems to withdraw us. We regard as such the exhortation addressed by Jesus to His mother and to the disciple whom He loved. It has always been accounted the third, and it is only by some modern exegetes that a different opinion has been advanced. Not to speak of the arbitrariness of individual writers who, without any reason, make it the second saying, the conjecture that it is rather to be reckoned the fourth has found upholders since the time of Neander. In such matters we must not decide on grounds of feeling; but were we disposed to appeal to such considerations, the usual method of reckoning would be found to

[1] We must certainly admit that this quotation in Mark is open to grave suspicion on critical grounds. But yet if it be a fact that our Lord (Luke xxii. 37) applied the passage of Isaiah to His death on the cross, then there is no feature connected with the crucifixion in which the prediction was so certainly fulfilled as in His being crucified between two malefactors. Ritschl felt the passage in Luke so burdensome that he laconically declares himself of the opinion (*l.c.* II. p. 26) that it cannot be regarded as authentic. This is convenient, but it is unwarrantable and arbitrary.

commend itself to the greater number of minds. As regards the historical relations, on the other hand, the words "after this," John xix. 28, give to the new view a support as slender as the support given by another circumstance to the traditional view is strong. The cry, Eli, Eli, either from being actually misunderstood or wilfully twisted, occasioned the Jews to say: "He calleth for Elias." But this stands in so immediate connection with the presenting of the vinegar-potion, that there is no room between them for the word spoken to Mary. Accordingly, it must be placed *before* the plaint of the dying Saviour. From the fact that it is peculiar to the fourth Gospel, we might conclude beforehand that Strauss will dispute its historical credibility. And, in reality, he characterizes the narrative as a fiction, invented with the view of elevating John above all the other apostles, and constructed from materials supplied by an earlier incident which is recorded by Matthew (ch. xii. 49). Now, to construct a story like the one which lies before us from the passage of Matthew just mentioned, is more than the most distorted imagination could have accomplished. And as to the preference of which John is said to have been the subject on this occasion, its nature was not such as to enable it to elevate him to a position superior to that of a Peter. It entirely vanishes in presence of the words addressed to the latter disciple: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build My church." However, the charge of Strauss is not to be disposed of with the easy sentence: "This narrative, so lofty and so penetrating in its substance, so simple and delicate in form, is unjustly relegated to the category of myths." There is a feature in it which deserves examination. It is impossible that the intention of our Lord in this *testimonium domesticum* (the expression used by Jerome) should have been to provide for the earthly future of His mother. For whatever view may be taken of the family relations of Mary, in neither of the two possible cases was she lonely and desolate as to her outward life. The bond which was established between her and John is to be regarded, therefore, from another point of view. Men are wont to speak in terms of admiration, because our Lord still paid regard to the relation in which He stood to His mother at the moment when He was accomplishing the supreme task that had been appointed Him by the Father. But mere admiration does not advance us a single step unless it rests on a perception of the real meaning of

our Lord's act. Is the real import of this act apprehended, or is it not rather missed by the representation that the dying One turned away His eye for a fleeting moment from His essential work, and permitted it to rest upon an earthly relationship, and still more by the extraordinary assumption that He wished to impress upon the future church the duty of watchful filial affection? And, on the other hand, is the true import of this third saying from the cross lost sight of, or is it not rather apprehended, when it is viewed as standing in a most definite relation to the atoning death of the Saviour? Our Lord says: "Behold thy son, behold thy mother." By these words he assuredly formed a bond between the two. But there was room for this new bond only in so far as a pre-existing one was dissolved. It is unnecessary to appeal to the word "woman," on which too much emphasis is usually placed; the scene itself is a sufficient testimony to the fact that Christ here brings to an end His filial relation to Mary: "*That* is thy son, for henceforth *I* am so no more." It did not cease of its own accord, so to speak, in consequence of His departure from the world, but He Himself dissolved it,—He who was then dying an atoning death. During the course of His active ministry He reminded Mary more than once of the limitations of her authority. As often as she interfered unwarrantably with His procedure, His rebuke followed unhesitatingly. But for all that, the relation of the Son to the mother continued unbroken. And even death, considered in itself, would not have prevented its further continuance. For the surviving mother can still speak of her departed child, and call him her son. However, the death of the Redeemer entirely severed the bond which had existed till then. He who died *for all*, withdrew by *this* death from every natural or earthly relationship to individuals. Ascending up to the High-priesthood, which is "after the order of Melchisedec," He must needs resemble him in appearing also as "without mother." And when He reassumed His life after *this* death, He intentionally kept Himself from the view of her towards whom He had occupied that special relationship. His making this express declaration to His mother, and that immediately before His death-agonies, and still more, His according to her the greatest possible compensation for the bereavement which pierced her soul like a sword, we willingly recognise as manifestations of filial piety; but this must not make us overlook the special truth taught by the

incident. It may be clearly discovered in the other part of the arrangement which Jesus made. "Behold thy mother," He said to His disciple. The fact of the command being given to *this* particular disciple is probably to be explained on the same ground as His presence in the palace of the high priest, in the pretorium of Pilate, and here at the cross.[1] But how does it come to pass that He *can* lay such a command on John with full reliance on his obedience? Now, generally speaking, it rests undoubtedly on the saying that His own would receive now in this time, and in an increased measure, brothers and sisters, mothers and children, for His sake and the gospel's, comp. Mark x. 30. The same Christ who introduces into family circles the sword of division, so that parents rise up against their children, and children against their parents, institutes among those who believe in Him new associations of a better or of a glorified character. But we ask more definitely, what is the proper foundation upon which these new associations are based? Not Christ regarded personally, nor His word, but His death, or, more precisely, His atoning death. That which the evangelist John points out (xi. 52) as the real groundwork of the comprehensive Christian society, namely, that Jesus "died for that nation . . . that He should gather together in one the children of God," is also the basis of the special fellowships which obtain among individuals. He who was dying "for that nation" forms a relationship between Mary and John from His cross which could not otherwise have been fully established, either by a command issued by the highest authority, or by the willingness of the receiver of the command. And thus, in point of fact, the idea of the atoning death is one which the third saying from the cross does not remove from the field of vision.

In the *fourth* of the seven last sayings, however, this idea is presented with the utmost distinctness and directness. This was clearly perceived by Strauss. It is true that he professes to reason here also from an exclusively human point of view. But

[1] According to the evangelical narratives, John was the only one of the Twelve who was present during the crucifixion of Jesus. No doubt it has been inferred from the statement of Luke, ch. xxiii. 49: "and all His acquaintance . . . stood afar off," that the whole of the disciples were present; but in the idiom of the New Testament, *οἱ γνωστοί* ("acquaintance") always means those who are only distantly related, and therefore seems designed to exclude the disciples who were in a different category.

the course which he adopts is scarcely intelligible unless it is explained on a different ground. His assumption that the evangelists only put the opening words of the twenty-second Psalm ("which forms, as it were, the programme according to which they drew up the history of the crucifixion") into the mouth of the dying Christ, is one which he is not in circumstances to defend against the obvious objection that mere legend would certainly not have attributed to our Lord an utterance of so doubtful a character. Schleiermacher admits that Jesus must have actually used the words in question; but just because he cannot reconcile himself to the idea of Jesus having been the subject of such an "agitation of soul," and of His relations to the Father undergoing such an "alteration," he falls back on the expedient that when our Lord exclaimed: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" He had the whole Psalm in view, and in particular the joyful strain with which it concludes.[1] It is exceedingly strange that those who are elsewhere the foremost to deny even the slightest relation to Schleiermacher, are the very persons who here walk substantially in his footsteps. Schleiermacher intended nothing further by the view to which he had recourse than to make the words of complaint that proceeded from the lips of Jesus psychologically conceivable. But what else is *aimed* at, or what else is *gained*, by giving to the cry of our Lord the same sense which the words had for the Psalmist,

[1] Strauss is not accurate when he says (*Der Christus des Glaubens*, p. 159) that Schleiermacher here followed the older rationalistic theology (even Meyer calls Dr. Paulus the first upholder of this view). The remark had already been made by Caspar Sagittarius (in 1684): "Sunt qui putant, Christum quidem initium hujus Psalmi clare pronuntiasse, sed eundem integrum una cum sequentibus in silentio recitasse," etc. He does not, for his own part, assent to the supposition (on historical grounds); however, he goes so far as to denominate it a *pia conjectura*. Whether or not the *conjectura* is entitled to the predicate of *pia* is a question which we leave unanswered. But we decidedly dispute its accuracy or its consistency with the facts of the case. The representation that our Lord, when He saw death drawing near, broke out in the plaintive words with which Ps. xxii. opens, that He then repeated the succeeding portion of the Psalm in silence in His own mind, and that when He reached the יְשׁוּעָתִי at its close He uttered His τετέλεσται,—this is a representation which does not harmonize with the supreme significance of the moment. In Koch's *Geschichte des Kirchenlieds*, many instances are adduced in which Christians awaiting death, with a song upon their lips and in their heart, breathed out their life with its last strophe. We are entitled to call such a death beautiful and edifying. But the death of Jesus was something more than the beautiful end of a pious man's career, and unquestionably the word "edifying" or instructive is not the one by which its true nature can be characterized.

and then showing, as may very easily be done, that it is just by a pious man assailed by despair (a despair to which he can be tempted by the thoughts and feelings excited in his mind through reasoning on the circumstances in which he is placed) that such a complaint and question would naturally be uttered? If our Lord made use of the words of the Psalm at the time of His death in order to describe His sorrow, this is very far from implying that they had the same signification for *Him* as they had for the original subject of the Psalm. And an interpretation which may admirably set forth the inner situation of the latter, may at the same time be very far astray, if its findings are forthwith applied to the dying Saviour. A pious Israelite brooding over Zion's lament in a time of conflict: "The Lord hath forsaken me, and my Lord hath forgotten me," might certainly feel the first risings of despair within him, and that just because of his uncertainty as to the "why." But how can the representation be carried out, that it was necessary for our Lord to undergo a conflict of this nature even although it immediately issued in victory! Buddaeus opposes those who understand the words of Christ as evidences of His *conflict* with despair, just as decidedly as those who regard them as the utterance of despair *itself* (comp. *Instit. Th. Dogm.* p. 785). Of the latter, he says that their view borders on blasphemy; and of the former, that they impugn the *sanctitas Christi.* But they cast doubt on even more than the *sanctitas* of our Lord; they lower Him to the level of a piety which finds it necessary to defend itself against mistaken conclusions and deceptive feelings. We formerly tried to show that psychology does not supply us with the proper key for understanding the scene in Gethsemane, but how much less is it able to do so in the present instance! We cannot but regret that it has been the usual method to place both manifestations of our Lord under the same view-point, as if they were necessarily and inseparably connected.[1] It is evident that the two cases are

[1] This assumption is shared by theologians who are in other respects exceedingly opposed to each other in regard to the subject before us. On the one hand, Hofmann thus writes (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 308): "The forsakenness of God, of which Jesus complains on the cross, is not different from His abandonment to the power of the God-opposed will." And, on the other hand, Delitzsch says (*Comm. on the Heb.*): "In Gethsemane that was in spirit already as good as accomplished which was brought to pass on the cross in external reality" (thus the *external realization* was here everything). We only require to listen to these utterances to feel that such a

very different. It is admitted by every one, that when our Lord rose up from His conflict in Gethsemane it was as a victor; how then could He sink back into the mood of mind which He had overcome? That which is scarcely imaginable on the part of a Christian man—a mere man—is surely not to be regarded as imaginable on the part of our Lord. In any case, it is advisable to withdraw the cry of our Lord from all contact with psychological experiments. A modern interpreter warns us against the danger of losing ourselves in "dismal dogmatizing," but there is much greater danger of our losing ourselves in sentimental fancies. Luther conspicuously displayed his admirable tact in dealing with this passage, when he said that the conflict in the garden was by no means to be regarded as an analogous experience, because God was here against Him;[1] "*the words admit of no other gloss or explanation.*" He means by this that our Lord's plaint over His abandonment by God could not have proceeded from a mistaken subjective feeling or opinion, but that it must have been grounded on an actual objective fact. But this can be really acknowledged without our acquiescing in the conclusions which have been drawn from it by church dogmatics. These conclusions, as developed and stated by Quenstedt, for example,[2] offend the Christian consciousness as much as they disagree with the real import of the words spoken by our Lord. For what is implied by the term "forsake" (ἐγκαταλείπειν)? It is obviously evacuated of a great part of its meaning when there is attributed to it the merely negative signification that God, to whom "all things are possible," had merely withdrawn His sustaining hand. No doubt Paul used the word in this sense, "persecuted, but not forsaken" (ἐγκαταλειπόμενοι, 2 Cor. iv. 9), but it is not appropriate in the present connection. If Hofmann has succeeded in placing his theory of "abandonment to the God-hostile will of the world" in a more or less favourable light in respect of the scene in Gethsemane, it

blending of things that differ is an arbitrary and unjustifiable proceeding, and a token of perplexity.

[1] Comp. Walch, XII. p. 1976. For analogous statements of Luther, see *Held. l.c.* p. 160.

[2] Comp. his lengthy "Excursus de Derelictione Christi" in the *Theol. did. pol.* III. p. 358: "Non quidem Deus pater filio suo ratione personae suae irascebatur, sed quia peccata totius mundi in se susceperat, non potuit non vi justitiae suae vindicatricis eum *extreme odisse*, tanquam peccatorem omnium, quos sol unquam vidit, maximum."

is here—not to speak of the former case—irrecoverably shattered against a circumstance which is in itself undoubted, and which has been admirably expressed by Bengel in the words: "Non solum ait, se a Deo traditum voluntate hominum, sed etiam a Deo ipso quiddam esse passum nobis ineffabile." On the other hand, the idea is weighted with a meaning foreign to it when there is introduced into it a *motive* which is presupposed or inferred to exist on the part of God, and when, accordingly, the ἐγκαταλείπειν is accounted for on the ground of an "extreme odisse," or even of an "irasci." No doubt the question of motive is one which we must inquire into, for it was raised by our Lord Himself when He used the word "why." But the supposition that the Father was moved by any such ground of action is one which could never have been admitted by Him who said (John xii. 27): "*For this cause* came I unto this hour." Our Lord gives a general explanation of the interrogative expression in an earlier connection. To "forsake" means to be "left alone," comp. John viii. 29, xvi. 32. The view to which Christ gives utterance in the latter passage: "And yet I am not alone, because the Father is with Me," is one which He cannot continue to maintain, apparently at least, in the present instance. However, the precise moment of the complaint must be observed. It was the moment of His dying. When He says: "Why hast Thou forsaken Me?" *He suffers death.* If dying be contemplated as a departing from the phenomenal world, or as an enveloping of the spirit in night, then indeed we cannot yet use this language, for we know that our Lord spoke "in the world" (John xvii. 13) in full possession of His consciousness, even *after* the fourth saying from the cross. But if we are thinking of the death-stroke properly so called, the death-struggle, the death-agony, the ὠδῖνες θανάτου, then we maintain that He emptied His death-cup ("tasting death for every man") when He uttered His mournful cry. Is not this seen to be implied in the words themselves as soon as they are carefully considered? *How could* the Son die otherwise than when the Father (of whom He said: "The living Father hath sent Me, and I live by the Father," John vi. 57) *forsook* Him and *gave Him up* to death? And in what else could the tasting of death essentially consist, except in this very abandonment by the Father Himself? The apostle's description (Heb. ii. 9) of the "suffering of death" by Jesus points also in the same

direction: ὅπως χωρὶς Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ παντὸς γεύσηται θανάτου.[1] Undoubtedly the sting of death is sin,—that is, sin in so far as it receives its strength from the law (1 Cor. xv. 56). And as our Lord in Gethsemane took upon Himself the sin of the world ("made sin for us"), and bore it upon the cross ("being made a curse for us"), He unquestionably felt this "sting of death" when He was dying. But because sin was ever a foreign thing to His person ("without sin"), because it was never excited in Him by the law, which therefore had nothing at all in Him (in the sense of John xiv. 30), only an express *divine volition accomplishing itself in the* ἐγκαταλείπειν could make Jesus feel the power which death had gained through the medium of sin. God had decreed that He should feel this power, and carried His decree into effect. But it was the "just," the "becoming" course, that which "behoved" to be. The essence of sin consists in this, that men have forsaken God, the fountain of life; and, on the other hand, the inevitable curse of sin is, that God must needs forsake men, and abandon them to death and destruction. The Saviour took upon Himself the sin of the world. He steps into the world's place. So death comes upon Him, a death which is accomplished in Him by virtue of a "forsaking" on the part of God. This is the "ineffabile," to quote Bengel's expression, which Jesus suffered at the hand of His Father, and it explains the "why" of amazement with which His plaint begins. We have been induced to dwell so long on the fourth utterance from

[1] We have no doubt of the accuracy of the reading χωρὶς Θεοῦ. The circumstance that all the MSS. which are now accessible contain χάριτι Θεοῦ is counterbalanced by the fact that Origen found χωρίς in the majority of the MSS. existing in his time. The critical remarks of Bengel are entirely just. For the way in which it is customary to account for the origin of the variation, namely, that it is an addition suggested by 1 Cor. xv. 27, is destitute of all probability. Such an addition in the middle of the eighth verse would have been quite intelligible, but how it could have pushed out the χάριτι in ver. 9 is more than we can discover. We have no occasion to go into the passage further at present; we merely assert that the statement that Jesus tasted death for all χάριτι Θεοῦ, appears to us foreign to the apostle's line of thought. Delitzsch has alleged, it is true, that χάριτι is the emphatic word in the object clause; but he has only alleged, not proved it. The following, "for it became Him," is explanatory not of a χάριτι Θεοῦ, but well explains a foregoing χωρὶς Θεοῦ. The intention was to bring into prominence the extent of the Son's being made lower than the angels, the essence of His "suffering of death;" but there was no occasion to emphasize the "grace" which was manifested in it. Even the choice of the word "taste" appears to be rightly explained only on the assumption that the original reading was χωρίς.

the cross by a desire to avoid the danger of importing into it more than it contains (an error into which church dogmatics has undoubtedly fallen here), and also by a wish not to weaken its force, as those do who explain this weighty cry on the ground of a subjective feeling on the part of Jesus. But if our interpretation be the accurate one, then the conclusion cannot be evaded, that at this moment the dying Saviour must have made atonement for the sin of the world; that He here accomplished what the counsel of God had decreed for human salvation; yea, that this was the essential and proper point looked forward to by the words with which He brought to a close the feast He celebrated with His disciples: "that the world may know that I love the Father; and as the Father gave Me commandment, even so I do. Arise, let us go hence."[1]

The understanding of the *fifth* of our Lord's last sayings depends in reality on the way in which we connect the clauses in the narrative of John (xix. 28). Two courses are open to us. The one makes the apodosis begin with the word "saith," and regards the words: "that the Scripture might be fulfilled," as belonging to the previous part of the verse. The other, again (which is adopted for obvious reasons by Strauss), makes the apodosis begin with the word "that," and thus the sense yielded by the verse would be, that when Jesus knew that all things were now accomplished, He uttered the words "I thirst" with the object of fulfilling the Scripture. We have no doubt that the former is the accurate view. We are driven to this conclusion even on grammatical grounds. In the other case we should be obliged to assume an arrangement of words which is quite unusual in John, and which is entirely opposed to the genius of his literary style.[2] But even if this objection were set aside, it would be

[1] We have noted with regret the interpretation of this "fourth saying" given by Ritschl (*l.c.* II. p. 156). He says that he wishes to give an intelligible "answer" to the question, What is its meaning? Starting from the idea that the Psalmist is only expressing a hypothetical judgment, he finds also in the cry which proceeded from the lips of *Jesus* no more than a "conjecture" that He was forsaken of God, a conjecture which did not correspond to the objective fact. This answer is certainly "intelligible,"—it is only too intelligible,—but in such matters mere intelligibility is not the first quality. We fear that the whole of theology may in this way be turned into a theology of mere "conjectures."

[2] A comparison of all the passages in which ἵνα is used in the fourth Gospel shows clearly that it is not the habit of John to begin an apodosis with this particle, and that he very seldom puts it at the beginning of a sentence at all. In the few cases

something more than hazardous to meet the explicit declaration: "Jesus, knowing that all things were now accomplished," with the assertion that one thing was excepted, and that our Lord, by acknowledging His thirst, brought upon Himself the remainder, the ὑστέρημα of His Passion in order that the Scripture might be "*completely*"[1] fulfilled. This view, which is not reconcilable with the phraseology employed, and which is excluded by the expression "all things," and especially by the word "now" (already), would certainly not have occurred to the mind of any one unless he had been proceeding on the assumption that the partaking of the vinegar was also a fulfilment of Scripture, and that it was related by the evangelist for that very reason. We reject the assumption in question not with the view of avoiding all contact with the Straussian "Passion programme," but because we consider it to be in itself destitute of foundation. It was not necessary that all the features which are supplied by the two Psalms in order to make up the picture of a suffering righteous man should have realized themselves in Jesus (if so, then something more than the drinking of the vinegar would have still remained), nor yet that every single experience of suffering through which He actually passed, according to the narrative of the evangelist, should have recalled predictions of the Old Testament.[2] The likeness between the passage: "they gave Me vinegar for My drink" (Ps. lxix. 22), and the passage before us, is too much of a

where it seems to go before the finite verb (ch. xix. 31), the sentence which it introduces is a parenthetical one. We should regard a proposal to begin the apodosis in the text before us with ἵνα in the same light as we should view a like proposal in reference to a passage which is precisely similar in its construction, ch. xiii. 1 (εἰδὼς . . . ὅτι . . . ἵνα).

[1] The assumption that τελειοῦν is a stronger word than τελεῖν, and that it designates a *complete* fulfilment, is unquestionably one which cannot be justified from New Testament usage. The remark of Bengel, that τελεῖν is appropriate to "things," and τελειοῦν to the Holy Scripture, is entirely correct. The fact that the evangelist uses τελειοῦν in the latter part of the verse instead of the usual πληροῦν, is to be explained by the connection between the τελείωσις of the Scripture and the accomplishment of the work of Jesus Christ | But His not repeating the word τελεῖν in the second case is accounted for, not by a wish to vary the expressions employed, but because, while one can speak of a τελεῖν in relation to τὰ γεγραμμένα, there is no instance of the formula τελεῖται ἡ γραφή being employed.

[2] When the undoubted truth that the work of Jesus was completely prefigured as to its fundamental features in the Old Testament is so treated that the whole details are tacitly substituted for the fundamental features, then there is a risk of the emphasis ceasing to rest on *what* took place, and being put on the circumstance that prophecy has not proved delusive.

surface character to strike us as being prophecy and fulfilment. The subject of the Psalm complains of His thirst, and of the mockery of His enemies in presenting Him with vinegar for its alleviation. Our Lord also says: "I thirst!" But the suffering which He now endures, and which He is said to bring deliberately upon Himself by means of the cry "I thirst," is not placed in the thirst itself, but in the fact of His being given vinegar to drink. Now the representation that our Lord intentionally brought about a part of His own sufferings we cannot quite comprehend. But still less are we able to perceive how the dying Saviour must have regarded the potion which He received as an affliction. He longs for something to allay His thirst, and there is offered to Him that which was at hand (ἔκειτο). No serious objection can be made to the reasonable assumption that it was the drink of the Roman soldiers. Yet we must not change this "vinegar" into the "wine mingled with myrrh" which our Lord rejected previous to His crucifixion. If we place the two passages, Mark xv. 23 and 36, side by side ("and they gave Him to drink wine mingled with myrrh: but He received it not;" "and one ran and filled a sponge full of vinegar . . . and gave Him to drink"), we see that everything is different; the potion, the design of those giving it,[1] and the procedure of Him to whom it was given.[2] And so far are we from discovering in the action any intention to wound Jesus, that we feel constrained rather to apply to the individuals concerned the gracious saying: "I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink." (The reader may compare together the passage first cited, Matt. xxv. 35, and Mark xv. 36: "one ran and . . . gave Him to drink."[3]) But in parting from the view which has just been

[1] It is quite true that the vinegar was given to our Lord amid the mockings of the soldiers. But the mockery was merely an *accompaniment;* the giving of the vinegar was not itself an *act* of mockery. John is entirely silent as to these expressions of mockery; for this evangelist, after telling us of the division of our Lord's garments, does not relate one single item of the circumstances whereby suffering came upon Him through the agency of the world.

[2] The circumstance that this difference is so prominently marked in the narrative of Mark in particular is all the more important the more we recognise that it was just by this evangelist that details of that character were recorded with peculiar exactness.

[3] It is characteristic that those who regard the giving of the vinegar as an act of great despite done to our Lord, feel themselves constrained to assume that it had a symbolical meaning, and say that Jesus intended thereby to foreshadow the attitude which the world would take up in the course of the centuries towards Him and His adherents,—its gratitude for the benefits of the gospel, a vessel full of vinegar!

stated, and which we decidedly reject, we are met by two questions, namely, why did our Lord give expression to the cry, "I thirst;" and further, on what ground and in what interest has the evangelist described the scene? The answer generally given to the former question is very simple. Christ said: I thirst, in the same sense as He said to the woman of Samaria (John iv. 7): "Give Me to drink." He asked for something to drink, in order that the agonies of physical thirst might be allayed. Hofmann's conjecture, that He wished to ward off fainting by means of a restorative, so as not to die in a state of unconsciousness, has not succeeded in gaining much assent. But there is no necessity for having recourse to any such expedient. It was in our Lord's power, after the suffering appointed for Him by the Father was accomplished, to remove any painful sensation which admitted of being overcome; yea, it belonged to the glorification of His patience and obedience that He should accept the *precise cup* which was appointed for Him from above without wishing to endure *more* than just what this cup contained. The words: "Jesus knowing after this," etc., deserve consideration. It has already been remarked that they are not intended to convey the impression that the new feature which is about to be narrated belongs to the time immediately succeeding that at which our Lord took leave of His mother; they are to be taken generally as designating a *later* time (as frequently in John, *e.g.* ch. v. 14). The saying in which our Lord confessed His thirst is intimately connected with the saying of which John is silent, the cry: "Eli, Eli," which the Redeemer uttered on receiving His death-stroke. But therewith *everything* was accomplished,[1] that the Scripture might be fulfilled, and consequently our Lord was now at liberty to bring about the satisfaction of His painful thirst.

Apart from numerous other obvious objections, we confess that we are unable to maintain the view that our Lord could have intended to close His career with a symbolical action, especially with one which would imply an accusation against the world for which He laid down His life.

[1] We are surprised to find Hofmann saying that everything was not then completed; that "the last thing that had to take place was that Jesus should die" (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 314). Naturally we do not appeal to our interpretation of the fourth saying from the cross, inasmuch as it may be disputed, but to ver. 30 in the representation of John. The explicit declaration τετέλεσται, which is in the perfect tense, was made before our Lord bowed His head and gave up the ghost. The death, then, is to be regarded from another point of view than that from which Hofmann has looked at it.

It is much more difficult, however, to answer the question: In what interest did the evangelist record the incident? Unquestionably not in a purely historical interest; the event itself was of deeper significance for him. But to what extent was his purpose a historical one? Men have always *felt* the difficulty which has been prominently brought forward by Hengstenberg in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John* (of course, with the object of vindicating his own view of the scene): "Jesus would certainly not have asked simply for something to drink when He was in the immediate neighbourhood of death; He could not possibly then devote one of His seven sacred sayings to the relief of a merely physical want." And it was with the object of satisfying this feeling that a view was put forward which was formerly a very common one, namely, that our Lord was not so much expressing a physical feeling, as the thirst of His soul for God, or for the salvation of men. Now-a-days this view has been tacitly abandoned almost on all hands; it is shattered against ver. 29, on which the evangelist immediately makes the whole emphasis rest. But there is no need of resorting to these allegorical and arbitrary devices in order to understand the wonder with which the course of events was watched by the eye-witness who records them. The "I thirst" involves the same presuppositions as the first saying which proceeded from the lips of the crucified Saviour. It is a mirror, by means of which John gazes into the same great heart of love which the petition contained in the first saying presented to his view. For to whom did the thirsting One turn, and what was implied in His stating His need to them? Even ordinary experience teaches us that it is much easier to heap coals of fire on the heads of one's enemies, or even to pray to God on their behalf, than to present a request to them, or accept a favour at their hands. He who can do this manifests, in truth, a love which is not native to this world. And yet we must not point generally to the inexhaustible store of the divine love with the view of explaining this act. The mere idea of forgiving love was not found sufficient to explain the prayer of Him who was lifted up on the cross; there was required the further idea that only the dying *Reconciler* was able to say: "Forgive them;" and a like thought underlies the saying: "I thirst;" the διψῶ also reflects the love which has accomplished the work of reconciliation or atonement.

The *sixth* saying states in express terms that this atonement is accomplished. It can have no other meaning. It must have the very same signification as the τετέλεσται of ver. 28, so that we now hear from the lips of Jesus that which was already present in His *consciousness*, before He partook of the vinegar. The expression ("It is finished") points neither to the Passion, now over and gone, nor yet to the accomplished fulfilment of Scripture. The parallel usually adduced, Luke xii. 50 ("I have a baptism . . . how am I straitened *till it be accomplished!*"), justifies the former view just as little as the declaration of Jesus, Luke xxii. 37 ("This that is written must yet be accomplished (τελεσθῆναι) in Me . . . for the things concerning Me have an end" (τέλος)), suffices as a foundation for the latter. It is a work which is described as having been accomplished. But again, any reference to the Pauline expression: "I have finished (τετέλεκα) My course," would be introduced here quite irrelevantly. Our word τετέλεσται cannot claim to be so comprehensive, because at an earlier time our Lord had already said to His Father, in reference to His active work: "I have *finished* the work which Thou gavest Me to do." His eye cannot be resting afresh upon that which is there represented by Him as already finished. There is no avoiding the conclusion that the work to which He refers is nothing else than the suffering of death, the fulfilment of the divine commandment, which pointed to the laying down of His life, the giving of Himself a ransom for many. And He now *proclaims* this work to be finished, just as it was already virtually finished before the vinegar touched His lips, inasmuch as He received His death-stroke and accomplished the expiation of sin at the time of the cry: Eli, Eli. The τετέλεσται points to the entrance of the High Priest into the Holy Place by His own blood, after He had obtained eternal redemption, and by virtue of it He Himself appears as τελειωθείς, as perfected Mediator, and as the Author of eternal salvation to all those who believe in Him. It may be asked, To whom did our Lord address the saying, "It is finished," and for what reason was it spoken aloud? The answer to the former question cannot be doubtful. True, the saying is not exactly in the form of a prayer; but yet it is addressed, in the first place, to the Father, just as were the words: "I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do" (ch. xvii. 4). Our Lord tells the Father, who had sent Him into

the world to do a special work, that He has finished that for which He "came unto this hour." And we may maintain further, that in the cry by which Jesus announced the completion of His obedience there was also involved the desire: "and now, O Father, glorify Thou Me" (John xvii. 5); and especially that this was the moment in which the saying was completely realized: "Called of God, an High Priest after the order of Melchisedec" (Heb. v. 10). But an additional object was served by the cry being uttered *aloud*. (Whether the "loud voice" mentioned by Matthew and Mark refers to this sixth saying, or rather, as we might suppose from the narrative of Luke, to the seventh, cannot well be decided.) Just as it was designed that the disciples should hear the high-priestly prayer, so also this τετέλεσται was intended to sound in the ears of the world—earth hear! To that world on whose behalf the atonement was made, its accomplishment is announced. The preaching of that gospel of reconciliation, which fills the centuries with its echoes, hangs on the τετέλεσται, which proceeded from the mouth of Jesus; on it rests that great apostolic utterance: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself . . . and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. . . . We pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled unto God" (2 Cor. v. 19, 20).

The remark has often been made, that the *seventh* utterance from the cross resumes the customary word "Father," after the more frigid and distant word Eli. But this remark has no point, except on the assumption that the fourth saying bears testimony to a *conflict* on the part of Jesus. Had it seemed good to our Lord to utter His τετέλεσται in the form of an address to God, He would no doubt have added to it the word "Father." Now, as to this last saying of the dying Saviour, one could not go further astray in explaining its meaning than Bengel has done, when he said: "hoc momento, pretiosissimo sane, expiatio facta est." On the other hand, it cannot be better characterized than in the words of Lampe: "The Father could not keep back from His bosom One who had so completely fulfilled His will." The words: "Father, into Thy hands I commend My Spirit," are not those of One who is *making*, but of One who *has made* atonement; His work being accomplished, He fares forward towards His Sabbath rest. The circumstance that His departing words are derived from one of the Psalms (xxxi. 5), must not be allowed to determine their interpretation

any more than a like circumstance in the case of the fourth saying. If the Psalmist, after giving expression to his hope of being rescued out of the hands of his enemy, and to his confidence in the God of truth, proceeds to comply with the exhortation which he elsewhere (Ps. xxxvii. 5, xliii. 5) addresses to his own soul, it by no means follows from this that our Lord also bears testimony simply to His assurance that He shall escape from the violent hands of men to the sheltering hands of the God of truth. We are obliged to take a deeper view of the meaning of our Lord's departing words, even by the expressions employed by the evangelist to describe His departure,—expressions which shed as much light on His exclamation as it in turn sheds on them. *Παρέδωκεν τὸ πνεῦμα*, says John; *Ἀφῆκεν τὸ πνεῦμα*, says Matthew. The word used by Mark and Luke is *ἐξέπνευσεν*. All the terms which the Scripture is in the habit of using elsewhere for departing this life (*ἐξέψυξεν*, *ἀπέθανεν*,[1] *ἐκοιμήθη*) are thus scrupulously avoided. Of course we must not draw from this conclusions such as those which Olshausen has erroneously deduced—conclusions against which even Augustine protested (comp. *De Spiritu et anima*, c. xxxiv.: "quid est aliud emittere spiritum, nisi quod animam ponere?"); but still we may infer from the choice of expressions made by the evangelists, that in their view this was a different departing from any with which ordinary experience made them acquainted. Again, older and more recent interpreters (especially Gerhard, and also Stier) have supposed that they touched the real point when they found the element of *voluntariness* indicated in this characteristic description of Jesus' departure from the world. Now, they say, our Lord verifies His own saying: "My life no man taketh from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again;" so that the dying which we perceive in the case of Jesus is not a passive, but an active dying, a surrender of His life proceeding from a free determination. Now we cannot but regard a contrast of this nature, in the sense in which it is here understood, as an altogether peculiar one. As if the suffering of death and willingness to die were mutually exclusive, as if both did not coalesce in our

[1] The circumstance that *ἐκψύχειν*, as often as it occurs in the New Testament, is employed only in relation to the death of wicked men, is probably to be regarded as accidental.

Lord's obedience when He drank His cup! Even when He suffered His death-stroke, at the time of the cry, Eli, Eli! the voluntariness with which He endured it does not escape observation. But the contrast in question is introduced most unfortunately in connection with the last saying from the cross. Here, where the pains of death already pertain to the past, the question of an enduring of death, or of an active willingness to die, is entirely out of place; the yielding up of the spirit was a something which explained itself; rightly understood, it was altogether natural. The Son of God "ascended up where He was before." "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world: again, I leave the world, and go to the Father," John xvi. 28; "If ye loved Me, ye would rejoice, because . . . I go unto the Father," John xiv. 28; "Holy Father . . . now come I to Thee," John xvii. 11–13. As is well known, our Lord regards His death almost exclusively from the point of view of "a going to the Father," in His closing discourses as preserved by John; and this was natural, considering the purpose of His parting words to His disciples. So we expect that the aspect of the matter which was then made so peculiarly prominent shall also be made apparent in the history of His dying; and this *is* done by means of the last saying from the cross. As He was able to make the claims which are stated in the high-priestly prayer only because He was fully conscious that He had acted faithfully as a Son in the house of God, so He was now able to return "to Him that appointed Him" (Heb. iii. 2) with the words: "Father, into Thy hands I commend My Spirit," only because He was conscious of having emptied the cup which the Father had given Him. The cry of the departing One is the utterance of the Atoner as He returns to Him that sent Him,[1] after completing His sacrifice.

[1] In describing the departure of Jesus with the seventh saying from the cross upon His lips as a "going to the Father," of course we do not wish to convey the idea that it was to a completely conscious fellowship with the Father. Bengel, it is true, remarks justly: "Nunquam de morte Salvatoris adhibetur verbum κοιμᾶσθαι;" but he did not mean by this that the condition of the Departed was not in reality that of a κοιμώμενος. This latter is necessarily implied in the reality of His death. By the assumption of a "going to the Father," nothing more is said than this, that just as it is stated of Lazarus (Luke xvi. 22): "And it came to pass that . . . he was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom," so the Son, after His departure into rest, went to "the bosom of the Father," until He reassumed His life, "being raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father."

### 3. THE DEAD CHRIST.

To him who regards the death of Jesus Christ as an ordinary death, the circumstances with which this event was accompanied, according to the accounts of the Gospel writers, will be antecedently suspicious; while all those who regard it with the eye of faith will almost feel that circumstances of this kind *must* have attended it. They *expect* to learn that an event which has exercised the profoundest and the most remarkable influence on the historical developments of succeeding generations has been accompanied by manifestations which, being themselves miraculous, foreshadowed the miraculous results. And they are satisfied to find that this expectation is justified. Strauss was compelled to move in a very precarious region when criticizing the sayings from the cross, but he here breathes freely, and feels that he is once more in his element. Although he unhesitatingly classes in the category of fables everything which the evangelists have reported as to the utterances of Jesus from the cross, his remarks are so meagre and prejudiced, and so devoid of weight, that he must have felt in his own mind that they were unsatisfactory, and that they were not likely to secure for him the assent of his readers. Here, however, he enters upon an investigation in which he hopes to exhibit his superiority afresh, and his revived confidence is apparent at the outset. Here he can again found an argument on the natural craving for the miraculous on the part of readers, and bring his customary weapons to the place of conflict,—weapons which proved entirely inappropriate in regard to the words spoken from the cross.

The critic turns with peculiar confidence to the examination of the NATURAL PHENOMENA which, according to the evangelical narrative, already accompanied the dying of Jesus, but which were manifested principally after His death had taken place. The Synoptics tell us of a darkness which rested on the whole land from the sixth to the ninth hour, while the death agonies of Jesus still lasted. Strauss tells the German people a circumstance (which Schleiermacher had also remarked on, speaking to theologians), namely, that an eclipse of the sun was an impossibility at that time; and he likewise tells them that, according to the then existing Roman legend, the sun had acted on the occasion of the murder of Caesar and before the death of

Augustus as it is said to have done when Jesus was being crucified. The mockery which underlies this comparison will certainly be repellent to most minds; but it is probable that the comparison itself will also be regarded generally as an irrational one, and be judged in the same way as would a parallel instituted between the value which Caesar and Augustus had for their contemporaries, and the delight which the Father had in His chosen Lamb,—the elect, precious stone laid in Zion.[1] But it is at the same time very questionable whether the usual view given by the so-called believing theology can really satisfy those who turn away with dissatisfaction from the mode of view recommended by criticism. The statement: "even Nature seemed to join in celebrating the sublimity of the moment; creation itself suffered along with the Lord of nature, and spread the veil of night, 'so to speak,' over the transaction at Golgotha, in order to cover up the crime" (Olshausen), is open to the most serious objections, and that even when it is stated in the usual pleasing manner of Baumgarten.[2] Poetico-romantic views of this description find no support whatever in the Scripture; and the attempt to justify them by such passages as Gen. iv. 11, 12, etc., is vain. Nor yet is the matter helped by appealing for aid to the prologue of the fourth Gospel; the ingenious combinations which are made up in this way are misleading, and their apparent profundity exists in phraseology merely. The darkness which prevailed during the crucifixion is to be judged from the very same point of view as the manifestations which took place after our

[1] The critic has, moreover, laid himself open here to the just charge of having read the Gospel history very superficially. In making the remark, for example, that "the sun, according to the Roman legend, had done the same before the death of Augustus," he overlooks the fact that according to the Gospel narrative the sun "did" nothing whatever on the occasion of our Lord's crucifixion, but suffered something. The sun is referred to only by Luke, and not at all by Matthew or Mark. But even the third evangelist speaks, in the first place, of the darkness which was spread over the earth, and only then does he add (ch. xxiii. 45), "and the sun was darkened." Thereby it is stated as clearly as possible that the darkness did not proceed from an obscuration of the sun, but rather that the latter was occasioned by the former.

[2] Comp. his *Geschichte Jesu*, p. 401: "When we are profoundly agitated at the spectacle of a glaring disharmony in the world, we wonder, nay, we are startled, that Nature should show herself indifferent, and move calmly on her way while everything is going a-wrack. In the present case this feeling receives complete satisfaction; Nature herself gives to these gloomy scenes in the world of man's life their appropriate hue by obscuring the mid-day sunlight."

Lord's death. They were immediate works of God of a miraculous character, which were designed to speak to the world in symbolical language. All that we have to do is to interpret this language rightly. And the difficulty of interpreting it lessens just in the degree in which we determine to abandon our own suppositions, and to submit to the explicit teaching of Holy Scripture. Now, what the evangelists place the emphasis upon is *this*, that a darkness (*σκότος . . . σκιὰ θανάτου*, Matt. iv. 16) spread itself, *ἐφ' ὅλην* (*πᾶσαν*) *τὴν γῆν*. (The assertion that we are to understand by *γῆ the whole earth*, goes too far; we have scriptural usage on our side in preferring to understand by it the Jewish territory, and, in particular, the neighbourhood of Jerusalem.) The singing seer hailed the advent of Jesus as "the dayspring from on high," and he describes its purpose as being "to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death." We know that Israel loved the darkness rather than the light; the welcoming, alluring light was persistently despised by Jerusalem especially. When Jesus took His farewell of the people (John xii. 35), He uttered this warning to them: "Yet a little while is the light with you. Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you: for he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth." They despised the warning. When Jesus died, according to their wish, and by their agency, the light of the world was extinguished for them, and the shadow of death became their dwelling-place. And this was expressed symbolically by the darkness which diffused itself over the land during the hours of their mournful triumph,—a triumph which soon experienced the check foreshadowed in the words: "Ye shall seek Me and shall not find Me, and where I am thither ye cannot come." But they were able to exclude themselves alone from salvation; the purpose of God *was* fulfilled, and the gateway of light was unfolded for the world; for the vail of the temple was rent, the earth quaked, the rocks rent, and the graves were opened.

It can only be in consequence of a fixed predetermination that the divine acts recorded here are declared to be fictions invented to feed a devouring craving for prodigies, and placed on the same level with the superstitious narratives incorporated by a Suetonius in the history of the Roman emperors. This fixed and arbitrary procedure is intelligible only on the ground of a denial of the

principle of the miraculous. For that which the evangelist narrates, when viewed on its symbolical side, corresponds with such exactness to that which actually took place, that we require nothing more than a general belief in a living God who rules in the realm of nature no less than in the kingdom of the Spirit, in order to feel ourselves constrained to make the confession: "This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes." Strauss himself is obliged to admit a correspondence between the doctrinal representation of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the first of the signs mentioned, namely, the rending of the temple vail.[1] But he takes while he gives. He denies, on the one hand, that the apostle assumes the existence of the Gospel narrative; he says that he "manifestly" does not. But he adds, on the other hand: "we could not, indeed, maintain conversely that the evangelical narrative was derived from the description in the Epistle to the Hebrews." How then did it originate? "If we take this last," he says, "in conjunction with the expression of the Apostle Paul (2 Cor. iii. 13–18), we see a group of thoughts and images current in that most ancient Christianity which arose out of Judaism, and which, after this had been used long enough as mere comparison, must at last have settled down naturally into a narrative like that which we have before us." Naturally! And this is to be accepted as historical criticism! Assuredly the author must have had but a poor opinion of the intelligence of the German people when he promised himself any success from the use of devices which it is unnecessary to characterize, and which can be rightly described in but one way. They will shake no one's faith in a truth which was embodied with equal clearness in the act of God and the word of the apostle. But what is this truth? If we possessed nothing more than the Gospel narrative, there would be room for uncertainty in answering this question from the circumstance of our not being able to decide a preliminary one which has an important bearing upon it, namely, whether the vail referred to was the outer or inner temple-curtain.[2] But the passage in the Hebrews sheds the

[1] He here relies entirely on Schleiermacher's treatise, *Uber die Schriften des Lucas*, p. 292; only he has left out what this theologian says as to the improbability of a fact which the priests alone could know pushing itself into public notice. Probably he thought that an objection which belonged to the polemics of commonplace rationalism was not now a weapon suitable for his purpose.

[2] Philo (*De vit. Mos.*), indeed, denominates the external vail (τὸ πρότερον) κάλυμμα,

necessary light upon the matter. "Having, therefore, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way which He hath consecrated for us through the vail, —that is to say, His flesh" (x. 19, 20). The expression does not admit of the explanation given by the majority of the older, and also by some modern interpreters. Those who make the symbolical divine act refer to the abolition of the Old Testament institutions (August.: "velum templi scinditur, quia synagoga honore nudatur, observatio antiqua dissolvitur;" Theophyl.: *ἐσήμανε τὸ καταπέτασμα σχιζόμενον τὴν τοῦ γράμματος νομικοῦ περιαίρεσιν*), overlook the circumstance that the question here raised cannot be that of destroying, for no one can imagine that the "flesh" of Jesus, of which the vail is explained, was "done away" or became the prey of "corruption." We must also regard the view of Hofmann as erroneous, namely, that the flesh of Jesus denotes that which separated Him from the supermundane God; that He had to put it off by dying, and to pass "through this flesh" in order to reach the Father. But the "flesh" was no obstruction to His fellowship with God; even during the days of His flesh He was in heaven, and in the bosom of the Father, consequently in every respect in the enjoyment of "unlimited" fellowship with Him. We have nothing whatever to do here with the going of the Son to the Father, but exclusively with the going of the High Priest to the right hand of God. And He went thither *not* by pressing "through the flesh," but *by means of* it,—that is to say, by giving His flesh for the life of the world. The vail of His flesh was no *obstructive* element, but, on the contrary, an *instrumental* element. The rent vail in the temple pointed, therefore, to a way opened for all through the atoning death of Jesus, a way which is called a "living way," in the sense in which He who opened it called Himself "the way and the life."

The further statement of Matthew, "the earth did quake and

and the interior one (*τὸ δεύτερον*) *καταπέτασμα*. But this circumstance is deprived of its weight from the fact that Scripture uses the latter expression alone for both vails. Jerome (following Origen), in a letter to Hedibia, declares it as his firm conviction that we are to think of the exterior vail. Modern interpreters decide, for the most part (certainly without convincing arguments), for the opposite assumption. Casaubon says rightly: "utrum e duobus velis Matthaeus et Marcus intellexerint statui hodie pro certo non potest;" nor is his assertion shaken by the thorough investigation of the matter by G. Olearius, *Observat. Sacr. in Matth.* p. 739.

the rocks rent," has also been explained by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The comparison drawn by Strauss between this feature of the narrative and an incident in the history of Elijah (1 Kings xix. 11) is as groundless as his assumption, that it was designed to prepare for the next feature, namely, the opening of the graves, is unsupported. It has an independent value. "Yet once more," says Heb. xii. 26, "I shake not the earth only, but also heaven." Not the earth only, but also heaven. The agitation of the earth, so that those things which are most stable—the very rocks—were moved, was a symbolical representation of the μετάθεσις which took effect in heaven after the Lamb of God ascended the high-priestly throne, and obtained the Headship of the "kingdom which cannot be moved," in order to carry out judgment to victory. Nothing else was to be expected but that criticism would reserve the full measure of its scorn for the concluding statement of the evangelist, that the graves were opened, and that sleeping saints arose from the dead. In point of fact, Strauss has here done his uttermost: "Inasmuch as Jesus raised from the dead but few people during His life on earth, and these few had returned only to earthly life to die a second time, a case was desirable in which a larger number of dead, and these not men liable to die a second time, but as risen saints, should have come forth out of their graves; and as the choice of the moment at which it was most appropriate to place this case might waver between the moment of His death and that of His resurrection, Matthew divides the occurrence, as it were, between the two." Now, this masterpiece of satirical criticism would perhaps have been successful had the evangelist spoken, in the style of the Gospel of Nicodemus, of those being released who were in Sheol, or of Christ's returning thence. But to the critic's regret, as may be supposed, all that is recorded is that after the death of our Lord many sleeping saints arose from their graves, and after His resurrection returned to the holy city, and appeared unto many. Consequently what we have to think of is not a manifestation of power on the part of *Jesus*, but only an act on the part of God, which accompanied the sacrificial death of His Son, and was designed to set forth its significance symbolically. The explanation of the sign is a matter of no difficulty. Its meaning is made abundantly clear by the words in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ch. xii. 23): "Ye are come . . . to

the spirits of just men made perfect,"—a passage to which we refer with all the more confidence, inasmuch as the "holy city" in the passage in Matthew suggests to our minds what is there called "the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem." As regards the actual facts underlying this sign, a difficulty has been felt which has constrained even interpreters, who admit the opening of the graves as a divine symbolical act, to adopt the notion that the further details communicated by Matthew are to be regarded as the mythical dress of an idea which is in itself entirely correct. This dangerous concession, to which even Olshausen was not wholly indisposed to assent, is one for which we see no ground. The opening of the graves, considered in itself, would have been an unintelligible symbol; only by the succeeding feature does its meaning become apparent. The difficulties raised by the explicit mention of "bodies," and of their "appearing," and by the temporal definition "after His resurrection," disappear for all those who recognise the historical character of the transactions which took place upon the mount of transfiguration, in which we discover much that is analogous to the incident before us. The expression "body" would be entirely appropriate as descriptive of Moses and Elias; the words, "there appeared unto them Moses and Elias" (Matt. xvii. 3), correspond exactly to the phrase before us, "and appeared unto many;" and the words, "after His resurrection," are to be regarded from the very same point of view as the command formerly imposed by our Lord upon the disciples to be silent as to the vision they had beheld until the Son of man was risen from the dead. To him who admits the application of this parallel, all those questions, of which Hofmann says, to Meyer's astonishment, that we need give ourselves no concern about them, will at once appear irrelevant. There is one thing, however, regarding this whole symbolic utterance on which we wish to place all emphasis, and it is this, that the Father was not giving testimony to His *Son* in general by these signs, but to the *work* which He had just accomplished; He was declaring the full sufficiency of the sacrifice made by Him for the expiation of man's sin. For it was through the *sacrificial death* of our Lord that men obtained liberty of access to God; His *sacrificial death* was the preliminary to the shaking of the heavens, yea, it was through *this* death that the power was wrested from him who had the power of death; the ban was

removed, and life and immortality were brought to light. By the words proclaimed in symbol, God set His seal to the atonement which had been made, and, being accepted of Him, it forthwith began to evince its power.

We shall arrive at a similar conclusion by considering the manifestations connected with the BODY of the dead Christ. The evangelist John alone speaks of these,—the evangelist who was in circumstances to observe them from being in the immediate vicinity of the cross, and who, besides, had an eye to note such things. The solemn asseveration of the apostle, that he was narrating true things which he had personally witnessed (ch. xix. 35; comp. 2 Pet. i. 16: "We have not followed cunningly devised fables (μύθοις), but were eye-witnesses"), stands in striking contrast to the assertion of Strauss, that there is no foundation of fact whatsoever for the representation. But still more startling is the contrast between the apostle's statement, that he communicated these things with the view of arousing or strengthening the faith of his readers, and the statement of the critic, that the fourth evangelist not merely presents to us fables, but that he has elaborated fantastic conceits which wear to the reader the character of absurdities. Now it is true that Strauss refers to one circumstance which at first sight may occasion a doubt of the historical credibility of the incident recorded by John. He calls attention to its inconsistency with the narrative of Mark, and believes that the manner in which the author of the fourth Gospel adheres to the narrative of the Synoptics in his account of the burial of Jesus proves that the foregoing scene, which is peculiar to him, is an interpolation invented by himself. When Pilate, according to Mark xv. 44, on being asked by Joseph for the body of Jesus, expressed surprise at His being already dead, this feeling on the part of the procurator does not square, says the critic, with the command that the legs of the crucified persons should be broken, which is presupposed in John xix. 31. And when the fourth evangelist says (xix. 38) that the object of the visit of the Jewish councillor was to beseech Pilate "that he might take away the body of Jesus," this conflicts, it is said, with his own previous statement that the removal of the bodies had already been ordered by the procurator (ch. xix. 31: "that He might be taken away"). But the real and the apparent state of the case are different. At the request of the Jews, Pilate, it is true, *had issued* a command

"that their legs should be broken, and that they should be taken away;" but for all that, it had only been partially *carried out*. The soldiers executed the crurifragium, in the first place, on the two thieves, either because it was easier to reach them, or because they gave more decided signs of life. When they turned their attention thereafter to Jesus, they observed that death had already taken place. Even to these rough spirits their task would be a painful, or, at all events, a troublesome one. They believe that they may here be exempted from unnecessary toil, and—no doubt with the consent of the centurion—they content themselves with a spear-stab, which would certainly be sufficient to extinguish any glimmering spark of life which might still have survived. The command of the procurator was twofold, but the two parts of it were related to each other. If the crurifragium was omitted, then it was necessary to omit the "taking away" also. Consequently the body of Jesus still remained in its place, while the bodies of the thieves were in the meantime taken down and buried. Is it a violent fancy, then, or is it not rather reasonable to assume that Joseph may have made his intentions known to the centurion (who was himself deeply moved by the death of Jesus), and commended the sacred body to his care? When he thereafter appeared before Pilate with the request that he might be allowed to take away the body of Jesus (John xix. 38), he had only to avow, as a reason for his request, that the taking away which had been already ordered (ver. 31) was not yet carried out in regard to Jesus, but was still left undone, because the crurifragium had been rendered unnecessary,—His death having occurred some time before (*πάλαι*). The procurator expresses surprise on learning that death had ensued so much sooner than was usual in the case of those who were crucified, and only after receiving confirmation of the report from the centurion does he accede to Joseph's wish. So far, then, from being mutually exclusive, the narratives of Mark and John fit exactly into each other. This would not have escaped the sharp eye of Strauss had he not been *searching for* a historical justification of his opposition to the narrative,—an opposition influenced by entirely different motives. The evangelist says at the close of his narrative that he wrote all these "signs" with the view of making his readers believe in Jesus as the Christ; and the one before us is the only sign in connection with which he mentions and emphasizes this as his

special purpose. The astonishment experienced by himself when he observed it breaks out perceptibly in his words; he hopes that the account of it will make a like impression upon the minds of his readers. And he was entitled to cherish this expectation. The divine voice could not be misunderstood, nor could its convincing power be denied. The apostle draws the interpretation of the "signs" from the Scripture, and his ability to derive it from this quarter is made (γάρ, ver. 36) an additional reason for faith. Strauss says that in the fact of the soldiers' finding Christ apparently dead, the evangelist saw a "plausible reason" for sparing Him the crurifragium, and introducing what was dogmatically desirable instead, namely, the spear-stab. Now, if we agreed with him in regarding the fourth Gospel as an interested romance, it is exceedingly doubtful whether we could acknowledge the "plausibility" of the reason. But the apostle is conscious of this, that he is relating a matter of fact, and this fact he traces back to immediate divine interposition. The hand of Providence took care that the body of Jesus should be laid in the grave unmaimed. The saying, "He was numbered with the transgressors," obtained its complete vindication; but now the word is, "Thus far, and no farther!" From this time forth it was to become clear that things were not with this Dead One as with transgressors in their death. The soldiers were obliged to pass Him by when they were carrying out the command which they had received, for the Lord of all had said to them, "A bone of Him ye shall not break."[1] He was the Lamb of God, the Passover sacrificed for us, and He was recognisable as such when the law which was ordained for the type was wondrously fulfilled in Him also. Men have inquired as to the meaning of the Mosaic ordinance. Now if, instead of starting from the type, they had started rather from the antitype, they would scarcely have been content with the unsatisfactory and thoroughly groundless expedient of Bähr. The mere thought of the body of Jesus being maimed is immediately felt to be unnatural and impossible. Our feelings are not at all shocked at the crurifragium in the case of the thieves, but they revolt at the bare idea of its being

[1] The incident becomes still more strikingly forcible if we accept the view of the ancient church, expressed by Tertullian in the writing, *Adv. Jud.* ch. viii.: "passio perfecta est die azymorum, quo agnum ut occiderent ad vesperam a Moyse fuerat praeceptum."

carried out in the case of our Lord. Starting from this point, we can also understand why the Mosaic ordinance shielded the typical Paschal Lamb from mutilation. Its object was to make a distinction between the victim which was the central point of a religious festival, and the victims which were destined only for a sacrificial meal,[1] and to teach that same "discerning" which the apostle imposed as a duty on the communicants of the Corinthian church (1 Cor. xi. 29). If, then, the evangelist justly regards even this first circumstance as God's seal to the sacrificial death of the true Paschal Lamb, he lays still more stress upon the second, namely, the spear-thrust and the flowing of blood and water from the side of Jesus. The passage which he cites from Zechariah is neither misread nor misapplied, as the critic asserts. The objection raised by Strauss, in a peculiar strain, that the prophet understood by Him who was pierced no other than Jehovah Himself, has been completely refuted by Hengstenberg in his *Christology*. But when he goes on to say that the word דקר in the original text was understood merely figuratively of a mental wound, not only is this view untenable on grammatical grounds, but an objection founded upon it would not touch the evangelist in the least. The translation of the Seventy (*ἀνθ' ὧν κατωρχήσαντο*) can be of no weight as against the fact that דקר is used neither in Zechariah nor anywhere else in the Old Testament in a figurative sense, and we can well understand how John should have been profoundly struck at the wondrous exactness with which the prophecy was fulfilled when he witnessed the spear-thrust.[2] But the literality of the piercing need not prevent us admitting, and, in a certain sense, even emphasizing the fact that the word דקר may be enlarged in its signification so as to include the idea of a mental wound,—an idea which will at once occur to the mind of any one who is not content to take a mere surface view of the act done by the soldiers. The time is past for regarding the spear-stab as a test of death, and the flowing of the blood and water as a proof that death had taken place. Its undoubted purpose was to kill our Lord, and, in the event of any spark of

[1] Comp. Hengstenberg, *Commentary on the Gospel of John.*

[2] The assertion of Strauss, that the author of the Apocalypse ("they which pierced (*ἐξεκέντησεν*) Him," ch. i. 7) did not know of a spear-stab in the side of Jesus, but only of the piercing of His hands (and feet), has no foundation whatever. For the piercing of the hands and feet (the *ὀρύσσειν* of the Sept., Ps. xxii. 17), the expression *ἐκκεντεῖν*, considering the usage of Scripture, would have been quite inappropriate.

life still remaining in Him, to make its extinction certain. But was this purpose not virtually traceable to those who were the prime movers in His death, and to whom He had said long before, "Ye seek to kill Me" (John viii. 37, 40)? And was there not concentrated in this spear-thrust (of which Bengel justly and profoundly remarks that it was the last and most conspicuous act of hostility done to the body of the Saviour by His enemies) all the hate and persecution which had carried the "murderers of the Just One" (Acts vii. 52), by closely-connected steps, to their goal? The more we look into the inner substance of the incident before us, the more do the soldiers pass out of sight; and, instead of them, we see the covenant people rejecting their Shepherd, piercing Him and casting Him out of His vineyard. There follows this human act, like an answer to it ("*forthwith*," ver. 34), a divine "sign." Thus John regarded the flowing of the blood and water; it was in his eyes a miraculous phenomenon. He foresees that many of his readers will receive his narrative with feelings of surprise and incredulity. And on this account he asserts, on his authority as an eye-witness, that the things which he relates are true, and vigorously combats any suspicion that might be entertained of the reality of a fact which was to be a vehicle of faith. He affirms that he had distinctly seen it, and knows for certain that he was not deceived. The peculiar accumulation of asseverating terms—for which there is no analogy throughout the whole Gospel—will be better understood by us if we assume, on the one hand, that the flow from our Lord's pierced side was considerable in extent (*ποταμοί*); and, on the other, that blood and water flowed separately from each other ("blood *and* water"), whether the "and" be explained as meaning that blood flowed first and water afterwards (Lampe), or that a definite blood streak was apparent within the water (Tholuck).[1] No deep insight into physiological laws is required in order to see the opposition between the phenomenon and the course of nature. Strauss is

[1] The reverse arrangement of words in the passage (1 John v. 6) gives to the latter view a high degree of probability. Moreover, every attempt to explain the phenomenon by natural causes is shattered against the assumptions indicated, and which, it seems to us, are unavoidable. The utterance of Calvin can scarcely claim consideration: "hallucinati sunt quidam miraculum hic fingentes; naturale enim est, dum coagulatur sanguis, amisso rubore fieri aquae similem; notum etiam est, in membrana praecordiis vicina aquam contineri," etc. Nor will the learned and profound treatise of Thomas Bartholinus (whom Tholuck follows), *De Latere Christi*

perfectly entitled to maintain, from his standpoint, that "every expert will tell us that blood and water can in no case have flowed from the side of Jesus; for if the blood was still flowing in His body, then nothing but blood would have come; if it had ceased flowing, nothing whatever would have come." Consequently, he who believed the fact reported by the evangelist, on the ground of his solemn testimony, could not avoid drawing a conclusion which the apostle hoped would tend to the furtherance of faith. The conclusion is no other than this, that the power of God must have exercised a miraculous influence on the body of Jesus. But what advantage accrues to faith from this? The answer of Euthymius Zigabenus, that "it clearly showed that the Pierced One was more than man," is obviously much too general and indefinite. However, it is to be decidedly preferred to the view put forth by Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 490): "The complete ebbing of the blood of the dead Christ betokened to the apostle that the body of Jesus was delivered from corruption, and thus from the destroying power of death." We do not know whether this view was suggested by a well-known objection of Schleiermacher, and put forth with the view of rendering it invalid, but undoubtedly both views belong to the same category. Schleiermacher, founding on the assumption that corruption begins at the moment of death, and relying on the saying which is frequently emphasized in the Acts of the Apostles, that the Holy One of God saw no corruption, adopted the view, that while our Lord undoubtedly accomplished the act of dying in a spiritual sense (inasmuch as His consciousness was reduced to the point of nullity, and inasmuch as He passed through the agonies of death), His life could not have been entirely extinguished in its physical aspect. Now, this conclusion would no doubt be deprived of its foundation by the reply that the body of Jesus was delivered from corruption by being entirely emptied of its blood. But the assumptions of Schleiermacher are so erroneous, considered in themselves, that his conclusion does not require to be met in this peculiar manner.

*Aperto*, which proceeds on the same line, convince any one who has laboured through it. On the other hand, however, we are unable to share Hengstenberg's fear that in this case the authority of the apostle would suffer. The remark of Bartholinus: "Non ideo existimandum divinae potentiae et gloriae ulla parte nos ire detractum, quando ad secundas causas restringimus ea, quae sensu nostro capiuntur et ratione," not only guards his own view, but has also its objective right.

The apostles make it perfectly clear in what sense they saw that Scripture, "Thou wilt not give Thy Holy One to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10), fulfilled in the Saviour. Peter does so in his Pentecostal address (Acts ii. 31 sqq.), and Paul in his preaching at Antioch (Acts xiii. 35 sqq.), by the explanation, "He whom God raised again saw no corruption." And as regards the question of the beginning of corruption, the anxiety displayed by Martha of Bethany teaches us more than precise natural science. When her brother had lain four days in the grave, she said, ἤδη ὄζει,—she feared that the process of corruption had already begun; she would scarcely have spoken thus on the day of His death. If the divine power willed that the sacred body should be defended from corruption, certainly it did not require to employ physical preventive measures for that end. The mistake of Hofmann[1] appears to us to lie in this, that he regards in the light of a token that which the evangelist views entirely as a divine symbol requiring to be interpreted from an exclusively symbolical standpoint. But even among those exegetes who recognise this principle of interpretation as the correct one, the symbolical meaning of the recorded fact is still in dispute. We pass by the view maintained by ancient and modern theologians, that it points to the two sacraments. Not only is it non-Johannine, considered in itself, but it is at the same time unable to vindicate itself in presence of the quotation from Zechariah; and, instead of being in any way recommended (as Tholuck thinks) by the parallels in the first Epistle of John, it is rather excluded. But a more serious question now arises, namely, whether Strauss has not hit on the correct view when he says that the pouring out of the Spirit, of which the death of Jesus was the preliminary condition, was that which the evangelist spiritually beheld in the flowing blood and water. He could have appealed in favour of this view to many other expressions in the fourth Gospel besides those contained in ch. vii. 38 sqq.; at all events, the promise which immediately precedes John's citation from Zechariah, "I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the Spirit of grace and of supplications," tells very considerably in its favour. And yet not absolutely and conclusively. The very quotation, whose context

[1] In his later writings the view objected to has become doubtful to Hofmann himself, and he seems to have abandoned it.

seems to be adequate to support the view, is, on the other hand, the rock on which it is broken. We assume as indisputable that the words of ver. 37, "and again another Scripture saith," are to be supplemented by a ἵνα πληρωθῇ from the preceding verse. But *what* was to be fulfilled? and what *was* fulfilled? It has been said that the evangelist is thinking only of the "piercing," and that the further contents of the passage, to wit, the "looking," which belonged to a different period, is here left wholly out of account (Bengel and others). Of course we reject the traditional translation as ungrammatical: "they shall behold (namely, in the flowing of the blood and water) Him whom they pierced." The undoubted meaning of the words is rather this: they shall look (in repentance, faith, and longing) *unto* Him whom they pierced. But this believing look requires a *ground*, and this ground must be found in the circumstance so markedly emphasized by the apostle, that blood and water flowed from the side of Jesus, or, more exactly, in that which the symbolical divine act meant. Let us consider the passage in Zechariah more fully. After describing the depth and extent of the mourning of Jerusalem, the prophet appends a prediction, whose fulfilment, he says explicitly ("in that day," ch. xiii. 1), is to take place at the same time: "In that day there shall be a fountain opened to the house of David, and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, for sin and uncleanness." The opened fountain corresponds to the opened side of Jesus. As the former points to the removal of sin and unrighteousness, so the stream which accompanied the spear-thrust pointed to the purifying virtue which resides in Jesus the Crucified, and which goes forth from Him to all who look to Him with the yearning of faith. The emphasis rests on the blood; the water merely places it under the view-point of its definite function. The blood therefore occupies the first place, not only here, but in 1 John v. 6 as well, where we read with still stronger emphasis: "not with water only, but with water and blood." No water can wash away the stain of sin; this can be done only by blood (Heb. ix. 22), or rather, only by the blood of Jesus Christ the Son of God. The apostolic utterance (1 John i. 7): "The blood of Jesus Christ, His Son, cleanseth us from all sin," ἁμαρτίας (ver. 9, ἀδικίας,—the new expression containing an undoubted allusion to the לְחַטָּאת וּלְנִדָּה of Zech. xiii. 1), gives the true interpretation of the sign which God exhibited in

the case before us. It was a symbolical attestation of the death of Jesus as a sacrifice for the sin of the world and for the sin of the individual. We have already said that it was an answer, so to speak, to the act of men. They meant it for evil; God meant it for good. The blood which they shed is set before them by Him as the medium of atonement for their guilt. And it is on this ground that all those who hear His voice look in faith to Him who was pierced. "They shall look," said the prophet. Even at the moment fixed on by John the future form was still appropriate, for the manifest fulfilment of the prediction took place only on the day of Pentecost. Still, even at the time when the "sign" was exhibited, first-fruits of the harvest which Peter afterwards reaped were not wholly awanting.

From this point of view, then, we examine the manifestations which appeared immediately after the death of Jesus in the *human sphere*. The first three evangelists are unanimous in the account they give of the impression made upon the mind of the centurion (Matthew includes the men under his charge) who presided at the crucifixion. Luke, however, speaks at the same time of a still more intense emotion experienced by the people who were assembled under the cross. The meagre statements which Strauss makes on the ground of harmonistic difficulties, are quite insufficient to cast any doubt on the credibility of the narratives. The insignificant variations in the different accounts, partly in regard to the words employed by the centurion, partly in relation to the genesis of the judgment he expressed, tend to vouch for their historical truth rather than the opposite. Moreover, the variations relate to the opinion of the narrators as to the motive impelling the heathen soldier to speak as he did, more than to the fact itself. The centurion would not himself distinctly know what special circumstance had brought this fruit of his lips to maturity; the profound impression made upon him was due to the influence of the whole spectacle. According to Mark xv. 39, he stood over against Jesus, steadily and sympathetically watching Him. And besides, it is according to the natural order of things that, while the mere executioner gives utterance to a simple confession, the people, on whom the responsibility lay, should be seized, like a τελώνης on a large scale, with a sense of the great crime which they had committed, and express their feelings in the same way as did the publican in the parable, Luke

xviii. 13. However, we cannot so easily dismiss the objection raised by criticism against these narrations on the ground of their internal improbability, and which charges them with merely embodying the fancies of early Christianity. We are unable to adopt the line of thought pursued by those to whom the facts recorded are entirely intelligible on psychological grounds, and who point, on the one hand, to the receptivity of the unprejudiced heathen, and, on the other, to the vacillating mood of the *mobile vulgus*. The centurion does not impress us with the idea that he is saying in a merely reflective manner: "This Dying One cannot have been a malefactor worthy of death;" nor do the people resemble a Judas in their revelation of themselves as if they were saying in the exercise of a worthless repentance: "We have sinned, in that we have shed innocent blood." As to the centurion's confession, the form in which it is reported by Luke will not readily be taken as the literal one; but even should it be so regarded, the words "Son of God" contained in Matthew's version would explain the sense which he attached to the terms, "a righteous man." And, as regards the people, the account given of their deportment harmonizes so strikingly with the subsequent description in the Acts (ch. ii. 37), "they were pricked in their hearts," that we must not impute to them a "sorrow of the world." But such profound impressions cannot be accounted for on any psychological ground; they are conceivable only as fulfilments of the prophecy: "They shall look unto Him whom they pierced." The meaning of the death of Jesus flashed upon their minds; they saw in the Dying One—not indeed with clear vision, but dimly, as by a presentiment of the heart—the antitype of the serpent lifted up in the wilderness.

We make this claim with still greater confidence on behalf of the two persons who presently appear on the stage to take charge of the entombment of Jesus. In connection with this part of the Passion history, criticism has carried its arbitrariness to the highest possible pitch. The assumption made by the church, that the well-known prediction of Isaiah (ch. liii. 9) was fulfilled in the burial of Jesus, is met by Strauss with the assertion that this prophecy (which is, besides, misinterpreted) was rather the source from which the "myth" of the honourable burial of our Lord was evolved. Undoubtedly this conclusion *considered in itself* can surprise no one, for it follows naturally from his fixed and con-

stantly applied principle. But, at the same time, as it is not based on historical considerations, or on any proof that the incident is internally improbable, it bears on its front a character of arbitrariness which at once condemns it. Such is the position occupied by criticism in regard to the passage before us. It has never attempted to assail a single detail of the narrative, just as if it foresaw that this would be useless; and, while admitting that the Romans were certainly accustomed to surrender the bodies of persons who had been executed to their relatives in order to interment,[1] it still continues to maintain, in singular contrast to this admission, that the account of our Lord's entombment is unhistorical. The passage in Isaiah, to which the alleged myth is traced back, tends much more to vindicate the historical reality of the narrative than the reverse. We need not dwell on the circumstance that none of the evangelists, not even Matthew, quotes the words of the prophecy. But we ask, What is its meaning? How is it to be explained? No material objection can be made in point of grammar to the rendering: "A grave was designed for Him among transgressors, but He found it with one who was rich." We frankly admit that but for the history of the burial of Jesus this rendering would hardly have occurred to any one; here, as often, the fulfilment throws light on the prophecy. Only when the wish of the Jews that the body of Jesus, like the bodies of the thieves, should be laid in an unhonoured grave was frustrated by the intervention of the rich man, only when Joseph had laid the body in his own[2] hitherto unused tomb,—burying it, with the aid of Nicodemus, with

[1] We add that the authorities, according to the Roman law, were not entitled to refuse this permission. Ulpian: "Corpora eorum, qui capitis damnantur, cognatis eorum neganda non sunt, et id se observasse etiam Divus Augustus libro X., de vita sua scribit." The only exception was in the case of those who had been guilty of high treason.

[2] The difficulty raised on the ground of Matthew's being the only one who expressly calls the tomb the property of Joseph, is entirely unnecessary. Meyer has even alleged that this detail is added from a later tradition, and that, if it had been historical, Mark would not have been silent regarding it, while it would certainly have been engraved ineffaceably on the memory of John. This is a mistaken judgment. By their description of the sepulchre, which is in perfect harmony with the description given by the first Gospel, Mark and Luke show their complete agreement with Matthew; and Strauss rightly remarks that it was undoubtedly their opinion that the tomb was the property of Joseph. As to John, again, the article ὁ Ἰωσήφ (ch. xix. 38) shows that the author presupposed the synoptical account, and that it was his purpose merely to add new and complementary features. When he says in

almost lavish munificence,[1] — was the prediction of the Old Testament seer understood. But any one who declines to accept this fulfilment of the prophecy as his lamp, will either not understand the prediction at all, or feel himself driven to an interpretation which will not bear the slightest examination. We appeal to the perplexity of those interpreters of Isaiah who despise the key just pointed out. The explanation to which Strauss adheres (although not without obvious hesitation), that "the rich" are to be taken as synonymous with "the wicked," is absolutely inconsistent with the views which the Old Testament is wont to put forth in regard to worldly prosperity. The wealth of an Abraham, a David, and a Solomon, is invariably exhibited under the aspect of a divine blessing; it is the accompaniment of piety, and an evidence of the goodwill of God. (As an honourable counsellor, a pious and upright man waiting for the kingdom of God, so also in respect of his external worldly circumstances and prosperity, Joseph was a veritable child and picture of Abraham.) If, then, the fact be that the prophetic passage receives its true and satisfactory explanation in the circumstances connected with the burial of Jesus, we are entitled to assert that the former is an indirect testimony to the historical truth of the latter.

Strauss states in the positive part of his book, that no one of the evangelists says that Jesus' own disciples asked Pilate for His body, but that all of them represent a man who stood only in a distant relation to Jesus as doing so. This remark, which he merely throws out by the way, was probably made in a polemical interest, and it deserves careful consideration. The

ver. 42 that the body was laid there because the place was near, and because the Sabbath was at hand, this is only an additional second motive for the selection of the tomb, which certainly does not exclude any other motive implied in the synoptical narrative.

[1] This expenditure was an element in the fulfilment of the prediction in Isaiah— an expenditure which was certain to obtain the same approval as our Lord gave (in John xii. 7, 8) to the woman who anointed Him. Here there neither was nor could be any murmuring. A new tomb, a newly bought σινδών, abundance of myrrh and aloes are called into requisition, and it was the intention of the friends of Jesus to honour His body still more when the Sabbath was past. If the expressions ἀλείψωσιν, Mark xvi. 1, and μύρα, Luke xxiii. 56, are taken exactly, a difference appears between what the women designed to do on the morning of the first day of the week, and what Joseph and Nicodemus did when our Lord was *buried*, which deprives the objection which Strauss has raised in regard to this part of the narrative of any semblance of a foundation.

Jews regarded the burying of their dead as an office of affection to be discharged by those who were most nearly related to the deceased, by sons especially, and in default of sons, by other relations or friends. The disciples were our Lord's nearest relations. "These," He says in Matt. xii. 50, "are My brother, and sister, and mother." When John the Baptist was put to death by Herod, his disciples came (Matt. xiv. 12) to carry away the headless body of their honoured master in order to lay it in the grave. At the burial of Jesus we miss those who were called on natural grounds to perform this task. Those who openly confessed their adherence to our Lord during His life, and who were constantly seen by all men in His society and following His steps, have here vanished entirely from the scene; while those who had hitherto cherished their faith in secret perform the last services of love for the Crucified, and thus show without hesitation their inner feelings towards Him. One may attempt to explain both of these circumstances psychologically. The consternation and deadly sorrow of the disciples may be viewed as an explanation of their otherwise so strange neglect; and it may be said, on the other hand, that the advent of death has often caused a long unavowed affection to break out into a clear flame. But we ask whether any one can rest satisfied with these or similar considerations. They do not at all satisfy us. The question raised here is not that of a relation of love or reverence towards Jesus, but of a belief in Him as the Messiah. Both Joseph and Nicodemus cherished this belief; but fear of the Jews, a regard to their position in the Sanhedrim, restrained them from openly avowing it; they were "secret disciples." Comp. John xii. 42: "Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also many believed on Him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess *Him*, lest they should be put out of the synagogue." How happened it that after the death of Jesus these scruples were set aside, —that Joseph, for example, prevailed upon himself to break[1] so

[1] Thus we understand the words which are peculiar to Mark, τολμήσας εἰσῆλθεν πρὸς Πιλάτον (ch. xv. 43). The usual explanation, that Joseph, on the ground of his honourable position, undertook the bold task of approaching the hard and severe procurator with a petition, is one which we are unable to adopt. It is quite impossible to understand in what the boldness of Joseph consisted, *so far as the procurator was concerned;* he could scarcely have feared the rejection of a request which was quite in accordance with the Roman law. (Bengel has pushed the view in question to an absurd extreme when he says: "laudabilis ausus non carens

completely with the Council by the step which he took, and to pass over into the ranks of the open disciples of the Crucified? Strauss says that Jesus had forfeited all claim to be regarded as the Messiah, according to Jewish ideas, when His life was brought to an end upon the cross. Assuming the correctness of this view, Joseph had acted wisely in occupying an attitude of prudent reserve up to the time of Christ's death, notwithstanding his interest in Him. But *after* the catastrophe, the natural and advisable course for him to pursue would have been to forget the beautiful dream which he had cherished, and to induce the people to forget that he too had for a time stood in some slight relation to the Crucified. But the course he adopted was the very reverse of this. He chooses at this very time to forsake the position of secret discipleship, and to confess in a frank and pronounced way his adherence to Him who had just died. How does this come about? "Historical investigation counts it the noblest part of its task," says its critical representative, "to discover not merely *what* has really taken place, but also the mode in which one thing has been caused by another." But in the present instance he is unable to discharge this task in respect of its "noblest part:" here the means which he recognises as alone legitimate are not available. As he refuses to admit that anything "has really taken place" unless he is able to account for it on his own principles, he unhesitatingly draws the conclusion that the evangelical narrative of the burial of Jesus is a fable. But there is an elucidating factor of which *this* criticism knows nothing. We go back upon the saying quoted from prophecy: "They shall look unto Him whom they have pierced"—a saying with which John immediately connects our narrative by means of the expression "after this." Were Joseph and Nicodemus also included in the charge

capitis periculo.") Τολμᾷν means here (as often in the N. T., comp. Rom. v. 7: "Yet, peradventure, for a good man some would even dare (τολμᾷ) to die") to prevail upon oneself, to bring oneself to resolve on something without regard to consequences. The step taken by Joseph must have aroused a storm of ill-will on the part of his associates in office. Τολμήσας εἰσῆλθεν we read. The "daring" is to be referred specially to the going into the pretorium. We know how carefully the members of the Sanhedrim had avoided doing so on this particular day (John xviii. 28). If our conviction that our Lord was crucified on the 14th of Nisan be correct (we have intentionally refrained from discussing this point in the present treatise, because its objects did not require us to do so), then the journey of the Jewish councillor was, in point of fact, so open to objection that nothing but an overpoweringly strong counter-motive could have constrained him to undertake it.

implied in the words "they have pierced," or were they not? It seems indeed as if the remark made by the fourth evangelist, that Joseph was a disciple of Jesus, but only secretly, for fear of the Jews, and his allusion to the fact that Nicodemus had only ventured to visit Jesus by stealth and under cover of night, were intended to cast a shadow upon these men and to include them among those who were accused of loving the praise of men more than the praise of God (ch. xii. 43). But this is apparent merely; these references are in reality but the foil to the pronounced attitude which they now assume. Again, it looks as if the evangelists expressly excluded both men from all participation in the crime of passing sentence of death on Jesus,—Nicodemus, by means of the statement in John vii. 51; and Joseph, by the notice in Luke (xxii. 51), "the same had not consented to the counsel and deed of them" (in his heart[1] he consented neither to the purpose nor proceedings of the Council). But here also appearances are deceptive. It was a well-known fact that the sentence of the Sanhedrim was unanimous, and that it was passed without any opposition. Consequently all its members, even those who were silent, were inevitably burdened with a share of the responsibility,[2] and Joseph and Nicodemus themselves had every reason to join with the people in smiting on their breast. Only *their* sorrow was less hopeless than that of the people. "*They shall look* to Him whom they have pierced:" this saying was fulfilled in *them* in its comforting sense. The dim presentiment which was awakened in the mind of Nicodemus during his midnight interview with the Master of Israel now becomes clear; he begins to understand the figure of the lifted-up serpent, and, understanding it, is blessed in the deed which he performs, by virtue of his coming to the light (John iii. 21). In the attitude taken up by the two "pious Jews," in their faith and confession, we see, as in a mirror, the true meaning of the death of Jesus as a sacrifice for the sin of the world. This is the solution of the problem.

The view which we take of the last passage in the Passion

[1] *οὐ συγκατατίθεσθαι*, of inward disagreement in contradistinction to a dissentient vote, exactly as the *συγκατάθεσις* is related to the *συμφωνία* in 2 Cor. vi. 16.

[2] We draw the reader's attention to the remarkable passage in Paul's address in the synagogue of the Pisidian Antioch (Acts xiii. 29): "When they had fulfilled all . . . they took (Him) down from the tree, and laid (Him) in a sepulchre." There those who buried Him are put in the same category with those who compelled Pilate to carry out the sentence of condemnation.

history is similar, and we introduce our examination of it by quoting the admirable remark of Hengstenberg: "Besides the saving repentance of which Zechariah speaks, there is another repentance; besides the voluntary looking to the Pierced One, there is an involuntary looking to which even unbelief is compelled." Even those who were directly concerned in slaying Jesus were not debarred from a saving look to the Atoner; on the contrary, they were expressly and urgently exhorted to such a look (Acts xvii. 20). But here also the saying was verified: "ye would not." And thus theirs was a "looking" of the character to which allusion is made by our Lord Himself in Matt. xxiv. 30, and by the apostle in Rev. i. 7. Immediately after the entombment of the Crucified, the words spoken before Caiaphas (Matt. xxvi. 64) began to be accomplished; the Nemesis was afoot. Matthew relates an incident (xxvii. 62 sqq.), namely, the embassy of the chief priests and Pharisees to Pilate in reference to the watching of the grave, of which all the other evangelists are silent, and to which, moreover, there is no allusion in any other part of the New Testament. It was to be expected, therefore, that it would not escape the assaults of criticism. On this occasion, however, Strauss is not alone in relegating it to the domain of unhistorical legends, for even interpreters like Meyer and Bleek are in entire accord with him. The objection, that doubt would thus be cast upon Matthew's whole account of the resurrection (with which the narrative before us is closely interwoven), naturally makes no impression on those who are unable to abandon their preconceived opinion of the first Gospel. However, the task which destructive criticism sets before itself in dealing with this passage is not an easy one. It pretends, indeed, that this is the case, but the pretence cannot be kept up; at all events it contrasts very strangely with the peculiar arguments by which the attack is conducted. No doubt criticism here assumes to an unusual degree an air of triumph; but it is very easy to discover behind it a consciousness of embarrassment and insecurity. Possibly it was not able to repress the feeling that its own portraiture was accurately delineated in the narrative of Matthew. On the strictly historical side there is only one solitary objection which can be raised against the credibility of the incident. How is it possible, it is asked, that the women who proposed to embalm the body of Jesus in the early morning of the first day of the

week should have limited their anxiety to the rolling away of the stone from the door of the sepulchre, when they knew that the watch and the seal made their access to it impossible? But we may well put the counter question, On what ground is it assumed that the adherents of our Lord were aware of the steps taken by the Sanhedrim? Of Joseph we read that "he closed the sepulchre *and departed*" (Matt. xxvii. 60); the women, it is true, tarried a while longer (Matt. xxvii. 61; Mark xv. 47; Luke xxiii. 55); but it is explicitly stated by the third evangelist that they also returned "and rested the Sabbath day, according to the commandment." And it was not till the *Sabbath* (Matt. xxvii. 62: "the next day, that followed the day of the preparation") that the Council submitted their proposal to the procurator, and adopted measures for carrying it out. The authorities had far stronger reasons for concealing the step which they had taken than for pursuing an opposite course; and, besides, the adherents of the Crucified were as yet scarcely in a mood to listen to rumours, or to collect information, so that the proceedings of the Jewish rulers would no doubt become known to them for the first time through the circumstances which accompanied our Lord's resurrection. But it has been further maintained that there is great *internal* improbability in the story, and an attempt has been made to show that the alleged action of the Sanhedrim is entirely unimaginable. If the disciples themselves, it is asked, did not understand the prediction of the resurrection of Jesus (which was proclaimed, besides, only in their own private circle), if they regarded even the Easter message at first as an "idle tale," how did it happen that the hierarchs were differently affected? how did they seriously think of that of which the disciples had no presentiment, and which they ventured neither to believe nor hope? But there is nothing really inconceivable in this. In regard to the future lot of their Master, His humiliation, and His subsequent glorification, the disciples were the most uninstructed of men. Notwithstanding our Lord's definite and unambiguous announcements of His approaching Passion, the result was, "they understood not this saying, and it was hid from them that they perceived it not" (Luke ix. 45). The mood of mind revealed by the disciples who were proceeding to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 20–24), shows in a very striking way how unable they were in their deep heart-sorrow to remember

the comforting words of Jesus, or to draw from them any encouragement to contemplate the future with hope. The circumstances of the enemies of Jesus were altogether different. It is to be specially noted that Matthew (ch. xxvii. 62) expressly names the "chief priests and Pharisees" as the persons by whom the visit to Pilate was made. From this we may infer that this step was taken at the instigation of the Pharisees,[1] and that the high priests fell in with the proposal, without waiting for any formal authorization on the part of the Council.[2] According to Matthew as well as John, the Pharisees were the watchful enemies of Jesus from the very beginning. They tried to take Him in His talk, took note of His sayings, stooped to play the part of informers, and were slow to forget what He had spoken to them in a tone of reproof and threatening. Could they fail to remember what He had said of the "wicked and adulterous generation," which was to receive no sign except that of the prophet Jonas? If Matt. xxii. 39, 40 be compared with ch. xxvii. 63, certainly nothing but utter perverseness can make any one maintain that there was no sufficient historical basis for the statement: "We remember that that deceiver said while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again." But, continues criticism, assuming that there were, the measures which the Sanhedrim is said to have adopted are not only highly peculiar, but utterly incredible. Strauss gives a very drastic picture of the absurd shortsightedness which Matthew here attributes to the supreme Council (Meyer unhappily adopts most of its features). As his

[1] The combination, "the chief priests and Pharisees," not found elsewhere in Matthew, cannot be regarded as an abbreviated designation of the supreme Council. The arrangement always followed by the first Gospel in describing this body is: "the chief priests and scribes;" and the second and third Gospels give also the simple designation, "the chief priests." However, we sometimes find that combination in John, and once the Pharisees are even mentioned *first in order*. But as often as it occurs in the fourth Gospel (ch. vii. 32, 45; xi. 45, 47, 57), the Pharisees appear as the active parties, the spokesmen (ch. vii. 47, 52), the devisers of the measures which were agreed upon. In the passage before us, therefore, we are not required to think of a step taken in obedience to the impulses of the Sanhedrim itself, but of a step which was taken at the instigation of a sect and its individual chiefs.

[2] Things were quite different on the day of our Lord's resurrection. Matters had then become very serious, and it was necessary that the whole Council should be gathered together, and come to some resolution. Consequently we read in Matt. xxviii. 12: "And when the chief priests were assembled with the elders, and had taken counsel," etc.

representation is entirely interwoven with his attempt to trace the genesis of the "legend," we shall consult the interests of brevity if we carry out our apologetic purpose by a direct elucidation of the passage in Matthew. His narrative falls into two parts. We read, in the first place, of a precautionary measure being taken by the Pharisees in view of a possible event, and then of a resolution adopted and carried out by the Sanhedrim after hearing the Easter tidings. Let us look preliminarily at the former of these. At the moment when they said, "we remember," the Pharisees were certainly as far from entertaining the idea that our Lord could really arise from His grave, as were those members of the Sanhedrim who had embraced the doctrines of Sadduceism.[1] And criticism has no ground whatever for ridiculing the idea of their indulging a hope that they might succeed somehow or other in sealing the conqueror of death in His grave. They cherished no such imagination; they were merely afraid, as they said to Pilate, that the body of Jesus might be stolen away by His disciples. They could not act as if the adherents of Jesus were wholly paralyzed. Had they not just heard of a distinguished member of their own Council openly ranging himself on the side of the Crucified? This made them anticipate further attempts on the part of the "Galileans." Cunning and false themselves, they expected to be confronted with weapons like their own. After a long and painful conflict they had been so fortunate as to rid themselves of the originator of a dangerous popular movement; but if His disciples should succeed in spreading among the multitude the rumour of His resurrection,[2] their efforts would turn out to have been in vain, and their victory would be rendered valueless. The last error would be worse than the first; for they were able to meet the first by putting Jesus to death, but streams of blood would not be sufficient to arrest the second. Consequently, if the design of the Pharisees was to anticipate an "error," to which the removal

[1] They contemptuously express their unbelief by the words: "that deceiver," using the same pronoun ἐκεῖνος (Bengel: "numquam principes populi suo nomine Jesum appellasse reperias") which the Apostle John is in the habit of employing in his first Epistle when expressing the firmness of his faith in Christ and the depth of his reverence.

[2] Τῷ λαῷ, ver. 64, the easily led, unthinking multitude, which gives heed to rumours, and is moved by them as by the wind. Comp. John vii. 49: "this people who knoweth not the law."

of the body of Jesus was the preliminary, the measures which they adopted were entirely appropriate to the circumstances of the case. They relied not on the authority of the official seal of the Sanhedrim, but on the power of a watch appointed by Pilate, to prevent the execution of the rash and violent enterprise which the disciples of Jesus were supposed to be meditating. This, then, was the purpose of the last request which they presented to Pilate in connection with the crucifixion of Jesus, and they found no difficulty in securing his compliance with it (Bengel: "Pilatus quasi cum indignatione calumniatores cito expedit"). In no part of the story can we discover anything which is improbable. But perhaps it may be different with the second part of Matthew's account of the transaction (ch. xxviii. 11–15). He tells us that certain of the guards came to the high priests[1] and communicated to them what they had seen and experienced. Their bringing the communication, not to the procurator, but to the Jewish authorities, is to be explained (assuming that the report was an official one) by the circumstance that Pilate placed the watch under the authority of the Sanhedrim ("ye have a watch"), leaving them to give all necessary instructions ("make it as sure as ye can," Matt. xxviii. 65). We regard it as an entirely indifferent question whether the Jews accepted the account of the soldiers as true or the reverse. The remark of Strauss, that the high priests and elders would have considered such a report to be false, and have insisted upon an investigation, is just as destitute of substantial foundation as his further remark, that the priests of the "Christian legend" accepted it as true. The former is a purely arbitrary supposition, and the latter does not find the slightest support in the text of Matthew. It is exceedingly probable that there was a difference of opinion on the point in the bosom of the Sanhedrim, similar to that which showed itself subsequently (Acts xxiii. 7–9) between the Pharisee and Sadducee members of that body. But the matter was not discussed. Even supposing that a greater or less number—remembering, perhaps, the Lazarus-miracle — may have been struck, as by a lightning flash, with a conviction of the truth, the story of the soldiers led not one of them to true faith. "If

[1] It is quite in order that the enemies of Jesus should receive the Easter message from these quaking guardians of His tomb. It was conveyed by our Lord Himself, or by His angels, to His own.

they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." As to the main point, they entirely agreed with those who regarded the story as a fable. The former had no time to indulge their feelings of perplexity, and the latter were unable to treat the empty tale with silent contempt. All were seized with a like consternation, and equally felt the necessity of *action*. For whatever the facts of the case were as regarded the matters asserted by the soldiers, it was at least clear that the rumour of the resurrection of Jesus being already afoot, and threatening to acquire consistency, their immediate business was to arrest its progress. The course which at once recommended itself, was to declare that to be an actual fact which they had previously mentioned to Pilate as a matter of solicitude. No doubt there were difficulties in the way of their so doing, but we are told (ch. xxviii. 12–14) in what way they expected to overcome them. Criticism finds it easy to show that such a proceeding on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities can hardly be imagined, and that the immorality of the course they resolved on would be surpassed only by the folly which could anticipate success from such a "counsel and deed." Undoubtedly the eye here gazes into an abyss of sin whose lowest depths it can scarcely reach. The Sanhedrim tempts the soldiers to utter falsehood, instructs them in its language, and promises to uphold the lie, if necessary, with the full weight of its authority. And as the watchmen were doubtless averse to follow the course pointed out to them (they were appointed to watch, and yet they are to confess, "we slept;" they abandoned themselves to sleep, and nevertheless observed that the disciples stole away the body of Jesus), the supreme authorities did not scruple to resort to corruption, and, to their own condemnation, paid the soldiers the dishonourable wages of deceit. But the alleged improbability disappears when we perceive the harmony between this transaction and the character evinced by the Pharisees in particular throughout the whole of their relations to Jesus. "Ye are of your father the devil. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it." If they were still determined to maintain their conflict with the truth, their only available weapon was lying; they had no other, therefore, to put into the hands of those whom they needed as their helpers and instruments. If we find it impossible to understand

or to imagine how they could expect to attain their object by such methods, or to extinguish the already kindled fire by such arts, it must be remembered that this is a case in which we must not measure by *our* rule. The counsel which Gamaliel gave them at a later time was a new gleam of thought to them. But, after all, were they so entirely wrong in their calculations? Were the results such as to put their scheme altogether to shame? The words of the evangelist convey no such impression. He writes: "and this saying is commonly reported among the Jews until this day." The lie must have succeeded in gaining access to the minds of the Jews, and asserting itself for a time in a more or less extensive circle. At the date when Matthew wrote his Gospel the report was still current. How long it continued to be accepted thereafter we do not know. The information contained in Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judenthum* does not enable us to come to any certain conclusion on the point. Meyer points to the circumstance that there is no allusion to the assertion that our Lord's body was stolen in any of the proceedings of the apostolic church, as a weighty testimony against the historical reality of the narrative. But from this circumstance (which is, besides, sufficiently explained by the fact that apostolic apologetics was wont to move on a higher level, and scarcely ever descended to this lower region) we might rather draw the conclusion that the Jews soon began to be ashamed of this expedient, —an expedient which could not withstand the overwhelming force of events any more than chaff can resist the rushing wind. It is true that Paul still says of them: "*even unto this day* the vail is upon their heart" (2 Cor. iii. 15), but the arguments on which they relied in opposing Christianity were of another character, and were pitched in a different key. Even the criticism of Strauss scorns to accept the "Jewish legend," preferring to reject the whole story as a "Christian legend." However, we may seriously inquire whether the character of this criticism is not correctly portrayed in that very proceeding of the high priests which it is pleased to call inconceivable. Do not its fallacious reasonings and conclusions justify us in accusing it of something more than of being merely objectively incorrect or subjectively astray? With this question we bring our investigations to a close. The foregoing pages contain our contribution to its answer.

# THE HISTORY OF OUR LORD'S RESURRECTION.

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## INTRODUCTION.

### 1. THE INTEREST INVOLVED.

THE rising again of Jesus Christ from the dead is that fact in the Gospel history to the overthrow of which negative criticism has set itself with all its powers tasked to their utmost energy. On this arena there was more to be done than merely to set aside a miracle, however pre-eminent. "Whether miracles in themselves are to be held as possible," such is the express declaration of Strauss, "cannot be the question when we are face to face with such an unheard-of and unexampled event." But for that very reason also the task of criticism was not to deprive one single troublesome and inconvenient doctrine of its historical basis. But "the resurrection of Jesus forms the central point of the centre, the very heart of Christianity as it has hitherto existed, *and therefore* it has ever been above all things else the mark for the sharpest arrows of her adversaries" (Strauss, *die Halben und die Ganzen*, p. 125). Those adversaries have never advanced to this battle-field with a spirit confident of victory, and they never *could*. It is true the Easter-accounts of the Gospels manifestly present important difficulties, and when these are skilfully advanced they may be used to support a doubt as to the reality of the facts related. Yet that critic who ventures his attack, armed with this weapon only, enters on a very unequal strife. The difficulties which are raised by the denial of Christ's resurrection are certainly far greater than those which stand opposed to its acknowledgment; these may all be more or less satisfactorily

solved, while those are found to be simply insurmountable. When, therefore, a premature triumph is proclaimed, the explanation is not to be found in the feeling of superiority. The outburst is due either to the confounding of a subjective conviction settled beforehand, with a result which should be the fruit of earnest scientific investigation, or it is intended to cover the helplessness which always arises when the available means are out of all proportion to the end which is to be reached, no matter how. The latter alternative is probably the right one. For on this head criticism could not be deceived, namely, that every advantage—whether real or apparent—which it had won, became insecure the instant it declined the task of destroying this last and most important stronghold. It was vain to overthrow the faith of men in the miracles of Jesus, so long as the highest miracle of His resurrection from the dead still remained untouched. It was lost labour to explain the death of Jesus, which faith calls an atoning sacrifice, as the mere succumbing of a champion for truth and right, so long as it did not get rid of a fact which asserts itself as the divine declaration of His death in the church sense of it. "Here we stand"—so has the most distinguished representative of criticism boldly declared —"at the decisive point where we must either retract all that has gone before, and give up our whole enterprise, or we must pledge ourselves to explain the origin of faith in the resurrection of Jesus without a corresponding miraculous fact," that is to say, must clear this fact out of the way (Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, p. 288). And the latter is his decision. He does his utmost to prove the Easter tidings to be a fable, to be that for which those disciples took it at the first moment, a *λῆρος γυναικῶν*.

Of course the apologist, unless his work is to be a failure, must have an interest of equal strength in upholding the disputed fact; certainly that interest must go far beyond the simple wish to maintain a part of the Gospel history. But it is a very important question whether his interest in the matter should be controlled by a motive equal (though pointing in the opposite direction) to that from which the interest of criticism proceeds. As to the latter, it must cease to be, unless it take pains to get rid of a fact on which, in the end, its whole structure would come to ruin. But is the apologist correspondingly concerned to have in the Easter miracle a proof which will secure

the truth of Christianity against all assaults, and carry every hostile argument in its victorious march? The attempt has more than once been made by establishing the history of the resurrection to gain an apology for the whole Christian revelation, and it has been hoped in this way to win for it the full conclusiveness of an irrefragable demonstration. We need not here consider the question whether this attempt rests on a just calculation; only we may state the fact in passing, that the apostles never followed such a procedure; even the relative places of the Petrine discourses to the Jews are undoubtedly to be judged from an altogether different point of view. So much the more decidedly do we advance the conviction that a defence of the Easter history, which is undertaken, not for the sake of the history itself, but in the service of that wider aim, is doomed to certain failure. In the region of dogmatics the principle may hold good which church theologians have maintained, "resurrectio Christi est basis ac fundamentum omnium fidei articulorum" (Quenstedt, *Theol. did. pol.* II. p. 376; Gerhard, *Harm.* c. 212); for apologetics it cannot be admitted as a regulative principle. Otherwise the apologist would set himself the mistaken task of raising the resurrection of Jesus to the rank of a mathematical certainty, and in his mistaken zeal overshoot his true aim.[1] When Strauss lays it down as the condition of acknowledging the Easter history, that proofs of an altogether *irresistible* character should be given for it, we can understand the demand from his point of view; but as it is unjustifiable, so it is also impossible to satisfy it. The life and work, the suffering and dying of Jesus Christ come under the category of a notoriety, under which His resurrection does *not* fall; it cannot therefore be demonstrated to those in whom the organ of faith is wanting. "Mortuum esse Christum," so Augustine rightly says, "et pagani atque inimici ejus credunt; resurrexisse autem Christum, propria fides est Christianorum."[2]

[1] Caspari's view (*chronolog.-geograph. Einleitung in das Leben Jesu Christi*, Hamburg 1869, p. 214), that the apostles, before everything else, laid down certainty as to the resurrection of our Lord, that first on this certainty they built up faith and repentance, and that without such a certainty the fact even for apologetics, as much as for the mission of Christianity, would sink to indifference, we hold to be a mistake.

[2] Comp. August. *de Trinit.* 2. In Ps. ci. conc. 2. When, therefore, the Apostle Paul designates the death of Christ equally with His resurrection as an object of

But even if the interest which criticism on the one side and apologetics on the other follow in relation to the Easter history does not rest on equal motives, yet in another respect that of the latter rises to the full intensity of the former. For on the resurrection of Jesus Christ there depends a consequence which has an importance for the Christian consciousness as decisive as it is comprehensive, nay, without which that consciousness could not exist. What is this consequence? It was, no doubt, from regard to the well-known declarations of Paul (1 Cor. xv. 19: "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable;" ver. 30 et seq.: "Why stand we in jeopardy every hour? What advantageth it me if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die;" 2 Tim. ii. 8: "Remember that Jesus Christ was raised from the dead, wherein I suffer troubles even to bonds, enduring all things," and such like) that the Fathers of the church from the earliest times down to the latter part of the Middle Ages[1] laid emphasis almost exclusively on the proof which the future resurrection of the dead has received from the Easter tidings. Still easier is it to understand why, in the present day, men prefer to advance the same aspect. In Jerusalem the Sadducees were grieved that the apostles preached *through Jesus* the resurrection from the dead (Acts iv. 2); at Athens the heathen made it the butt of their ridicule (Acts xvii. 32); at the present day one may well feel himself called still more urgently to stand fast for a truth on which the religion of naturalism and the denial of everlasting judgment are confounded. Notwithstanding all this, it cannot be gainsaid that if the apologist enters with this fact alone on his contest, his strength is not adequate to his task.

The consequence at stake must be weightier and more far-reaching. Is there yet another? And does the Scripture know

faith (so 1 Thess. iv. 14: εἰ πιστεύομεν, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη), he has in view not the fact of His death, but its meaning in the history of salvation, not the ἀπέθανεν in itself, but the ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, 1 Cor. xv. 3.

[1] Full proofs of this are to be found in Reich, *die Auferstehung des Herrn als Heilsthatsache mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Schleiermacher*, Darmstadt 1845, pp. 100–111. But it is far from correct to say that this mode of view fell into the background in the following centuries; it is familiar also to the church theologians of the seventeenth century. Gerhard has taken pains to show that the hope of our resurrection has its anchor in the Easter miracle; not less than "undecim vincula hujus connexionis" are pointed out by him.

of one such? In the same context to which the passages just quoted belong, the apostle speaks as follows: "If Christ be not risen, then is your faith vain, *κενή*—your faith is vain, *ματαία*; ye are yet in your sins" (1 Cor. xv. 14, 17). Krauss (in his *theologische Commentar zu* 1 *Cor.* xv., Frauenfeld 1864, p. 69 ff.) misses the sense of the passage when he understands the *πίστις κενή* of a faith which is devoid of contents; the *ματαία*, on the other hand, of such a faith as wants the joy of hope in the perfecting of the divine life in its subject. But we also doubt whether Hofmann himself has hit the right sense in placing the ideas under the relation of reality to truth, and specially finding the *πίστις κενή* in the case of any one believing what never had any existence at all.[1] The *κενόν* receives its explanation from the preceding and similar description of the *κήρυγμα*, while the *μάταιον* is explained in the following clause. *Κενόν*, in this light, is not that *κήρυγμα* which includes no contents whatever, but a proclamation which lacks divine strength; and, consequently, the like holds true of the faith which rests on such a *κήρυγμα*.[2] It is not this more objective, but the subjective side which is indicated by the second epithet. *Πίστις* is *ματαία*, in so far as it—and that just in consequence of the want of divine power—is destitute of the confidence which belongs to its idea, that confidence without which it cannot do that whereto God has appointed it; it does not raise man above his consciousness of sin, and he himself feels that he is not freed from its power.

[1] If this were the apostle's meaning, he would certainly have used a much sharper expression. The *ψευδομάρτυρες* of ver. 15 leaves no doubt on this head.

[2] Comp. 1 Cor. ii. 4: *οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις τὸ κήρυγμά μου ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως, ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν μὴ ᾖ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ.* This is the meaning in which the apostle is accustomed to use the expressions *κενός*, *κενοῦσθαι*. Hofmann's explanation (*die heil. Schr. N. T.* III. p. 24), "*κενοῦσθαι* means to be deprived of that which in its essential being is something," is abstractly considered quite right; only the question is to make out the relation which Paul in the given case has in view, and to point out the specific contents which he regards as endangered. Κενόν with him always denotes that from which the divine element, whether in the matter of contents, or proof, or destination, has been withdrawn. So he writes (Phil. ii. 7) of Christ Jesus *ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν*, that is to say, in so far as the Son gave up the *εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*. So he teaches, Rom. iv. 14: *εἰ οἱ ἐκ νόμου κληρονόμοι, κεκένωται ἡ πίστις*, namely, in so far as the promise which God has given would in the supposed case have been rendered null. And in 1 Cor. i. 17 we read: *ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, the divine power of the preaching of the cross would be called in question, would be denied, if it were held to be necessary to secure its proper impression to that preaching by words of human wisdom.

Thus, then, faith, according to the apostle's view, is subject to both that κενοῦσθαι and this ματαιότης, apart from the proclamation of our Lord's resurrection. It is first through this fact that it reaches its being and operation; it is only through it that it gains the certainty which can equally defy contradiction from without and doubt from within; otherwise the consciousness of salvation is illusory. It is not always that theology has found itself in accord with this Pauline view. Schleiermacher lays down the position, "that it is impossible to prove an immediate connection between the fact of the resurrection and the in-being of God in Christ and His redeeming work. It is quite supposable that the Lord might have been raised to glory without this intermediate step, and it serves to secure neither the spiritual presence which He promised, nor the abiding influence upon those left behind of which He spoke. Every one familiar with dogmatic propositions may be expected to admit that he regards that historical fact as a matter of indifference for the right impression of Christ." He has not on this account denied the fact; on the contrary, on a ground to be afterwards explained, he claims its acknowledgment very decidedly; he even goes out of his way to defend it against the assaults of criticism. Only it was easy work for Strauss to prove the failure of this attempt, and even to show ground for the suspicion that the apologist's own conviction respecting the reality of the fact which he championed could be none of the firmest. In any case, Schleiermacher's interest in respect of our Lord's resurrection was a very lukewarm one; neither *could* it be urgent, because it did not flow from the right source. Quite another importance attaches to the subject on the supposition expressed by the Apostle Paul. The "impression of the redeeming work of Christ" is not enough for him to establish the reality of the consciousness of salvation. For this object, he regards the fact of His resurrection as absolutely indispensable. Without it he would pass the judgment on His whole work, and very specially on His suffering and dying: ἄρα Χριστὸς δωρεὰν ἀπέθανεν. If, then, the gospel is really a power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth, only if our Lord rose from the dead, then the apologetic interest in the Easter event rises to such a degree of intensity as can never be surpassed by the critical interest in the opposite direction. Exactly as Strauss utters the confession that he finds himself

here at the deciding point where he must either give up his undertaking or remove the last stone out of the way; so also the apologist stands here at the point on which depends the decision as to the existence or non-existence of *justifying* and *saving* faith. An interest thus awakened is strong enough to call forth the full energy demanded by the conflict.

### 2. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE.

If we have spoken of the intensity of the apologetic interest as essentially demanded for the discharge of the task proposed, we have not meant this in the general sense, that an urgent and lively interest of any kind whatever serves to sharpen the eye for the discovery of the requisite ways and means. For it is not on its strength taken in itself that the supposed assistance rests, but much more completely on the way and manner in which it is awakened and raised to its specific height. In the light of this genesis it is that we think above all to find the place from which to begin the consideration of our subject.

It seems, indeed, as if there could be no doubt about the right point of departure. It is Scripture which has recorded our Lord's resurrection. The apostles call themselves its witnesses; they assure us that they saw, and heard, and touched the Risen One—nay, even that He ate before their eyes. And what Luke sums up in the beginning of his second work thus: "Jesus showed Himself alive to them by many proofs, being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God," lies before us in detailed accounts in the Gospel history, their leading outlines being arranged later by Paul also. Therefore it is from the Scriptures that the Lutheran divines have drawn their main arguments for the certainty of Jesus' resurrection. To the teaching of Scripture Schleiermacher ascribes faith in this fact which it attests; because it is written, therefore and only therefore has he claimed for it a ready acknowledgment. And most recently also the opinion has been expressed that this faith rests solely on the accounts which Scripture contains regarding the appearances of the Risen One. If, therefore, criticism made an attack upon the Easter message, it would seem that in order to ward it off, we must go back wholly on the credibility of Scripture, and from this point prove the authen-

ticity of those special narratives, and the truth which results from them.

And yet it is a noteworthy and significant fact, that at the very time when the course described was the one peculiarly obvious, an extraordinary inclination is unmistakeable to get at the same conclusion in another way parallel to this from a different point of departure. We have not in view those theologians who were already obliged to defend themselves against Spinoza. Against his objections it was impossible for men like Olearius (comp. the treatise to be found at the close of his *Observat. sacr. ad evgl. Matthaei*, p. 741 et seq., entitled "Demonstratio apostolica resurrectionis Jesu Christi"), Jac. Carpovius (comp. *Theologia revelata dogmatica*, II. p. 619 et seq.), Buddeus (comp. *Institutt.* p. 794), to rest on the mere Scripture proof. But when J. Gerhard composed his thorough and learned "διάσκεψις de gloriosa salvatoris Jesu Christi resurrectione,"[1] on the one hand, no doubt had been raised on scientific grounds as to the reality of our Lord's resurrection; and, on the other hand, the orthodox doctrine of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures remained full-blown and undisputed. If the author, notwithstanding the absence of provocation on the side of polemics, was led to place at the beginning of his work a chapter, *De certitudine facti*, i.e. *an Christus resurrexerit*, it was with him a matter of course to set the testimony of Scripture in the foremost rank, as he has done under five different heads. But what moved him to admit in the second rank yet another mode of proof entirely different, and there to adduce considerations which, from his standpoint, appear to be really superfluous? We have but one answer to this question. Here there is a feeling betrayed that the Gospel accounts taken by themselves do not suffice to establish faith in the resurrection of Jesus Christ on its solid basis; that is to say, even the consciousness which was under the full control of dogmatics could not escape from the αἴσθησις, that the character of those narratives, apart altogether from their divergencies, might give rise to a doubt as to whether their contents were strictly historical. The utterance of Spinoza: "Narrationes evangelicas de Christi resurrectione stylum poeticum fabulasque Ovidianas sapere," justly called forth at the time the

[1] It is to be found printed in the second part of his *disputationes theologicae*, p. 1395 et seq., which appeared at Jena 1655.

lively indignation of theologians, and brought upon the philosopher the deserved reproach of lacking the requisite *verecundia*. And yet there is a grain of truth concealed under the frivolous assertion. The descriptions of the life and sufferings of our Lord of themselves attest the firm historical ground on which they transpire; the Easter accounts appear much more akin to the way and manner in which the first, and very specially the third evangelist have described the entrance of the Son into the world. No man can be expected, simply on the ground of the Bible Christmas history, to acknowledge the supernatural birth of Jesus. Even in the case of those who hold themselves to be inwardly convinced of the genuineness of these narratives, it is not the narratives alone, but other grounds as well which have brought them to the conclusions that He was conceived of the Spirit and born of the Virgin. In relation to the resurrection history, the same want is strongly felt. It is true Gerhard has not acknowledged this, and it may never have come to perfect clearness in his mind; but we have no doubt it was under its influence, that side by side with the Scripture ground, he entered upon another sort of demonstration for the "certitudo facti."

From what point has he drawn his proof? "Adde," so he writes, "Spiritus sancti effusionem, evangelii praedicationem, multorum ad Christum per eam conversionem, miracula Apostolorum, ecclesiae perpetuam conservationem." Thus he alleges the fact already indicated by Athanasius (in the treatise, *de incarn. verbi*) quoted by him, and which, as is well known, has been employed by modern apologetics as an irresistible and triumphant proof of the immovable certainty of the fact. It cannot in the remotest degree be our object to throw suspicion on the convincing power of this view. Criticism has laboured in vain to break the point of it. Strauss, indeed, bids us remember Baur's "genuinely historical" assertion, that it is not the matter of fact in the resurrection of Jesus, but only faith in it, which forms the indispensable supposition to our understanding the appearance and work of the apostles. But the tone of superiority with which he hurls at us this memento (*L. J.* p. 289) cannot impose on us, simply because he fails to prove *how* possibly the faith of the disciples could have arisen *without* the actual fact. Or is that meant for a proof, when he explains that a reaction

from terror at the unheard-of event to the mood from which visions could proceed, passed in the dark depths of the soul,—a violent transition, a lightning flash, in which the close atmosphere of the compressed inner life discharged itself? Or is it a proof, when Holsten thus explains the case of Paul: the image of the glorified and raised Christ which appeared to him proceeding from the persecuted church, was the goad (the pricks) upon which his soul, still burning with zeal for the divine truth of Judaism, received its bloody wound, and the rock on which the passion of this zeal seethed and broke for ever? When men who claim the reputation of clear, sober thought lose themselves in such fanciful phrases, they of all men can least by such means conceal the want of arguments; they become the betrayers of their own helplessness, and thereby strengthen the force of the proof which they have assailed in vain. But it is still another question whether it is well for apologetics to start from this position, however secure. Gerhard has chosen the appropriate expression when he allows for it the worth of a "confirmatio certitudinis." Faith may in this way find itself *strengthened.* That it finds also its *foundation* here, he would never have admitted; and neither can we. In Gerhard's view, the *foundation* rests exclusively in the Scripture history of the resurrection.

If, then, this basis taken by itself appears to us insufficient, what is needed for its consolidation? We cannot answer this question without going back on those in whom faith in the Risen One first came into being. How came they to this faith? and what course did they follow to plant it in the minds of strangers? Nothing seems to be more obvious than that the disciples were led by their Easter experiences to the conviction of the resurrection of Jesus. They received the first message not without distrust; but their doubts died away and passed to the very opposite when the Lord appeared in their circle, and when they, by every means of sensible perception, became aware of His bodily presence. We may acknowledge all this, and yet raise the doubt whether in this, taken by itself, the factor of the certainty of their faith is to be sought. Baur has rightly pointed out, as to the scene with Thomas, that all this seeing and touching, this materialism and tangible corporeity, makes out nothing for faith in the resurrection of Jesus, so long as the fact taken by

itself is not established as a thing certain and necessary.[1] For it is erroneous to suppose that our Lord's censure was directed against the unbelief with which the disciple had met the testimony he had received; and the position is untenable, that it was the humiliating gratification of his demand which overcame the doubter. The censure is aimed at a more comprehensive want, of which this unbelief was only a sign. And he was overcome by the same power which set up its first trophy in the history of Nathanael. Repeatedly, now to individuals, and again to the whole circle, did the Risen One open up the Scriptures, according to which Christ must so have suffered to enter into His glory. For what object did He do so? No other interest is discoverable than that of laying a foundation for their faith in the fact which their eyes have presently before them, and of bringing about the result of which the fourth evangelist has thus written: "When He was risen from the dead, His disciples believed the Scriptures. For as yet they knew not the Scripture, that He must rise again from the dead" (comp. John ii. 22, xx. 9).

The view of Strauss, that the revelations of the Risen One appear as mere hallucinations of the disciples, begotten by their remembrance of the personality of Jesus, and supported by their faith in His Messiahship, has met with approval and assent from many; in the case of others, it has proved misleading and unsettling. One is tempted to regard this result as a veritable riddle; for the laws of human nature make it an absolute psychological impossibility that men who had buried their hopes by the cross should so soon as the third day thereafter,[2] "from their inner being outwards, by the way of the mind, of the imagination, and of the excited nervous frame," have been able to

[1] In Gerhard also we find the same feeling coming out strongly. Decisively as he elsewhere insists upon the fact that the Easter faith of the disciples flowed from their *αὐτοψία*, this does not prevent him, in view of these sensible means of proof, from making the remark, "in rebus humanis judicium sensuum et experientia, *αἴσθησις καὶ πεῖρα*, praecedunt fidem; sed in rebus divinis fidem sequitur intellectus et experientia."

[2] The Christian *kerygma* of our Lord's resurrection on the *third day* could not but be peculiarly a stone of offence to Strauss. He himself cannot help admitting that his view of the origin of faith in the resurrection of Jesus *seems* to fail utterly, because of the impossibility of making its origin conceivable so early as the third day (*L. J.* p. 311). And not only does it *seem* to fail here, but it is shipwrecked really and inevitably on this rock. In vain he seeks to rescue it from certain destruction by disputing the historical ground for the determination of the time (though Paul mentions it as an element of the apostolic preaching), and explains it

restore their shattered faith. Assuredly not one of the whole "German people" would have given in to this assumption had there not been a germ of truth contained in the phantom of the brain. This, namely: the earlier conviction of the disciples that Jesus was the Christ, was in reality a co-operating factor going to produce their faith in His resurrection. As, on the one hand, it was impossible for them to talk themselves into this fact, or imagine it, unless it had actually happened—as under no circumstances, and by no brilliant or morbid qualities, could they have breathed so much truth and life into a vision of their own creation, that it was more real to them than their own existence; so, on the other hand, when He actually rose, when He appeared bodily, they could not have given Him their faith had not the knowledge ripened in them during their earlier fellowship with Him, that He was the Christ, the Son of the living God. Despite the testimony of their senses, they would have persisted in the delusion, *πνεῦμά ἐστιν, φάντασμά ἐστιν, ἄγγελος αὐτοῦ ἐστίν,—they,* as undoubtedly as the high priests or Pilate would have done, had the Risen One chosen to present Himself before their eyes.[1] Thus, then, their faith in the Easter miracle certainly broke forth in virtue of the revelations by which the Lord showed Himself to them as the living One; but it broke forth on the ground of the full assurance with which they had once protested their *πεπιστεύκαμεν καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν,* on the ground of that which their Lord recognised in them in His last farewell utterance: "Now ye believe" (John xvi. 31); nay, what He testified of them before His Father: "They have believed that Thou didst send Me."

as the result merely of inferences from Hos. vi. 2; Luke xiii. 32; Matt. xxvi. 61. It is hard to believe that this desperate evasion of utter helplessness can satisfy himself. That he does not hope it will meet with favour seems to be betrayed by the less pretentious tone with which he sets the matter before his readers.

[1] The circumstance that our Lord did *not* do this was, it is well known, used by Spinoza as a main objection to the credibility of the resurrection history. "Si Christus actu resurrexisset, sine dubio se Pilato Judaeorumque proceribus conspiciendum praebuisset, si quidem ita eos ad fidem flectere potuisset." He deserved no better answer than that of Carpovius, that he would draw his inference thus: "quicunque redivivus esse dicitur, nec tamen hostibus suis se praebuit conspiciendum, ille actu ex mortuis non resurrexit." One can scarcely trust his eyes when he finds Holsten recently designating the objection of the philosopher as one which has not been met down to the present hour. How little can the man have known the mind of the Lord, and the nature of the kingdom of heaven, who can form the idea that the Risen One must have revealed Himself to the world!

Now the way and manner in which they propagated faith in the Risen One is a true copy of the genesis of their own. No doubt it would seem here also as if they had simply appealed to their experience and observation. And this they did and must have done: "This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses" (Acts ii. 32, etc.). But they do not confine themselves to such appeals. Peter manifestly did more; and that not only in his Pentecostal sermon to the Jews, but likewise in addressing Gentiles in the house of Cornelius. Especially worthy of remark and emphasis is the circumstance that in both cases he prefaced his testimony of the Risen One by stating how Jesus had been proved by His life and work on the earth to be the Christ. Comp. Acts ii. 22, x. 38. But it is the same also with Paul. True, if we consider how he deals with the doubters at Corinth, does he not seem to lay emphasis entirely on the cloud of witnesses who beheld the Risen One with their eyes? Certainly, and yet only if the common understanding of the passage is the right one. The endeavour to make out its real object we must reserve for a later point in the discussion, and meanwhile describe it as a deceptive appearance when the apostle's object is supposed to be to stamp out the scruples of the church by "the brilliant array of witnesses," or by "their imposing number." Of higher importance for our present purpose is an expression which precedes this enumeration. It fully discloses the way and manner in which Paul proclaimed to the world our Lord's resurrection: "I delivered unto you how that Christ rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 4). The details which immediately follow, and which are closely connected by the "and that He was seen," prove, indeed, that he constantly appealed to its witnesses for the reality of the fact; but the "according to the Scriptures" makes it equally certain that he would not have faith founded on this ground only. The question is how to explain this determining clause. Undoubtedly the older commentators were mistaken when they collected every text whatever bearing on the subject, nay, every available type of the Old Testament, and then drew the conclusion that the apostle had used them more or less fully in the work of his *kerygma*. Nor can we quite agree with the explanation given by Hofmann (*die h. Schr. d. N. T.* III. p. 349); it seems to us to separate the "according to the Scriptures" too widely from

the fact of the "was raised" as such. Assuredly, Paul ever appealed to distinct Old Testament sayings; but certainly also in such a way that, following the rule of the great Isaiah prophecy, he set forth the inner necessity of our Lord's resurrection,—a necessity which was founded in the person and merit and mission of the Christ; a necessity which, in regard to the sufferings and glories that should follow, finds its expression in the solemn formula, *δεῖ οὕτως γενέσθαι, ἵνα πληρωθῶσιν αἱ γραφαί*;[1] a necessity such as he himself finally indicated by the *διό* in the passage of his Epistle to the Philippians.[2]

We maintain, indeed, with indisputable right, that the way and manner in which the disciples themselves gained the conviction of the resurrection of Jesus, in which they afterwards propagated it in the world, is important, not to say authoritative, for him who undertakes to strengthen faith which has been shipwrecked, and vindicate the fact which has been brought into suspicion. Especially do we thus come to know the standpoint which serves as a guiding star to one attempting an apology. According to this view, it is no other than the assumption that Jesus is the Christ. It may be that this standpoint will be regarded by many as a strange or as an impossible one. But the remarks with which we sought above to indicate our interest in the conflict before us had for their aim to anticipate this strangeness, and take off its edge. If the object is to find a proof of Christianity in the Easter tidings, and so to draw the conclusion, "the Lord is risen, therefore He is the Christ," then, indeed, that cannot be assumed which must be the result of the demonstration. *For us* the case is wholly different. For *our* interest lies in maintaining that the resurrection of our Lord affords a sure ground, not for faith in general, not for faith in the sense of holding-for-true, for a *πίστις*, which Paul would call *κενή* and

[1] In this formula we have the true explanation of the *κατὰ τὰς γραφάς* in the passage in Corinthians.

[2] A bright historical example illustrating the course followed by the apostle in regard to our Lord's resurrection lies before us in the discourse which he delivered at Antioch in Pisidia, comp. Acts xiii. 30 et seq., *Ὁ θεὸς ἤγειρεν αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν*, so he begins. Next he dwells with emphasis on the experiences of the eye-witnesses: *Ὤφθη ἐπὶ ἡμέρας πλείους τοῖς συναναβᾶσιν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῆς Γαλιλαίας εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ, οἵτινες νῦν εἰσὶν μάρτυρες αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν λαόν*. But immediately thereafter he goes back upon the *γραφαί*, upon the *ἐπαγγελία πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας γενομένη*, and finally rejects a definite prophecy, that by its light and validity he may furnish faith with a solid basis.

ματαία, but for evangelical faith, for *justifying* and *saving* faith; and the attempt to produce an apology with such a view determines our programme thus: Jesus is the Christ, and therefore He must rise again.[1] In our day we hear theologians, as well as laymen, when hard pressed with critical objections, and at a loss to meet them, making their escape with the words, that personal experience of the living One is after all the surest and the sufficient pledge for the reality of the resurrection. So far as this judgment rests on pious feeling, it is a matter of indifference to science. There is a sense, however, in which even science can appropriate it. Paul has more in view than the immediate religious feeling when he speaks (Phil. iii. 10) of a γνῶναι (according to Eph. iii. 18, 19, equivalent to καταλαβέσθαι) τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ. He means that ἐπίγνωσις, no mere αἴσθησις, that ἐπίγνωσις which makes one capable of a δοκιμάζειν. And the δύναμις τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ, although it shows itself chiefly in the practical life, is in so far also a matter of reflection, as the necessity of the fact is comprehended on the ground of a previous assumption, and with a view to an end.[2]

There is only one thing more which might be remarked as to our view. Does any peculiar worth belong to an apology for the Easter history, which proceeds on the assumption that Jesus is the Christ? Does it perform any important, any useful service

[1] We do not at all mean that the state of the case is wholly otherwise with the man whose object is simply to prove the Easter history, than with the apologist of Christianity in general. He too who undertakes this comprehensive task dare not, in our judgment, use our Lord's resurrection as a means of proof. Otherwise he sets himself an impossible task, and beats the air. He too must first prove the position that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, without any regard to the Easter fact. Or must that be thought impossible? We will not cite Schleiermacher. It might be replied that the sense in which this theologian regarded Jesus as the Christ was an extremely attenuated one. But this much is certain: the disciples *before* the resurrection of our Lord, ay, even without the most distant imagination of it, delivered a confession to this effect. This is the pattern for apologists. In the treatise of Krauss (*die Lehre von der Offenbarung*, Gotha 1868) that part seems to us a failure, a stone out of place in the edifice, in which the author uses the appearances of our Lord—bringing them as he does under the category of miracles—as proofs for the reality of divine revelation.

[2] This course has been touched on by Gerhard also somewhere in his διάσκεψις. He speaks of the "*necessitas*" *resurrectionis Christi*. But apart from all else, the circumstance that he shows this necessity in not less than eight respects, arouses anything but a good impression in favour of his view. In fact he holds everywhere merely to single texts, drawing inferences from them without giving a real insight into the subject.

for those who acknowledge the latter truth without hesitation? This is a question which we can only answer by at the same time explaining the method which we intend to follow.

### 3. THE METHOD.

The assumption that Jesus is the Christ, leads certainly by the way of reflection to the conclusion that the Christ must have risen from the dead. But no one will in reality follow this way to the end, unless he knows first of the fact as an accomplished one. Our presupposition was immovably fixed in the minds of the disciples, but of itself it did not avail to bring one of them to the triumph of the conclusion; and never, not even in a momentary flash, did such a hope enter their souls during the days of their bereavement. It is really idle to ask what form their consciousness would have taken had the Lord not presented Himself before their eyes as the living One. Speaking generally, the words may be taken as decisive in which the disciples of Emmaus expressed themselves: "We hoped He would have redeemed Israel." Still even these admit various possibilities. One, however, is unconditionally excluded. When Peter, James, and John, on the day of the transfiguration, received the warning to say nothing of what they had seen "till the Son of man were risen from the dead," they dwelt with amazement on the unusual words (*ἐκράτησαν τὸν λόγον*, Mark ix. 10); the thought appeared to them strange, and they exchanged their wonder with one another, asking what the rising from the dead should mean. And so they certainly never would have conceived the thought of a *risen* Christ.[1] In the first place, they must see the living One bodily before them, and gain a sensible assurance of the reality of His appearance; only thus was the way paved for the reflec-

[1] That part of Dr. Holsten's work in which he seeks to set aside this inconvenient point appears to us one of its weakest. Even in respect to Paul his procedure is violent. He will have us believe that the apostle's idea of the resurrection is radically a very slight modification of the view which, according to Josephus, was already held firmly by the Pharisees. We shall return to this point hereafter. And as regards Peter, he tries to help himself with his theory of the "transforming of reality by a *constructio a posteriori*," to which the biblical authors were constrained. And we content ourselves simply with remarking this. For we confess that we are not equipped to meet the author's resolute determination to set aside all and every passage which imperils his views.

tion that the Christ could not have remained under death, that the Holy One of God could not have seen corruption;—as it was on this ground, again, that they could give entire trust to the perception of their senses. At the present day the state of the case is still the same. Some measure of historical certainty must first precede reflection, and the full measure of certainty must be the final result. The only question is, Is there such a preliminary measure? Is this fulness attainable? And criticism answers with a decided No!

The historical difficulties which Jesus' resurrection offers have been at all times remarked and considered. This was the case so early as Augustine, for he has given them a thoroughgoing illustration in his treatise, *de consensu evangelistarum.* One may pass considerably beyond the boundary to which Schleiermacher's concession goes;[1] one may concede that no other part of the Gospel records presents equally numerous and equally important difficulties; but this admitted, there remains still that measure of historical certainty which is the condition of dogmatical reflection. But now that modern criticism has done its work, does this basis remain intact? The first attacks of the fragmentist, whatever attention they excited, especially when Lessing appeared as their eloquent advocate, did not succeed in overturning it. This was prevented by rationalism. For the view of the fragmentist, so intimately related on the one side, and yet on the other so strange to rationalism, and which was decisively opposed by Semler, was swept aside by its current. It found no room to establish itself and to draw its consequences. What remained undone then, our age has lived to see. It is not Baur alone who has appreciated the ability with which Strauss has carried forward those beginnings to their conclusion. We have not to do here with the honour of brilliant dialectics, of comprehensive learning, of classical mastery of language, which the author of the *Church*

[1] Schleiermacher's inclination to put the difficulties of the resurrection history on exactly the same footing as those which appear in the earlier parts of the Gospel narratives, seems at first sight surprising, and contrasts strangely with the zeal with which he seeks to invalidate the historical character of the narratives relating to the fatherless conception of Jesus. Why in the one case so conservative, and in this so radical? The explanation is obvious. The resurrection of Jesus was to Schleiermacher a matter dogmatically indifferent. On the other hand, this theologian lay under a very pressing necessity to remove from the dogma of our Lord's supernatural birth its historical basis.

*History of the Nineteenth Century* has heaped on the head of his scholar; but with the fact that certainly the negative side of the criticism of the Gospels has been in all essential points completed by Strauss. We separate this negative side of his undertaking very decisively from the accompanying essay, to explain the origin of the Easter accounts. The two are in our opinion of very unequal worth. The vision theory is destitute of all and every misleading plausibility; nay, in consequence of the monstrosities which it would have us to admit, it produces a thoroughly repelling impression. Justly has Hofmann (*die heil. Schr.* I. p. 113) dismissed it with a simple protest; to an elaborate refutation it has no claim. No doubt this part too has found numerous friends and adherents; but only in the circle of those who take their stand on the "self-assurance of the modern consciousness" ("Selbstgewissheit des gegenwärtigen Bewusstseyns"), and who therefore have no other means of evasion. Characteristically enough, one of its representatives has set himself the very modest task of proving only the *possibility* of an explanation of the kind; to raise this possibility to actual fact, this he expects his readers to do out of complaisance to him, from love to that consciousness which allows no interposition of a transcendental power into the individual spiritual life.

It is wholly different, on the other hand, with the critical proof of the negative judgment. Here we confess that we cannot adopt the standpoint of those who simply pass from the subject to the order of the day. If it is really as Strauss maintains, and as under his handling seems plausible, that in the history of the resurrection "each evangelist contradicts all the others, nay, each of them contradicts himself" (*der Christus des Glaubens*, p. 166), then there is room for the supposition that the Gospel testimony is "the mere product of the wish to provide a dogmatical view with its historical support" (Strauss, *L. J.* p. 295); and the Pauline Gospel, the doctrine of the evangelical church, the apostolic exclamation, "Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ," lose their historical foundation. And yet to this extremity the fullest appreciation of the critical difficulties cannot drive the impartial student. The immediate impression which, on the one hand, the work of the apostles, on the other, the resurrection history itself produce on him, will always prove sufficient to balance the

suspicion that the former might *rest* on a deception, and that the latter might have arisen from a more or less deliberate *intention* to deceive; it will always be strong enough to secure that measure of historical certainty which we need to begin with.[1] Only thus much we must grant—criticism has certainly made a number of details in this history uncertain, and the sum of them is so important and musters so threateningly, that the full assurance of conviction is no longer a factor to be assumed beforehand, but must first be gained. In what way do we reach this goal?

It is still usual to give the preference to the harmonistic method. That this path is one so well trodden, need not of itself prevent us also from following it. A sure way is never out of date. True it is, that Harmonistic was grievously compromised by Osiander; but the zeal and penetration which Gerhard discovers in his *Harmonia*, brought the discredited method again into honour. Lessing undoubtedly knew this work. Many remarks, and these not the worst, in his *Duplik*, are evidently borrowed from the work of the theologian. But Lessing was not the man who could appreciate such efforts; he regarded them only as material for the exercise of his wit. And in that region he has done all that was possible; only Strauss perhaps surpasses him with his clever description of the master key of Harmonistic which forces locks ("dem Hauptschüssel der Harmonistik, der die Schlösser verdrehe"). The severe judgment also which R. Rothe (*z. Dogm.* p. 28) passes on "the arbitrary play of the older Gospel harmonies, which was truly shameful in its absurdity," is, so far as Gerhard is concerned, undeserved. Nothing will be found in the *Harmonia* of which one need be ashamed, judged from the standpoint of the theology of our day. The excellent work only requires to be read more diligently, and not merely the few fragments extracted (and mostly without naming their source) by modern commentators. We charge ourselves peculiarly with the duty of again calling attention to it, and urging our younger theologians especially to make use of it.

Notwithstanding all this, we have more than one reason for avoiding the Harmonistic plan. On the one hand, the position

[1] We here take note of an admission which Baur, greatly to the annoyance of Strauss (comp. *L. J.* p. 288), did not hesitate to make. For thus much he allows, that the historical investigation can never prove with certainty that the resurrection of Jesus was *not* an external, whether a miraculous or natural event.

of the exegete, who could not help betraying the church divine, was a wholly different one from that of the apologist who sets himself to combat the attacks of criticism. A method, which in the former case offered itself as a matter of course, would here be unsuitable and opposed to our aim. Gerhard's Harmonistic was not intended to meet a polemical attack; its motive lay simply in the dogma of inspiration. In consequence of this dogma, every contradiction in the resurrection history must be exhibited as merely apparent (an enantiophany), and to the exegete there fell the task of solving it. But the highest ability brought to bear on this work would be labour lost, when the discussion can no longer be conducted on the ground of the acknowledged dogma. Moreover, on the other side we have a goal before us which Harmonistic, even in the most favourable circumstances, can never reach. For it is absolutely beyond its power to achieve a real and complete conviction. At the present day it cannot in fact avoid making concessions to criticism again and again, which with other results are very hazardous for its objects; and so it must not unfrequently be content with extremely precarious hypotheses, and go back on possibilities for which it can desire acknowledgment only *in abstracto*, and the probability of which it cannot itself accept. Very peculiarly in respect of the resurrection history does it too often justify Lessing's trenchant sentence (*Duplik*, p. 3), "Some answer may be given to everything;" but to give some answer and therewith to silence a doubt ("Etwas antworten und ein Bedenken beantworten") are two different things. We need not on this account dispute its worth. The standpoint of Ebrard's *wissenschaftliche Critik der evangelischen Geschichte* is throughout the Harmonistic one; only once or twice has the author, especially in his last edition, made an excursus which takes him beyond it, and yet the book has made an impression and been a success. The peculiarly irritable tone in which Strauss expresses his impatience of it, is not less significant than the circumstance that the work of *Theology and Christendom* has reached a third edition (Frankfort 1868). That it has not succeeded in giving full satisfaction to any one, arises not from any defect in the execution of the task, but in the weakness of the Harmonistic method. But what other gives a better hope?

The resurrection accounts of the evangelists secure, to begin with, only a limited measure of historical certainty, and it is

impossible, in view of the present position of criticism, either by exegetical art or historical reflection, to carry this measure to the requisite degree. And yet it suffices to enable the apologist to attempt a defence of the challenged fact from another side. We have already described the way. He who starts from the firm conviction that Jesus is the Christ, is infallibly led to the historically given result. Had the Lord not risen, He would not have been the Christ, He would not have been perfected as the Christ. "This Jesus God hath made both Lord and Christ," such is the preaching of Peter (Acts ii. 36) *after* the accomplishment of the fact: it must then be possible to understand the necessity of the fact from the simple premiss. This is the proof which we have to lead. But supposing we had succeeded in our task, would our work thus be finished? Should we be in a position from this secure height to ignore the critical difficulties,—whatever may be the truth about them, they now affect us no more, they may be left to themselves? No, this is far from being in our mind! For our concern is not to secure certainty in itself, but full *historical* certainty; the aim before us is not merely to rebut, but to conquer criticism. From the conviction gained that the Christ could not remain under death, that He must by means of resurrection resume His life, our plan absolutely requires us to return again to the history. But then, we hope, this very history will appear to us in another light. Then will its extraordinary character, with which the mere historian cannot find himself at home, be transparent to us; then will also the diversity of the records, "in which each is said to contradict the other—nay, each to contradict himself," lose the pith of its strangeness; and thus the truly vindicated history results in the Sabbath rest of conviction. Only when this has been accomplished, but then assuredly, will that "reason for the hope that is in us" be concluded which the apostle (1 Pet. iii. 15) demands from the confessors of the Risen One.

The attempt to carry out the task, thus understood, leads to a different arrangement of the matter than would otherwise commend itself. Apart altogether from the fact that our aim is not limited to the object of coming to an understanding with criticism, we are prevented at the very outset from following it step by step in its course. To Strauss, who comes to the subject with the firm conviction that the resurrection of Jesus is a fable, the course

of representation could not be doubtful. His first business was the trial of the witnesses. He begins with Paul as the earliest in the series of the more detailed narrators. "But Paul, according to him, merely appealed to a tradition; what he relates is simply repeated from others. He who altogether had no special gift for the historical investigation of an objective fact, was the less disposed to examine the ground or groundlessness of the tradition, inasmuch as he held himself sufficiently convinced of its trustworthiness, by the Christophany which fell to his own lot. His own experience, however, was only visionary; and since he puts the experiences of the other witnesses, by means of the unchanged ὤφθη, into one and the same category with his own, they too fall under the same judgment." And so, from this point, criticism advances to illustrate the figure which the evangelists have drawn of the Risen One as He appeared. Here it finds characteristics which can co-exist in no real being, but which form only a creation of the fancy. And so it finally reaches the conclusion that so unheard-of a miracle, which, as it asserts, could claim acceptance only in virtue of irresistible proofs, cannot be regarded as having really happened, and that the reports of it throughout must rest on error. For us, since we too approach the subject not without presupposition, but with those presuppositions which have been more than once indicated, the order must be a different, or rather the opposite one. The appearances of the Risen One before the eyes of His disciples are certainly of high worth in our estimation; we shall explain ourselves on the point at the proper time. Only in regard to them we lay the stress not solely on the tendency to convince the disciples of the reality of the resurrection as an accomplished fact;[1] their real importance seems to us to be a wholly different one. However that may be, before these appearances are taken into consideration, the person of the appearing One Himself demands to be contemplated. We know well, that only within the region of those manifestations did that person become recognisable; but to

[1] This, too, is a point where we cannot altogether agree with Krauss (as above, p. 265). We mean that we cannot join him in the emphasis with which he seeks to limit consideration to the appearances of the Risen One, and to exclude all that lies behind. And yet he allows that we get back to this conclusion on the testimony of Scripture and in virtue of our own reflection. Is that not a sufficient basis for the consideration of the subject? Or do we really know anything more of the appearances of the Glorified One from other quarters than from the testimony of Scripture?

let the standpoint of His intercourse with His disciples hold the foreground in our discussion, and to leave it in the background, are two very different things. Only, even behind the person of the Risen One, there lies, finally, yet a third matter, namely, the exercise of power which forms the ground of the miraculous appearance, and it is with this third that we shall have to begin. Accordingly, we treat first of the raising of Jesus, the divine act which wrought the miracle; next, of the rising of Jesus, of the person of Him who showed Himself as the Living One; and, finally, of the appearances of the Risen One in the circle of His own.

# FIRST SECTION.

## THE RAISING OF JESUS.

### 1. THE ACT OF GOD.

IT could never escape observation that the Easter miracle is described in Holy Scripture in a twofold way. Now it is a raising of Jesus which is spoken of, and, again, His rising; ἐγήγερται is used of the one aspect, and ἀνέστη of the other. While in the Gospels both forms of expression are used about equally, the former is the common one in the writings of the apostles, although the latter is by no means foreign to them.[1] The history of theology is as familiar with the endeavour to set aside the view of the risen Christ as it is with the lively interest to avoid the expression of a raising of our Lord. "Quid magis," asks Socinus, "vel risu dignum vel a veritate alienum, quam eum, qui mortuus sit, se ipsum in vitam revocare? quid absurdius et scripturae magis dissentaneum?" and not without exegetical ability and dialectical cleverness has he sought to prove the harmony of his view with Scripture and sound doctrine. All the more zealous were church divines to secure exclusive prevalence for the opposite view,—a view already familiar to the Fathers,[2] already formulated

[1] Schleiermacher's assertion to this effect, *Dogm.* II. p. 94, is erroneous. It is true that, owing to the doubtfulness of the reading, we cannot appeal to the well-known passage in the Epistle to the Romans (xiv. 9); but we have sufficient proof remaining in the declaration of the apostle to the Thessalonians (i. 4, 14), πιστεύομεν ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη. How little mere enumeration avails in such questions is obvious from the circumstance that, though with regard to the *verbal* form the case undoubtedly stands, as we have admitted, it is rather the opposite which holds good of the *substantive* form. Only once in the whole of Scripture have we the expression of an ἔγερσις Χριστοῦ (see Matt. xxvii. 53); everywhere else we read of His ἀνάστασις.

[2] So in Ignatius, *ep. ad Smyrn.* 2 (ed. Dressel, p. 186): ἀληθῶς ἀνέστησεν ἑαυτόν. Nevertheless, afterwards, in the seventh chapter, the other view is represented: τὴν σάρκα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῇ χρηστότητι ὁ πατὴρ ἤγειρεν.

by Thomas Aquinas, but one necessarily founded on their own dogmatic views of the person of Christ with which they approached the subject. "Christus," so they teach, "ut Deus vel quoad divinam naturam se ipsum ut hominem in mortem traditum ex mortuis suscitavit per virtutem vivificatricem sibi essentialem." Nay, they carry the thesis to the extremest point, and add the assertion: "Christus ut homo vel secundum humanam naturam se ipsum suscitavit per virtutem vivificatricem personaliter sibi communicatam."[1] As to the fact that the apostles testify to a raising from the dead wrought by the glory of the Father, they were only able to meet it with the evasion that thereby nothing else was meant than the power belonging to the Trinity as a whole. It were to be wished that the zeal which one and another bestowed on the disputed point had rather been devoted to shed light on the question how the two aspects of the subject are related to one another, and for what reason Scripture presents the one not less than the other. It is impossible to evade the question by referring to analogous cases, and so reducing it to a matter of indifference. Undoubtedly the appearing of our Lord in the world is also placed in the twofold point of view: it appears as the result of His spontaneous coming as well as the consequence of a sending which He received. And yet no one feels himself thereby obliged to ask whether the incarnation is to be referred to a self-determination of the Son, or whether it is not rather to be traced back to a decree of the Father; indeed, no one *can* put this alternative, for the Lord comprehends both in one, and says: "I proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself, but He sent Me," John viii. 42.[2] Only the state of the question respecting the Easter miracle is this, that in different passages sometimes the passive, sometimes the active "moment" meets us with a strength of emphasis which almost displaces the other aspect from our horizon. The way in which Peter expresses himself in the Pentecostal discourses (Acts ii. 32

[1] Comp. Quenstedt's elaborate discussion, "an Christus propria virtute divina resurrexerit," in his *Theol. did. polem.* II. p. 435 *et seq.*

[2] Church divines get over this passage, too, with the remark that the point in question here is a consilium et beneplacitum commune, ss. Triados. "Missio non est imperiosa, sed liberrimi consensus; non coacta, sed spontanea; adeoque nullam arguit mittentis et missi inaequalitatem. Missio in divinis non tollit aequalitatem personarum, sed tantum supponit originis ordinem." Comp. Quenstedt, *ubi supra*, II. pp. 81 and 214.

iii. 15, iv. 10), the manner in which Paul writes in his Epistle to the Romans (iv. 24, vi. 4, viii. 11), admits only the view that the Crucified One *received* His resuscitation from the Father. On the contrary, from the saying of our Lord that He will raise the temple of His body in three days, the entire spontaneity of the self-determination and self-power of the Son come out so prominently that the passive "moment" is hardly compatible with it. The question, why the Scriptures present the one view as well as the other with such energy, may be answered generally without difficulty. The interest is undoubtedly a practical one; the matter involved is the consequences which arise from both sides for the consciousness of salvation belonging to the Christian church. But even these consequences would lack their sure basis were the expressions, the Lord is raised, and the Lord is risen, nothing else than different representations of one and the same fact. To the difference of view there must also be a corresponding distinction in reality. If it is unquestionably the same new life upon which the Raised or the Risen One has entered, yet it does not follow that the idea of raising is absolutely coincident with that of rising. At least both demand to be considered separately.

Never did the Lord foretell His future Passion without at the same time announcing its final and glorious issue. Of the latter He was certain, on the same ground on which He was aware of the former. It is from a divine necessity that He explains His cross; and under the viewpoint of this δεῖ He as expressly puts His consequent glorification, Matt. xvi. 21; Luke xxiv. 26. But the nearer the hour came, the more clearly is He concerned to exhibit the greatness of His Father, and the love with which He embraces Him as the ground of His hope. As during His entire earthly career He acknowledges and emphasizes His dependence on the Father,—the Father the giver, and ever ready to give; the Son the receiver, and fully empowered to receive,—so He expects from these same hands the δόξα which is due to Him after the completion of the work committed to Him. Therefore He prays, immediately before His Passion: "I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do; and now, O Father, glorify Thou Me;" and He dies with the word full of hope: "Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit." His disciples also were directed by Him to find their comfort and trust in the living God, who sent His

Son into the world and keeps open eye over Him; believe in God: thus He turns to them when He sees their trouble and fear come. When, then, the Easter miracle was completed, they could not immediately and in the first place judge it otherwise than as an unfolding of God's power, and as a proof of love which the Father gave, nay, rather which it was impossible for Him to deny the Son. "It was not possible," so says Peter on the subject, "that He should be holden of death," Acts ii. 24. It was not possible, that is to say, on the part of God,—God could not allow it, or He would not have been God nor the Father of this Son. And Paul writes: "Wherefore also God hath highly exalted Him," Phil. ii. 9; διό, that is, on this ground, because of this obedience, which had established a claim for corresponding action on the side of God.[1] But the justness of this view will appear in a convincing light only when we concentrate our attention on the one point in question. It is of the rising of Jesus that we are speaking, not of His glorification in general. If we allow ourselves to take both ideas as one and the same, of course there remains scarce any room for a specific act *of God*. Rothe, who absolutely identifies the resurrection and exaltation of the "second Adam," correspondingly regards (by giving one-sided emphasis to the going to the Father in the farewell discourses in John) Christ ceasing to live as so immediate and regular a transition into the divine condition of cosmical being, that the concurrence of an operation on the part of the Father seems as good as excluded; indeed, he lets go the resurrection itself, for what he describes under this name is not the real idea of resurrection (comp. *Theol. Ethik*, II. § 560 of the 1st edition). If, on the contrary, we

[1] Church divines have the context not less than the meaning of the word against them, when they contend that the apostle's words have no relation to a reward which fell to the lot of Christ. From the untenable ground that it was impossible for the Lord to receive anything which He did not already possess (Gerhard: "in exaltatione non est Christo data nova quaedam potestas, quam per unionem personalem non acceperit;" Quenstedt: "Christus sibi ipsi nihil meruit, quia erat et est omnisufficiens et nullius rei indigus"), they allow themselves to be driven to the view directly opposed to the word that the particle διό is to be translated by "*proinde*, accordingly;" and so they maintain: "innuit Paulus non antegressam causam meritoriam, sed certum ordinem et consequentiam, quod nimirum humilitatem Christi insecuta sit sublimitas." Comp. Gerhard, IV. § 329. Quenstedt, *l.c.* p. 326. Notwithstanding, it will afterwards appear that it was not merely dogmatical prepossession which led them to this exegesis, but that in one respect they showed very sound judgment.

confine our view to the Easter event in itself, and comprehend it in its true idea, we shall be forced to the same supposition as is expressed by Paul: "Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father;"[1] we must, on the one hand, admit that only an immediate miraculous creative interposition of God's hand makes this effect intelligible; and, on the other hand, acknowledge that in the historical situation the Father of Jesus Christ must have interposed thus and not otherwise.

For what is it that the Easter morning proclaims? The dead One has again become alive,—"Christ died and revived," Rom. xiv. 9. "He died." So writes the apostle. The theology of the church has always shown the deepest interest in maintaining the reality of this death. The interest does not date first from the conflict with rationalism; neither was it at all inspired merely by the memory of older Docetic errors; but it rested on the perception that only on this understanding has the atonement been really accomplished and its saving efficacy assured. "Si imaginarie tantum Christus mortem sustinuisset, imaginarie quoque tantum redempti essemus." When the Tübingen divines, especially Thummius and Luc. Osiander, sought to advance the view of Christ's decease, that no doubt a dissolution of soul and body took place, but not a separation,—a *διασταση τοπική*,—it was on this ground that they were met with so lively an opposition, because they did not seem to give full force to the idea of death; for it is not exhausted by the *solutio animae a corpore*, but by the necessary consequence of this, the *avulsio localis*. "Extra dubium omne est," thus especially the Saxon theologians expressed themselves, "sicut nostra mors se habet, ita cum morte etiam Christi comparatum fuisse; atqui in morte nostra non corporis tantum et animae fit *ἀνάλυσις* et *ἀπόλυσις*, sed et *χωρισμός* vel *ἀποχώρησις*; ergo in morte etiam Domini verum recessum animae a

[1] Both words demand to be equally emphasized. It is not of the *δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ*, but of the *δόξα τοῦ πατρός*, that the apostle speaks. He will represent the Father of Jesus Christ as the agent who wrought this work on His Son; and he describes His *δόξα* as the medium. Hofmann rightly rejects the common explanation, that by this is to be understood God's omnipotence; and he would scarcely reckon it an essential improvement which Meyer makes when he substitutes the idea of majesty. Neither, indeed, can we agree with his own proposal (*die h. Schr. N. T.* V. p. 227), if for no other reason, on account of the *διά*. The *δόξα* rather denotes here, as in John xi. 40 (*ὄψει τὴν δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ*), the immediate, miraculous, creative interposition of God.

corpore factum esse arbitramur," "qui si nullus factus est, ne mors quidem ulla fieri potuit" (Athan.).[1] And yet it is a question whether the position which they thus sought to establish with the one hand was not dangerously overturned with the other. It is of no avail that they put the proposition in the forefront, that the whole Christ, the Christ the θεάνθρωπος, was the subjectum mortis obitae, when, notwithstanding, ever afterwards the one thing spoken of is the *corpus* mortuum,[2] and that withal in so exclusive a way that the person of the dead God-man itself is well-nigh lost to view. The idea that the death of Jesus consisted in a free dismission of the soul from the body ("ultronea et spontanea libertate animam suam ex corpore voluntarie emisit"), that this soul thereafter dwelt in triumph in the blessedness of the heavenly regions ("triumphavit in coelis," "non tantum statu beato et gaudio, sed et coelesti sede et habitaculo"), and by a free determination ("quando sibi visum sit") accomplished its return to the body ("remigravit in corpus"),—this idea neither consists with the conception of a death truly suffered, nor is it compatible with the thought of a real state of death beginning with the expiry of breath; and neither does it harmonize with the real meaning of the last words of the Crucified One; for more cannot be found in them than the expression of His confidence that He will receive again His departing life through the glory of His Father. We may not indeed speak as if the Lord, at the moment of His death, wholly lost His consciousness, or as if His spirit had sunk into a faint (so Gess, *Christi Person und Werk*, Basel 1870, p. 196); still less dare we countenance the Socinian error, that in the moment of death His existence had ceased ("Christus in mortuorum statum constitutus plane esse desiit, sive existere cessavit, quum mori et non esse idem sint"): only no expression of life on the part of the Deceased during the *triduum mortis*, whether active or merely receptive, is reconcilable with the reality of His death. He would not, in this case, have died "*vere et proprie*;" His death would have been, not indeed a counterfeit (Scheintod) in the rationalistic sense, but yet a merely apparent

[1] Comp. the judgment of the Saxon theologians on the points in dispute between the Würtemberg and Marburg divines in Quenstedt, II. p. 427.

[2] Comp. W. Lyser, *disp. de resurr. Jesu Christi:* "Quatenus resurrectio praecise consideratur, convenit huic personae secundum illam naturam, quae crucifigi et mori potuit. *Proxime corpus resurrexit.* Illud enim resurrexit, inquit Hieronym., quod moriendo cecidit."

death (*scheinbarer* Tod),—a death "κατὰ δόκησιν;" and then He would in like manner have risen only apparently, and not ὄντως.

It has always been felt that the Petrine phrase, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι (1 Pet. iii. 18), was of great importance for the question before us; and the more is it to be lamented that the interpretation of it is so doubtful and disputed. Only the point about which a difference can arise is merely the relation of the two datives, and the meaning in which the apostle uses the word πνεῦμα in this connection;[1] as to the sense of the participles, there could hardly be a difference of opinion. In the former there lies the thought, that from the subject the life was *taken away* which till then it had possessed, that it *suffered* death by external violence,[2] hence immediately before this, as also ch. iv. 1, the πάσχειν required independently by the practical aim of the passage; in the latter, on the contrary, we have it expressed that on the same subject by means of a raising from the dead its life was anew *bestowed*. For neither may the word ζωοποιηθείς be understood of anything else than the Easter miracle, nor *could* the state of death into which the Lord was brought, and which He Himself attests in the words ἐγενόμην νεκρὸς καὶ ζῶν εἰμί (Rev. i. 18), be otherwise removed than by means of His subsequent resurrection. Every divergent interpretation either falls through by comprising the entire reality of His death, or it leads to the utterly erroneous and unscriptural

[1] Nösgen, in his noteworthy treatise, *Christus der Menschen- und Gottessohn*, Gotha 1869, has revived Selnecker's explanation, which in turn was borrowed from church dogmatics, that the πνεῦμα denotes the spiritual and divine nature itself. Certainly he does not go back upon the impossible explanation that the first dative is to be taken ὑλικῶς, the second ἐνεργητικῶς, but what are meant are "the states of subsistence, according to which a being put to death and a being made alive again were possible for Christ, and in accordance with which the one and the other took place." But we confess we are utterly unable to understand how far the divine nature of Christ rendered the ζωοποιηθῆναι possible, or how this ζωοποίησις took place "in accordance with the divine nature." The author's polemic has not for a moment caused us any misgiving as to the correctness of Hofmann's explanation, that the datives must denote the end of an existence which lay behind, and the beginning of a new life. This explanation is not at variance with the apostle's train of thought, but is the only one which thoroughly corresponds with it.

[2] It has been prejudicial to church theology, both exegetically and dogmatically, that it asserts the "voluntary death" of our Lord in a sense which entirely does away with the passivity of the dying Christ. Proceeding on the declaration, "No man taketh my life from Me, but I lay it down of Myself," it thoroughly confounds the free determination of Jesus to go to death, with a free act of dying itself. His death is regarded everywhere as an "ultronea *emissio* animae."

view, that the ζωοποίησις of our Lord was accomplished immediately on His departure to the other world, and so had preceded the ἀνάστασις.[1] We call the view unscriptural. For wherever in the N. T. we read of life from the dead, the ἀνάστασις appears as the turning-point. Nowhere is there a ζωοποίησις asserted except with this presupposition. We read (John v. 21): "The Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them." And again (John xi. 25): "I am the resurrection and the life" (comp. Rom. viii. 11). Till the hour of His rising our Lord also remained in the state of death into which He passed when He commended His spirit into the hands of God. And on Easter morning the same thing happened in His case which was accomplished three times by Himself in the days of His flesh: ἐπέστρεψεν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ (comp. Luke viii. 55). And further, the change was brought about on Him by His Father. "The Father raiseth up the dead," John v. 21; "God who quickeneth the dead." Only He who has life in Himself, who only hath immortality, could bring back the life which was extinguished. Church divines wrongly appeal to the declaration of Christ that He also possesses life in Himself ζωὴ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, and to the fact that precisely in reference to the divine quickening He sets in sure prospect a doing likewise of His own (comp. Quenstedt, *ubi supra*, p. 436). For what is perfectly true of the time of His working, does not hold of the night when no man can work. He cannot be at once the object and the subject of the same act. The complaint, which Calovius especially has made, that the θεάνθρωπος is not distinguished sharply enough from φιλάνθρωπος, is, as respects the region before us, only so far well founded that

[1] Unfortunately Nösgen too has lent himself to this opinion. He has the perfectly right view that ζωοποιηθείς can mean nothing else than ἐγερθείς, but then he adds immediately that the resurrection itself cannot be meant by it. But why not then? Surely not for the empty reason which he has borrowed from another theologian! And what else then could be meant by it? Our author answers, "that it refers to the awaking which preceded the resurrection (*ubi supra*, p. 195). Dying as to His humanity, Jesus as to His Godhead was immediately made alive; though, on the other hand, His body remained yet for a time separated from His soul, and sank into the state of death with its consequences, namely, dissolution into its elementary parts" (p. 348). The weakness of this utterly unsuccessful explanation does not require our pointing out; its variance with Scripture is manifest. A thesis which requires such forced distinctions and presents such views cannot be the right one. In his exposition of the Petrine Epistles published in 1875, Hofmann has anew presented the right view of the matter, without, however, entering into a critical examination of Nösgen's statements.

undoubtedly history knows of no second case in which the awakening operation of God was, as it is here, a strict and proper postulate. Therefore the apostle testifies in the words of prophecy that it was impossible for the Father to allow His Holy One to see corruption; "it was not possible." But in immediate connection therewith, He has laid emphasis on the fact that only the divine power could have loosened the bands of this death. What God alone could do, that He *must* accomplish here.

For what was the resurrection of Jesus Christ in the historical course of events? It was God's answer to the deed which the world had perpetrated on His messenger. So Peter understood it, and so he explained it as often as he spoke of it to the Jews. "Whom ye slew, Him hath God raised from the dead." Comp. Acts ii. 23, 24, iii. 15, iv. 10, v. 30. And so also it was understood by the early church in the first days of her persecution. For on the ground of *this* divine interposition she founds the confident expectation that the Lord of heaven and earth will reveal His mighty arm in every case in which the world rises against His anointed, Acts iv. 24–30. Undoubtedly it had been determined in the counsel of God that the Christ should suffer death at the hands of sinners; therefore the pleading of the Son, "let this cup pass from me," remained unheard by the Father. But as Israel could never ask the question in this relation: "Why am I yet judged as a sinner?" so neither could this circumstance restrain the retributive action of the holy and righteous God. It was precisely in the case before us that this action was provoked in the very highest degree. Partly on account of the nobility of the blood shed—it was the "precious blood" in the absolute sense of the word; partly because of the diabolical spirit which had been the motive of the murder. The Jews falsified the calculation, "they will reverence my son," so they must themselves proclaim the anticipation of their future in answering the question, "What will the lord of the vineyard do unto those husbandmen?" (Matt. xxi. 40). The voice of Abel's blood cried to God from the earth; but much louder did the blood of Jesus call; for by *this* murder the measure of all the blood-guiltiness hitherto contracted was filled up, and on the heads of *these* murderers must all the righteous blood come, which from Abel downwards had been shed on the earth. But now what demonstration of God's righteousness could correspond

to the circumstances of the case? Would it be enough if He brought the murderers to account: "Where is thy brother Abel?" or if He entered into judgment with them, and let such a retribution follow that an Annas or a Caiaphas would tremble under it, crying: "Mountains, fall on us; hills, cover us"? Neither is that excluded; but it would appear sufficient only in *one* case, that is, if Israel by its doings had crossed the ways of God, if Israel had hindered the realization of His thoughts. God, who Himself had willed and determined the sacrifice of His Son, could avenge His blood on His murderers only in *such* a way as, on the one hand, would bring *their* deed to nought, turn *their* calculation to shame, nay, give themselves over to the annihilating feeling of their defeat; while, on the other hand, He conducted *His own* purpose to its full realization. How was all this to be reached? Only by the resurrection of the Crucified One! The Jews took the life of the Messiah; their counsel was, "Let us kill Him, and so the inheritance will be ours;" they imagine that the triumph is theirs of having broken His bands and cast away His cords; accordingly *this* is their righteous judgment, *κρίμα ἔνδικον*, that this destroyed life should be restored, that the rejected One by a resurrection from the dead should be raised to be Lord and Christ over all, and so over themselves. Strauss calls the resurrection of our Lord an "unheard-of" miracle, one which can be received only on irresistible historical grounds. But it really needs only an impartial regard to history, and simple faith in a living God who sent His Son into the world, to exclaim with the apostle in a tone of wonder: How should it be thought a thing incredible with you? Only one thing would be historically incomprehensible, if, namely, this answer of God to the deed of men had not been given! How deeply, besides, Israel felt it as the Nemesis breaking in upon it, we have a telling proof in an utterance of the Sanhedrim. When the authorities sought in vain by threatenings and punishment to prevent the apostles preaching the Risen One,—in vain, because the fact of the Lord's resurrection could not be undone,—then the betraying cry broke forth from them: "Ye intend to bring this man's blood upon us" (Acts v. 28).

Thus, then, this answer of God to the world could not fail of accomplishment. But we dare not understand it as a mere reaction of His righteousness against the sin committed,—as a

purely penal retribution; for this reason in the very outset, that the deed perpetrated was at the same time the decree of God Himself. Thus there is an absolute need of a more exact determination. This completion, however, is not reached by taking further into account the relation to Him who bears the stripes of sinners, and who entered willingly into His Father's counsel. No doubt He, if any one, could take up the appeal of the Psalm: "Judge me, O God, and plead my cause against this ungodly nation;" no doubt much more confidently than His apostle waited afterwards on the "righteous judge" (2 Tim. iv. 8), could He be assured of the "righteous Father" who would appear on His behalf. And so, indeed, it is expressly taught that God bestowed on Him, as the reward of His obedient suffering, the highest and most comprehensive dominion. Only little as we can agree with church divines in disputing the one possible meaning of the διό, Phil. ii. 9, on the other hand we are bound to acknowledge without reserve the sound perception with which they repudiate the *sibi promeruit* on the part of Christ. Neither is the answer of God to the world in the sense of vengeance, nor the reward of the Son in the sense of compensation, the result achieved. If we have in the one case as well as in the other a "declaration of God's righteousness," in both cases there meets us the close connection which the apostle has established for the epoch of Christ (ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ) between "the just God" and "the justifying God." Commentators have rightly applied the κρεῖττον λαλεῖν (speaking better things), which Scripture predicates of the blood of Jesus, to the circumstance that it implores from God grace and forgiveness for sinners. This, indeed, is not contained in the word as such; for κρεῖττον means "more strongly" or "powerfully," and nothing else; it denotes the greater intensity of the effect. But because the voice proceeds from the blood of the *Saviour*, not only must its tone be a stronger, but its sound also must be a different one.[1] Accordingly, if the resurrection of Jesus is the divine answer to the deed of man, it must have corresponded, while maintaining conclusively its reaction against the

[1] In exactly the same way Paul, in tracing the parallel between the ὑπακοή of Christ and the παρακοή of Adam, describes the effect of the former as not only stronger quantitatively (πολλῷ μᾶλλον), but just because it proceeds from Christ it is also different qualitatively; it issues not in κατάκριμα, but in δικαίωσις ζωῆς.

latter, to the nature and destination of the blood shed, and it must have issued in the full realization of this determination. By it the intention of the world must have been defeated; by it God's own purpose must have been accomplished. It, too, must have co-operated to that salvation, to procure which the Father had given His Son to the world,—a salvation so comprehensively and unconditionally fitted for all, that even His murderers might share it; wherefore we find that Peter, on the ground of the raising of Jesus now accomplished, directs the invitation to them also to accept the blessing which has been opened up (Acts iii. 26).

### 2. THE AIM OF THE RAISING OF JESUS IN THE PLAN OF SALVATION.

Our discussion thus far has indicated the region in which the end of the raising of Jesus in the work of salvation is to be found. The divine answer to the deed of the world was a negative given to the murderers, and an acknowledgment of the Son. "The Redeemer Himself needs," so says Nitzsch (*System der christl. Lehre*, § 138), "a certain justification,—that, namely, which falls to Him in His resurrection from the dead; but in fact it is our own justification." Others before him taught the same doctrine; especially did Olearius, in the treatise which we have so often quoted, elaborately discuss the thesis, "quod Christus, ipse justificatus, nos quoque justificet." Even in Gerhard there is a similar declaration, not to speak of the Reformed theologians. It has always been readily acknowledged that there is a more or less close connection in general between the raising of Jesus and man's justification before God; and how could this have been gainsaid when the apostle has written: "To whom it shall be imputed if we believe on Him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead . . . who was raised again for our justification!" The doctrine could not be more decidedly expressed, that the divine act in the raising of our Lord had our justification for its object. But everything depends on our gaining the right view of this connection; especially must we avoid the danger of establishing too loose a bond between them. It would be difficult to defend Lutheran divines from the charge that they have fallen into this danger in one way or another. For as to what they teach on the one hand, that the Easter event appears as the indispensable con-

dition of the applicatio salutus acquisitae,[1] it gives a connection between the raising of Jesus as such and our justification only mediately through the wider and far from evident[2] assumption that the former was the prerequisite of our Lord's "munus sacerdotale." And though, on the other hand, they fall back on the explanation that the open grave was a "manifestatio, declaratio, confirmatio," an "evidens testimonium" of the completion of the redemption,[3] "ut fides nostra quam certissima reddatur," yet they do not thereby prove any link of connection between the divine deed and our justification in itself, but only with faith which they describe as the "organum applicandi meriti per Christum parti." But this connection, thus circuitously obtained, is not that close and immediate one which Scripture apparently establishes. The Reformed theology evidently strove in earnest to give

[1] Comp. Melanchthon in his *Com. on the Ep. to the Romans:* "est autem non solum mors Christi apprehendenda, sed etiam quod resuscitatus sit noster pontifex apud patrem." Chemnitz, *exam. conc. Trid. loc.* viii. art. vii.: "Christus salvator noster est non tantum merito, verum etiam efficacia, ut qui tanquam advocatus noster intercedit et apparet vultui Dei pro nobis, ut per vitam ejus servemur ab ira; propter hanc etiam causam Paulus morti Christi jungit resurrectionem ejus." Especially Egid. Hunnius, in his work, *Articulus de justificatione hominis peccatoris gratuita,* Frankfort 1590. He puts the question: "pertinetne resurrectio Christi ad nostrae justificationis negotium?" and after affirming it with a *quidni,* supporting his answer by corresponding passages of Scripture, and formulating the thesis, "ad liberationem a peccatis atque sic ad justificationem requisita fuit Christi a morte resurrectio," he writes, by way of explanation, p. 57 ff.: "necesse enim erat, ut esset sacerdos in perpetuum secundum ordinem Melchisedek, atque sic integrae nostrae salutis auctor existeret, nimirum administrator bonorum acquisitorum."

[2] For we can find no evidence in the assertion of Hunnius, *ibid.:* "Christi exaltatio ad pontificatum resurrectionem ejus necessario praesupponit, praesertim quia non tantum quâ Deus sed etiam quâ homo sedere debuit aeternus pontifex." It is not easy to see why it needed the resurrection that He might sit "quâ homo" at the right hand of God. For it was most strenuously maintained by the Lutheran theologians that Christ in His state of death by no means ceased to be, "verus, essentialiter perfectus et eminenti modo dictus homo." Comp. Quenstedt's discussion: "an Christus in triduo mortis verus homo permanserit," *ibid.* p. 414.

[3] Comp. Gerhard in the διάσκεψις quoted above: "si Christus in morte mansisset, de meriti sufficientia *adhuc dubitari potuisset.*" Similarly Egid. Hunnius, *ubi supra:* "quando Christus ex mortuis excitatur, resurrectione hac sua *toti orbi testatum facit* evacuatam esse omnem vim peccati." No doubt they occasionally make an attempt to present also the objective side of the matter; only they sink back immediately into the region of the subjective, on which they everywhere lay the main stress. Calovius especially would never have been brought to consider the resurrection of Jesus otherwise than as that "*documentum* infallibile plenissimae satisfactionis per mortem Christi praestitae," which makes our faith in the merit of our Lord ἀμεταπτώτως certain.

fuller justice to the postulate of Scripture. Only in the liveliness of its interest it allowed itself to be carried beyond the right goal. For by finding the act of justification, in so far as it falls in time, as really executed in the resurrection of Jesus ("Christ's resurrection *is* the divine acquittal of believers," Heidegger, Lampe, etc.), it establishes a complete identity instead of a connection.

In refusing to go beyond the acknowledgment of so loose and general a relation between the resurrection of Jesus and our justification, the Lutheran theologians were influenced by the fear that if they admitted a closer and firmer bond between them they would imperil the full sufficiency of Christ's meritorious obedience. "Hoc certum esto, solam obedientiam Christi activam et passivam esse meritoriam causam nostrae justificationis."[1] And so Gerhard expresses himself, without the least qualification, to the effect that the resurrection of our Lord can have nothing to do with our justification, "specialiter quia in obedientia Christi *plene* erat satisfactum, *nec ulla ad pretii illius complementum necessaria erat accessio.*"[2] It was difficult to get rid of the feeling that after all Scripture spoke differently on the subject, but they met this feeling partly by more or less able distinctions (as when Gerhard, in his disputation with Pererius, teaches that we must distinguish whether the merit of Christ is spoken of "generaliter" or "specialiter," or when Quenstedt holds that the "meritum Christi" is to be understood sometimes εἰδικῶς, sometimes γενικῶς), partly they sought to overcome it by strong assertions.[3] Only they now came upon expressions, in regard to which the deepest

[1] They would have got beyond their standpoint, only had they been willing to appropriate the view of Victorinus Strigel (*loc. theol.*, ed. Pezel, II. p. 334), which regarded the resurrection of Jesus as pertaining to His obedience. But no later author has ever taken notice of this peculiar view. How far it contains an indubitable truth will appear in a later connection.

[2] Similarly Quenstedt (*ut supra*, p. 379): "Christus resurrectione sua nobis justitiam non promeruit, utpote cujus meritum morte consummatum fuisse exclamatio ejus in cruce τετέλεσται confirmavit." And further: "fructus resurrectionis non sunt meritorii, sed confirmatorii, collatorii, applicatorii."

[3] Calovius especially cannot be freed from this charge. He maintains the false position that Scripture never teaches that our Lord rose *for* us, but only that He rose *on our account* ("Christum non pro nobis, sed tantum propter nos resurrexisse"). As if Paul had not (2 Cor. v. 15) expressly written: τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγερθέντι, and as if it were at all possible in the enumeration (Rom. viii. 34) to leave out the ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, which is added in the fourth clause, in any of the former, and so in the preceding ἐγερθείς!

thinkers of their number at least were incapable of satisfying themselves with such a subterfuge. This holds in the highest degree of the classical passage on the question before us, where the apostle (Rom. iv. 25) has written of the Saviour: "Who was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our justification." In the case of any impartial reader, the words could not fail to produce the immediate impression that, according to this view, our Lord's resurrection appears as the condition of man's justification in exactly the same way as His sacrificial death; that justification is rendered *objectively* possible, not by one of them, but really by both. No doubt there was a time in the historical development of theology which was unfavourable to the exposition of the true contents of the passage. Catholic theologians, and among them especially Andradius, had laid hold of it to prove that the forgiveness of sins and justification are two entirely different things, since the former is traced to the death of Christ, while the latter is ascribed to His resurrection. And so it was easy to understand the Lutheran position when their polemic explained the passage solely from this viewpoint. But when the proposition was clearly proved and recognised, "gratuitam peccatorum remissionem et justitiae per Christum partae imputationem vel realiter a se invicem non differre, vel certe a se invicem separari non posse" (Gerhard, *l. de justif.* § 199), then free space was gained, apart from the confessional dispute, to examine the full contents of the Pauline declaration. And then it was granted, not by expositors only (witness the excellent Balduinus), that the apostle regards our Lord's resurrection as a "complementum justitiae a Christo nobis acquisitae," but Gerhard himself, with an inconsequence worthy of praise, and in contradiction to his declarations elsewhere, did not hesitate to allow that, according to this authority, the resurrection of Christ appears as "causa, pignus et complementum nostrae justificationis." We meet with expressions like the following: "Christus sua morte *et resurrectione* pro peccatis satisfecit, patri coelesti nos reconciliavit et nobis hoc promeruit, ut fide in ipsum coram Dei judicio justi reputaremur." He vindicates his dogmatical consistency by remarking: "excitando Christum a mortuis Deus eum ipso facto absolvit a peccatis nostris ipsi imputatis, ac proinde etiam nos in eo absolvit." On the value of this explanation we do not enter, but turn to consider the passage itself,—a passage which, as the close of a com-

plete development, has all the appearance of affording an essential view, *εἰς τὴν οἰκονομίαν Θεοῦ τὴν ἐν πίστει.*

The exposition which Calvin has given of the passage has rightly found warm recognition from many. The precision, conscientiousness, and impartiality which so highly distinguish this exegete come out here most brilliantly; only few, however, have given it their real assent. For Calvin explains, "sacrificio, quo expiata sunt peccata, inchoatam fuisse salutem nostram, resurrectione vero demum fuisse perfectam;" and again (in commenting on 1 Cor. xv. 4) defines more closely, "quemadmodum morte Christi abolitum fuit peccatum, ita resurrectione parta justitia; haec *partitio* diligenter notanda est, ut sciamus, quid ex morte, quid ex resurrectione illius petendum sit nobis" (nearly to the same effect in the *Institt.* II. 16: "Sic salutis nostrae materiam inter Christi mortem et resurrectionem *partimur*"). And the Lutheran system of thought could not on general grounds sympathize with a division which so violently severed from one another the remissio peccatorum and the justificatio—which were related merely as the *στερητικόν* or *privativum* to the *θετικόν* or *positivum*, and therefore formed an inseparable unity. But even from the purely exegetical standpoint such a partition appears absolutely impossible.[1] Even Chemnitz pointedly remarks that the apostle did *not* write (as he *must* have done in the supposed case) "mortuus est propter *remissionem* peccatorum;" but his words were these: "mortuus est propter *peccata* nostra." And, in fact, this circumstance must ever prove fatal[2] to every attempt, however able, to establish a difference of *effect* in meeting human wants for the two saving facts, so that one was gained by the death of Christ, the other by His resurrection. But we are far from mistaking on that account the fine perception which has

[1] There are passages in the letters of Paul, and they belong to the very region in question, which are specially fitted to warn us against such handling. The apostle writes, Rom. xiv. 9: *εἰς τοῦτο Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἔζησεν, ἵνα καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων κυριεύσῃ.* But no one has proposed to explain this by saying that Christ won by His death the right of lordship over the dead; by His reviving, that over the living. This never occurred even to Calvin. And yet the words would warrant a partition here, as much as at iv. 25.

[2] This holds also of the theory which Reich (*ubi supra*, p. 290) has developed. He maintains that the forgiveness of sin rests on the death of Christ; our adoption by God, on the other hand, on His resurrection. What Gerhard would have said to this confounding of the nature of justification with its consequences, may be seen from his discussion (*l. de justific.* § 149).

guided Calvin in his explanation of the passage. He has most justly recognised that in some sense or other the two declarations of the apostle stand contrasted with one another, though he mistakes the region in which this contrast appears. On this point we cannot be misled by the unimportant objection of Eg. Hunnius, that Paul uses not an adversative particle, but the copulative; for as to the conclusion drawn by this theologian from the καί, "mortem ergo et resurrectionem Christi in unius beneficii societate conjunctas esse, non disgregatas," we readily acknowledge its truth. Our task, however, is rightly to apprehend the mutual relation of the apostle's twofold sentence.

The more prominent of our modern commentators (apart from solitary instances like Olshausen, who has totally misunderstood the passage) have generally decided for the explanation that Christ was given over to death for our sins, that is, that they might be expiated; on the other hand, His resurrection served the purpose of working faith in men, on the ground of which their justification becomes possible. So Knapp, Fritzsche, Meyer; and so even Hofmann, not only in the *Schriftbeweis* (II. p. 530), but also in his later exegetical work (V. p. 161). There are several grounds which prevent us from acquiescing in this explanation. The thought that the Easter miracle is intended to produce faith, or the assurance of faith, may be imported indeed into ver. 25; but not only is it foreign to the letter of it, but it seems expressly excluded by the preceding ver. 24. How? The resurrection of Jesus having just been designated as the *object* of faith, would it be immediately thereafter mentioned as its efficient *factor?* That is really difficult to believe! With this objective condition, on which man can obtain justification, ver. 25 has absolutely nothing whatever to do; it can only describe the objective presuppositions by which the act of justification (δικαίωσις[1]) has been made possible for God. God must give Jesus over to death, but not less must He raise the dead One again; both must precede if He is to bestow δικαιοσύνη on believers. As the one was necessary to

[1] In the explanation referred to, regard has not been had to the circumstance that the apostle speaks of δικαίωσις, not of δικαιοσύνη, and accordingly has in view not the effect on man, but the act which pertains to God. For nothing else can be meant by δικαίωσις than the divine act which restores δικαιοσύνη. Its opposite, ch. v. 18, is κατάκριμα, the act of God which dooms to death.

this end, so was the other also indispensable. It should not be overlooked that the statement of the apostle brings to a close the whole course of thought from ch. iii. 21. In ch. iii. Christ was set forth as the "propitiation in His blood;" in ch. iv., following the analogy to Abraham's history, His resurrection had been exhibited; in our final word, so weighty and comprehensive, Paul combines both and each with equally strong emphasis, as the twofold condition whereby God has made it possible for Himself to pronounce the justification of men.

Thus there was needed, according to the teaching of the apostle, not merely the offering of Jesus, but also His resurrection, to secure the divine act of our δικαίωσις. To the question, how far the latter was a prerequisite to this end, he has not, it would seem, given an answer.[1] But the way at least to its settlement is indicated by the declaration when more exactly examined. It has been already remarked that its two members are in some sense or other contrasted with one another. No one who surrenders himself to the immediate impression of the words will call this in question. Since we cannot establish a μερισμός in respect of the effect, we find ourselves led to fix our attention more closely on the double διά. Reich speaks inconsiderately when he remarks (*ubi supra*, p. 96) that the twofold διά is to be taken as denoting the same relation. But the like objection applies to those commentators who without more ado explain the first member to the effect that Christ was offered up in order to atone for our sins. Had this been the apostle's meaning, he would certainly have used the corresponding expression; but he has avoided it, and undoubtedly of set purpose. Most certainly the παρεδόθη contemplates no other end than that the offered One should be the propitiation for our sins (1 John iv. 10); but this is the very question, whether Paul in the first half of the sentence has a final relation in view. To point to the "offences" (παραπτώματα) will certainly not harmonize with this supposition, but will always remain awkward. The case is rather this: the first διά denotes the ground; the second, on the other hand, indicates the end. Our offences were the *ground* on account of

[1] Ritschl takes refuge in the view (*ubi supra*, II. p. 159) that the apostle is merely using a "rhetorical exaggeration of expression." It seems to us a somewhat precarious course in such cases, to which hard and fast dogmatical assumptions will not apply, to bring in rhetoric to the rescue.

which Jesus was offered; our justification was the *end* for which God raised Him from the dead. Was God minded to offer to the entire human race the grace shown to Abraham, and so to fulfil His promise made to the patriarch, there came in the way of the fulfilment of this purpose a mighty hindrance. For his children according to the flesh had not remained like the first father of the justified. The "law entering" had occasioned many offences,[1] and therewith brought about a state which in iii. 10–18 is described as notorious. This state was altogether fitted to awaken the divine wrath (comp. iv. 15), and to restrain that grace which bestows the gift of justification (iii. 24). And because the undoing of this condition rested on the giving up of Jesus, the apostle could write that our offences were the ground on account of which Jesus was delivered up.[2] Undoubtedly the object contemplated in this "delivering" was nothing else than the justification of sinful men; only for the real completion of this act for the full attainment of the divine *end* Paul teaches there was an absolute need of yet another thing. To understand his thought we follow the way expressly pointed out to us, if here also we keep in view the analogy which dominates the whole of ch. iv. What is the God who justified Abraham called? "He that quickeneth the dead, and calleth things which be not as though they were:" so He is described in ver. 17. Abraham believed on Him *as such*, and *this* faith was reckoned (ver. 22) to the father of the future church for righteousness; but, on the other hand, it was only *He as such*, only the God who quickens the dead, and calls what is not as though it were, who could bestow righteousness on the believer. And so likewise the God who justifies *us* is called "He that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead" (ver. 24). On Him *as such* we believe, and this faith is counted to us for righteousness (to whom it shall be imputed if we believe, etc., ver. 24);[3] but, again, it is only *He as*

[1] Commentators must be blamed for disregarding the choice of this expression, and so interpreting our passage as if the apostle had written διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν.

[2] We assume, indeed, that the idea of the divine ὀργή is *not* to be understood, as Ritschl holds (comp. *ibid.* II. p. 138 et seq.), in a purely eschatological sense as an attribute of the final judgment. The utterances of Paul can be thus summed up only on the supposition made by Ritschl, that the apostle sometimes adopts the Pharisaical view of the world, and in dealing with his readers of Jewish education argues *ex concessis*. But we are not at all disposed to admit such a view.

[3] It is only from this point of view that this description of the object of faith,

*such*, only the God who raised Jesus from the dead, who can bestow on us the gift of righteousness. And hence it is that we hear the declaration: Jesus was raised for our justification.

"He calleth things which be not as though they were," so writes the apostle of the God before whom Abraham stood when he believed. But the words tell with like exactness in all cases wherein the act of a man's divine justification is carried out. For in every such case the non-righteous (ὁ ἀσεβής, iv. 5) is described as righteous. How can this be? Church divines have been far from cutting this knot by appealing to God's absolute power and freedom. They have readily acknowledged the consequences which flow from passages like Prov. xvii. 15 ("he that justifieth the wicked is an abomination to the Lord") in relation to the conduct of the supreme Judge Himself. On the contrary, they point to the fact that a "fundamentum firmum, solidum, omnibusque numeris absolutum" is certainly not wanting to the divine δικαίωσις. In his classical treatise, *de vocabulo imputationis*—and on it are based all the expositions of the later divines—Chemnitz thus speaks (comp. *loc. thcol.*, Frankfurt 1594, II. p. 326 et seq.): "relatio mentis et voluntatis divinae ex gratuita misericordia propter Christum credentibus peccata non imputat, sed imputat illis Christi justitiam; id est, habentur coram Deo in judicio ejus, acsi perfectam haberent justitiam inhaerentem." Only he has not hereby removed the question, so hard to suppress, how God can impute to the sinner, even when the latter approaches Him in faith, the righteousness of Christ. So much the less has he done so, the more expressly he puts emphasis on the fact that faith is not a *virtus insita*, but only the *medium et organum*, "quo relatio Dei fundamentum applicat ad terminum." In so far as the theology of the church in relation to this question stops short at God's *gratia gratiosa*, His *misericordia* or *favour*, it has manifestly left an essential blank which urgently needs to be filled up. Scripture supplies the want; it supplies it in the apostolic word: Jesus was *raised* for our justification. God could call the unrighteous man righteous only if a pledge were provided that the actual condition would more and more correspond to this name. And the pledge *was* provided. It was not found in the believing man, as

which otherwise might seem strange, becomes quite transparent. Chemnitz has rightly laid a stronger emphasis on this than modern commentators are wont to do.

if his faith made sure of a following holiness; but it was given in Christ. Not, however, in the Christ whom God delivered over to death, but in Him whom He raised from the dead. It was a thing to be reckoned on, that the Risen One would advance those who believe to such a stage as is described in the words, "We shall be like Him" (1 John iii. 2). That is expected by Paul *from* Him of whom he says, that from the resurrection from the dead He came to the power assigned Him by the Father. That he expects *for* those who belong to Him who has been raised from the dead (Rom. vii. 4); they will bring forth fruit unto God, they will serve in newness of spirit, walk in newness of life,—dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ (vi. 4, 10). Immovable as the truth remains, that God can justify men only for the merit of Jesus Christ, the proposition remains as firm, that the imputation of this *justitia per Christum acquisita* to the unrighteous was made possible for Him by the fact that He possessed in the Risen One the pledge for believers *actually becoming righteous.* It is therefore with literal correctness that Peter proclaims that God made Jesus the Christ by resurrection from the dead—Christ in the full sense of the word. "This Jesus has God raised up," so he says in Acts ii. 32; and taking up the thought again, ver. 36: "That same Jesus God hath made Christ." Now, at length, the act of justifying the unrighteous had been made practicable; and hence the proposition: Jesus was raised for our justification.

We have explained in the proper place that we have not entered upon our subject free from all presuppositions, but on the assumption that Jesus is the Christ. He who has no doubt of this will himself draw an obvious inference. Did God assign to His Son the place, and to men the gift of a Christ, then after sending Him into the world and giving Him over into the hands of sinners, He *must* raise Him again from the dead. For this was the condition if the merit of His life and death were to accrue to the needy as an "abounding of grace" and a "justification of life." And from this point of view the reader will find, in the accounts given by the evangelists of our Lord's resurrection, only such facts related as were to be expected. At least their reality could only be made matter of doubt on the supposition of their containing in themselves weighty historical difficulties. This, in fact, is the judgment which negative

criticism has passed on them. The question is, with what right?

### 3. THE HISTORY OF THE RAISING OF OUR LORD.

It is of the raising of our Lord from the dead that we come to speak. The designation is certainly far from being exact. The deed of God, whose contents and saving aim we have been considering, cannot, taken in and by itself, be a subject of historical representation. Only the evangelists have communicated to us the various events which preceded the appearance made by the Risen One Himself. Those, undoubtedly, should introduce and make way for the latter. Yet they followed so immediately in the train of the divine deed that they belong to it essentially, and make it possible to infer backwards to it.

Though negative criticism has directed its main attacks against the accounts given us of the manifestations of the living One, yet it has never hesitated to arraign also this history of the Easter morning. Only in more modern times it has been at pains, by a careful sifting of the material, to escape from an obvious reproach. Much of that which the fragmentist emphatically alleges, Strauss leaves either expressly or silently aside. No man in the future will handle the subject in the way of a Celsus. Even Lessing gave the denial to his great Anonymous when he found serious contradictions in the circumstances, that the women, according to Luke, bought the spices *before* the beginning of the Sabbath, while, according to Mark, they bought them *after* its close; or that, according to the first and second evangelists, they saw only one angel; according to the third, two, and that in different places. True, we do not believe that Lessing's own attempts to solve these difficulties did anything to prevent criticism from reviving such questions. If only some other than he had expressed the supposition that the ἡτοίμασαν ἀρώματα (Luke xxiv. 1) does not necessarily imply any actual labour, but may be equally well understood of mere intentions and inquiries, "destinabant aromata, providebant aromatibus,"—ridicule of the "master key" of Harmonistic would certainly not have been wanting. Or had some other advanced the perfectly appropriate remark (borrowed, besides, from Gerhard's *Harmony*),

that one may not count the angels in presence of Him at whose service they stood ready in legions,—"the entire grave, the whole wide region around, was invisibly full of angels; now the one appeared, again the other; now in this place, again in that; now alone, again in company,"—we can form a lively imagination of what Strauss would have judged of the justification appended to this view, "that it may be always thought more a poetical than a true one; only in such cases it is the worthiest that is the truest" (comp. the close of the fourth piece in the *Duplik*). So much the stronger impression, on the other hand, has undoubtedly been made upon him by the judgment of his great predecessor, that the evangelists should not be put on the rack about petty details, such as the stream of language throws off quite involuntarily from the pen of the historian; for, in the whole course of history, there is not a single example to be found of an event being related by several who wrote independently of one another, and who used no common source, without the most obvious contradictions in matters of detail.[1] But, indeed, it is merely on the ground of the disharmony of these secondary matters that the latest criticism is ready to pass simply to the order of the day. Further concessions it will not admit. Strauss has complained with lively indignation that Schleiermacher's criticism is ever right in laying down the premises, and puts the dilemma almost always with precision, but that its conclusions are seldom pronounced according to the real materials, but usually according to a preconceived judgment. This theologian, Strauss holds, is wrong in putting the contradictions which occur in that part of the Gospel accounts before us, on the same footing with those which meet us in the earlier parts. The

[1] The visible complacency with which Lessing indulges in this view does not rest on any zeal to justify the evangelists; it is explained by the circumstance that here he found the weapon with which he could deal the keenest strokes at the bitterly hated theory of inspiration, and at the "squint-eyed Thersitic" Harmonistic. But, in fact, he is right, and he might have adduced a striking example from New Testament history. Paul's conversion is related several times in one and the same book, but not without obvious differences in the details. According to the one account, all his companions heard the heavenly voice; in the other this is expressly denied. In the one we are told the travellers all fell to the ground; according to the other, Paul only sank to the earth, while his attendants remained standing. Comp. Acts ix. 7, xxii. 9, xxvi. 14. Does it occur to any one, on account of these contradictions, to question the credibility of the history? Not on *their account* certainly. At least *where* it happens it is a mere pretext.

true state of the case, he contends, is rather this, that the credibility of the resurrection history is irretrievably ruined because of the quality of its contradictions. Here, says he, circumstances come to light which undoubtedly fall with all this weight into the scales.

The difficulty of forming from the Gospel records a clear image of the course of events is acknowledged. While the three first evangelists tell of several women who went out in the early Easter morning either to visit merely, or with the view of anointing Jesus, the fourth knows only of the visit of the one Magdalene to the grave. According to the synoptical account, the group of women not only see the stone rolled away, but they enjoy immediately the appearance of the angel, and receive from his mouth at the same time with the gladsome message the command to make it known to the apostles. According to John, Mary sees nothing except the open grave, and immediately hastes at her own impulse to the city, to confide what she had observed to the two most distinguished of the Twelve. In Matthew and Mark, the heavenly messenger directs the women to appoint the disciples a meeting-place in Galilee, for there they would see the Risen One; but of such a direction, Luke and John know nothing. According to Matthew, they rose hastily and with joy to carry out the commission they had received; on the contrary, Mark relates that from fear they said nothing of it to any man. The beginning of Matthew's account expressly reserves the appearing of Jesus for a later time and at a more remote place; while, according to the course of this account, the Risen One met the women as they were hasting away that same hour.[1] In point of fact, these are conflicting and diverse elements, which can with difficulty be harmonized so as to give a satisfactory view. Nevertheless, the older Harmonistic set itself to the task. Indeed, men were not then in a position to decline giving a solution. A dogmatical presupposition occasioned the inevitable necessity; but it lent also the determined courage. Only that the laboriously

[1] On this last point Strauss has needlessly heightened and exaggerated the difficulty. Understanding as he does the words of the angel, Matt. xxviii. 7, as a direction addressed to the *women* to repair forthwith to Galilee and there behold the appearance of the Risen One, the revelation immediately afforded to them could not fail in his view to be doubly surprising. But the passage quoted contains only the commission which they were to carry out; here, as in the parallel passage, Mark xvi. 7, which strongly proves our point, the ὑμεῖς are merely the disciples.

raised edifice totters the instant that the supporting dogma is shaken, was proved beyond all dispute by Lessing. It has been attempted in more recent times to support the positions of Harmonistic in another way. Pains have been taken by a pragmatical delineation of scenes and situations, and by psychological anatomizing of the frames belonging to the various persons who appear in the narratives, to conjure up a harmony which the plain historical understanding does not acknowledge (so, above all, Hengstenberg, comp. *Comment. on John*, III. p. 226 et seq.). The charge which criticism has raised against this procedure, "that it twists the plain evangelic narrative into the unnaturalness of the most fashionable sensationalism," sounds harsh, but one can hardly call it undeserved; one cannot at least help subscribing out and out to the adverse criticisms which Strauss brings together in the second part of his polemic, *die Halben und die Ganzen*, p. 101 et seq. It is far from being a necessary consequence that we must also grant the inferences to which he has advanced. Even from the purely historical standpoint their soundness is only apparent.

First, criticism is met by the grave charge that it is in the habit of advancing the contradictions in the evangelic narratives with all pointedness, while it maintains a resolute silence about that in which the representations agree. It sets the discords in the harshest light possible, so as to blind the eye of the reader to the existing harmony, and so deceive it on this head. And yet the amount of this latter material is very considerable. All the evangelists tell of a going to the grave on the part of female disciples of Jesus in the early morning; they all report that the women found the stone rolled away and the grave empty; and none of them knows anything other than that they had an appearance of angels; and that, further, through their instrumentality the first obscure hints of the Easter miracle reached the ears of the apostles. Or are these trivial matters of detail? It will be shown that in them is to be found the pith of the whole!

Criticism is further open to the charge that it exaggerates every mere enantiophany into an insoluble contradiction; that it despises every attempt at harmony, even in cases where it could be attained with ease, by adopting the perfectly honest assumption that the one or other of the evangelists was the more exact. We cannot call it a contradiction when the fourth evangelist tells

only of one female disciple having gone to the grave of Jesus on Easter morning, not, like the others, of several. Mary of Magdala, to all appearance, took a similar place among the female attendants of our Lord, to that of Peter and John in the circle of the apostles. Matthew, as well as Mark and Luke, name her in the first place (Matt. xxviii. 1; Mark xvi. 1; Luke xxiv. 10); nay, even in an earlier passage of the third Gospel, she stands at the head of those who minister to the Lord on His journeys (Luke viii. 3). Strauss has said that the singling out of this woman in the evangelic Easter accounts suggests much for thought. The fruits of his own meditations he does not withhold from his readers (*Leben Jesu*, p. 309). Others may well reach a simpler result. If Mary, from the time of her deliverance from a severe suffering, followed the Lord with the whole-heartedness of faith and devotion, we can as easily understand the higher degree of her sorrow as her taking the lead on the way to the grave, and her vehement excitement caused by what she discovered in its neighbourhood. Again, it thus becomes perfectly intelligible, not only why the evangelist limits his account to her person and leaves her companions aside, but why also the Saviour, showing Himself, turned especially to her.[1] Neither can we admit a contradiction in the fact that the women, according to Mark's account, delay carrying out the commission which the angel gives them, and which, according to Matthew, they executed with joyous haste. The proof that the second Gospel terminates with ver. 8 of ch. xvi., and that all that follows is a spurious addition, we must reserve for a later connection. But if it is true that we have in Mark merely the fragment of an Easter narrative, not only is the history generally imperfect, but ver. 8 itself particularly needs completing; and this it would undoubtedly have found had the recital been continued. And so it is inadmissible on the ground of a statement left unfinished to make out a manifest contradiction.

[1] We decline the more readily to solve the enantiophany by urging the plural form, John xx. 2, as Mary in ver. 13 speaks in the singular. Elsewhere, too, in the fourth Gospel we find οἴδαμεν, without our requiring to suppose a plurality of distinct persons; and again, an οἶδα, without its denoting merely individual knowledge. "οἴδαμεν," so says Nicodemus, iii. 2, and yet we can hardly think that he has men in view who shared the opinion with him; again, "οἶδα" is the word of the Samaritan woman, iv. 25, and evidently she does not mean by it any purely personal conviction.

Neither, finally, can we find an absolutely irreconcilable contradiction in the divergency which is said to exist between Matthew's account of our Lord's first manifestation and the Johannine narrative. Undoubtedly, if Mary of Magdala—as the first evangelist relates—in common with the other Mary not only heard the angel's words, but also saw the Risen One Himself, and received the χαίρετε from His lips, she cannot have stood soon thereafter at the open grave mourning bitterly that her Lord was taken away. No pragmatic psychological discussion could possibly undo this knot, and all attempts of Harmonistic have been baffled by the matter-of-fact letter of the accounts. But what if Matthew and John are not thinking of different facts, but if it is one and the same manifestation of Jesus which both have related? Calvin, so early, had this possibility very definitely before him. It was a light task for Gerhard to establish his different view, by means of a detailed comparison between the two texts (*Harmon.* 209). But he has been unfair to the accordance which is so obvious, and that precisely in the most prominent points of the narratives. Matthew writes of the women, "and they came and held Him by the feet, and worshipped Him;" and this very intimation we have to presuppose in the case of the Magdalene, according to John's account. In both narratives the Lord cuts short this act of homage with the command rather to carry out the commission which He is on the point of giving. Finally, in both accounts He uses an expression by which He is not wont otherwise to designate His disciples—He calls them His *brethren*. These are facts which, in our view, tell with considerable, not to say with decisive weight for the identity of the narratives.

But we do not deny that there are difficulties remaining which have the undoubted aspect of being insuperable. More particularly, there are two circumstances to which both the fragmentist and the latest criticism point with triumphant assurance. When in Matthew and Mark, on the one hand, the appearing of Jesus is expressly fixed for a later time, what shall we say to the fact that, according to accounts elsewhere, the Risen One not only shows Himself immediately at the open grave, but on the very same day in the midst of His disciples? And when, on the other hand, in the two first Gospels, Galilee is designated as the place where the Lord will show Himself to His own, how will it square with this, that, according to Luke, He appeared only in

Jerusalem and the region round about, and that, in the same way, John also transfers at least the most prominent manifestations of the living One to the capital?

As to the first-named fact, it would really establish a grave difficulty [1] if there were not one circumstance intervening which essentially alters the state of the case. Lessing overlooked this circumstance, at least he writes as if he were wholly unaware of it. Strauss knew it well; and what a stone of offence it was to him, appears from the incredibly violent attempt which he has made to set it aside. Had the first evangelist really left it unmentioned that the Lord was seen in Jerusalem, and that on the day of His resurrection, by human eyes, *we* at least would certainly not have taken refuge in the precarious evasion that this remains unjustified by the critical conclusions. Were we obliged to acknowledge the truth of the premises, we should rather adopt Meyer's view, that there was a twofold tradition respecting the appearances of the Risen One, a Galilean and a Judean; only we could not do so with so unconcerned and light a heart as that with which this theologian has recommended it; the consequences might be very dangerous. But fortunately we do not need it. We ask: Has not Matthew in express terms told of a manifestation of Jesus on Easter morning? Has he not (xxviii. 9), though quite shortly and by the way, witnessed to the fact that the Risen One met the women in His own person after they had had the vision of angels? It is true he speaks only of this one appearance (and that because it was the *first* [2]), while he passes over the remaining history of the great day with definite intention; but is not the mention of the one sufficient to rebut the assertion, that of the manifestations of the Lord which took place in Jerusalem he knew absolutely nothing? Strauss has devoted

[1] Lessing declares this contradiction to be the most important of all; he confesses that it is the one which he would like best to be able to answer. Comp. Stück 8 in the *Duplik*. As is well known, the Emperor Julian treated the subject; not, however, in the interest of contesting the credibility of the Easter history, but to make out a moral charge against the person of our Lord. In repelling *this* polemic, Euthymius had easy work.

[2] True, we do not hold the close of Mark's Gospel to be genuine; but undoubtedly it goes back to a very high antiquity, for it is quoted so early as by Irenaeus, consequently it expresses the tradition universally received in the oldest church regarding the manifestations of our Lord; and, according to ver. 9, there had never been any other belief than that the first appearance of the living One was made to the Magdalene.

an elaborate discussion to the passage of Matthew in question. He describes (*L. J.* p. 314) its contents as "in the highest degree peculiar; anything so purely superfluous could not only not happen, but could not even have been related originally in this connection; were we to think the passage away, then the description of the evangelist would best be brought into harmony with itself." In point of fact, nothing could be more desirable for criticism, and nothing more serviceable to its aim, than if this passage did not occur in the text of Matthew. Then, happily, a glaring contradiction would be proved in the accounts of the evangelists. But the words stand there. Even the various reading which is found in some MSS. is not of such a kind as to justify a doubt of its genuineness.[1] So far, Strauss is not wrong in holding that the reader, after what precedes, is not expecting the information contained in vv. 9 and 10. So much the more important must they have been to the evangelist himself, and to us they are of incalculable value. They tear asunder the meshes of criticism. They make it obvious that, between Matthew on the one side, and Luke and John on the other, there exists no discordance respecting the manifestations of Jesus on the resurrection day itself.

No doubt, however, the question still remains, Why Matthew confines himself to narrating the first appearance of the Risen One, why he has kept silence about the manifestations which were enjoyed by the disciples in the course of the day? This question has frequently been set aside as incompetent; but at least it is not so difficult that it requires to be cut short in this summary way. The views developed by Hofmann (in the *Schriftbew.* II. p. 520, III. p. 6) certainly claim recognition and approval. It is a perfectly just remark, that "there in Galilee, in the land of His believing followers, it was fitting that the Lord should again gather together His own." *This, too,* may be

[1] And yet it is in such a way that Strauss has sought to get rid of the obnoxious passage: "It is a later interpolation, not into our text of Matthew, but into the description which the first evangelist took as the basis of his resurrection history, but into which he imported a feature absolutely incompatible with it." Comp. *L. J.* p. 314. The author pronounces the censure on a modern apologist, that he makes up for the want of weighty grounds by obstinacy of assertion. In respect of the case before us, he has pronounced this judgment on himself. If the eyes of any one are not opened by this passage to the character of the newest criticism (*neueste Critik*), either he will not see, or he is beyond help.

granted, that the third evangelist, who makes his Gospel terminate in the investiture of the disciples with the office of witnesses, had for this very reason no occasion to mention the Galilean manifestations, because the call to that office had its beginning in Jerusalem, the holy city. Only these considerations are far from being sufficient to explain the strange silence of Matthew respecting the manifestations of the Risen One made to the apostolic circle at Jerusalem. For though this silence does not of itself force us to the conclusion that the author had no knowledge of the fact passed over,[1] yet his whole narrative seems to leave far less room for intercourse between Jesus and His disciples at Jerusalem than that of Luke for the same in Galilee.[2] The angel charges the women with the direction to the Eleven to repair to Galilee—"there shall ye see Him;" the Lord Himself sends the message to His brethren, "that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see Me;" this supposes His intention, His determination to show Himself first to them there, and not on that very day and in Jerusalem,[3]—a determination which, judging from Matt. xxvi. 32, He seems to have formed even before the catastrophe. And yet the case may be quite otherwise. If the sum of the Gospel declaration is to the effect that the Risen One revealed Himself both in Jerusalem and in Galilee, this corresponds to a fully warranted expectation; for in both places the Lord had worked; here as well as there He had won adherents,—and "he that loveth Me," so He had said, "I will

[1] How unjustifiable such a conclusion would be, is convincingly proved by the close of the fourth Gospel. Within the strict limits of his Gospel, which in a sense certainly ends with ch. xx., John does not once give the slightest hint of our Lord's Galilean manifestations. But he knew of them, nay, by way of appendix he has spoken of them; for whatever judgment may be formed of ch. xxi., its contents are certainly to be referred to the authority of the evangelist. But in that case it appears clearly that an evangelist might see himself called upon to pass over, in the substance of his narrative, events which were perfectly well known to him.

[2] In fact, the case is otherwise with Luke than with Matthew. Neither Lessing nor Strauss have succeeded in proving an irreconcilable contradiction between the narrative of the third evangelist and the acceptance of Galilean manifestations. The pitiable jest, that the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles is an improved second edition of the closing chapter of the Gospel, is highly characteristic. A cause which needs such means of defence does not awaken any prejudice in its favour. But as to the matter itself, we must reserve our view to a later stage.

[3] The view given by Lücke, that the Lord undoubtedly had this intention, but that He afterwards changed His purpose, is inadmissible. Nor does it commend itself to us in the modified form in which it has been revived by Hofmann. The

manifest Myself to him." And if He verified this saying according to the third and fourth evangelists, even on Easter day to the very followers to whom it had been immediately given, we find herein a divine fitness (*πρέπον*), not to mention a fulfilling of the word, "A little while and ye shall not see Me, and again *a little while* and ye shall see Me." Nevertheless, it was possible for an author who did not intend to publish a chronicle, but who was guided in all his statements by a very definite aim, to lay stress so exclusively upon the one class of these manifestations that he not only passed over the other, but was led to leave it wholly out of account.[1] And such was actually the case with Matthew. The first Gospel, in delineating the Messianic work of Jesus, moves throughout on Galilean ground. Not till the history of the Passion has to be given is the scene changed to Jerusalem. The author had decided on this limitation of his materials on account of the prophecy, which he has put, ch. iv. 14 et seq., at the head of his narrative, and made the guiding star of his course. And so it was hardly possible to expect anything else, at least it is intelligible, if, in respect also of the manifestations of the Risen One, he remains on that ground, which had formerly experienced the "great light" in its light-giving rays. The evangelist had every reason to choose the prophetic word referred to as his guide in depicting the working of Christ; for it was there in "Galilee of the Gentiles, the land of Zabulon and the land of Nephthalim, by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan," that the

view of this theologian, that the message of the women remained strange and incredible to the disciples, may have a tolerable foundation in passages like Mark xvi. 14. But the wider assertion, that the unbelief of the Eleven hindered their departure for Galilee, and that this delay constrained the Lord to reveal Himself so early, falls to the ground—not to speak of other obvious difficulties—before the historical situation itself. Unbelief would have much rather led them to return as soon as possible to their native Galilee, there to indulge their grief in quiet, and to be less exposed to the possible plots which might be formed by the hierarchy. It was budding faith which detained some (comp. John xx. 8: "*ἐπίστευσεν*"), and an instinctive expectation which detained others in Jerusalem. And corresponding to this was the will of the Lord, who was minded to reveal Himself to them here first, and afterwards in Galilee.

[1] When Strauss argues from the present *προάγει*, Matt. xxviii. 7 (compared with the future *προάξω*, ch. xxvi. 32), that the angel represents Jesus as already on the way to Galilee, this wonderful minuteness misses its aim. It commits the same error as Kinkel, and recently Greve, when from the present *ἀναβαίνω*, John xx. 17, they have concluded that our Lord, immediately after His meeting with the Magdalene, ascended to the Father.

most and the most striking works of the Lord had happened. But how, now, if it was in the same place that precisely *those* manifestations of the living One were made, which to Matthew were of peculiar importance,—not the first nor the most overpowering, but perhaps those in which there was experienced an altogether peculiar communion between the Risen One and His own,—so that Matthew, when he bethought him of our Lord's appearances, found himself immediately transported to Galilean ground? We will not press the "there shall they see Me" (ὄψονται), xxviii. 10; we know that the expression applies also to a quickly passing appearance; but it can quite as well denote a visit for longer intercourse (comp. Heb. xiii. 23), it is perfectly suited to describe scenes such as the one which is disclosed to us in John xxi.

On the ground of these considerations, we deny that real contradictions are to be found in the history of our Lord's resurrection; at least we refuse to admit that any which may occur appear weighty enough to establish a doubt of the credibility of the fact. And, in truth, it is not these alleged contradictions only, but still more the peculiar character of the narration, which—at least with modern criticism—has supplied the desired pretext. It compares the accounts which the evangelists have given of the reviving of Jesus with the preceding descriptions of His Passion. "In the same measure as the latter are clear, harmonious, and coherent, the former are fragmentary and obscure; throughout they lack objectivity, they produce the impression of purely subjective ideas." It is especially the history of the Easter morn itself on which criticism has passed its sentence of severest reprobation. "Solitary visions," so says Strauss, "may at first have really occurred;" but the starting-point he holds which was wanted for these alleged appearances, the going of the women to the grave, with all they observed there, is in its whole range the invention of a later time. That the narrative bears on it a poetical impress, will hardly be granted by the impartial reader. For surely it did not need a poet's fancy to represent the fact that the female friends of our Lord, as soon as it was practicable, proceeded to His grave to do the last duties to the dead. Only the striking peculiarity of the description, as compared with the preceding narrative, cannot certainly be mistaken. The proof which Strauss draws from this, of "how the reports had worked

themselves more and more from the visionary to the palpable, from the subjective to the objective," belongs in our opinion to the most successful parts of his work. It is sure of its impression on unestablished, "unprejudiced" minds. But only on them. Others will first ask the question, whether the strange character of the narrative is not the necessary result of its subject, whether it does not thoroughly correspond with its theme. Criticism would be at a dead loss had it to formulate the conditions under which it would be disposed to credit the resurrection history with objectivity. Suppose the scene at Bethany had been repeated on Easter morning. Suppose the evangelists had related that a circle of witnesses stood round the grave; that there had been an audible voice from heaven, "δεῦρο ἔξω;" and that the dead had come forth like a bridegroom from His chamber,—there could be no doubt how it would be judged by *him*, who esteems the narrative of the raising of Lazarus to be a pure fiction. We have supposed an impossible case. The history of our Lord's raising could not be other than it meets us in the accounts of the evangelists. For what is the theme of these descriptions? It is an act, an immediate act of the living God Himself. Such a divine act does not pass before the view of men. What comes under our senses is partly the circumstances which accompany it, and partly its result. So, on the one side, we have the appearing of the angels, the servants of God who do His will, their speaking and acting; and, on the other, the manifesting of Him who bears witness to Himself as the living One from the dead. One other case is related in the N. T. of an act of God due to His immediate interposition. The return of our Lord to the world of appearances naturally compares with His advent in the flesh. And how obviously in both cases are the Gospel records mutually related! The angel of the Lord appeared on the plain of Bethlehem. And there were shepherds in that country who watched their flocks by night. The glory of the Lord shone round about them, and they feared greatly. But "Fear not: I bring you good tidings of great joy." They are sent to the city of David; they see the child, and spread the word as it was spoken to them. So also does the angel of the Lord appear at the grave of the Risen One. And women had come from Jerusalem to view the place and anoint the dead. "Fear not: ye seek Jesus, who was crucified. He is not here: He is risen." They

are dismissed with a commission; and as they go they see the Lord, and spread the word as it was spoken to them.

We allowed before that the narrative of our Lord's resurrection, taken by itself, is not sufficient to afford a sure basis for faith in the Easter fact. But if one has in Jesus recognised the Christ, if he has grasped the truth that the Father *could not but* raise Him up after the suffering of death, he will rest in the Gospel description exactly as it lies before us, not only without repugnance, but with real satisfaction. And he will do so, not as if he looked down from a proud eminence on the critical difficulties, but because he does not share that absence of preconception (Voraussetzungslosigkeit) which alone gives them their weight, and secures their existence.

# SECOND SECTION.

## THE RISING OF CHRIST FROM THE DEAD.

### 1. THE ACT OF CHRIST.

AS an act of Christ we describe His rising from the dead. If neither the one-sided assertion, "Christum propria virtute resurrexisse," nor the answer understood in its Socinian sense, that *God* called Him back to life, fully corresponds to the contents of Scripture, but if both must alike have their full weight, then the question arises, how far side by side with the *glory* of the Father, which loosed the bands of death, there is yet to be allowed an act of the rising Christ Himself. Distinctions such as those made by the older theology will not solve the difficulty. There has been set up a difference between ζωοποίησις and ἀνάστασις, and under the former has been understood the *restitutio vitae*, under the latter the *vitae recuperatae coram hominibus manifestatio*. Only to limit the act of Jesus to His mere "egressio e sepulchro et egressi ad alios praesentatio" would allow no other spontaneity than that which we must allow on the part of a Lazarus;—not to mention the fact that church dogmatic contends with great emphasis that our Lord's rising (ἀνάστασις) was already completed *clauso adhuc sepulchro, lapide nondum devoluto*.

No mechanical distinction-drawing whatever between the *effects* of raising and of rising meets the solution of the problem. In the abstract, one may understand the Petrine word, "having loosed the pains of death," of the restitution of life taken simply in itself; but concretely we cannot conceive it otherwise than as Carpovius has explained it: "commercium inter corpus animamque seu vis agendi harmonica corporis animaeque restituta fuit." The subject demands to be considered from an entirely different standpoint.

It has been said that our Lord's resurrection appears in fact as the effect of a twofold factor, the one of which rests in Himself, the other in God; but that in the Son there was merely the *causa apprehendens*, while the *causa efficiens* remains exclusively the Father's. Unless this formula receive at least a more definite meaning, it can afford no satisfaction; for what it says of Christ applies in some sense or other, in all cases in which the word of power, "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead," reaches its end. The terms in which the Lord Himself has spoken of the question before us certainly assume more than that mere *apprehensio*. He says (John x. 18): "I have power (*ἐξουσίαν*) to lay down my life, and I have power to take it again: this commandment have I received of My Father." The word *ἐξουσία* undoubtedly never denotes a self-originated, but always a bestowed, especially God-bestowed power (in this respect, too, the word of the apostle holds: there is no power, *ἐξουσία*, but of God, Rom. xiii. 1); in the fourth Gospel it never occurs otherwise than in connection with the *ἄνωθεν δοθῆναι*.[1] But we are not therefore entitled to lower its meaning to a mere "competency," or worse still, to an "endowing with privilege." The idea of plenipotentiary power demands in all circumstances to be maintained. And in the connection before us this *may* be done. All depends on our finding the exact point on which the stress lies in the saying of Jesus Christ. If we take into view the historical relations, and especially observe the circumstance that the "laying down of the life" in the very same way as the "taking of it again" appears as the expression of His *ἐξουσία*, then the force of the latter will be found not so much in a superhuman power contrasted with helplessness, but much more in a freedom of self-determination, which knows itself to be independent of any external will and of any constraint. Our Lord points this word immediately against the Jews. It is not *their* counsel which robs Him of life, He Himself of His own free

[1] And hence we seldom or never read in Scripture of an *ἐξουσία* of God. The passage which one might be tempted to cite would be Luke xii. 5: *ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντα ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν γέενναν*. But suppose we are not led to decide that the text of Matthew (*τὸν δυνάμενον*) is the more genuine, the expression in Luke would tell with considerable weight in favour of those commentators who, as the object of the *φοβεῖσθαι*, understand the power of Satan. Comp. Stier, *Reden Jesu*, V. p. 400 et seq. The only other place where the expression occurs is Acts i. 7: *ἃ ὁ πατὴρ ἔθετο ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐξουσίᾳ*.

motion presents His soul as an offering; and if *they* are minded to banish Him to the grave of annihilation, His victory will defeat their hostile purpose,—"Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up again." Yet it is not against them only that He alleges so determinedly the freedom of His will, but even in respect of the Father He is fully conscious of it; neither on this side does He experience any compulsion.

True, He speaks of a *commandment* which He has received from above, but this does not at all prejudice His ἐξουσία; on the contrary, the latter proved itself gloriously in the fact that He gave Himself up to the command of the Father in virtue of the freest determination. But here now is the question to what that divine command relates. To limit its reference to the *laying down of His life* is exegetically unjustifiable. *This commandment*, such is the Lord's word. The *this* as certainly embraces the entire contents of ver. 18, as in the preceding ver. 17 the love of the Father received the similarly comprehensive explanation. It was the will of God that Christ should resign His life, but it was also His will that He should take it again. And in both respects the Son complied with the will of the Father. We say in *both* respects. The previously mentioned assertion of Victorinus Strigel, that Christ's resurrection was an act of His obedience, has been denied only on account of its paradoxical sound. And, indeed, the self-denial which constitutes the essence of obedience does not seem to harmonize either with the glory of the Risen One taken in itself, or with the idea of a reward thereby accruing to Him. The matter, however, receives another light as soon as we consider the work to which the exalted One was called. The τετέλεσται of the dying One only proclaimed *that* service to be finished which the Son had to perform to the Father in the Servant form; His ministry as a whole did not yet come to an end with this exclamation, but in the hour of His glorification a new phase of the same began. At the very moment of His rising again He expressly designates Him whom He had been accustomed hitherto always to call His Father, as His God, and that in the same strict sense in which He is the God of the disciples. (Rightly Aug.: *sub quo et ego sum.*) This new ministry is dissimilar from that which had reached its height and found its close in the *laying down of His life;* but it nevertheless corresponds to the idea in its full strictness. For just as

the Lord during His days on the earth had constantly considered His Father's interest, working in His name, labouring for His honour, so He pursues the same aim on the throne of His glory. And as He testified in this world that He came not to do His own will, but the will of Him who sent Him, such is also His testimony in His estate of exaltation. This is the thought which the apostle has expressed in the profound passage, 1 Cor. xv. 25 et seq. He describes the working of the glorified Christ as a *reigning*, and this reign he represents—exactly as in the related passage in Philippians, and in full agreement with our Lord's own declaration, that the Father has given all things into His hand—as an unlimited one, as one which would set aside all opposition. Instead of the former suffering and struggling, a ruling and conquering. In sure prospect he beholds the final triumph which this King will gain over all opposing powers, till the last enemy is overcome, and no one remains either in heaven or on earth, or under the earth, who refuses Him homage. But we find it declared with the same emphasis, that the reigning of the exalted One is in the service of the Father. Ver. 27 itself only becomes clear when considered from this point of view. Paul explains it as a matter of course, that when all things were given over to the Son, He must be excepted who willed and ordered this subjection. But if this is obvious of itself, why then the remark at all? It would in fact be superfluous, were it not his intention to describe the reigning of Christ as a ministry in relation to the Father.[1] This intention appears still more evident from the description of the end which that kingly work pursues. When the apostle describes it as having this object, that God may be all in all, and when he teaches at the same time, that the Son, as soon as this end has been reached, will Himself become subject to the Father, and deliver to Him the kingdom,—the idea of a service which the anointed King is

[1] We cannot adopt that understanding of the words which Hofmann proposed in the *Schriftbeweis*, and which he has preserved in his later Commentary, that they are meant to indicate the absence of all exception from the πάντα ὑποτέτακται. That would indeed be an extraordinary proof of the universality of this dominion. From the fact that the Father is not subject to the Son, it surely does not follow that everything else is put under Him. Had the apostle had this in view (one, besides, which is not at all founded in the general context), he would have expressed himself otherwise, in some such way as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who (ii. 8) writes: οὐδὲν ἀφῆκεν αὐτῷ ἀνυπότακτον.

called to perform to His God and Father appears as the undoubted essence of the whole section. It had its beginning, this service, and that at a very definite time; it has its progress, and that to a very definite limit; precisely at this limit it will at last reach its glorious end (εἶτα τὸ τέλος, 1 Cor. xv. 24). The Easter morn was the hour of its beginning;[1] its progress transpires in the history of the kingdom (it is still in progress, for what is written Heb. ii. 8 still holds true to-day: "we do not yet see all things put under Him"); and it will be finished when He who uttered the τετέλεσται on the cross will give forth the cry, "πάντα ὑποτέτακται" (comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* III. p. 660; *die h. Schr. N. T.* III. p. 369).[2] We say that it was on Easter morning that it began.[3] When God addressed to

[1] The definition of the church, that the *exaltatio Christi* began with His resurrection from the dead, and that His rising is the *terminus a quo* of His *munus regium*, remains undisturbed. Hofmann (*die heil. Schr. N. T.* III. p. 363) is of opinion that the βασιλεύειν, which Paul predicates of the Lord, dates from His appearing again. As to the claim which the Saviour raised even before Pilate's judgment-seat, that He was a King, we can fully acknowledge it without granting that His work on the earth can be called a βασιλεύειν. So it may be admitted that when Christ appears He will show a kingly glory, without regarding any other expression than that of βασιλεύειν as the appropriate one for His ruling at the right hand of God.

[2] Anything different from this explanation, and the conclusion immediately following from it, are not to be sought in the αὐτὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὑποταγήσεται. Paul could use the expression without any fear that his readers would understand the ὑποταγήσεται in the same sense as the preceding ὑποταγῇ. If the object of that dominion which the Son exercised in the service of the Father is reached, then, of course, the dominion as such is at an end; but yet only to make way for another, a dominion which He exercises, not *for* the Father, but *with* Him, and which He maintains for ever: βασιλεύσει εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, Rev. xi. 15.

[3] It is a mistaken view, at least an inexact form of expression, when, as is commonly the case, the dominion of the Risen One during the forty days is regarded only as a type of His kingly work as exercised from heaven. The former is not the type of the latter, but its *actual beginning*. Thus we understand the first words which fell from the mouth of the Risen One. He says to Mary of Magdala: μή μου ἅπτου· οὔπω γὰρ ἀναβέβηκα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου· πορεύου δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφούς μου καὶ εἰπὲ αὐτοῖς· Ἀναβαίνω πρὸς τὸν πατέρα μου. The prohibition of Christ has been very variously understood, and the present ἀναβαίνω has led to the most fantastical explanations. We have shown in an earlier connection that the meeting of the Lord with Mary, both in time and as a fact, coincides with His manifestation to the women, Matt. xxviii. We must therefore take the material to explain our ἅπτεσθαι from the attitude taken by these latter. Now we read: ἐκράτησαν αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας καὶ προσεκύνησαν αὐτῷ. So a twofold declaration. Strauss has kept to the second, and finds in the prohibition the refusal of a divine homage which did not yet belong to Him (*L. J.* p. 606). But we have more right surely to attach weight to the preceding ἐκράτησαν, partly because of the word used, partly from the known peculiarity of

the dead the resurrection call, He summoned Him to kingly sovereignty, and to the ministry connected with it. And the Son obeyed the summons of His free determination; He entered on the dignity, He also undertook the service. So for the second time He fulfilled the word, "I come to do Thy will." And so our confession is not only to the effect that Jesus was raised by the glory of the Father, but it finds its complement in the declaration, that He Himself rose from the dead; in this sense we speak of an act which the Lord executed on Easter morning.

It will become still clearer, as soon as from the more comprehensive idea of the exaltation we concentrate our view on that of the resurrection. The resurrection from the dead is the return

the Magdalene. Ἅπτεσθαι means "to touch sensibly," and nothing else; not "to touch" in the sense of touching in order to prove (that would be ψηλαφᾶν), but to grasp and hold fast its object. Gerhard exactly explains it, remarking: "ideo tam arcte eum complecti conabatur, ne iterum elaberetur." Mary was cured of demoniacal possession. Luke, and also—though indeed it is not genuine—the close of Mark, expressly record that the Lord freed her from this calamity. Now it was precisely such persons (we earnestly beg our readers to compare Luke viii. 38, 39) who had the liveliest interest in keeping up uninterruptedly immediate communion with the physician in whom their help lay. Christ rejects the boldness of His disciple. And He gives a reason for His prohibition. But strange that we should think to find its ground everywhere rather than in the immediately following words! What has led to this mistake is the fact that the Lord afterwards not only tolerated, but even called for the touch of His disciples, and especially of Thomas, without considering that the ψηλαφᾶν of the called apostles has nothing akin to the ἅπτεσθαι of Mary. The main stress of the reason is rather to be found in the second hemistich. "Touch Me not: for I am not yet ascended to my Father; but I ascend, tell my brethren, I ascend to Him." So the present ἀναβαίνω. We reject as earnestly as any of the modern commentators the anti-scriptural hypothesis based on the word, that the Lord ascended to heaven in the course of Easter day. Only we cannot pass so lightly as most of them have done over the peculiar tense. The inevitable postulate is this, that what in one sense had not yet happened (οὔπω ἀναβέβηκα), was in another sense an already present (not a future yet to be realized) fact (ἀναβαίνω). And this postulate is also justified. When the Father raises the Son, He says to Him: "Sit Thou at My right hand;" and when the Son rises from the dead He enters immediately into this kingly dignity, His βασιλεύειν begins. Thenceforth His acts are purely those of a sovereign. As a sovereign He meets the Magdalene; as a sovereign He rules in the midst of the Eleven—as a sovereign, in the same strict sense in which He fills His kingly office after His ascension. Negative criticism has reasoned backwards from the ὤφθη κἀμοί of the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 8, in its well-known way to the narratives given of all earlier manifestations of the Risen One. We shall have to prove later that its conclusions are false. Meantime we cannot overlook the germ of truth which is contained in the error. *So far*, we mean, the appearances of our Lord to the Eleven are in fact on the same footing with His manifestation to Paul; as in the one not less than the other, it was the King whom God anointed who showed Himself.

to a *bodily* life. This is the point which is rightly emphasized by church divines as the true and essential force of the idea. "Consistit resurrectio," so says Gerhard, "in animae Christi ad corpus reductione, ita ut illae duae partes per mortem separatae in eandem rursus naturam coalescerent." Similarly in Hollaz (in his *exam. theol. acroam.* III. p. 301) the "actus Christi, quo corpus suum animae redunitum e sepulchro eduxit." And Quenstedt defines it (*l.c.* p. 379) as that "gradus exaltationis, quo Christus idem illud corpus, quod in cruce mortuum et in sepulchrum fuerat collocatum, per iteratam animae cum ipso corpore unionem vivificatum e tumulo reduxit" (comp. the full and successful vindication of this definition given by Buddeus, *Institt.* p. 794).[1] In this view they have the Scriptures as manifestly on their side as Rothe has them against him when he describes the resurrection of our Lord as merely the delimitation of His being, following on His decease as His reaching the perfection of "pure spirit." This view is in harmony neither with the Easter history, nor with Paul's doctrine, nor with Christ's own explanations. It is obviously a bodily life in which the Risen One holds intercourse with His disciples. "They thought they saw a spirit," such were indeed their first thoughts (according to Luke xxiv. 37); but with the words "it is I myself," and still more completely with the accompanying signs, this delusion immediately disappeared.[2] The account given by Paul, 1 Cor. xv., rests throughout on the assumption that the Lord arose to a bodily life; without this assumption it would lose its significance and miss its aim. When the apostle writes in the outset: "I received . . . that Christ died, and that He was buried, and that He was raised again the third day," he understands it (and that in full harmony with the angel's word at the open grave: "He is not here; He is risen: see the place where He lay") in no other sense than that the body from which the soul had gone, the body which had been buried, had become again the organ of His action.[3]

[1] How decidedly the church Fathers maintained this view, has been proved by numerous quotations from them made by C. L. Müller in his painstaking and trustworthy treatise, *de resurrectione Jesu Christi sententiae, quae in ecclesia Christiana ad finem usque seculi sexti viguerunt*, Havniae 1836, p. 63 et seq.

[2] Rothe, who fully recognises the reality of the appearances of the Risen One, helps himself here by means of a view, the discussion of which we must reserve till a later stage.

[3] And so even Rothe cannot avoid speaking in some sense or other of a corporeity

And finally, the same is the effect of our Lord's own declaration about *laying down His life and taking it again.* For if it is the bodily life which Christ gave over to death, the same life must be that which He takes again; otherwise neither would the *it* nor the *again* have their just force.

The shrinking from ascribing to the glorified Christ a body in the sense of church divines, certainly does not arise merely from the difficulty of forming a satisfactory view of its properties. At least in the case of Rothe, it has an altogether different ground. In his case it arises from the fear that the idea of the exaltation might be prejudiced by it. And, in reality, however we may have the view that the "glorious body" (σῶμα τῆς δόξης) is raised above common wants as well as above earthly limitations, it cannot wholly banish the misgiving, whether for the Son, as He is seated "at the right hand of the majesty on high," a body is really suitable. This scruple is generally sought to be allayed by reckoning up all the glorious qualities of a *corpus glorificatum.*[1] This treatment, however, must always do violence to the subject; we prefer to abstain from it, and instead to consider the question how far the feeling indicated is after all to be justified. For it *has* a justification. Undoubtedly the body of humiliation (σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως), such as the Lord wore it during His earthly career, experienced a change to its direct opposite. But what was the object for which the Father bestowed on His Son the glorious body (σῶμα τῆς δόξης)? No other than this, that He should finish His kingly rule in this body, the rule to which He was called; more precisely, that He, *in virtue* of this body, should execute the service which He who put all things under Him expected from Him; for in order to this service the glorified body was the absolutely indispensable organ. The glorious body completely displaces from the eye the

belonging to the Risen One. But he leaves merely the word while he denies the thing. For in stopping short at the point, that Christ after His decease became "pure spirit" (reiner Geist), he could only allow a corporeity, or—as he is wont to express himself—a soul-animated body, in so far as this body itself is again regarded as real holy spirit, nay, as the Holy Spirit κατ' ἐξοχήν (comp. *theol. Ethik,* erste Aufl. II. p. 292). But that means saying, and at the same time unsaying. For a "pure spirit" is bodiless. Πνεῦμα and σῶμα are contrasts in Scripture. A body to be thought of as real holy spirit is simply *unthinkable.*

[1] J. Gerhard counts up not less than eleven. They are mostly abstractions from the manifestations of the risen Christ, without any attempt to view them as a unity. The section is by far the weakest part of the διάσκεψις.

servant form (*μορφὴ δούλου*); the sight (*ὄψις*), the appearance (*ἰδέα*), is that of a Lord; but only the more brightly and clearly does it mirror that place of ministration into which the glorified one had entered anew to His Father and His God. And what results therefrom? That the Lord, by returning again to a bodily life, carried out a *commandment* which He had received, and that so His resurrection from the dead may be regarded as His own free act!

By the one outstanding passage in which Scripture presents this formula, the view indicated must be established, and by the same must it seek to gain its further development. The Lord says (John ii. 19): "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." *Ἐγερῶ*, *I* shall do it, I *Myself*. The exposition of the words is matter of controversy. Those who question the rightness of John's own declaration are at present in a decided minority; nevertheless, it is far from being generally acknowledged that the Lord simply prophesied the fact of His resurrection. The tendency is rather to settle down into the view that there is a double meaning contained in the enigmatical utterance. There is only *one* case in which this view would prejudice the authority of the apostle, and that is if it supposed a relation to the stone building of the temple and to the destruction of the Jewish theocracy; for this is the very thing which is censured by the evangelist as a mistaken Jewish delusion. Apart from this, the view finds no obstacle, but rather support, in the words of ver. 21: "But He spoke of the temple of His body." For the question is forced on us, For what reason did the Lord describe His body as a temple? The occasion may be to be sought in the previous purifying of the house of God; but the occasion is not the reason. We are the less at liberty to set aside the reminder that the church of Jesus Christ is called in Scripture the temple of God, as this church not less frequently bears the name of Christ's body, and as both descriptions—especially in Paul—so melt into one another that the apostle must have thought of the body as a temple, and of the temple as a body.[1] So the church is a temple of God; but it is at the same

[1] The fact meets us with special clearness in the language of the Epistle to the Ephesians. To be compared are ch. ii. 20–22 with ch. iv. 15, 16. In the words *οἰκοδομὴ τοῦ σώματος*, *αὔξησις τοῦ σώματος*, on the one side, and *αὔξει ἡ οἰκοδομὴ εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον* on the other, the unity of both thoughts is perfectly obvious.

time the Lord's body. If in these expressions nothing else is found than ways of representing the communion of believers in one (Rothe, *die Anfänge der christl. Kirche*, p. 292; Ritschl, *Entstehung der altcath. Kirche*, p. 98), then, indeed, no cause need be sought either to explain their mutual relation, or even their origin. But if one regards them as more than mere images and similitudes, he cannot avoid this task.

First, so much is manifest, that the former designation has its root in the Old Testament. It is rooted in the promise that the Lord will dwell among His people as in His holy place on the earth. Attaching itself to the divine promise, Lev. xxvi. 11, 12, the thread passes through the predictions of the prophets, so as to become more and more interwoven with the expectation of the Messias who was to appear (Zech. vi. 12). The church of Christ arose, and with it began the fulfilment of the promise (comp. 2 Cor. vi. 16). By what name then should the New Testament language rather describe the church now in her bloom, than by that which the ancient promise had hallowed! It is extremely common, not only with Paul, but also with Peter and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And yet it could no longer be felt to be fully adequate as soon as the idea of the church became developed from the specifically Christian viewpoint. Then a new name was inevitably demanded, a name corresponding to the time of fulfilment, as pointedly as did the Old Testament name from the standpoint of prophecy. And that apostle brought it into use, in whom the idea of the church taken generally prevailed with peculiar vividness and power. Paul calls the church the body of Christ. No doubt the closeness of the bond which unites believers to Christ, and again as members to one another, lies not far from the meaning of the designation. Only this practical service must not be confounded with the essential force of the idea. This is above all the question, In what sense and with what right can the apostle so designate the church? If we are right in thinking that the Old Testament term only receives a Christian determinateness in the New, the two must be so related to one another, that the former must be understood from the standpoint of the aim; the latter, on the other hand, from the viewpoint of the realization. Through Christ the dwelling-place (*κατοικητήριον*) was formed which God sought to have with men. By the offering up of His life, by the

"giving of His flesh," by the "offering of His body," the Lord won a holy church; and by His rising from the dead, by His "taking His life again," this church found the beginning of its actual existence. It is the fruit which the grain of corn brought forth by dying in the earth, and springing up into new life. The church which grew immediately from the person of the Risen One (from His flesh and from His bones, Eph. v. 30—with which we beg our readers to compare the remarkable harmony of the "flesh and bones" which the Risen One, Luke xxiv. 39, predicates of Himself); the church in which He has His being and manifestation on the earth; the church within which He rules as Lord and acknowledged head, nay, by which He more and more overcomes the world,—is in reality, in the strictest, or rather the literal sense, His body. But for that very reason it is in an equally strict sense the dwelling-place of God, the "tabernacle of God with men;" for wherever the Son has become sovereign, there, at the same time, the Father "makes His abode" (comp. John xiv. 23).

From the point we have gained, we return to the words by which the Lord in the passage of John meets the objection of the Jews. He says: Destroy this temple. Certainly, He might thus, as always, have designated His body by this sublime name; for in Him, not in the gorgeous building at Jerusalem, had the living God His dwelling—one greater than the temple is here, Matt. xii. 6. But the temple of this body was broken, and, built anew, it rose from the grave; and so the idea must widen in such measure as the object of the *destroying* and the fruit of the *raising* demand. The *αὐτόν* at the close cannot be quite covered by the *τοῦτον* at the beginning; it embraces also the church, which, growing from the resurrection of the Lord, became His body, and as such the temple of God. And this exactly is the double sense contained in the enigma. If we have explained it rightly, a bright light is shed over the word, in which the full spontaneous action of the speaker is revealed, *ἐγερῶ*, *I* will do it, I *Myself*. If His return to a bodily life was so indispensable a condition to the growth, progress, and perfection of the church, it was for that reason the prerequisite if the Father was to have a dwelling-place on the earth, in order to be in the end all in all. The event which happened on Easter morning appears not as one merely which happened to the Lord; it is at the same time His

act, an act in which He again declares, "A body hast Thou prepared Me. Lo, I come to do Thy will."

The interest involved in our discussion thus far has required us to touch on the task which the Risen One is to accomplish in His Father's service. We have, however, intentionally confined ourselves to the most general hints, that we may now attempt the closer investigation of the subject.

### 2. THE AIM OF CHRIST'S RISING IN THE PLAN OF SALVATION.

We saw in an earlier connection that church divines, because of their acknowledging the Easter event only in a very general sense as the act of God, give no satisfactory explanation of the object of the *raising* of our Lord effected by the glory of the Father. Scarcely one of them has risen above the definition of Chemnitz (*exam. conc. Trid.* VIII. art. vii.), "quod pater satisfactionem et obedientiam filii acceptavit pro reconciliatione et propitiatione nostra: id resuscitatione ejus ostendit." The more decidedly they insisted on the proposition, "Christum *propria* virtute resurrexisse," the more surely could it be foreseen that they would correspondingly lay emphasis on the value of His *rising;* but it was also to be feared that in consequence of their one-sided position they would go beyond the limits of biblical truth. And in both respects the expectation has been realized. Above all, Egid. Hunnius has carried out the view that the Lord, in rising from the grave, triumphed over the hostile power of *death,* and made all who believe on Him partakers of His triumph.[1] The majority of later divines have followed this teaching;[2] only Calovius passes over it in silence.[3] It is in the highest degree common in the language of Christianity, and from the earliest

[1] Comp. his formerly cited treatise, *de justific.* p. 57: "Necessarium erat ad nostram salutem, ut non tantum moreretur Dominus, verum etiam mortem debellaret adeoque omnes hostes nostros vinceret. Si enim mansisset in morte, nec resurrexisset: tum clare patuisset, non ipsum vicisse mortem, sed ab eadem esse victum. Quando autem ex mortuis excitatur . . . absumto hoste . . . jam partae victoriae insignibus illustris procedit, tanquam vitae princeps nostraeque salutis consummator."

[2] Quenstedt, *l.c.* p. 379: "Finis resurrectionis est gloriae Christi et victoriae plenarie reportatae demonstratio." Hollaz: "Resurrexit Christus ad manifestandam gloriam de morte impetratam." Carpovius: "Resurrexit, ut victorem se et triumphatorem ostenderet."

[3] In his dogmatic treatise Gerhard also leaves it aside. And yet the *Harmonia* shows that the view was neither strange nor unpractical in his estimation. He

times the church of the Lord in its Easter festival unites in the sense of it. Nevertheless, the question arises whether it can be proved by the teaching of the Bible; and we are convinced that it cannot stand the test except with important modifications. Only by a series of *Old* Testament passages, which are, besides, extremely doubtful, has J. Gerhard been able to make good the assertion that the Holy Ghost describes the rising of Christ throughout the whole of Scripture as an *actus triumphalis ac victoriosus* in this sense (*Harm.* III. p. 2104 of the Frankf.-Hamb. edition); the *New* Testament refused Him this service. No one will hold that the sayings of our Lord: "I am the resurrection and the life; I live, and ye shall live also," gained truth in reality in virtue of His rising from the dead. Nor can we believe that the Pauline declaration, 2 Tim. i. 10, will be alleged against us. Undoubtedly, the apostle there describes our Lord as having *abolished* death. But it is only imagination that sees in the words the image of the conqueror of death, who at the open grave has waved the flag of victory over the enemy trampled under foot; sober exegesis reaches another result. It seeks the explanation in the illustrative passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews (ii. 14). And there it finds the *death* of Jesus represented as the power which successfully encountered the enemy, but the *abolishing* itself limited to the one fact that the reconciled (*οἱ ἀπαλλαγέντες*, ver. 15, for the term can mean nothing else) have been delivered from servile bondage to the fear of death. As to the real conquest, the destruction of death, the *abolishing* in its full sense, Scripture bids us expect it only at that point which Paul has designated as the *end*. Then, and not till then (*τότε*, 1 Cor. xv. 54), will the prophecy be fulfilled, "Death is swallowed up in victory;" then, and not till then, will it be realized, "There shall be no more death," Rev. xxi. 4; "the last enemy that shall be destroyed," so we read 1 Cor. xv. 26, "is death." Instead, then, of teaching, with church divines, that the Lord overcame death by His resurrection, it is only allowable to say that when He rose from the grave He entered on that dominion whose final aim was the destruction of death, and which cannot stop short of such an issue. But that is not the saving

speaks of it (in the 207th chapter of the writing referred to) as follows: "Resurrexit Christus tanquam victor et triumphator; uti vita ejus, sic quoque victoria ejus nobis bono est; mortem in victoria absorpsit, arcem infernalem destruxit."

end of the resurrection of which we are in search; as soon as the fact was completed it must have gained an *immediate* realization, as in the moment of Christ's sacrificial death the propitiation for sin was immediately accomplished.

"The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death." This *last* presupposes that the destruction of death will be preceded by the removal of other enemies. What others has the apostle in view? He has named *principalities, powers, and dominions.* Whatever may be the explanation of these terms and of their relation to one another, thus much is clear, that only by means of sin can the powers spoken of develope their disastrous action. Suppose, then, we substitute for them this simple idea. We are entitled to do so; in the very context we have the most definite occasion. For if sin is that by which death came into the world, and that by which it obtained dominion in it, death the wages, sin the sting, then the overthrow of the one must be completed ere the destruction of the other can be effected. Well, then, is it the overcoming of *sin* that we have to regard as the saving end of Christ's rising? Undoubtedly this answer comes considerably nearer the truth. The death of Jesus atoned for the sin of the world and made the remission of guilt possible. But only in so far—that we have already come to know—could God forgive it and proclaim the justification of the sinner, as He possessed in Him whom He raised from the dead the pledge that the forgiveness of sin should be followed by its actual removal. If this was the indispensable condition of the Father's act of grace, then the Son also must have risen, to the end that He might actually do away with the sin which He expiated by His death in the condition of His new life.

What Holy Scripture teaches of the life-work of the Risen One, both in relation to God and man, is in entirest harmony with this view. In relation to *God,* it usually designates Him as our advocate. But what is meant by the *interceding,* in which His office of advocate is carried out? Certainly not that He makes good the merit of His sacrifice before the Father; but neither does it denote an "interpellatio patris ad impetrandum nobis quaecunque corpori atque animae praecipue salutaria sunt" (Quenstedt. *l.c.* p. 259). But it means His appearing in the presence of God (ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, Heb. ix. 24), guaranteeing the annihilation of sin (the ἀθέτησις τῆς ἁμαρτιας,

ver. 26), and thereby securing those in a state of grace whose guilt has been atoned for by His sacrifice once for all. And in relation to *men*, what does Scripture represent as the working and governing of the Risen One? That He produces a new life in them, a life in righteousness and holiness which are well-pleasing to God. Such is the *power*, such the *working* of His resurrection. Gerhard rightly guards himself against being supposed to believe that Scripture considers the resurrection as the *figura*, as a *nudum exemplum* of our renewal; it appears much more completely as its cause: "Christi resurrectio re ipsa nos suscitat ex morte peccatorum et novum hominem vivificat; immediato enim et indivulso nexu cum nostra renovatione conjuncta est."

But is, then, the restoration of this new life which the Lord implants in us in virtue of His resurrection from the dead, anything else than the actual abolition of sin?

Nevertheless, even thus the question before us is not yet satisfactorily answered. We did not recognise the overcoming of death as the saving end of Christ's resurrection, because it is rather the end of the dominion of Christ glorified; and for a similar reason we cannot allow that it is the doing away with sin; for, though this will precede the last aim, yet it too will come as a *result* of His kingly working. Here, however, we have to do with an aim which is *immediately* realized on the completion of the fact. By the resurrection of our Lord a saving blessing must have been gained, must have flowed forth and become active, which was bound up with His return to a bodily life as inseparably as from that date it remained infallibly open.

The contribution furnished by the views we have set aside towards the discovery of the true one, we shall not let slip. Accordingly, the resurrection of Christ had in view the doing away with sin and the abolition of death, that God might be all in all. But in no other way shall we be able to represent to ourselves in the concrete the goal arrived at, than by considering that the Spirit of God will then have become the fulness of all things (*πλήρωμα πάντων*). For only in spirit is a *dwelling* of God thinkable (Eph. ii. 22); and the Spirit is life, and that life through righteousness; His sovereignty, in consequence, the death of death and the end of sin (Rom. viii. 10). So it is with the final goal. The inference backwards to the process of its realization is self-evident. For if the Spirit is the end to fill all, He must have entered into

the world there to develope His working; He must keep His ground when He is quenched, grieved, nay, blasphemed; and by His witnessing and rebuking, He must overcome the contradiction of sin till His victory is complete. On the other hand, we have something else to emphasize with all force and to keep unchangeably in view, namely, that it is the Risen One who controls the process indicated, nay, that He Himself by His resurrection has opened and set it agoing. This, it seems to us, is the true meaning of the much-disputed passage in the beginning of Romans. There the Lord is called "the declared Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead." To this end God had destined Him to be what He was (namely, Son of God) *with power*. With this *power* there are immediately connected the words, *according to the Spirit of holiness*, and they express something about the power. But it is not the proof of its cause, or of its prerequisite (so Hofmann, *die heil. Schr.* V. p. 7), that we have to seek in the closer definition, but the description of the standard according to which it is to be measured. For this is the very glory which the Father decreed to His Son, that from Him should come the Spirit, who creates a state of holiness.[1] But He entered into this glory, the divine declaring was realized in Him by (from) His resurrection from the dead. In virtue of His resurrection He has entered into the condition of the "Son of God with power;" in virtue of it, and certainly from the date of it, He exercises His *power*, the "power according to the Spirit of holiness." And what follows, hence, for

[1] It has been prejudicial to the exposition of this passage that men have come to it almost uniformly presupposing a relation of contrast between vv. 3 and 4, and have explained the words as if the apostle had provided the two clauses with the particles μέν and δέ. Consequently some (so especially Hofmann, *die heil. Schr.* V. p. 5) have come to the conclusion that Paul is contrasting with that form of the human life of Christ, in which He was the Son of God in weakness, the other, wherein He became so in power; while others (so recently Nösgen, *Christus der Menschen- und Gottessohn*, p. 198 ff.) have found in the passage the designation of the Lord's two conditions of being, His human and divine nature ("the first clause contains the admission of the human origin of Jesus, the second the proof for the assertion that He is nevertheless the Son of God"). We do not share the scruple which the last-named commentator has raised against the view of the former, "that the apostle would not know a Son of God in weakness, who has now become so in power;" the well-known passage at the close of 2 Cor. (εἰ ἐσταυρώθη ἐξ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ ζῇ ἐκ δυνάμεως θεοῦ) would suffice to dissipate it; while we have no doubt that Nösgen's own explanation will have to contend with still graver objections than that he assigns to the terms ἁγιωσύνη and ὁρίζειν meanings which the language

the solution of our question? What appears as the *saving end of Christ's rising?* Nothing else than *the bestowal of the Holy Spirit!*

Thus much we assume as granted, that it was first through Christ that the gift of the Holy Spirit was effected. This it is which the apostle has described as the glory of the new covenant, of which Christ is Mediator, that the divine promise, "I will put My laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts," was realized by the ministry of this High Priest (Heb. viii. 10). It has indeed been maintained that this promise found its fulfilment under the first covenant. Hengstenberg alleges the fact that a circumcision of the heart was not only then demanded, but also effected. And even then prayer for the Holy Spirit was not only offered, but also answered (Ps. li. 11, 12). "As throughout the New Testament, in relation to the Old, there is nowhere to be found a new beginning, but ever fulfilment only; so, in respect of the communication of the Spirit, only a difference of degree can be established; in place of parsimony there are riches, instead of the few come the many; and Calvin has with perfect right declared the opinion, that under the Old Testament no regeneration yet took place, to be an absurdity" (comp. *Christol.* II. p. 484 et seq.). But Hengstenberg has unwarrantably identified two distinct ideas. An *inworking* of the Spirit is not that *indwelling* of His which creates a new life. The inworking, viewed morally as well as charismatically, may be strong and rich in results; notwithstanding, it still differs specifically from the Lord's promise, "the Spirit abides with you,

refuses to bear. Meanwhile, neither of them, weighing the matter more closely, will escape from the acknowledgment that the supposition which they equally share rests on a deceptive appearance. The κατὰ σάρκα (to which, besides, a κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης cannot well correspond) does not bear that emphasis which apprizes the reader of a contrast. Paul might have left it out entirely (as indeed it is actually wanting in the parallel, 2 Tim. ii. 8); at least he has meant it here in the same casual sense in which it is clearly distinguished, ix. 5 (ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστός, *scil.* τὸ κατὰ σάρκα), as a merely parenthetical element. Did he find himself (probably by ver. 2) led to mention the Davidic descent of Jesus Christ, so much was self-evident, that *God's* Son (for so He was named at the beginning of the verse) was sprung from the seed of David only κατὰ σάρκα; and there was no need whatever for any determination by way of contrast. If, then, in ver. 4 he lays stress wholly on the ἐν δυνάμει, his interest was to define the way in which this δύναμις comes to be known. And the Lord exercises it by His Spirit, by the Spirit who creates the state of holiness. Exactly in the same way is the glory of His power fully described in contrast with the ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου in ch. viii.

and shall be in you." The former was not wanting even under the Old Testament dispensation; the latter belongs exclusively to the *grace* which came by Jesus Christ.[1] Through Jesus Christ, but not through His appearing taken generally. The Lord did not bring the Spirit into the world as His gift for it. Neither did He leave Him behind for it as His legacy. He who said to the disciples, "Peace I leave with you," would never have said: My Spirit I leave with you. And had one of them, like Elisha, addressed Him with such a request, He would have vouchsafed him no other answer than that which the sons of Zebedee received, "Ye know not what ye ask." *Οὔπω ἦν πνεῦμα ἅγιον* (the Holy Spirit was not yet), so writes the evangelist, John vii. 39; and under the *not yet* he includes the entire course of the earthly appearance of Jesus Christ. If at that time the Spirit *was* not yet, then the Lord could not then bestow Him; and neither could He, when it had closed, leave Him behind to the world which He left. And, in fact, it was true in the strictest and most proper sense, the Holy Spirit was *not yet*. Let us take the words exactly; let us not break their point. If the text ran, as the cod. Vat. has it, *οὔπω ἦν δεδομένον*, the whole declaration must, on closer investigation, have produced the most lively astonishment. For, since the gift of the Spirit had been immediately before this expressly described as one yet future, "they should receive," the explanatory declaration, that hitherto He had not been dispensed, appears at least very superfluous. And therefore we must differ from those expositors who, indeed, reject the addition on critical grounds, but otherwise regard it as a thoroughly pertinent gloss. The gloss could only obscure the apostle's true meaning. Of the Spirit who should make His dwelling in the hearts of believers, to establish in them a new life, a life of holiness,[2]—of this Spirit *as such* he denies not only its having

[1] The expression *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* is not very common with the Apostle Paul. But when we meet it, it is generally in connection with the indwelling of the Spirit in our hearts,—an indwelling which produces the state of regeneration and adoption, comp. Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6. We have therefore a right to explain it from his desire to set forth this renewal by the *πνεῦμα* as a process made possible and actual through Christ. First must Christ come to make His abode in the world ere the Spirit could abide in the hearts of believers.

[2] This is the simple purport of the Lord's word in ver. 38, and the prophetic passage, Isa. xliv. 3, on which it rests. Expositors have often imported the thought

been *given*, but also its *being*. "Came," ἐγένετο, so he said, i. 17, of the grace and truth brought by Christ as Mediator,—*came*, and not *was given* (ἐδόθη); so he would have pronounced the judgment over the past, not yet was there grace, not yet was there truth. As it required the Son to become man if grace and truth were to be found, so must the event *take place*, that the Spirit, whom believers were to receive, should, from not yet being, come into existence.[1] And how *has* this come about? The evangelist gives the answer in the final clause, "Jesus was not yet glorified," and the Lord Himself has furnished the explanation: "If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send Him unto you," John xvi. 7. The terms *being glorified* and *going away* are both indefinite. Some have explained them of the death of Jesus. They then fall back partly on the wholly external circumstance, which sheds no light on the subject, that by His propitiatory sufferings the Lord merited and won the Spirit for His own (so Hengstenberg, *Comm. zum Joh.* III. p. 111); partly they give the deeper reaching explanation, that so long as the Saviour remained in earthly life, so long the Spirit was present in Him only; that first He must die, that the Spirit, loosed from the person to whom He was bound, might develope His powers as the principle of life. Others, again, think of Christ's return to heaven, to enter upon His government; not till He had become

that an efficacious communication will go forth from the believer upon others; even Hofmann speaks of a fountain of the Spirit, whose life-giving streams should flow out upon the Christian's surroundings. Only this reference is entirely alien from the context, and does not find the least support in its whole compass. Both in the declaration of Christ Himself and in the Johannine reference, believers appear only as receiving, not as giving. If a complement must be sought for the ποταμοὶ ῥέοντες, it is surely much more natural to seek it in the parallel, ch. iv. 14 (πηγὴ ὕδατος ἁλλομένου εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον), than in the groundless interpolation of a thought which is foreign to the genius of the passage.

[1] We decline to commend our view by appealing to the exact phraseology of the second clause. Were the Received reading "οὔπω γὰρ ἦν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, ὅτι ὁ Ἰησοῦς οὐδέπω ἐδοξάσθη" the undoubtedly genuine one, we should raise a double question; first, for what reason did the evangelist substitute for the simple πνεῦμα in the first half a πνεῦμα ἅγιον in the second; and then this, why did he follow the preceding οὔπω with an οὐδέπω? And the result of the investigation of these questions might fall into the scale with considerable, not to say decisive weight. Only we decline this help. For the reading of the Rec. is by no means sure. The ἅγιον may be a spurious addition transferred from ch. xx. 22, and the οὐδέπω a mistake of the copyist which became naturalized. The cod. Sin. leaves out the former, and instead of the latter reads a simple οὔπω.

Lord over all, even over the Spirit, had He the power to send forth the Comforter. Undoubtedly all these views are relatively true,[1] but none of them seems to us entirely satisfactory. Supposing the *being glorified* may (like the *being lifted up*) denote our Lord's death, or supposing we might complete the *going* by the *right hand of God* as its goal, then the thought of an "emancipation" of the hitherto fettered Spirit does as little justice to the *was not yet* of John as the reference to the power of the exalted One, which merely cuts the knot without loosing it. If we refer the expressions in question solely to our Lord's resurrection, this understanding, so far as the *being glorified* in the evangelist's explanation is concerned, approves itself as true. For by His resurrection Christ entered into His *glory* (Luke xxiv. 26); it was the beginning of His glorification, and its beginning is (on account of the *not yet*) that with which we have now to do. But the prophecy also, *ἀπελθεῖν, πορευθῆναι, ὑπάγειν* (going away), we can understand only in this sense. Intended for the comforting of the disciples, it is always connected with the promise of a speedy return. "I go away, and come unto you," John xiv. 28. Hofmann has justly protested against the indefinite references which are generally assigned to the words; but it will be hard for any one to convince himself that the critic has equal right on his side when he explains the *come* of Christ's Parousia. In that case it would have been impossible for our Lord to subjoin the words (ver. 29): "and now I have told you before it come to pass, that when it is come

[1] There is only one view to which we must deny the least particle of truth. It has been said that the dispensing of the Spirit by Christ, and His redeeming influence upon individuals in general, are the fruit and consequence of His own ethico-religious perfecting. Thus Rothe explains (*theol. Ethik*, II. p. 292 ff.) that, at the moment when the moral development of Jesus was perfected, the organism of His nature (Naturorganismus) became real Holy Spirit, nay, the Holy Spirit *κατ' ἐξοχήν*; and that thereby He is now in a position to appropriate to Himself the individual beings of our natural humanity, and to enter into an organic and vital bond with them. Mau, too (*vom Tode und von der Aufhebung desselben durch die Auferstehung Christi*, Kiel 1841), considers the result of the earthly development of our Lord's spiritual life to be, that risen from the dead He carries out His redeeming office on humanity. And even Reich indicates the view in many places, that our Lord's spiritual life in itself must be developed and perfected ere it could become the instrument of a saving outpouring. This view, in whatever form it may come up, is the one from which we wholly dissent. It may be put into the Scriptures; but to take it *from* either an expression of our Lord or the utterance of any apostle, is impossible.

to pass ye might believe." How the evangelist himself understood the promise is clear from the observation, John xx. 8, 9.

This being now established, we *have* the answer to the question how it happened that the period described in the words, "the Holy Spirit was not yet," gave place to one of which it could be said He "now is." It came about by the rising of Christ from the dead! To this event Peter points the overwhelmed witnesses of the Pentecostal miracle, as they ask one another, "What meaneth this?" to it Paul points in his profound words (Rom. viii. 11): "The Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you." But the connection between the rising of Christ and the indwelling of the Spirit in the hearts of believers is set before us with all directness in the Easter evening incident, which is communicated to us in the fourth Gospel. The Lord stands in the midst of His disciples; He breathes on them, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." The question to which the words usually give occasion does not affect us at this point. True, we are convinced that the disciples were here made as certainly partakers of the gift of the Holy Spirit as they were of the peace which the Lord held out to them before.[1] And if it is asked how this narrative stands related to the history of Pentecost, there is no need of the precarious assumption that the dispensation which followed in the two cases differed in quality or even in quantity. No doubt a gift which is yet latent differs from one which has come to clear consciousness and full operation; the bestowal of the Spirit on the Eleven is one thing, and His outpouring on the new-born church is another. But for the present we do not touch this side of the subject. We do not even care to dispute with those who regard our Lord's action as symbolical,—in some sense or other they are quite right. We mean that it is much rather the act than the effect with which we have to do. The main question is not what the breathing of Jesus effected on the disciples, but what follows from the fact that on occasion of His first manifestation before the eyes of His own, He so acted on them. And this is the

[1] We have been astonished at the judgment of Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 522), that we dare not think of a communication, because a breathing on is not a breathing into. The evangelist makes use of the term ἐνεφύσησεν, the same therefore which we meet in the history of creation (καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, Gen. ii. 7), and undoubtedly he meant it also in the sense of the primitive record.

answer: by His rising from the dead the bestowal of the Spirit must have been rendered possible;—and thus we have to regard the gift of the Holy Spirit as the saving end of that rising.

Now after the Lord's rising from the grave, and through the very fact that He had received His life again from the dead, there was Holy Spirit; with the Easter morning the "not yet" was at an end. But what is the connection between these two? The solution of the question is made difficult if one deals with the comprehensive thought of the exaltation of Christ. No doubt an answer may be given from this standpoint, but only such a one as fails to give the satisfactory view. We shall gain a better explanation if here, again, we take account of the strict idea of the rising from the dead. Perhaps we have been thought to be on dangerous ground when we have taken the Johannine explanation of *the Spirit's not yet being* until the Lord was glorified, in all its strictness, and especially when we have not even regarded the critically doubtful "given" as a correct gloss. And we are met, perhaps, with the undeniable fact, that at least the Holy Spirit was in Christ Himself, even during the time of His humiliation. Only there is a sense in which we must really take exception to this apparently indisputable truth. So far, namely, as His own possession was concerned, the Lord certainly had the Spirit in His entire fulness. He was conceived by the Spirit; He was anointed with the Spirit. The saying of the Baptist held good of Him: "God giveth not the Spirit by measure." This was attested by His words, for they were *Spirit and life;* it was proved by His works, for He performed them by the Spirit of God. And so striking was the evidence, that the opposition which sinners offered to the Son of man amounted to a blasphemy of the Spirit Himself. But in the context of our passage the evangelist leaves this side of the matter entirely out of view. Here he is speaking of the Spirit, in so far as He was a *gift* of Christ to His own, an object for human reception,—"they should receive." And is he wrong in asserting that this gift was not at all in existence,—not even as yet in Christ Himself? A *gift*,—when is it really and truly existent? Surely only when it can pass over from the fulness of the possessor into the bosom of its receivers!

But here, indeed, the right viewpoint must not be displaced. The matter in question is not the capacity of the receivers to take

the offered gift; nor is it the power of the giver to refer them to the foreign possession; but purely and simply *the possibility of communication at all;*—this and nothing else is the point in question. This possibility was wanting so long as the Lord stood in sensible intercourse with men; then *His flesh* (σάρξ) was the preventing and restraining cause. On Easter morning the hindrance passed away, or, more correctly, it became converted into the direct opposite,—the *flesh* of the glorified One became the organ of the communication of the Spirit. With the utmost emphasis did the Lord declare, in the synagogue of Capernaum, that His *flesh*, His corporeally human appearance, was the mediator of salvation and life for all; and the stranger the assertion was to the Jews, the more decisively does He point it against their objections. But He could not possibly have expressed the truth more directly than He does in the context of the same discourse, that this *flesh* in its present condition can secure for men neither Spirit nor even *life*, which the Spirit alone can establish. It did not hinder Him prosecuting that healing activity of which Peter testifies in the house of Cornelius (Acts x. 38); on the contrary, it fitted Him for this blessed work. His presence, the παρουσία τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, made the sick whole and put suffering to flight. "Lord, if Thou hadst been here," say the sisters of Bethany, "our brother had not died." And He Himself says when He will help, "Let us go to him." But no laying on of His hands, no breathing of His mouth, could have communicated the Holy Spirit even to the most receptive and believing soul; His saying would have proved true: "the flesh profiteth nothing." It must pass, this *flesh*, through the baptism of which He said, that He must suffer it ere His fire should burn on the earth. Only from the new *flesh* of Him who gave His life for the life of the world (John vi. 51), who returned thither where He was before (John vi. 62),—only from it could the streams of the Spirit descend upon men. It was His resurrection from the dead by which He took it to Himself; His rising was essentially His entrance into this new corporeal form of life. *Before* it, then, the *gift* of the Holy Spirit was not yet in existence (οὔπω ἦν); through it, it first *came into being* (ἐγένετο) in the strictest sense. If this is held fast, it may be granted that the disciples also required to be fitted for the inward receiving of this gift. As the world could not receive the Spirit of truth at all, for it saw Him not and

knew Him not (John xiv. 17), so He could only be received by the friends of Jesus when they had gone through the time of fasting,—when they had suffered the loss of the bridegroom; privation was the way which brought them to this privilege. So may it be conceded that the Lord indeed must first have been exalted to the right hand of God before He, "as having power over all flesh," could pour out His Spirit upon *all* flesh, in like manner as His own person had been the gift of the Father to the entire world.[1] Only these are always merely secondary references; the matter of decisive importance is, that the *body of glory*, the *spiritual* body which the Lord took to Him by His rising again, was the absolutely indispensable organ which He needed for the dispensation of the gift of the Holy Spirit. It is, in this respect, of incomparable and conclusive importance that the Risen One, on occasion of His first manifestation to His own, makes the spring of living water flow over them. At the moment when they recognise the reality of His bodily life, they experience its immediate efficacy. From it they receive the Spirit, and so trace the "power of His resurrection." In this fact the words have their explanation: "I go away, and come again unto you;" and: "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send Him unto you."

From the standpoint to which the discussion has brought us, let us now consider the historical communications. When Peter gave testimony to the assembled Jews regarding the event of Pentecost, he began by explaining to them the miraculous fact; afterwards he excites in them the desire to draw from it the right conclusion. The explanation he takes from the circumstance that the Lord is risen from the dead; but the inference which he desires, is the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Christ ("let all the house of Israel know," etc., Acts ii. 56). To the latter he then subjoins the corresponding exhortation, and the promise that they also, in case of their obedience, would receive the gift of the Spirit. And under the overpowering impression of the miracle before their eyes ("*which ye now see and hear*," Acts ii. 23), they followed the direction given them. We cannot have the slightest

[1] The observations made by Reich, *ubi supra*, on both relations,—on the former, p. 245 ff.; on the latter, p. 255 ff.,—we may therefore allow to be true in general, although we might desire many important modifications in details.

thought of questioning the entire right with which the apostle drew his conclusion. He who bestows the Spirit is the Christ; this is the very gift which proves Him to be such. As the Holy God, in order to justify the unrighteous man, requires not only the atonement of his guilt, but also a surety who can guarantee his *becoming* righteous, so sinful man himself desires not only forgiveness, but also power (ἐξουσία) to be born anew, to become a child of God,—in one word, a pure heart, a new spirit; not till he has received this gift does he know and prove the Christ,—"by this we know Him, because He hath given us of His Spirit," 1 John iv. And yet we must persist in our former declaration, that the apologist does not gain his end in this way. That Jesus is the Christ, must rather be the assumption with which he enters on his task. But the greater in that case is the gain which will accrue to him for the certainty of Christ's resurrection. If, that is to say, it is firmly established that only the Risen One was qualified to bestow the Spirit, then must the Christ, from whose hands this gift required to come, and really did come, have issued from the grave. No objection to this is possible. The meshes of this proof could only be broken by maintaining that the Gospel representations of our Lord's resurrection are in themselves impossible,—that they contain contradictions, the reconciliation of which can neither be accomplished by thought nor expected of faith. As a matter of fact, such is the judgment of modern criticism. It declares the contradictions in the history of Christ's rising to be much more weighty than those which occur in the history of His raising. While in the latter it is only the different accounts which disagree with one another, in the former every single historian is at variance with himself, and that so conspicuously, that the representation of each of them shows itself to be absolutely incredible. Were it so, then indeed we should have a rock before us on which all proofs, however otherwise unassailable, would infallibly suffer shipwreck. But the question is, whether this is the true state of the case.

### 3. THE HISTORY OF THE RISING.

Criticism has undoubtedly fastened on the right point in making the description of the person of the Risen One, as drawn by the evangelist, the main point of its attack. This description may

certainly appear as obscure, contradictory, and generally of such a kind as to throw suspicion on the reality of the historical fact. The accounts we have present, as Schleiermacher expresses himself, "two opposite indications,"—the one of which gives rise to the idea that the Risen One returned to the same bodily life which His death on the cross had taken from Him; while the other forces us to the conclusion that He passed into another new and higher life, out of which He became visible to His own only in passing manifestations. (A full view of the state of the case is to be found in Reich, *ubi supra*, pp. 27–49, and in the relative section of Strauss' *Critical Recension of the Life of Jesus.*) It has been sought in two ways to prove that these "opposite indications" cannot overthrow the credibility of the fact of the resurrection. On the one hand, Schleiermacher maintains the position that those evidences which point to something supernatural in the new condition of Jesus belonged exclusively to the disciples and their previously formed opinion; while the Lord Himself everywhere follows the tendency to prove His appearance natural, identical with the former one, and, generally, as such that it nowise diverged from ordinary human life (*Leben Jesu*, p. 476). On the other hand, the more recent theology has taken its stand on the explanation that the Risen One was in a transition state—on the borders of two worlds—during the forty days, and so bore in Himself at one and the same time the stamp of this world and that of the future. (So Martensen, *die christliche Dogmatik*, p. 364; similarly also Hasse, in his unsuccessful treatise which appeared in 1854, *das Leben des verklärten Erlösers im Himmel*, p. 84 ff.) We should be hardly put to it if we had to choose between these alternatives. Schleiermacher's view manifestly contradicts the Gospel narratives. If neither Mary of Magdala nor the travellers to Emmaus know the Christ "who appears" (ἐφάνη, ἐφανερώθη[1]); if He vanishes from the eyes of the latter, and again, despite the closed doors, suddenly stands in the midst of His disciples,—it is impossible to escape the consequences of these details except by evasions which inevitably fall under the charge of violence and arbitrari-

[1] Schleiermacher has not been moved from his view by the circumstance that Scripture usually employs these and similar expressions in describing the appearances of Christ. He has found a defender on this side of his view in J. T. Dödes, in the treatise which is so important in connection with our subject, *de Jesu in vitam reditu, Trajecti ad Rhenum*, 1841, p. 148.

ness.[1] But supposing a course of that kind were endurable, there would immediately arise a new and graver difficulty, which makes the view so laboriously defended alike untenable by faith and unbelief. Thus much Strauss has proved (*der Christus des Glaubens*, p. 182 ff.), having convincingly shown on what assumption it rests and to what consequence it would lead. If the Risen One was invested with an ordinary human life, He cannot really have died, but merely passed through the state of apparent death; and then He must, later, have departed from this "ordinary human life" also in the ordinary human way, that is to say, by real death.

But neither, indeed, does the theory which recent theology is accustomed to develope help us out of the dilemma. If the representation that the Risen One, during the forty days, was in a state of transition on the borders of two worlds, is to be more than an empty phrase, it expects us to accept the idea that His bodily frame, during the period referred to, was undergoing a process of gradual glorification or transformation,—a process which began on Easter morning and terminated on the day of the ascension. This idea, however, is met by the grave difficulty that there is not a single indication of it to be found in the whole compass of the resurrection history;[2] and it is completely exploded by the fact that Scripture everywhere teaches us to regard the resurrection itself as the completion of the new body. "It is *raised* in incorruption, in glory, in power; it is *raised* a spiritual body." So writes the apostle; and thereby forces us to the conclusion that Christ, from the moment of His passing from the grave, was

[1] It is extraordinary to see the strong feeling with which Calvin rejects the undoubtedly right and only possible explanation of the words ἔστη εἰς τὸ μέσον, John xx. 19, 26. He insists that the door was previously opened (in a miraculous way, of course). The opposite view he declares to be a papistical error, nay, he pronounces the judgment: "facessant pueriles istae argutiae, quae nihil prorsus habent solidi et secum trahunt multa deliria." The later Reformed expositors have followed his authority, and contended against the right explanation in the same tone. Nicolaus Arnoldus, professor at Franecker, in a work once greatly valued, now almost forgotten, *lux in tenebris*, 4 Aufl., Frankfurt 1698, thus expresses himself: "per corpus solidum penetrare, id est solido mendacio." This is connected with his contention against the Lutheran doctrine of the ubiquity, which he is in the habit of characterizing as a "majestatice ineptire." In what respect the polemic is not wholly without justification, will appear in the sequel.

[2] Now and again, in support of the view, the fact has been appealed to, that the Lord forbade the touching of His body on Easter morning, whereas He afterwards suffered it. We have already remarked that the forbidden ἅπτεσθαι in the one case, and the allowed ψηλαφᾶν in this, are wholly dissimilar.

clothed with the body in which He ascended to heaven and sat at the right hand of God.[1]

Criticism has adopted a very easy way of getting rid of a knot which the attempts described have certainly left unloosed. "To eat and to vanish, tangible limbs and coming through closed doors,—these are traits which only fancy can conjoin, but which no one can conceive together in a real state of being" (Strauss, *ubi supra*, p. 182); "and so the Gospel testimony, in seeking to present the most cogent proofs for the resurrection of Christ, is shattered, and collapses in empty nothingness" (*L. J.* p. 295). But it has not proved that this easy way is in reality the only one open to sober and impartial thought. We hold it to be an extremely dangerous admission which Krauss makes (*die Lehre von der Offenbarung*, p. 315), that it is impossible to comprehend the Christophanies of the Crucified and Risen One in a way which will be at once unassailable scientifically and religiously. We take it to be an earnest question, very closely affecting faith, or rather forming an essential condition of it, whether our Lord's state during the forty days, with its "opposite indications," is really inconceivable.[2]

Thus the Gospel accounts offer particulars which betray a body belonging to the Risen One of a wholly different organization from that which it was found formerly to have. "Found in fashion as a man,"—this held true of our Lord during His earthly life, even in relation to the "house of His tabernacle." He was hungry, and ate; He was thirsty, and drank; He was weary, and slept; He was tired, and rested: all these characteristics indicate that material body which the apostle has described as "our earthly house." The forty days present another picture. Men did not see Him come, but appear; they did not see Him go, but

[1] When Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 51 et seq., describes the change of those whom the Lord finds alive at His coming again as the matter of a moment (ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ῥιπῇ ὀφθαλμοῦ), the same necessarily holds good of those who are awaked from the state of death at the Parousia. And if *they* go forth from their graves with the corresponding new organ, how can any one allege a gradual process in the glorifying of *Christ's* body?

[2] We should agree with Krauss if no other explanation could be given than that which Hasse has fallen on (*das Leben des verklärten Erlösers im Himmel*, p. 122 ff.), —namely, that the resurrection-body is to be thought of as a *commingling* of spirit and body; or than that adopted by F. Kühn (in a treatise published at Stralsund, 1838, *wie ging Christus durch des Grabes Thür?*), that we have to suppose a sort of *communicatio idiomatum* between spirit and body. Before such representations, indeed, the mind of the reader is brought to a standstill.

vanish; from what they observed, it was obvious that His present body was nowise subjected to physical laws and limits.[1] Gerhard: "certum quidem est, Christum in resurrectione sua verum et naturale corpus, adeoque illud ipsum, in quo mortem sustinuerat, e sepulchro retulisse; interim tamen corpus ejus non amplius θνηταῖς δυσχερείαις obnoxium sed proprietatibus corporis spiritualis praeditum fuisse (Amphiloch.: τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐκ τοιοῦτο). Dicitur autem corpus spirituale, non quia carne et ossibus destitutum in spiritum plane mutatur, sed quia manente corporis substantia proprietatibus spiritus exornatur. Invisibile est, non movetur de loco in locum successive juxta rationem hujus saeculi, non indiget cibo ac potu, pertransit corpora solida nullo impedimento" (*Harm.* c. 212). Against the conceivableness of such a body *in and for itself*, no well-grounded objection can be raised. If any one cannot form this idea, Paul must have written the instructive passage, 1 Cor. xv. 36 et seq., in vain for him; and the more certainly would he fall under the censure which the apostle has prefixed to it upon the Christians in Corinth. The reproach of *foolishness* applies not only to the inability or indisposition to draw a simple inference from existing analogies; but it embraces also the narrowness which cannot separate the idea of body from that of matter. As if both stood and fell with one another; as if the body were to be conceived only as the bearer of the *living soul*, and not also as the organ of the life of the *spirit!* "As certainly (ver. 44) as there is a natural body (σῶμα ψυχικόν), so certainly there is also a body which has nothing to do with matter."

This positive assertion cannot rest on the preceding context, for to prove a thing conceivable is by no means to demonstrate its actual existence. The "is" finds its solid basis in what follows. There is in truth an immaterial body; for with such a body did the *last Adam*, the *first-fruits of them that slept*, go forth from His grave. This is not a prerequisite of faith; but if one acknowledges the resurrection at all, it is impossible for him to avoid this postulate of reflective thought. For when the Risen One became alive, it was not to take up again and continue a

[1] The only parallel from our Lord's past life, His walking on the waves of the sea, does not wholly coincide with these observations. The analogy demands to be carefully drawn. In applying it, the distinction must be observed between *natura* and *voluntas*. We shall return to the subject in a later connection.

life which had merely been *interrupted* by death; but after the *close* of His life in the flesh (*μετὰ τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς σαρκός*), He entered into newness of life (*καινότης τῆς ζωῆς*). In that He died, He died unto sin once; but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God, Rom. vi. 10.[1] Lazarus was awaked from the state of death (not *from the dead* in the sense of Rom. i. 4, Heb. xiii. 20, but *from the sleep of death;* comp. John xi. 11: "that I may awake him out of sleep") *to finish* the same life which by the issue of his sickness had come to a stand; the Lord rose from the dead after His twelfth hour had struck, after He had brought His earthly life to a close. We find it therefore in perfect keeping, if the appearance and manifestations of Lazarus *after* his resuscitation differed in nothing from what they were before (comp. John xii. 2); for his awakening was nothing more than the restoration or repristination of his former state of life. On the other hand, it would be cause of astonishment if we found a similar identity in the case of the Risen Christ. The apostle distinguishes (Heb. xi. 35) a twofold *resurrection.* He writes: "Women received their dead by a resurrection" (*ἐξ ἀναστάσεως*); there he has the cases in view in which the dead were brought back to this earthly life. But immediately after he testifies of a *better resurrection,* and this is the hope with which faith looks forward to eternity But in what sense does he

[1] Such is the true meaning of the contrast which the apostle has in view in this passage. He contrasts the life which Jesus spent and closed in the *σάρξ*, with the newness of the *ζωή* upon which He entered through His resurrection. Commentators have overlooked a saying of our Lord which provides the key to the understanding of the apostle's words. In Luke xx. 38 it is said of the children of the resurrection: *πάντες τῷ Θεῷ ζῶσιν*; and we learn from vv. 34–36 how this clause is to be understood. In the very same sense Paul says of Christ: *ὅτι ζῇ τῷ Θεῷ*. It denotes the direct opposite of the life which He passed *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*; the latter is once for all closed, and lies for ever in the past. Only when thus understood do the words really yield that conclusion for the readers which the apostle was concerned they should draw. Hofmann rightly rejects the explanation, that the Lord died *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*, to atone for or put it away, as wholly foreign to the text. Only we protest still more decidedly against the assumption, that the Son of God was raised by His death above a connection with sin, in which He had stood till then. However circuitously and cautiously one may express himself, as Reich does (*ubi supra*, p. 38), "Christ had no part, indeed, in the original *sin*, but yet in the original *evil* of human nature;" or, like Gericke ("Abh. über die Auferstehung," *in den theol. Stud. u. Krit.*, Jahrg. 1843, H. 2), "in the death of Jesus there took place the innermost interpenetration of the divine and human nature,"—he cannot help making suppositions which are unscriptural and untenable, and giving to the apostle's words a meaning which is foreign to them.

understand the predicate which he appends? Is he thinking merely of the new sphere of life, the *better country*, ver. 16, to which this resurrection brings them? Since he calls the resurrection *itself* a better one, he must rather have in view the organ in which the raised ones appear, the "house from heaven," the "house not made with hands,"[1] of which Paul (2 Cor. v. 1, 2) has spoken. Their bodily constitution will be another and a better, because it must correspond to the new life in which it has to move. The Lord meets the want of understanding on the part of the Sadducees, with the explanation that those who should one day attain to the resurrection from the dead are to be conceived as then equal to the angels (*ἰσάγγελοι*). This involves more than the mere fact that their bodily organism will no longer be distinguished sexually; but it is altogether differently constituted from the earthly. It does not come from the womb of woman, but "they are the children of the resurrection;" it does not mature towards an eventual cessation of life, but "they cannot die any more" (Luke xx. 36); and on that very account it cannot possibly be material. Only of whom could this hold in a higher measure than of the "Lord from heaven," of the "first-begotten from the dead" Himself! *His* image (the image of the heavenly, 1 Cor. xv. 49) will be borne by those who are partakers of the future resurrection; to *His* body, the "body of His glory," they are, indeed, to be conformed (*σύμμορφοι*), Phil. iii. 21. On Him first, therefore, as having in all things the pre-eminence (*πρωτεύων*), must that change pass of which Paul testifies: "this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality;" and so transformed, He passed from the resurrection to His glory. If, then, the accounts of the resurrection present indications which suppose another new and higher bodily constitution than that which the Lord possessed during the days of His flesh, they perfectly fulfil the expectations which reflection raises from its own standpoint.

But now it is not these indications in themselves which criticism has turned to its advantage, but it appeals to the contradiction which they are said to manifest to entirely opposite indications. The Risen One is seen; His voice is heard; His body is touched; He Himself calls the attention of His disciples

[1] We have not been able to convince ourselves that the common explanation of this expression, which Hofmann questions, is really to be given up.

to it, and bids them convince themselves that He has *flesh and bones;* He points them to the marks of His wounds, as if they had closed in the rapid process of natural healing; He walks with them, and takes food before their eyes: all these signs seem to force us to infer an ordinary material body. Rothe's hypothesis (*theol. Ethik,* I. § 560), that the Lord, after laying down His body, reassumed it for a definite object in a merely transitory way for particular short intervals, to put it off immediately again after reaching His object, should have found more appreciation than it has; for it contains in fact an element of truth. As it is here expressed, indeed, it is exploded—not to speak of other difficulties[1]—by the narratives of the evangelists themselves. For their accounts are not to the effect that His bodily organism bore upon it, now the marks of materialism and again the opposite, but simultaneously the one as well as the other were observed in it. He sits with the disciples at table, and vanishes before their eyes; He penetrates through closed doors, and lets His flesh and bone be touched. Hence we are forced to infer, in the words of Hofmann, at once "the newness and the identity of His bodily life;" it was necessary for Him "to have a bodily life, which was the continuation of His former one, but He required also to return to another form of it than that which He had previously borne among His own" (comp. *Schriftbew.* II. p. 521). But it is this very conjunction of the two, so now says criticism, which is impossible in a real being. It should not have been attempted to refute this "impossibility" on grounds which are derived from an arbitrary conception of the spiritual body. The indefinite character and manifold contents of the idea open up indeed ample room for speculation; but it dare not be abused as a free pass for monstrous representations. However it may be defined, the proposition can never be questioned, that it is at least impossible for the *spiritual body* at once to want and possess the qualities of a material body. And therefore the attempt which Reich (*ubi supra,* p. 43 et seq.) has made in this direction could not but prove a failure.

The course followed by the Fathers and later divines undoubtedly inspires incomparably greater confidence. They grant

[1] Rothe has not said what finally became of this "erewhile material body" of the Lord. He has hesitated to state the view, that it was consigned at last to the earth, though most probably this was his opinion.

what cannot be denied on any pretext. Instead of constructing a bodily constitution which shall unite in itself contradictory properties, visible and yet invisible, palpable and yet ethereal, they make no scruple of claiming for the body of the Risen One, as its true characteristics, those qualities which they are wont to regard as the essential attributes of the spiritual body—*invisibilitas, illocalitas, inpalpabilitas;* such is its true and actual character. And here we find in fact not only a firm starting-point, but the right one for our study. But how now do they proceed? How do they adjust the opposite indications of the Gospel accounts? "Discernendum est," so Gerhard explains in the frequently quoted *διάσκεψις*, "inter id, quod est *συστατικόν* et essentiale corporis *ἴδίωμα*, et inter id, quod Christus ex libera *οἰκονομίᾳ* certo aliquo fine suscepit. Prius est *οὐσίας* necessariae, posterius *οἰκονομίας* arbitrariae."[1] It is no doubt the assumption of such an *οἰκονομία* or *συγκατάβασις* on the part of the Risen One which prevents modern theology from regarding favourably the older view. The idea in question has come into disrepute, certainly not without cause; and it would require first to be disentangled from many inconsistent elements, especially from connection with anything like a pious fraud, ere it could be used with confidence. But it is not such as to deserve reprobation in all circumstances. Church divines have rightly remarked that those very manifestations of the Risen One which are now in question were not only calculated to re-establish faith in the consciousness of the disciples, but that they actually produced this fruit in them.[2] The Lord appears in their midst, offers them

[1] A more exhaustive treatment of the subject by this theologian is to be found in the *Harm. evang.* (Hamb. Ausg. p. 2144 ff.). He seeks to show that essentially the Risen One was not visible, for "inter corpus spirituale et inter oculum terrestrem nulla est analogia, proportio et affectio;" that essentially (ex proprietate corporis glorificati) He was inaccessible to the touch of human hands; and if He took meat, this dare not be regarded as a matter of *ἔνδεια*, necessitas ac indigentia. But what appears as impossible "actu," demands to be judged "potentia sive *δυνάμει*," and is to be understood ex *συγκαταβάσει* from the object in view. Even the wound-marks, of which it had been already maintained by Egidius Hunnius (in his work, *de persona Christi*, Frankfurt 1590, p. 97) that they are out of keeping with the "natura, proprietas et perfectio plena corporis glorificati," are explained by Gerhard (*l.c.* p. 2193), "ex libera oeconomia et dispensatione."

[2] Gerhard: "Apparet Christus discipulis in propria specie, alloquitur voce nota, palpandum sese exhibet et in conspectu eorum manducat, ut veritatem resurrectionis suae iis confirmet." He quotes with approbation the following statement of Lyranus: "per cicatrices clavorum ostendit, quod habeat ideum numero corpus.

His greeting, and gives them a proof of His life. But they think they see a spirit. Then He bids them touch His body, to assure themselves that He has truly risen from the dead. Still they doubt; and He asks food at their hands, and takes it before their eyes; then at length "the disciples were glad when they saw the Lord." And this is the fact to which the witnesses of His resurrection appealed in their after career, to justify their preaching. For John has it in view when he writes: "what we have seen and our hands have handled" (comp. Erich Haupt, *der erste Brief des Johannes*, Colberg 1869, p. 10); and this it is which Peter alleges when he says in the house of Cornelius: "we did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead" (Acts x. 41). Against such condescension to human necessities, taken in itself, no objection can be raised. But does not a doubt arise when the question comes to be, How was such a condescension possible? How *could* the Lord show wound-marks which He did not in reality bear on His person? How could He present a body to be touched which did not possess the impenetrability of matter? And how could He take food when this absolutely presupposes a sensible organism? Gerhard stoutly withstands the thought, that the *οἰκονομία* of the Risen One was carried out by a deception practised on the senses of the disciples. "Quamvis Christus non ex necessitate, sed libera voluntate comederit, vere tamen ipsum comedisse statuendum est. Non apparens tantum et phantastica erat manducatio" (*Harm.* p. 2172). But what avails the protest if no other thought is shown to be possible? Here our church divines manifestly leave a blank. True, they fill it up as well as they can. Only in how violent a way! They call to their aid the idea of the divine omnipotence, and fall back on the allegation of the miraculous. "Post resurrectionem Christus de corpore suo fecit quod voluit;"[1] so Augustine had disposed of the query; and even before him

Per tactum et visum ostendit, se habere corpus verum et non phantasticum. Per comestionem ostendit, se habere corpus vivum anima vegetativa animatum. Per hoc quod loquebatur sensibiliter et rationabiliter, reducens eis ad memoriam quae dixerat ante mortem suam, ostendit, se habere corpus animatum anima sensitiva et intellectiva et eadem qua prius."

[1] This often quoted saying of Augustine, which is still cited with approbation by Hengstenberg (*Comm. zum Joh.* III. p. 310), would be far more tenable if the judgment which it contains were in regard to the status *ante* resurrectionem. The very thing which stands emphatically on the front of it makes the assertion precarious.

Tertullian,[1] in the words: "Christus est potentior omni lege corporum;" and Jerome: "nihil valet natura contra naturae dominium." But Gerhard, too, is of opinion that this answer suffices to set aside the scoffings, "φλυαρίαι," of doubters: "Quod ex Physicorum scholis afferunt, ad id facile responderi potest ex ipsa philosophia: ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἄλλο γένος. Ex regulis physicis non sunt aestimanda, multo minus oppugnanda divina *miracula*." In itself this is quite right. But, first, the previous question meets us, whether the idea of the miraculous is at all applicable to the region before us. And this we must deny. When the Lord fasted forty days in the wilderness, or when He walked on the waves of the sea, these were miraculous events; for both transcended the course and law of nature: but of the manifestations of the Risen One which are in question, no one will maintain the same. It is not a collision with the *law of nature*, but an *internal* contradiction with which they confront us; and over a contradictoriness in conception the assertion of a miracle does not help us. So the appeal to almightiness does not avail for a moment to cut this knot, not to speak of loosing it. This is so evident that the representatives of this view could not help proving unfaithful to their own principle. When they gave the explanation: "aliter absorbet terra aquam sitiens, aliter solis radius candens; illa indigentia, iste potentia," they again set the idea of the miraculous aside, and argue from the nature of the *heavenly body*. But, of course, they in this way stultify their own procedure.

There was no need of this unsuitable means to reach the end in view. It was unnecessary to insist on the element of omnipotence, and so to land in a miraculous action, which, besides, in spite of every precaution and assurance to the contrary, can hardly be preserved from a suspicious connection with Docetism. Instead of this course, it should have been unreservedly acknowledged that the Lord appeared in the midst of His disciples in a *sensible-material* body. "They thought they saw a spirit," so it is said of the Eleven (Luke xxiv. 37); and it is this *reasoning* of their heart which is met with the challenge: "Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have." Surely the Lord could not use more express terms to affirm the materiality of His body.[1] But does this acknowledgment, then,

[1] Very curious are the words of Reich (*ubi supra*, p. 39): "*wholly* without σάρξ Christ was not, even as the Risen One, for He expressly claims for Himself σάρκα

—for we will follow our view fearlessly to its consequences—does it exclude the idea, that the first-begotten from the dead entered into His glory from His grave, clothed with a new body? Rather are not both perfectly compatible? Let us look this question fairly in the face. We make bold to maintain the affirmative. The solution of the problem lies in that idea of which the Scripture makes use throughout on this field (*ἐφάνη, ἐφανερώθη, ἐμφανὴς ἐγένετο*)—the idea of His *appearing!* The promise which our Lord bequeathed to His own in the parting hour, "I will see *you* again," and "yet a little while, and ye shall see *Me* again," is usually understood of a spiritual seeing in the power of the Paraclete. But supposing this were the meaning of the promise, it could not have been fulfilled in the experience of the disciples, except on the condition of their previously seeing the Risen One Himself. They must first be sure that He lives; then only were they in circumstances to await in hope the manifestation of the living One in the Spirit, or to experience it in reality. We do not in the least retract what we said in an earlier connection. The beatitude: "Blessed are they who do not see, and yet believe," preserves its rights unabridged, and the censure which it contains remains untouched. Only the matter in question here is not the faith of the disciples in general, but their faith in the Lord's resurrection in particular. Had the former remained wholly intact, there would still have been needed a specific factor to secure the latter. The case of Thomas requires to be weighed with care. The Lord once said previously, with His eye upon the Twelve: "There are some of you who believe not." Even in respect of the Eleven this judgment still held good. Formerly, it was the traitor who was meant; here, it is Thomas on whom the rebuke falls. "Be not (*μὴ γίνου*) faithless," is a cry of warning to one who has strayed far and come into peril, that he make not shipwreck of his faith. Only, does it follow that what in his case was the demand of unbelief, was therefore a thing with which the others could dispense? No, *seeing* was also required by *them*, and all of them, not even excepting the one for whom the look into the grave was enough to awaken the dawn of faith (he saw and believed, John xx. 8).

*καὶ ἀσπίλα.*" So not "*wholly*" without *σάρξ*; but surely, then, neither "wholly" without *ἀσπίλα*? In fact, a suspicious adverb is this "*wholly*"! If one can express himself thus, he has not so much as a view on the subject, far less a conviction.

We have already acknowledged the truth which church divines have on their side, in regarding the manifestations of the Risen One from the viewpoint of a condescension, *συγκατάβασις*. "Christus totus in eo est," so Gerhard appropriately remarks, "ut per sensuum ministerium discipulos ad resurrectionis fidem perducat" (*Harm.* p. 2170). But they were mistaken in limiting this condescension to solitary instances, while in truth it belongs to the appearing of the glorified One *in itself*. The event which happened *economically* was not particularly that the Lord showed the marks of His sufferings, or that He took food before the eyes of His own; the gist of the matter is, that He gave Himself to be known by the senses at all. Such being His object, the mode of carrying it out was self-evident. No doubt other possibilities may be imagined,—such as might find their occasion and material in the experience of Paul, or the history of the glorification; but it is fancy which strays into such dreams, dreams which pass beyond the region of the conceivable. Only a *sensible* being can present itself to the senses of men; for the organs of perception must have an object corresponding to them. And only when we assume a sensible organism, can we form the thought of the Risen One *appearing* in the circle of His own. A phantom is a thing of nought; and visions belong only to the inward eye. And thus, by simply fixing our view on the idea of appearance, the question: "with what body did He come?" at once finds its decision. But it was not such (*τοιοῦτο*) a body in general that the Lord showed to His disciples, not a body merely which enabled Him to rise and walk, to sit down and eat;[1] but He shows them the same body in which they had seen Him before,[2] the same which at last endured the piercing of its

So much may be allowed to church divines, that this taking of food was not a matter of *ἴνδαια*. But it is a mistake to suppose that this is to be explained by a miraculous power belonging to Christ, and it is at least one-sided to assume that He had nothing else to establish than the reality of His bodily constitution (Gerhard: "edere est maximum vitae argumentum"). But, on the one hand, this eating was a natural consequence of His appearing; and, on the other, it was the means of carrying out to the full their communion. "Come and dine." Comp. Luke xiii. 26: "we have eaten and drunk in Thy presence, and Thou hast taught in our streets."

[2] This is not in opposition to the facts, that neither Mary of Magdala nor the travellers to Emmaus know the Lord. These facts partly yield to the psychological key without difficulty, partly become intelligible by supposing an intention on the part of the Risen One.

members and the spear-wound. "It is I Myself,"—so *He* testified, so *they* found it. For neither did this body see corruption, nor did it disappear, no one knew whither; "He is not here, but He is risen,"—this word of the angel applies also to the crucified body, for it was this body which the women came to anoint; the resurrection preserved it! One may not indeed express himself as Rothe has done in the hypothesis we have quoted. We cannot at all speak of a putting on and a putting off; and still less of a twofold body, a material and an immaterial. The body of the risen Lord is one. As to its essence it is a *spiritual body*,—the organ of that life to which the Risen One is called. But this body corresponds to the law of phenomena so soon as the Lord resolves to make Himself known sensibly to His own; and it *can* correspond to this law, because Christ by His rising entered into His glory.

In vindicating our view, we do not intend to go beyond the limits of the Gospel narratives. Otherwise we should be met with the question, whether the doctrine of our Lord's second coming must not lead to the same supposition. For the church has always rightly taught that the future Judge will appear with a visible body (Quenstedt: "visibiliter in carne redibit"), and will be revealed even to the eyes of the world.[1] But with equal right does the church hold fast the proposition, "de corpore Christi glorioso et in thronum dextrae divinae evecto visibilitatem praedicari non posse." How is the one to be reconciled with the other? But we leave the subject. Much more important is it for us to prove, that the view we have advanced stands the test of the narratives of the resurrection given by the evangelists, and that it in turn makes them clearer and more intelligible. This holds good especially of the two prominent cases in which the opposite indications meet one another in all their sharpness. We say in all their sharpness. For no enantiophany can be more striking than when Luke, in speaking of the travellers to Emmaus, follows up the terms, *drew near, go with them, went in,*

[1] Not all church divines have cherished the view, that the Lord at His second coming will bear on His person the marks of His sufferings; but the majority of them certainly lean to this opinion. Comp. Quenstedt's discussion in the *theol. did. pol.* III. p. 622: "an vulnerum in passione acceptorum praecipuas cicatrices ostensurus sit in die pantocritico judex vivorum et mortuorum Jesus Christus." Calvin calls the view a "delirium stultum et anile." Gerhard wavers in his expressions.

*sat at meat, broke bread,* with the wholly disparate phrase, *He vanished* (ἐγένετο ἄφαντος); or when, in John's description, there follows on the *He stood in the midst of them* (ἔστη εἰς τὸ μέσον), the statement that the disciples saw and touched the body of their Lord. Every attempt at reconciliation is here vain; it is impossible to establish a continuity. It is the idea of *appearing* which explains the enigma. We beg our readers to mark the relation in which the cases described stand to one another. In Luke we find the miraculous element at the *close;* in John it meets us at the *beginning.* So the first and last points testify immateriality, while all that lies between these sharply defined points bears on it every mark of a material body. At the moment of His appearing the latter prevails; apart from it the former abides. "He stood in the midst," so John relates. But the meaning is not that the Lord penetrated through closed doors, and the disciples saw Him coming. It is not the *came* which is the object of this seeing, but their eyes first saw Him who appeared in their midst. Ἄφαντος ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῶν, He vanished out of their sight, so we read in Luke. But the evangelist would not have us to understand him as if the Lord had moved away beyond their sight. So, indeed, Gerhard has explained the expression ("factus est inconspicuus, desiit esse conspicuus"); but in vain has he contested the undoubtedly correct translation of the Vulgate: "evanuit ex oculis eorum." The object of His appearing was reached; the appearing itself took end; the Risen One returned to His invisibility.

We cannot break off without considering another question, which not only receives its own answer from the point we have reached, but which thereby reflects a confirmatory light upon the result which we have developed. The question which we have in view becomes a source of hopeless embarrassment whenever the anti-scriptural view is rejected, that the Lord during the forty days was in an intermediate state, that He gradually matured in a process of rising glorification for His ascension on high. Where did He dwell during the interval? And what work had He meanwhile to do? It has been repeatedly attempted, as is well known, to find an answer in the assertion that the Risen One even on Easter morning, immediately after the scene with the Magdalene, ascended to His God and Father. Most recently this hypothesis has once more found a warm

defender (comp. Greve, *die Himmelfahrt unseres Herrn Jesu Christi,* Hannover 1868). The arguments which the author has brought to its support are not exactly new; but so much the more vehemently has he urged its claim to undoubted truth. "Without it, the whole state of the Prince of Life during the forty days is mystified or darkened, and from this mystification the church has suffered till now;" "the traditional ecclesiastical view must give way wholly to the apostolico-biblical,—hitherto it has not been so." When one can speak of a doctrine which the church has persistently proclaimed from the beginning[1] down to the present hour, branding it as "a vain and anti-scriptural view," he virtually pronounces his own condemnation. It is needless labour to convict such a testimony of error. Discipline calls on us to crush such eccentricities in the bud. Unfortunately, these extravagances have discredited the whole question which has given occasion to them. It has been called idle and irrelevant. But the real merit of Greve's work lies in this, that it has energetically asserted its right. Not only has it a place, but it is absolutely inevitable. The full materials needed for its solution we shall have before us together, though not till a later stage. But even now we can in this interest use the key which has opened to us the right view of the resurrection history. We return to the idea of *appearing.* Reich has denied its consequences when he passes the judgment: "It would be hard to say where else than in heaven the Risen One could have been in the interval" (*ubi supra,* p. 317). For the Lord could indeed *reveal* Himself also from heaven; and He did so even sensibly; but His *appearing* was out and out conditioned by His being on the earth. Luke has named the day when He was taken up as the limit to which these proofs of His life extended. Henceforth the being seen (ὀπτάνεσθαι) ceased, no earthly eye saw Him more. He will appear yet once more; but only *once* more. "This Jesus shall so come again in like manner as ye have seen Him

[1] The author indeed maintains that the traditional view is of later origin, while the older apostolic church represented the view defended by himself. But he has been unable to adduce any other than the well-known passage in the Epistle of Barnabas (c. 15, Ausgabe von Dressel, p. 36). The interpretation of the words he has borrowed from Meyer (*Comm. zum Luc.* p. 588). But, supposing this explanation to be the right one, what follows from it of importance? The conclusion of Mark may perhaps have misled the writer of the Epistle to this erroneous impression; as to the view of the church of his time, it argues nothing.

go into heaven"—so in like manner;—till then He is absolutely invisible.

Christ, then, was on the earth during the forty days; that will be the general answer. But a more definite form is given to the question. Not, indeed, in a coarse external sense is it put by any one. No disciple during the Easter days allowed the words to escape his lips: "Lord, where dwellest Thou?" "None of the disciples durst ask Him." And so still it is only ignorance that could imagine that the glorified One needed a place where to lay His head, or required to be waited on by human hands. But the point on which explanation is desired is this: In what circles did the Risen One move, and what detained Him so long on the earth? How can we meet the difficulty of Reich, that, after all, He spent only a few hours in intercourse with His own? We cannot accept the answer given by Hengstenberg, that the Lord dwelt during the interval on the mountains in prayer to the Father, occupied as the representative of the infant church; for, apart from other obvious difficulties, it is utterly destitute of historical support. We must take to do with what we know and what is confided to us. And it is enough if we use it faithfully. Let us only take possession of what is actually before us. The Risen One appeared to His own; to the disciples alone, to the exclusion of the world,[1] did He manifest Himself sensibly. Undoubtedly, to appearance, these manifestations have their narrow limits; and so far it may be said that the remaining history of the forty days is hidden by a thick veil. And yet the idea of them gives forth a light which reveals the apparently closed region. In His appearing there becomes manifest what otherwise indeed is veiled, but what is as certainly present. The momentary appearance is the pledge of the constant presence. It is foolish to say that the Lord passed only a few hours with His own; that where else He dwelt, what else He did, remains unknown. For it was only His sensible intercourse which was confined to the space of those hours; He was always *near* them, and *personally* near, and He remained so to the end; the place where His disciples were was also *His* abode, for it was only on their account that He still

[1] Comp. Acts x. 41: "Not to all the people, but unto witnesses chosen, even to us." John xiv. 22: "Lord, how is it that Thou wilt manifest Thyself unto us and not unto the world?"

remained on the earth.[1] Only when He left the earth on the fortieth day did He take leave of them.[2] We recall an occurrence of an earlier time. The Lord had fed the people in the desert. He constrains the disciples to enter the ship to return to Capernaum; He Himself remains on the land to dismiss the multitude, and He ascends a mountain. Hours pass; then suddenly He appears before them walking on the sea. They are terrified, and cry out that it is a spirit; but He answers: "Be of good cheer, it is I, be not afraid." The likeness to the resurrection history is evident. Then, too, the disciples imagine they see a spirit; then, too, the Lord meets them with His "it is I Myself." But this is not quite the part on which we fasten; our interest rests on another point. While the disciples fought with the stormy waves, where in the meantime was Jesus? We are told, indeed, by the evangelist that "He was alone on the land, but the ship was in the midst of the sea;" but he does not leave it unnoticed that the Lord accompanied them in thought and followed them with His eye (εἶδεν, Mark vi. 48); and when He stands bodily before their view in the midst of the lake, they discover that He had been always present with them. How much more so was it during the days of the resurrection! Christ appears. But He comes not, and no one knows whence! Only the veil falls, and He who is constantly in the midst of His own is sensibly beheld by them.

The interest of our last discussion goes only to prove a result already gained. Therefore we discontinue it, though still incomplete, to take it up again at an after stage. For the present we return to its starting-point. We have proved that the "contradictory indications," on which criticism has rested its destructive process, find a satisfactory solution. They become intelligible,

[1] As to the *disciples*, it is readily granted that their Lord's appearances formed the real matter of their life during the forty days. What they lived in this interval, they lived in the thought of the Risen One. If any one scruples to make the same supposition with reference to the *Lord*, he is not doing justice to the circumstance that His kingdom on the earth depended on the service of the disciples.

[2] We do not forget the words of the Risen One: ἔτι ὢν σὺν ὑμῖν τοὺς λόγους τούτους ἐλάλησα πρὸς ὑμᾶς (Luke xxiv. 44), but they are not to be so rigidly taken as if this εἶναι σὺν αὐτοῖς held in no sense true during the forty days (so Reich, Hengstenberg, Greve). The words deny only the constancy of the intercourse, without excluding personal communion. The latter was not closed till the day of the ascension; just as then only the saying of the Lord, νῦν πάτερ ἁγιε πρός σε ἔρχομαι (John xvii. 13), became fully true.

on the one hand, from the essence (οὐσία) of the body in which the Lord rose from the dead, and on the other, from the element of His appearing. So far are they from overturning the credibility of the Easter history, that they become the seal of its confirmation. The narratives force us to infer a higher glorified bodily organism; but such an organ was needed by the Risen One in order to dispense the gift of the Spirit. Again they force us to infer a material body; but only in such a one could the Lord appear to the disciples. Finally, they conjoin both kinds of characteristics with one another so naïvely, intertwine them so firmly, and interweave them so closely, that their apparent contradictoriness did not occur to the narrators; but, in fact, there is no contradiction here; for it is the same body which appears, and the same which retires into the invisible world. For proof of this identity we return once more to the incident, which we rightly judge the most prominent point in the whole resurrection history. The Lord breathes on His disciples, and says to them: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." The breath which their senses discerned obviously touched them as the breathing of a living soul, as the exhalation of a material organism. But so considered it could not possibly be the conductor of the Spirit; for this gift can only pass over to the hearts of men from the quickening spirit by means of the spiritual body. Where, then, except in the presupposed identity, is to be found the solution of the enigma?

But there is yet another interest which leads us to refer to this occurrence. The terms are decidedly against those who regard the act of our Lord only as symbolico-*prophetical*. On the contrary, "He speaks, and it is done;" He gives, and the disciples receive. But then, indeed, the whole way and manner in which the appearances of the Risen One are commonly judged will undergo important modifications. They are on other grounds advisable, these modifications, unless we are to lay ourselves dangerously open to the attacks of criticism. If we limit the object of the Christophanies merely to the end of convincing the disciples that the Lord was risen indeed, we have no answer to the question why He tarried on the earth for forty days more. For in this case it would have been in perfect order if He, according to the apparent reading of the third Gospel, had left this earthly scene on Easter evening. But now the Lord says: "Receive the Holy Ghost." So He performed an action such as

we have already seen to be the essential occupation of His kingly office. For the dominion to which the Lord is called in His state of exaltation is exercised in nothing else than the dispensation of the Holy Spirit. This was the end which the Father had in view in the mission of the Son generally (comp. Rom. viii. 3: sending His Son), and especially in His resurrection from the dead. Undoubtedly, church divines have Scripture on their side when they define the object of the *sessio Christi ad dextram patris* in several ways; but as certainly do all these definitions run up into that one comprehensive object. He represents us at the Father's right hand; but we have received His own authentic declaration about this *interceding*,—"I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Comforter to abide with you for ever." He is called the *Minister of the Sanctuary*, where He has sat down at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty (Heb. viii. 2); but ver. 10 leaves no doubt wherein the apostle places this ministry of the exalted Saviour. If, then, the Lord even in the days of His resurrection, when He appeared in the circle of the disciples, bestowed the gift of the Spirit, these appearances rise of themselves above the level of the common view. Far from corresponding merely economically to the wants of the weak, they are the kingly acts of Him who has already entered into His glory; they are similar to that which He does for ever on the throne of God. Similar; but yet not the same. For what He executes on the earth cannot be wholly identical with His ruling in heaven. Beginning and progress do not stand in the relation of pure continuity; but on account of their place, if for no other reason, we assume a more preparatory object for the beginning. From this point the interval of forty days receives its explanation. This interval was needed, and was needed of this duration. It was to be expected that criticism, to explain the genesis of the "legend," would apply the Jewish symbolism of numbers. It found no lack of instances in the O. T. history. True, it is not always days, but sometimes years that are spoken of. But that is a small matter. The forty is there (is it not?) in plain figures. The candid expositor can only refer to one precedent; but on this he will certainly insist. For forty days the Lord lived in the wilderness; there the tempter showed Him all the kingdoms of the world and their glory,—"*τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἅπασάν σοι δώσω*;" and at the

end of the struggle the conqueror entered on the career of Messiah. Forty days again did the Risen One tarry on the earth. All power in heaven and on earth was already bestowed on Him ("ἐδόθη μοι"), and He actually proved His possession of it; and yet in some sense or other the time specified was only the preparation for His kingly working from heaven, as the interval in the wilderness paved the way for His Messianic career. In some sense or other. But how is this to be more exactly defined? With this question we enter on new investigations.

# THIRD SECTION.

## THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RISEN ONE.

### 1. THE REALITY OF OUR LORD'S APPEARANCES.

WE have explained in the proper place on what ground we treat the appearances of the Risen One third in order. They are not of the same importance to us as to historical criticism. The *absence of presupposition*, with which the latter approaches the Easter history, implies that the message, which for centuries one day has proclaimed to another, is in itself of no account; that it lays the entire stress on the question whether eye-witnesses saw the living One, and whether those eye-witnesses have given us their own account of what they saw. It imagines itself constrained to answer this question in the negative, and consequently the fact itself collapses before its tribunal. The case is quite different with him who starts from the certainty that Jesus is the Christ. Far from advancing the claim on which criticism declares it must insist, he accepts the message of the church, because its contents are the sure consequence of his own presupposition; nay, far from resting his faith in the living One on these *proofs*, he does not even need them to strengthen or justify his faith. And we think this is the true order. Hofmann has rightly maintained that the disciples should have believed the resurrection of Christ, even without having seen Him appear. For only thus can we understand the rebuke which our Lord administered to the travellers to Emmaus. They allow that they have heard the news, but they own at the same time that it has only gone to confound their minds (ἐξέστησαν ἡμᾶς, Luke xxiv. 22); and for this unbelief they are called "fools and slow of heart." We are not, however, on this account at all cold or indifferent towards the narratives of the manifestations of the Risen One. We, too, hold them to be of high account.

But the viewpoint from which we estimate their value is wholly different from what it would be if they were the foundation of our faith in the Easter event.[1] As the essential foundation of this faith, with which it must stand or fall, we do not regard them. Our attitude towards them is thus a much freer one than that of historical criticism. We have not an equal, at least not an analogous interest in maintaining these accounts of the evangelists, as criticism has in dissolving them. We are in a position to weigh without prepossession the scruples as to their credibility; while criticism, inspired by its tendency, cannot do justice to the numerous, nay, conclusive marks of their historical reality.

And, indeed, there is no domain of the Gospel history where the full bias and prejudice of criticism betray themselves more clearly than on this. The objections which it raises do not apply in the least to the existing narratives as such. When Strauss remarks, "These accounts assume a resurrection of Jesus, but I cannot admit so monstrous an event; they testify to a mongrel being to which I cannot concede a real existence; and consequently they belong to the mythical," these are really not the arguments of historical criticism; they are taken from another region than that of history. He has made a confession of which we have cause to take note; he has seen himself constrained to it by the character of the Gospel narratives. "*Taken in themselves,*" so he expresses himself (*L. J.* p. 308), "some of the histories of Christ's appearing admit of being reduced to events of a purely natural kind. With respect to the descriptions of the travellers to Emmaus, or of the draught of fishes in the early morning, it may be easily supposed that the excited disciples imagined they saw their lost Master in some unknown stranger who made a peculiar impression on them, or met them in perplexing circumstances. In Herzog Ulrich's times, things of a perfectly similar kind happened in Suabia." When one cannot help conceding to the narratives, "taken in themselves," a historical character, and so some measure at least of credibility, he must, unless he is

[1] We regard Gerhard as mistaken when, *ubi supra*, he reckons the appearances of our Lord among the proofs of the reality of His resurrection. He adduces them only in the last place; but then he thinks that they put an end to doubt: "Τεκμήριον est certum et indubium signum, quod facit τὸ τέκμαρ, h.e. τέλος dubitationi; cui opponitur τὸ εἰκός, signum verisimile et probabile, ab ἔοικεν." The element of truth which underlies this view, and which we shall point out in its proper place, is wrongly applied here.

enslaved by some prejudice, be necessarily led by historical investigation to the question whether the disciples were really deceived in their perceptions, or whether the error does not rather lie on his own side. But instead of fixing its eye on this possibility searchingly, criticism expects us to admit another. We are expected, namely, to assume that the appearances of which the witnesses have given account "are to be regarded as purely subjective, as facts of their inner life." Both Strauss, who was the author of this view, and Holsten, who, in his frequently mentioned treatise, *zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, undertook to establish it more firmly, take their departure from the Apostle Paul as "the earliest author who has given us more minute information respecting the genesis of faith in the Risen One." Alleging his "nervous character and his disposition to fanatical states of soul," appealing, further, to his passionate restlessness and the zealot-like impatience of his action, they seek to make it probable that he was so impressed with the inner certainty and calm peace enjoyed by the early church as to doubt the righteousness of the cause which he had hitherto served. "From this inner discord," so they maintain, "there easily arose an ecstasy in which he imagined that he saw the Christ, whom he had so violently persecuted, in all His glory, and heard His voice calling him. From this point they next reason backwards to the Christophanies which happened to the earlier witnesses. These, too, they derive from such a subjective source. Has not the Apostle Paul by his *κἀμοί*, 1 Cor. xv. 8, expressly classed them in the same category with his own experience? Undoubtedly the adherents of Jesus, immediately after the catastrophe, were in a condition of unusual nervous excitement. Several of them, such as Peter and the Magdalene, were notoriously disposed to hallucinations. If, now, recalling the personality of their Master, and firmly believing His Messiahship, they understood His death, not as a sinking into the realm of shades, but as an exaltation to God, an entrance into glory, it is not hard to conceive that what is to be taken by *us* as mere vision, may have presented itself to those interested ones as an external and sensible perception."

In a former connection we have said that we are entirely at one with Hofmann in the course which he has followed in relation to this monstrous supposition. He simply discards it as absolutely untenable. The short protest is, in fact, fully justified

when the vision theory seeks to rob the reality of the Lord's resurrection of its sure support. For when one finds the latter firmly established altogether apart from the manifestations of the Risen One, he has no interest in putting himself right with a hypothesis which betrays itself as a pure evasion. Only on another side this interest may be awakened in a way all the stronger. For when the object is, as in our case, to view the Christophanies, *not* from the standpoint of proofs for the Easter miracle, but to claim for them a more comprehensive and *independent* meaning, the rejection of the critical view must necessarily rest on a preceding refutation. And this refutation has been attempted. We are far from undervaluing the labours which have been thus expended; but they have not had the wished-for success. The vision theory continues to find approval among theologians and laymen in a far wider range than is commonly believed. Leaving the question aside, whether this approval is really to be explained from the circumstance that the critical view "gets rid of the miraculous in a way corresponding to the spirit of the age," it could not have come about had there not been some elements of truth in the statements of our adversaries. The apologetic which refuses this acknowledgment, acts against its own interest. It is a wholly groundless fear when it is said that we make advances to criticism by such concessions; in this way, rather, we enter into the lists in which a successful struggle against it lies before us. It is a twofold object which we have in view.

The word vision, in the domain of which we are treating, has gradually gained such a character that it is regarded as a matter of valour to yield not a hairbreadth to criticism. But the latter is indisputably right when it appeals to the testimony of Scripture itself to prove that not only did ecstatic conditions in general, but a visionary beholding of the glorified Christ in particular, repeatedly take place in the first Christian church. It was a vision which is reported of the dying martyr: "he looked up to heaven, and said, Behold, I see the Son of man standing at the right hand of God." It was also a vision which is related by the author of the Apocalypse: "I was in the spirit on the Lord's day, and I heard behind me a loud voice; and when I was turned, I saw one like unto the Son of man." In view of such facts, the possibility cannot be denied that the first witnesses also

spread the news of the living One on the ground of inward perceptions, and that the often quoted ὤφθη (was seen), which Paul predicates of them, may be taken in the sense of a subjective vision. No effort, indeed, will succeed in raising this view to the level of probability. The depression into which the disciples undoubtedly sank on the death of their Lord, was certainly the most unfavourable soil for ecstatic states; and who can believe that their spirit, purely of itself, without the co-operation of any factor from without, could have sprung so soon from this depth to the vision of a Stephen? But as to the abstract possibility, we are certainly constrained to concede it to criticism. Therewith it declares itself satisfied. This concession seems to it to be basis enough for further operations. Has it, then, really a sufficient foundation, a sure point of support? Let us look more closely at the admitted possibility. Specially let us consider its true and sharply-defined field. How widely does it extend? Certainly not further than that the disciples, partly in consequence of impressions previously received, partly on the ground of Old Testament prophecies, or of the Lord's own utterances, attained by reflection to the certainty that the crucified One had passed through the gates of death, not to death, but into the glory of God; and that they, incessantly occupied with this thought, gradually rose through a heightening of their inner life to a visionary contemplation of the glorified One. This would be the utmost limit.

But how is the faith of the church related to the contents of this concession? And how is the origin of the Gospel narratives to be explained thereby? In the latter, in the first instance and immediately, there is not a word of a glorified Christ; it is only the Risen One as such who meets the astonished witnesses. It is not in the halo of glorification that they recognise Him, but in the restoration of His earlier form. What reflection could have led them to this idea? and how could their imagination have produced such a phantasm? According to the accounts given by Luke and John, it cost pains to convince them that the Lord had really returned to bodily life; they could not grasp it, they could not shape their thoughts according to it. Criticism, indeed, explains those reports as unauthentic legends; only the elements at least must have existed out of which to form them. And these elements, where were they to be found? Not in prophecy.

The scattered declarations of the Lord Himself passed fruitlessly over His hearers. "What means the rising from the dead?" so they asked one another in common amazement (Mark ix. 10). Whence then the cry, or even the thought,—nay, the mere legend itself,—that the *risen* Christ had been seen? The way and manner in which criticism seeks to set aside this difficulty has certainly not raised its credit with any impartial judge. Strauss appeals to the fact that a resurrection from the dead was by no means strange to the Jewish consciousness. But even he must confess that it was not expected till the end of the world. ("I know," so says Martha, John xi. 24, of her departed brother, "that he shall rise in the resurrection at the last day.") And how does he help himself over this difficulty? "That the resurrection might take place earlier," such is his explanation, "in a single case, that of an *exceptionally* holy man, made no difficulty from the standpoint of the Jewish thought of the time." We might have wished that he had produced suitable proofs of the "Jewish thought of the time" to justify his view. Destitute of proof, even as it is given here, it testifies to the utter helplessness of the author and his recklessness of assertion. Such hardihood in clearing the chasm is too much for Dr. Holsten. This "exceptionally" is a leap which he does not trust himself to take after the master. He endeavours to make out the opinion of the Pharisaic school regarding the resurrection from the dead, and he assumes that the disciples of Jesus shared the view of this sect. For the convenience of his readers, he has given the relative passages of Josephus word for word. Only these passages prove, according to his own admission, the reverse of the supposition on which the representations of the evangelists rest. For the passing into another body (*μεταβαίνειν εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα*), to which the Pharisaic creed looks forward for the souls of the just (comp. Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 14), excludes the thought of a revivification of the body left inanimate on the cross, as conclusively as it leaves no room for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh in general.[1] The author says, with perfect right (*ubi*

[1] In maintaining the position that the Apostle Paul had his doctrine of the resurrection, as he is wont to present it, when he was yet a Jewish Pharisee (the change at the utmost being the substitution of the idea of the *πνεῦμα* for that of the *ψυχή*), Dr. Holsten is without answer in view of 1 Cor. xv. If Paul formerly shared the opinion of the Pharisaic school, he must afterwards have given it up and forgotten it; for a *μεταβαίνειν* of the dead *εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα* is incompatible with his view, that

*supra*, p. 128), that it cannot be maintained on historical grounds that Peter and James could have regarded the resurrection of Jesus as a raising of the body which had been laid in the grave. But does not this indisputably prove that narratives which obviously assume this view could not possibly have arisen had not ocular demonstration forced the conception of it on the witnesses? Criticism should have acknowledged this; indeed, it has virtually done so by laying the whole stress on the Christophany experienced by *Paul*. Here it had to do only with the glorified Christ, without encountering the Risen One as such to hinder its procedure; here it could, with an appearance of right and with hope of success, put the question whether this heavenly vision, as Paul himself called it, did not spring from a purely subjective root. And, further, by raising the fact that the apostle (1 Cor. xv.) simply appends his own experience to that of the former witnesses to a proof of their mutual homogeneousness, it might succeed with the difficulty which it finds in the Gospel narratives, not indeed to the extent of removing it, but in evading it. Only the abuse which it has made of the Pauline "was seen of me also" (ὤφθη κἀμοί) is obvious. How it may be with the vision of Saul, we leave for the present undetermined; in any case, this conjunctive κἀμοί does not establish the inference of criticism. Undoubtedly the apostle means thereby to raise the manifestation made to him to the level of the same importance with those which precede; he means to emphasize the truth that *he too* "saw the glorified Lord in person as really as any other before him" (comp. R. Rothe, *zur Dogmatik*, p. 325);[1] but

the dead body is the σπορά from which the new one arises. Speaking generally, the passage in Corinthians leaves us in no doubt that the fact of the resurrection of Jesus is the hinge on which exclusively the apostle hangs his proclamation of the future resurrection. Christ the ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων,—there is revealed in this description the source from which he drew it, and from which he received it as one specifically new.

[1] This fact sheds light also on the peculiar name which the apostle has given himself in the context of the passage in Corinthians. The word ἔκτρωμα has received very various, sometimes extraordinary (Bretschneider), and even romantic explanations (comp. Kienlen, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* 13, 2, p. 316). Sober exposition oscillates between the idea of a "weakly" and a "premature incomplete" birth. Neither the passages in which the LXX. have used the term, nor Lobeck's quotations (*Phryn.* p. 209), contribute anything towards a decision; but the text itself does. The article before ἐκτρώματι has justly been reckoned strange. We can understand it only on the supposition that the apostle has taken this name from the mouth of his Judaizing adversaries at Corinth. In what sense *they* meant the derisive appellation is abundantly clear from the polemic of Paul against their suspicions; so

equality of dignity is not dependent on entire homogeneity; on the contrary, in that case the ascended One must have appeared as one, and the Risen One as another. His manifestation on the earth and His appearing from heaven must have been distinguished from one another by a necessity of nature.

But now the question needs to be treated, and herewith we enter upon a second consideration, whether criticism can rightly use the history of Paul's conversion in the service of the vision theory. We have already remarked and explained why our opponents find here a much more favourable position than when they are confronted with the Gospel narratives. Nor are we able to deny all success to the efforts which they have made. That the apostle, with his known peculiarities and in the given historical circumstances, might have fallen into an ecstasy, and in this condition have beheld in the way of vision, in the halo of His glory, the object of his persecution,—this they have, in fact, proved to be possible and conceivable. When Holsten enters into the details of the theory, he undoubtedly exposes himself to frequent contradictions; but as to the proof of the possibility of such a vision on the part of Paul, we cannot help conceding it to him. But what gain is there to criticism in this concession? What advantage has it from the confession of the abstract possibility, when in the concrete case in question it is decidedly denied, nay, when it is *proved* that what the apostle experienced on his way to Damascus cannot be understood as an immanent psychological act of his own spirit, but only as a transcendent deed of the glorified Christ? We apply ourselves to the proof.

It is not our intention again to take up investigations which have already been closed. Very recently anew it has been sought to point out the essential difference between Paul's ecstasy, 2 Cor. xii., and his experience on his way to Damascus. Krauss

specially the passage, 2 Cor. x. 10: ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος, φησίν, ἀσθενὴς καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος. But in one view the apostle himself is not dissatisfied with the name; he accepts it: "they are right, I *am* an ἔκτρωμα; the term applies to me." And how far does it apply to him? Since he has immediately *before* laid stress on the fact that the risen Christ appeared to *all apostles*, and since immediately *after* he speaks of his own apostleship, he obviously puts the ἔκτρωμα in relation to his call to the apostolic office effected by the manifestation of the Lord. And that he was turned so suddenly and unexpectedly from the career of a persecutor to that of an evangelist by the miraculous might of that undeserved grace which presented itself to him in the heavenly revelation (Grot.: "vi subita"),—such is the meaning in which he himself owns the name and willingly lets it stand.

has given the attempt his warmest approbation (*ubi supra*, p. 267), and we on our part have no desire to depreciate its merit. Dr. Holsten, against whom it is particularly directed, has, indeed, defended himself in a special answer. But it is vain for this theologian to attempt to prove that Paul himself was not in circumstances to distinguish between vision and supernatural reality. Pity for the laborious but fruitless diligence which he has expended on this argument. His subtle and bewildering distinctions, which make, and again take back concessions, and which seem to be almost intended to confound his readers, may impose on them for a moment, but they cannot alter the simple state of the case. If one listens impartially to the apostle relating the decisive experience with the calm clearness of a conscious recollection, he is at once furnished with the answer to the question whether the narrator—both in reference to the matter itself and his own conviction—is speaking of a merely subjective vision, or of an objective event falling under the senses; he *has* come to the conclusion, that it was impossible for the narrator to confound an occurrence only imagined by the receiving subject with the reality of a bodily appearance of the glorified One (comp. Niedner, *christl. Kirchengeschichte*, p. 109). Otherwise we should be obliged to share the standpoint of a Festus, who took refuge in the explanation: "Paul, thou art beside thyself; much learning doth make thee mad." We should be obliged to give the apostle the lie direct, when he answers the governor with the protestation: "I am not mad, most noble Festus, but speak forth the words of truth and soberness" (Acts xxvi. 24, 25). Paul can confess to a folly (*ἀφροσύνη*), in so far as he has taken up the tone of boastfulness from necessity; but of the want of sobermindedness (*σωφροσύνη*), the want of the diacritic power to prove things that differ (*δοκιμάζειν τὰ διαφέροντα*), he never would have acknowledged himself guilty.[1] But this side of the subject has been sufficiently illustrated, and we wish to touch it merely by the way.

[1] We have in the Pauline letters a section in which the apostle himself has in a practical way rebutted the supposition that the manifestation which he had was a merely subjective one. In the passage 1 Cor. xv. 5 et seq. his intention certainly is not to adduce solitary instances in which the Risen One was seen by human eyes; but his undoubted intention is to reckon up all the cases of this kind which had ever come to his knowledge, in their entirety as well as in their chronological order. But has he not then omitted one of them? Why does he not add: *ἔπειτα ὤφθη*

There is another rock on which the vision theory, so far as Paul is concerned, must be irretrievably wrecked. Let us leave aside the event itself which brought about the revolution; let us ask instead about the *effect* with which it was accompanied. From the latter there will then arise of itself an argument backwards to the event. The effect in question is usually summed up in the idea of *conversion*. Wrong, the expression is not; but it certainly requires to be more closely defined. If by it is meant the transformation of the fanatical Jew into a decided Christian, we hold the declaration to be not only insufficient, but dangerous, or rather ruinous. The circumstance that it has been, whether expressly or tacitly, adopted is, we are firmly persuaded, the reason why criticism has succeeded in using the history of Paul with such success for its ends. It is, indeed, as plain as day that a purely internal change can only be explained by internal factors, and that psychological art has free scope on this field. And so Holsten has at once cleverly and successfully replied to the unfortunate deductions of Beyschlag. "That the merciless fanatic was transformed into a patient sufferer full of world-subduing, self-consuming love,"—this fact he readily grants; but he is right in disputing the consequences which his opponent has drawn from it; and with equal right he puts to him the question, in what place Paul designates this moral transformation as the fruit of his "conversion-hour." As to the true and essential effect of the Christophany on the way to Damascus, there can on the historical ground be no doubt. Not only did it break the unbelief of the persecutor, not only did it revolutionize his view of the world ("Weltanschauung"), not only did it make his heart a new creation (καινὴ κτίσις),—all these were only secondary elements; but above all, it made of him *an apostle of Jesus Christ*. On this point alone did Paul himself uniformly lay the supreme weight. Whenever he speaks of his apostleship, whether in the tone of defence or of simple

Στεφάνῳ? Of this case he had an immediate knowledge, not a merely traditional one; and he himself had been so intimately associated with it that the remembrance of it was constantly present to his mind (comp. Acts xxii. 20). Now the reason of the blank is obvious. The martyr's vision stood apart of itself from a section which, in accordance with its aim, had to state the sensible objective manifestations of the Risen One. But what inference follows therefrom for the explanation of the words: ἔσχατον πάντων ὥφθη κἀμοί? The conclusion is inevitable, and to our thinking there is no possible objection to its evidence.

testimony, he constantly traces it back to the Christophany which happened to him (comp. 1 Cor. ix. 1, xv. 8, 9; Gal. i. 16). On the other hand, whenever he relates this latter, he always represents as its object and effect his investiture with the office.[1] Well, then, if this was its effect, to what presupposition are we thereby led? Does *this* result, too, admit of being understood as the product of a mere vision, or are we not absolutely constrained to assume an objective cause? As is well known, Baur, at the close of his life-work, and to the annoyance of many, expressed the opinion that no analysis, either psychological or dialectical, explains the conversion of Paul, and that the enigma does not admit of a solution unless we acknowledge a miracle. His scholars have set themselves the task of rectifying this "error" of the master. For this purpose they have left out of view the fact which moved Baur to his final judgment. They are silent about the apostle's official appointment and work, and instead of this they lay stress exclusively on the new world-view ("neue Weltanschauung") which he gained. But by merely ignoring it, they do not get rid of a fact on which their structure falls to the ground. No one could, by his own resolution, destine himself to the apostolic office. The condition was an express and immediate call from the Lord. An apostle is not a teacher, not a pastor, not an evangelist; a specific difference raises him above all these offices. One might think himself called to ministerial service in the kingdom of God by pronounced inclination and by manifest gifts, and the *vocatio mediata* was enough to warrant him in entering on it; but as to the apostleship, Paul himself has summed up the prerequisite in the words, "not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised Him from the dead." And we are to suppose that he believed himself to have received such an office in a vision? That on this subjective basis he entered upon it with the confidence which we know, and in the way not less known to us finished his course in it? We will not insist on the element of improbability, strongly as it presents itself. Were this all, that the apostle felt himself subjectively called to this position without having the superabundance (περισσεία) of certainty given him by an objec-

[1] Even the church of that day was not amazed that its former persecutor had suddenly become a believing Christian; but *this* was the cause of its astonishment, ὅτι ὁ διώκων ἡμᾶς, νῦν εὐαγγελίζεται τὴν πίστιν ἣν ποτε ἐπόρθει, Gal. i. 23; Acts ix. 20, 21.

tive testimony from the Lord, we should know of moments when a wavering, an uncertainty, a doubt crept over him, when the question pressed on him, "lest by any means he should run, or had run, in vain." For mere *faith* in a call does not shut out, but rather necessarily includes, assaults of doubt. But in the most critical situations and under the most searching trials,—when a flood of suffering poured over him more than sufficient to produce sobriety, when his office was challenged in a quarter which itself was fitted to shake even a firm consciousness,—we find nowhere the very slightest trace left by such assaults.[1] Meanwhile we pass from this count of probability. Criticism takes the edge from it by explaining that Paul himself was convinced of the objectivity of his call to office as an external fact. But is it also ready with an answer to another question which we must put to it? It is allowed, or rather expressly conceded by it, that visions only objectivize subjective processes, that they are only reproductions of already existent psychical images. Let it then be granted that Paul in his inmost soul believed already on the Risen One *before* the Christophany, and that he, on the point of journeying to Damascus, was at the last weak struggle against the goad of truth; be it granted that this latent faith only required the vision to enable it to burst triumphantly through. Can criticism satisfy itself with this concession thus limited? Does it suffice for its need when confronted with the contents of the history? No, it must perforce go further; it must advance to the assumption that the persecutor, even in the midst of his fanaticism, had raised the thought within himself of exercising the apostolic office in the service of the Risen One. In a vision which admittedly only objectivizes images already formed, he could not *without* this presupposition have understood the voice

[1] It has been remarked that there was independently an element in the case which counterbalanced any possible and perhaps actual temptation of the apostle, namely, the success of his official work. Did not Paul himself repeatedly appeal to it? Yes, he did so. But against whom, and with what view? He writes to the Corinthians: If I be not an apostle to others, yet am I an apostle to you; ye are the seal of my apostleship; ye are our epistle ministered through our office, and the signs of an apostle were wrought among you. And similarly he must have met the older apostles in Jerusalem, comp. Gal. ii. 7–9. His interest was thus a purely apologetic one. As to himself, he ever judged his official successes only as gifts of grace, as matter for his thanksgiving. They are not to him a proof of his apostleship. This he seeks exclusively in the Christophany which was granted to him; any other he neither required nor desired.

calling him, he could not have imagined himself receiving the charge and the mission. Does criticism nevertheless expect of us such a self-contradictory assumption? If it does so, it passes beyond the domain on which it is possible to have dealings with it. Does it, on the contrary, itself recoil before this monstrosity? Then it dare no longer appeal in support of the vision theory to the history of Paul.[1]

Without our intending it, the last consideration has landed us on the threshold of another task; it has even presented us with the viewpoint which must control the attempt to find its solution. If one is judging the appearances of the Lord only as proofs for the certainty of His resurrection, only as evidences of His life, he has sufficiently satisfied the demands of apologetics when he has led proof that there is no objection to the historical character of the narratives which is less groundless than the positive representation given by criticism. But the demand rises higher; it takes an altogether different form when one raises the manifestations of the living One above the level of mere τεκμήρια, and claims for them an *independent* significance. There arises the question: Why, then, was it necessary for the Risen One to appear before the eyes of men? And the answer will not be really satisfactory unless it discloses a very definite connection between these appearances and the securing of the world's salvation. The proof is wanted, that as the Lord rose from the dead for our redemption, the same interest also demanded the revelations of the living One. Not till an answer is given to this inquiry will the Gospel accounts be raised beyond the assaults of criticism, and the conviction of their historical truth become perfect.

### 2. THE OBJECT OF THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE LIVING ONE IN THE PLAN OF SALVATION.

It cannot surprise us that the common view of the object of the Christophanies has gained almost undisputed preva-

[1] Highly significant is the way and manner in which Strauss has got over this subject (*L. J.* p. 304): "So there resulted an ecstasy in Paul, in which Christ appeared to him in all His glory, discovered to him the perverse and pernicious character of his course, and summoned him to pass over into His service." "*And summoned him to pass over into His service;*" that is all, absolutely all that he says to remove the difficulty! If there is a clause in the work of Strauss which bears on its front the stamp of hopeless perplexity as well as emptiness, it is this.'

lence. On the one hand, it corresponds to the immediate feeling, that the conqueror over death must have shown Himself alive to those who, in consequence of His departure, were plunged in the night of mourning and dismay. On the other hand, it harmonizes with the communication repeatedly made, that the Lord sought above all to convince His disciples of the reality of His resurrection. Even Hofmann acquiesces in the view, that "the assuring of His own was the object of the forty days' interval" (*Schriftbew.* III. p. 4). But on closer consideration, serious doubts arise about this traditional view. For example, if it rightly assigned the aim of Christ's appearing, the relatively considerable number of them (the πολλὰ τεκμήρια, Acts i. 3), *to begin with*, would be without a satisfactory explanation. So early as Easter evening, the fourth evangelist declares the result: "Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord;" and therefore, even then, the proposed aim was reached in the circle of the disciples. It has been said that the absence and the obstinate unbelief of Thomas forced the Lord to a new manifestation before the eyes of His own; nay, it has even been maintained that this very episode delayed their departure to Galilee. But supposing we grant this, at least on that eighth day, the last doubt and the last doubter would have been overcome, and the need of further manifestations disappeared. *Besides*, we call attention to the fact that the Lord, in every case in which He secured the certainty for His disciples that He was truly risen, combines with this proof a more or less severe censure. Already they should have trusted the news which He had sent them, and never should the delusion that they had seen a spirit have come into their hearts (Luke xxiv. 38). True, He immediately removes their doubts, He helps them to reach a restful conviction; but this act of mere condescension to weakness cannot possibly be regarded as the real final aim; it can only be judged as the preparation for reaching a more comprehensive, that is to say, the *true* object. Especially instructive in this relation is the close of Mark's Gospel. True, this section is not only suspicious, but we are firmly persuaded of its spuriousness.[1] Nevertheless, we are far from

[1] The genuineness of this section has now but few defenders; and those who have more recently attempted its vindication, have only brought the cause they serve into greater discredit (Caspari, *ubi supra*, p. 202; *Evang. K. Z.* 1868, Nr. 67). The commonplace argument, that it is scarcely conceivable how a later appendix could

ignoring it as a meaningless addition by an incompetent hand; it is not without importance for us. With the view of giving a conclusion to the apparently unfinished treatise, the author has employed materials already contained in the three other Gospels, and so far his description is destitute of all *historical* worth. But all the more deserving of attention is the way and manner in which he has given his *resumé*. The passage is nothing else than a reflection on the history of our Lord's manifestations, a judgment respecting their object. And this judgment may be regarded as the true one. It is first declared that the disciples gave no faith to the rumour, not even to the authentic report of the resurrection; only their view of the Lord succeeded in overcoming their doubts. And so it is acknowledged, that in the

have found its way into almost all the Codd. and versions, should be finally dismissed, for it is certainly much more difficult to understand how the narrative of the woman taken in adultery came into the text of John. In like manner, the question should be set aside where the genuine conclusion of Mark is to be found, or why the evangelist did not finish his work. The difficulty which the question creates is only an apparent gain to those who urge it.—In how great a degree the external evidences throw suspicion on the passage, has been convincingly proved by the thoroughgoing investigations of Klostermann (*das Marcusevangelium*, p. 298 et seq.). But we admit that in the case before us internal criticism must decide. It has been said, "that from ver. 9 onwards a sudden change becomes noticeable in the style. The peculiar stamp of narration belonging to Mark disappears, and a compiling indistinct brevity takes its place. Besides, it is evident that the second half of the chapter cannot possibly proceed from the author of the former. There the angel pointed to an appearance of the Risen One in Galilee, while such an appearance is neither related nor even mentioned in the after course of the narrative.' Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. p. 519, III. p. 4. These are certainly circumstances which must fall with important weight into the scale. Yet we cannot regard them either singly or in their totality as conclusive. We have a wholly different reason for disputing the genuineness of the passage. Let us test ver. 19. The opening words ("ὁ μὲν οὖν κύριος μετὰ τὸ λαλῆσαι αὐτοῖς") certainly sound quite historical, and prepare us for a historical communication. But in truth it is not so followed up. Beginning and continuation form the strangest contrast. The declarations: "ἀνελήφθη εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ" in no case belong to a Gospel history; an *evangelist* could not possibly write thus. It is the language of the confessor, not the tone of the narrator; they form articles of faith, not historical facts; fruits of reflection, not reminiscences. This judgment applies even fatally to the first of the two propositions. Ἀνελήφθη εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, He *was* taken up into heaven, is a wholly different description from that of Luke when he relates (xxiv. 51): καὶ ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ εὐλογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτούς, διέστη ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; on the contrary, it sounds quite like Paul's word when he writes: ἀνελήφθη ἐν δόξῃ (1 Tim. iii. 16). But beyond all contradiction this holds true with the second declaration. Ἐκάθισεν ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ, so the *apostles* could and must preach; but *not* so could an evangelist narrate, *not* with such an unhistorical delineation could Mark close his Gospel *history*.

first place certainly His manifestation was calculated to restore the faith of the disciples. But how far this was from forming the final aim, appears from the report of the rebuke with which the Risen One appeared in the midst of their assembly. Thus it was only a preliminary result, a step towards the object properly so called. And wherein did the author of the section find this last full aim? In nothing else than in the sending out of the Eleven, and the founding of their office! This appears not only from the circumstantial narrative of their commission, but specially from the concluding remark, that the disciples went out preaching everywhere in the strength and under the blessing of their Lord. But it is not from this almost apocryphal passage that we would take the answer to the question before us; we rather seek it in a place which is invested with the highest authority. Nothing could well be more desirable for us than to find ourselves in possession of a section in which an apostolic hand had summed up the manifestations of the Lord. The kernel of their contents would also reveal their object. And in fact we have such a passage!

The narrative given by Matthew of the appearance of the Risen One in Galilee is very commonly and rightly regarded as enigmatical. In saying so we have not in view those difficulties which have already been disposed of in a former connection; there remain many other dark points besides. The most prominent of them is the following. The manifestation of the Lord, which the evangelist undertakes to describe, took place, of course, during a later portion of the forty days' interval; all the Jerusalem scenes recorded by John belong to a more or less distant past. When, then, the disciples left Jerusalem and went to meet the Risen One in Galilee, they must all of them have possessed certainty of faith. And yet we read (Matt. xxviii. 17): "And when they saw Him they worshipped Him, but some doubted" (ἐδίστασαν)! How is it possible to understand this? Some have taken the idea of the διστάζειν in a weaker sense ("they were uncertain whether they should pay the Lord divine adoration"); some have thought to find the doubters in a wider circle. The apostle, say they, speaks of more than five hundred brethren who saw the Risen One; and presumably this latter appearance is identical with that related by Matthew. Even now Ebrard (*ubi supra*, p. 767 et seq.) has anew declared for

this view, though the text of the evangelist is conclusive against it. "Then the eleven disciples,"—so the narrative begins. Were others besides them present? We know not: the author himself gives us neither occasion nor right to say so. Certainly by the those who "saw Him" of ver. 17, he meant none else than the Eleven; and consequently he includes them among those of whom he remarks that they doubted. So the difficulty remains unsolved. And a second arises. However far this manifestation may be brought down into the last days of the interval, it certainly does not form the close of the appearances. For it was not from a mountain in Galilee, but from the Mount of Olives, near Bethany, in Judea, that the Lord returned to heaven. And yet Matthew's account produces out and out the impression of a *farewell;* it is hard to see how, after *this* opening, further intercourse or another manifestation could have followed. Augustine has here again shown his fine feeling, his correct tact. To the annoyance of the later harmonists,[1] he maintains the proposition, "testimonium Christi de omnipotentia sibi data et praeceptum de evangelio in toto orbe praedicando ad diem ascensionis referenda esse" (*de cons. Evang.* III. p. 25). The question which was thus raised, he has not indeed satisfactorily answered. But we are also convinced that the enigmas which the narrative of the first evangelist presents are absolutely inexplicable so long as we proceed on the supposition that he has given the history of a single, independent, and sharply defined manifestation. Quite another light is shed on the subject when we adopt the view, that he has rather described the sum of Christ's manifestations, that he has comprehended their history, not in the form of epitome like the spurious conclusion of Mark, but in their essential contents. In this case the difficulties are resolved. If Matthew's account is taken as the report of a later independent appearance, then a doubt in the circle of the apostles at this stage would be incomprehensible. If, on the contrary, the evangelist had the entire sum of Christophanies in his eye, he could not leave the fact unmentioned, that the Lord was not met, on the part of His own, with unanimous faith. Here he has Thomas in view.[2]

[1] Gerhard exhibits this dislike all the more strongly that he finds himself far from being in a position to meet the church Father with sound arguments.

[2] The plural οἱ δὲ ἐδίστασαν does not stand in the way of our view. It is found elsewhere in the N. T., where only a single individual of a definite circle is meant.

For this disciple only proved himself a doubter strictly so called. As to the others, their conduct (Luke xxiv. 37: "they supposed that they had seen a spirit;" ver. 41: "they believed not and wondered") does not justify the expression of an actual διστάζειν. And again, if Matthew's text is held to be the account of a single appearance, it is scarcely distinguishable from the history of the ascension; the one seems to melt into the other. If, on the contrary, our view of the passage is the right one, it is plain why it bears so unmistakably the stamp of a farewell scene. For the entire manifestations of the living One,—what else are they, what else *can* they be than leave-takings? In them all there is reflected, and *must* be reflected, the message which Mary of Magdala is charged to carry to the disciples: Go, tell My brethren, I ascend to My God and your God.

If, then, we may take Matthew's account as indicating the kernel and true contents of the Christophanies, we shall find no more favourable place for raising the question, what *end* they served. Here will the answer be found, or rather it lies before our very eyes. It harmonizes thoroughly with the result reached by the author of the conclusion of Mark, in the way of reflection. For all that the first evangelist relates—the revelation on the Lord's part, the charge which He delivers, the direction with which He follows it, the promise with which He closes—are summed up in no other fact than in the founding of the apostolate, and the investiture of the Eleven with this office.[1] *With this view*, then, did the Risen One *appear* in the circle of His own. And we get this answer not only from the summary of Matthew, but the narratives of the third and fourth evangelists go to establish its truth. The sum and substance of the rich and varied materials communicated by Luke is the declaration of the Risen One, that

When John vi. 64 expresses the assurance that Jesus knew well τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ μὴ πιστεύοντες, he has in view the one Judas Iscariot, the same of whom the Lord immediately declares, ἐξ ὑμῶν εἷς διάβολος ἐστίν.

[1] Therewith we also include especially the institution of baptism. The doubts raised against the historical character of the fact are in themselves of little account; but they are positively excluded, for the reason that without an express institution it is impossible to explain the church's practice of baptism. For no one will satisfy himself that this practice spread in connection with the baptism of John, and following up the baptism of the disciples in Judea (John iv. 2). On the other hand, it may appear suspicious to give that command of the Lord the special relation to the apostolic office and its institution. Does not Paul explain to the Corinthians that he baptized only a few of them, for he was sent by Christ not to baptize but to

He will cause repentance and remission of sins to be preached in His name among all nations, and that by the mouth of the disciples shall this testimony go forth to the world. And the culminating point in John's account is the Lord's saying on Easter evening: "As the Father hath sent Me, so send I you." Nay, even beyond the domain of the Gospel history, the answer we have given finds its confirmation. Of the appearances of the living One, Peter spoke thus in the house of Cornelius (Acts x. 40 et seq.): "God showed Him openly, not to all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead." And how does he continue? "He commanded us *to preach unto the people!*" That the Christophany which fell to the lot of Paul was intended to call him to the apostolate, we have already sought to show. Now we add the proof, that the long section in which the apostle has spoken both of this and of all the earlier appearances of Christ (1 Cor. xv. 5–8) rests on the same thought. Only when thus viewed does this otherwise extraordinary passage stand in its true light. In itself it cannot but be thought in the highest degree strange that a more or less considerable number of the Corinthian Christians, like Thomas, should have denied out and out the Lord's resurrection, and in consequence of this heresy have virtually broken with the church. The text of the chapter, apart from anything else, nowhere entitles us to make this supposition. The apostle everywhere speaks only of those who doubted the future resurrection of the dead (ver. 12). He reproaches them with being slow to draw the true inference from the Easter miracle. Besides, he expressly acknowledges that they have accepted, and continued to believe, the fundamental facts of the Gospel.[1] No doubt Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. p. 529)

preach the gospel (1 Cor. i. 17)? Notwithstanding, neither is there in these words a depreciation of baptism, nor do they warrant the conclusion that it did not belong to the office of the apostle to carry it out. Paul is describing his special call, founded on his peculiar gifts, which he must follow above everything else. And so he must have taken care universally, when he had preached the gospel with success, that believers were baptized; as at Ephesus he induced the disciples of John to have the *βάπτισμα εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ*. And even as an *apostle* he must have insisted upon it on the ground of the command delivered to the *apostles: μαθητεύσατε βαπτίζοντες*.

[1] Since the apostle gives this testimony to the Corinthians: *παρελάβετε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἐστήκατε ἐν αὐτῷ* (ver. 1), *ἐπιστεύσατε* (ver. 11), it is purely arbitrary to maintain that faith in the Lord's resurrection was not general in that church. What

has good right to think that that fraction of the church might possibly, on its dangerous incline, have come even to deny the Lord's resurrection. But if the apostle really felt this fear, it seems to us very improbable that he would have met the danger with a catalogue of the Christophanies. Thereby he could hardly have averted the evil successfully. There must be another interest in which he marshals these witnesses. And he himself has indicated it in ver. 11: "Whether it were I or they, so we preach, and so ye believe." He speaks, therefore, on the one hand, of the apostolical *kerygma;* on the other, of the state of faith in the church. But, *so we preach;* what means this *so?* We do not think that exegesis has dealt fairly with the particle. It is generally taken as designating the contents of the *kerygma,* —"*that* we teach, and *that* ye have believed." But the Christophanies enumerated immediately before can no more be regarded as a subject of preaching than as an object of faith. That Christ died, and that He rose again, according to the Scriptures; *that* the apostles taught; *that* the churches believed: but not this, that the Risen One was seen by various persons, and at various times and places. This latter fact neither formed the contents of the preaching, nor was it a matter of faith; certainly, however, it formed the condition of the apostolical *kerygma.* Because the disciples saw the living One, therefore did they preach *what* they proclaim, and this their preaching found faith. Thus, and not otherwise, according to our inmost conviction, does the *so* demand to be understood. And what follows therefrom? The same that has already met us in various ways,—that the founding of the office, the investiture of the disciples with its rights and duties, was the object of Christ's manifestations!

*This* is the end, then, for which the Lord manifested, and *required* to manifest, Himself to His own. For it was only—

it lacked was not the confession of the fact as such, but that lively conviction which measures its bearing and draws the conclusions which follow from it, despite the objections at once of the contracted understanding and of the sinful heart. And so Paul asks his readers whether they have not received the message εἰκῇ, that is, as a dead treasure of mere orthodoxy, or whether they have taken it in actual possession, κατέχειν, that is, τῇ καρδίᾳ συνιέναι. (Hofmann's explanation of the passage, *H. S.* III. p. 347, is decidedly erroneous. A thought like this would certainly be extraordinary: ye shall be saved by the gospel, unless ye have believed it in vain, that is, without its turning finally to your salvation!) And therefore he stirs them out of their slothful and sleepy condition (Heb. xii. 1) with the penetrating and awakening call: ἐκνήψατε δικαίως καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε (ver. 34).

and here we touch a new side of the subject,—it was only by appearing bodily before their eyes that He could gain the end in question. That He had risen, in a general way, to newness of life, the disciples might have believed even without seeing Him; nay, it would have been quite natural had they trusted the simple message. But to *preach* the faith, to open their mouths for the apostolical *kerygma*, this they could not, dared not even have done had the express charge not been given them by the Risen One in real, sensible manifestations. It is to misapply a psychological commonplace, to say that every living conviction awakens the impulse to communicate and propagate it. He who can content himself with this phrase has yet to learn the real nature of the apostleship; he has never yet felt a breath of Paul's saying: "Woe is me if I preach not the gospel; the office is committed unto me." In the declaration of Peter and John (Acts iv. 20), "We cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard," there is something else than that which is commonly found in it. As to what the disciples have "heard and seen," that has as little to do with their *earlier* fellowship with Christ as the power (δύναμις), which they deny of themselves, can be understood of a reaction against an irresistible inward impulse. On the contrary, the former relates to the manifestations of the living One, and the latter rests on the divine command received by them. We have an authentic explanation of the passage when we read, Acts xiii. 31: "He was seen many days of them which came up with Him, *who are now His witnesses.*"

Dr. Julius Müller, in his excellent essay, "von der göttlichen Einsetzung des geistlichen Amtes" (comp. *dogmatische Abhandlungen*, Bremen 1870, p. 468 et seq.), has done important service in pointing out the specific dignity of the apostolate. If we concur with the views of this theologian, we shall not merely acknowledge that such an office could have been founded only by the Risen One, to whom all power was given in heaven and on earth, but we shall also admit that it needed the personal appearing of the glorified One to commit it to those who had been called to exercise it. It is a mistaken, though a very widespread view, that the *Spirit* raised the disciples to the apostolate. Luke calls them apostles, and they *were* such before the day of Pentecost broke. Dr. Müller (*ubi supra*, p. 628) is

certainly right in saying that the Spirit wrought in the apostles as in no other member of the church; this power from above was undoubtedly the essential condition of the work of their hands. But the qualifying for office differs from the appointment to it. To the elders of Ephesus Paul says at Miletus (Acts xx. 28): "the Holy Ghost made you overseers" over the flock; he would never have said the like of himself.[1] We have already seen—it meets us in almost every one of his letters—with what tenacity he holds to the fact that he received his office from Christ, who appeared to him personally. All knowledge may have been communicated to him by the Spirit, every step of his course may have been thus indicated to him; but as to his office, he is conscious of the fact that it was given him by the Risen Christ when he saw Him face to face, when he stood opposite to Him eye to eye. Nor can it be said that the Lord completed the ordination of His servants in a bygone past. If He sent them out formerly, not to all the world, but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel; not furnished with the power from on high, but only with the ability to save the sick and possessed; not with the commission to forgive sins and dispense the goods of the kingdom, but merely with the message, The kingdom of heaven is come nigh,—we have in this nothing else than a prophetical outline of that office which bears within it a superabounding light, the office in which there is mirrored the full glory of Him who is called Apostle in the highest degree, and whose apostolate combines with the royal priesthood (Heb. iii. 1). As at the first the glorified One could raise the disciples to this level, so they could only maintain themselves on their giddy height by having received the heavenly calling from His mouth and His hands, with an immediateness which excluded all doubt. We may go still farther. Not only was there needed an express *appointment* to the office, "I send you, go ye into all the world," but an *introduction* of some kind or other. We know from the Lord's own explanation that He reserved much on this field for the guidance of the Spirit. But there was something else which

[1] Once we read (Acts xiii. 2): εἶπεν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· ἀφορίσατε δή μοι τὸν Βαρνάβαν καὶ Σαῦλον εἰς τὸ ἔργον ὃ προσκέκλημαι αὐτούς. Only there was no separation here to the office in general, but merely to a single work in the office. And this single work was, besides, of such a kind that Paul was to do it in company with Barnabas. But Barnabas, near as he stood to the Twelve (hence once, but only this once, the name even passes over to him, comp. Acts xiv. 14), was not an apostle.

He had to order personally and orally. As He not only revealed to Paul his call to office, but gave him the command to go to the heathen, and generally all the directions of which Acts xxvi. 16 et seq. gives account, so it was also in respect of the Eleven. Therefore He showed Himself to them many times and ways—to the whole circle and to individuals separately. Therefore did He speak to them, as Luke tells us, in all these appearances, of the kingdom of God (Acts i. 3). Therefore, in a word, was there need of the longer, or forty days' interval. We refer back to a former discussion. There we compared the forty days with the exactly equal time of the sojourn in the wilderness; and the comparison led us to the view, that as the period in the wilderness prepared the way for the course of the Messiah, so the time before the ascension was the prelude to His kingly working. In these forty days He took possession of the power which the Father had given Him over all flesh. And this He did by calling, consecrating, and instructing instruments by whom His name was to be made glorious from sea to sea, till every knee should bow to Him, and every tongue confess that He was Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

We have sought to make out the end of Christ's appearings, and proved at the same time that it could only be attained by means of these manifestations. But one thing yet remains. We have called the end in question expressly a *saving* end. And this claim requires to be justified. What we assume, then, is this, that the manifestations of the living One also appear as the consequence of the fact that Jesus is the Christ; that they too were needed for the salvation of the world, for the redemption of men. Now this supposition is admitted; nay, even as to the ground and connection of the matter, there exists a well-nigh complete harmony. We mean that the restoration of *faith* is very generally regarded to be the object in view. And because the faith of the world depended on these appearances, they might, in fact, be spoken of as having a *saving end.* The correctness of the answer in general we admit. But everything depends on the sense in which it is understood. There is a view, and it is by far the most common, which we decidedly reject. The protest which we enter against it is not only prepared for, but is even already established by our statements up to this point; it remains for us only to sum them up. It is said that the Lord's

appearances made His resurrection certain; they overcame the doubt of the disciples, or rather converted this doubt into an assurance of faith, which, as it has continued to burn and work on, has resulted in the fact, "He was believed on in the world." So most of the church Fathers have judged, and, following them, church divines. With special clearness has J. Gerhard expressed his judgment, comp. *Harm.* c. 212: "Debebant discipuli testes esse resurrectionis in omnes gentes. Ideo Christus voluit ipsis eam esse maxime certam et confirmatam, ut testimonio eorum etiam nos fidem haberemus. Sic enim debemus colligere. Apostoli, qui de resurrectione Christi testantur, non solum audiverunt Christum resuscitatum esse, sed ipsi etiam eum viderunt. Ergo eorum testimonium de Christo resuscitato est verissimum ac certissimum. Ex quo apparet, non solum propter Apostolos, sed etiam propter nos de confirmanda resurrectionis suae certitudine Christum tantopere fuisse sollicitum, ne scilicet tergiversaremur ac recusaremus fidem tam evidentibus fundamentis innixam. Magni vero refert Christi resurrectionem immota fide amplecti; est enim hic articulus reliquorum omnium fundamentum." We put out of account the historical difficulty, that this view makes the disciples appear in a false light,—as if they had made shipwreck of faith; that it places the entire manifestations of the Lord in the category of His revelation to Thomas,[1]—as if the Risen Christ had showed Himself only on account of doubters. There is another thing which has yet more weight with us. On this view, faith in Christ, taken generally, is interchanged with the conviction of the fact of the resurrection; or, faith in the resurrection is identified with faith in the Risen One. But we know well that, despite the undeniable connection between the two, the one is neither a sure guarantee for the other, nor does it always produce it; at least we know that the apostles did not proceed on this assumption nor act according to it. The matter thus demands to be otherwise judged. *We*, too, do homage to the view that Christ's appearances had for their object the establishment of faith, and that the faith of the world depended on them. But we do not seek the evidence and justification of the assertion in the fact that

[1] We shall see in a later connection that in this way even the Christophany to Thomas is robbed of its force and meaning; its peculiar character in that case falls quite into the background.

these manifestations prove the certainty of the Easter message. The explanation which satisfies us is this: by means of His manifestations the Risen Christ appointed the office which preaches faith and produces faith.[1] Without this office and its exercise, faith would not have found being in the world. "How shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? So then faith cometh by hearing" (Rom. x. 14, 17). "He was preached among the Gentiles,"—this is the cause; "He was believed on *in* the world,"—such is the effect. If this relation between cause and effect presents itself as a matter of fact, if it forms part of the "confessedly great mystery of godliness," then we can truly speak of a saving object in the Lord's appearings. For from them arises the office through which faith comes, and only in virtue of faith does the world partake of the life of the Son of God, and of the salvation which the Lord has won for it by His dying and rising again.

Is it so, then, that Jesus, because He is the Christ, required not only to rise again, but also to manifest Himself before His own? Is there thus evidently an inner necessity for these manifestations? Then criticism must have the weightiest difficulties to press on us ere we can admit a doubt as to their credibility. The question is, whether criticism finds a provocation, or at least a pretext, for this procedure in the words of the Gospel narratives. We put ourselves undoubtedly under the guidance of the right star when we keep firmly in view the standpoint described. The thought, that the Lord appeared to the eyes of the disciples with the view of setting up the apostolic office, will spread a satisfactory light over all details of the narratives; and so they will themselves be advanced to

[1] Here is the place where we must again take up an earlier discussion. We protested at the proper time against the view that the saving object of the Lord's resurrection lay in the awakening of faith; we rejected the interpretation of the passage, Rom. iv. 25, to that effect. Now it is clear whereon the error of this view rests. The Lord's *resurrection* has been confounded with His *manifestations* when risen, and what is only true of the latter has been asserted of the former. The saving end of the resurrection itself is to be found entirely on the same objective domain as that of the atoning death; Christ rose that the redemption of the world might be objectively finished. On the contrary, the Risen One *manifested* Himself to render possible the subjective condition on which the redeemed *can* attain to righteousness. By His appearances and their immediate effect He founded a *believing* church.

that measure of historical certainty with which apologetics may rest content.

### 3. THE GOSPEL NARRATIVES.

It is a just remark of Strauss, that the evangelists give us always merely solitary appearances of the Risen One. "He shows Himself now here, now there, now in this way, again in that; one knows not whence He comes nor whither He goes, nor where He dwells." But it is unjust when criticism on this ground maintains "that the whole produces the impression not of an objective self-coherent life, but of subjective ideas and separate visions." In an earlier connection we have advanced a better explanation of this certainly undeniable fact. The glorified One *could* only from the very nature of the case manifest Himself temporarily. Continuous communion with the disciples lay now beyond the region of possibility; intercourse with them in the strict sense belonged to the past. It is therefore as a thing of the past that the Lord describes it when He says (Luke xxiv. 44): "These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you." Similarly John xvi. 4, 5: "I *was* with you, but now I go." Comp. Egid. Hunnius, *de persona Christi*, p. 99.

This fact should have been more regarded even on the conservative side, and restrained men from the adventurous attempt to weave the Lord's manifestations into a progressive and connected history. Since St. Bernard described the ascension as the "felix clausula *itinerarii* Christi," exegesis has not only preserved the *expression*, but also expended unbounded labour in filling up the forty days, calculating the intervals, and explaining the divine economy accordingly. The fruitlessness of the enormous labour which Gerhard and others bestowed on these questions has yet failed to deter more modern theologians from applying themselves to the task. Once again Gess (*Christi Person und Werk*, p. 197 et seq., and also in a separately published treatise) has made the attempt. Assertions are to be found in it in abundance; for proofs we have searched in vain. But others, too, have sought at least to make out the number and chronological order of the Lord's appearances. Scripture gives no help to their endeavours. True, the fourth evangelist once reckons,

—"this was now the third time that Jesus showed Himself to His disciples" (xxi. 14); but it is here as with the similar phrase, "this second miracle again did Jesus" (iv. 54); both the descriptions refer to what the author meant to relate, but not in general to what had taken place. True, the Apostle Paul seems to enumerate the manifestations of Christ not only completely, but also in their order; the εἶτα, ἔπειτα, ἔσχατον lead to this conclusion. But he is reporting what had been delivered to him, and as it was retained in his memory. His report does not even tally completely with the Gospel accounts; and rather than allow ourselves to subscribe the violent dicta of the older and more recent Harmonistic, we should prefer to lean to Strauss's judgment, that the apostle having had vouchsafed to himself a convincing Christophany, could not have felt any lively interest in subjecting the earlier appearances to a thorough investigation. All these aimless and fruitless inquiries we therefore set aside.

Neither do we allow place to the further question, whether Scripture really gives account of all the cases in which the living One was seen by human eyes. "Many other signs did Jesus in the presence of His disciples," so writes John (xx. 30), with evident reference to His appearances; and of *many* proofs of His life during the forty days, we find Luke telling (Acts i. 3). Are these *many* exhausted by the narratives which we have? We do not know; we should rather, for our part, avoid the affirmative answer. But essentially the question is one of indifference; our only concern is to use conscientiously what we have (John xx. 31).

Finally, we pass over in silence those appearances of the Lord, of which indeed authentic accounts have reached us, though without their appearing in the form of strict narration. It is possible on the ground of these to make suppositions, to enter into calculations of probability, and even to advance to bold conclusions,—we find ourselves under no temptation to anything of the kind. Paul names more than five hundred brethren by whom the Lord was seen at one time; some of them already fallen asleep, but the greater part still living. The statement is surprising in more than one respect; but we must be so much the more careful to avoid daring hypotheses, and take the fact as it stands.[1] The same apostle tells of a Christophany which

[1] It has been argued from this fact, that in Galilee—for here it is customary to seek the five hundred brethren—faith in Christ must already have prevailed very

happened separately to Peter; and the third evangelist, too, mentions one such, though only incidentally (Luke xxiv. 34); but there is a want of all historical material to guide us to an explanation of it of any certainty. The length to which men go when they give fancy full scope in this domain, is shown by the way and manner in which they have expounded the appearance of the Lord to James. In the Pauline catalogue we read the short notice: "After that He was seen of James." The legend which Jerome is said to have found in the Gospel of the Nazarenes is very generally and justly repudiated. Only this legend is not nearly so insipid as the assertion of recent theologians, that James was charged to induce the disciples to return from Galilee to Jerusalem (among others, Greve, *ubi supra*, p. 57).[1] All this, then, we leave aside, and limit ourselves to the consideration of the actual narratives.

### THE LORD'S APPEARANCE TO MARY MAGDALENE.

In the proper place we have indicated the standpoint from which we have to consider the accounts given of the manifestations of the Risen One, in order to reach the full conviction of their historical truth. Let us at once consider the first narrative before us from this viewpoint. The pith of it lies in its preparing the Eleven for their Christophany, in its paving the way for their appointment to office. Thus viewed, the details of the history

widely. And it has been sought to support this inference by the "remarkable" circumstance that, in our Lord's charge, Acts i. 8, "ye shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth," *Galilee* is purposely left out. But the support is weak, and the circumstance not so "remarkable." The field of His mission is surveyed by Christ. But as the disciples were *themselves* Galileans (ἄνδρες Γαλιλαῖοι, so they are addressed by the angel. Are not these all of Galilee? so the amazed Jews and proselytes ask on the day of Pentecost), they could not properly be *sent forth* to Galilee.

[1] There is *one* question which we cannot wholly repress, and one supposition which we will allow ourselves, without, however, claiming for it the least importance. The history of exegesis shows that expositors with rare unanimity have regarded James, the Lord's brother, as the receiver of this manifestation. Gerhard remarks (*Harm.* c. 213): "Scriptores ecclesiastici uno ore testantur, Christum apparuisse Jacobo Alphaei filio, quem Paulus vocat fratrem Domini." He himself agrees with this view, and it is the prevailing one at the present day. But we have in vain sought for tenable grounds by which it might be justified. It is nothing to the purpose when Hofmann says (*die h. Schr.* III. p. 351) that in James' position as president of the mother church, in consequence of which he was also especially well known,

will gather clearness, and the last scruples of their credibility disappear. A question which gave very lively occupation to the older and far-searching commentators, has been almost entirely discarded by modern exegesis. We mean the question why the Lord showed Himself first of all to the women, and to the Magdalene in particular; why He did not appear before all in the circle of the disciples. One *may* wonder at this, and more gravely than did the Twelve once when they found the Master engaged in conversation with the Samaritan woman. Gerhard has collected numerous grounds of explanation,—they are one and all useless (*Harm.* c. 206 f.). True, it may appear quite appropriate that the Christ risen from the dead should immediately become visible at the open grave; and so it may be admitted, that those whom grief and love impelled to the tomb in the grey morning had the first claim to the joy of seeing Him. But this explanation is only satisfactory on condition that the Lord appeared to them not *for their own sakes*, but that they were merely employed to carry the news to the disciples—*apostolae apostolorum*, as the old divines are wont to call them. And is this condition established by the Gospel description? We think, perfectly! No one will take it amiss if practical exposition, in the interest of edification, uses the scene with Mary in the manner familiar to us. It lays the main stress on the dialogue, *Μαρία*, *Ῥαββουνί*. But the real significance of the meeting does not lie here, but in the Lord's words in ver. 17. We have already

the reason appears why the apostle chooses to mention this appearance. For Paul does not really make any selection among the Christophanies; he names all he knows of. Were it admissible to speak of a persuasion on this field, we should state ours, to the effect that we are shut up to think of James the elder. It would be surprising, to begin with, if this disciple during the forty days had lacked the distinction, which he had enjoyed during the former time, of communion with the Master in equal measure with Peter and John. But we have a still more definite reason for expecting in his case peculiarly to hear of a special manifestation of Christ. The Lord made revelations both to Peter and John as to their personal lot on the earth. Before the former He set his death on the cross; and as to the latter, He expressed Himself somehow or other about his future, however dark and indefinite the expression is held to be. We return to the subject later. And are we to suppose that to the third in the circle of His closer companions He said nothing of this kind? Precisely to *him* He *had* certainly something peculiar to say, for *his* lot stood out above the fate of the others. He was the first apostle who suffered the martyr death, and drank the cup of His Master. If he was predestined thereto, if the divine wisdom had this in store for him, there was certainly a very definite reason for a renewal of the question, Matt. xx. 22, on the part of the glorified One.

expounded the dark utterance in an earlier place, and in order to further explanations we found on the result then gained. It will be granted us that Mary accompanied her Rabboni with that "laying hold of His feet and worshipping Him", which Matthew has expressly asserted of the women on Easter morning. The prohibition to *touch* will thus refer to this language of signs, and more especially to the *laying hold*, not to the *worshipping* as such. The latter would not likely have been forbidden by the Lord; Mary's place had no doubt always been at His feet; and in this case, too, the prohibition must have been worded otherwise. So we keep to the κρατεῖν alone. In what sense did the disciple allow herself this action? Thinking of later scenes, many have been led to suppose that *she* too believed she saw only a glorified spirit from the other world, and therefore was concerned to reach certainty on the subject by touching with her hands. That such an imagination passed through her mind we will not characterize as inconceivable; only we think it to be improbable. First, she took the Lord for the gardener, and the next moment we are to suppose He appeared to her as a sainted spirit. That is hard to believe. But it is not only improbable, but wholly impossible to suppose an inference which, on the ground of that reflection, she attempted to make. She would thus be put in the position of Thomas, and the same psychical experiences asserted of her as passed in that disciple. She must have thought within herself what Thomas expressed, she must have taken that which he demanded. There is surely another and a simpler way of dealing with her "laying hold" or "touching." She has lost the Lord. She sees Him again. Rabboni, *my* Master! such is the cry which breaks from her; and it is easily intelligible how she accompanied the exclamation with the symbolical act of taking possession. She clasps His knees, as the father embraces the lost son,[1] and as men in general appropriate with an

[1] It is an appropriate description in which the servants in the parable sum up the father's demonstrations toward the lost son (Luke xv. 27): ὑγιαίνοντα αὐτὸν ἀπέλαβεν, he has him sound again. Of Mary, too, it might have been said: ἀπέλαβεν ζῶντα τὸν κύριον. The corresponding Latin expression would be *potiri*. So Ulysses says at the beginning of the dispute over the arms of Achilles (Ovid. *Metamorph.* xiii. 128 et seq.):

> "Si mea cum vestris valuissent vota, Pelasgi,
> Non foret ambiguus tanti certaminis heres,
> Tuque tuis armis, *nos te poteremur*, Achille."

inward embrace some good which has been torn from them and which has been restored. But Christ checks her, and says: "Touch Me not." He has come, but not, however, to revive the former intercourse, but to close it. He has returned, not, however, to remain, but to depart. He has appeared to Mary, not, however, on her own account, but only on account of those to whom He immediately sends her: "but go to My brethren." He grants her nothing, and to herself He discovers nothing; she saw Him, but only to be the bearer of His message to the Eleven. It is unmistakeable, in the measure in which the Lord widens the gulf between Himself and Mary, He fills it up in relation to His disciples. He describes them as His brethren. Once before they received the name from His lips (Matt. xii. 49), but not in the strict, proper, full sense which is demanded here by the closing words of the verse. In fact, then are they truly His brethren, if His God is also their God, and His Father is also theirs. But how did He mean that? Augustine's explanation, which is commonly taken as satisfactory, and still quoted with approbation, "natura meus pater, gratia vester," is far too general, and has no justification in the text; it overlooks the close connection in which the words stand with the verb, *I ascend.* The Lord Himself has given an explanation of it in the discourses of the night of His Passion. "Ye would rejoice because I said, *I go to the Father*, for the Father is greater than I; he that believeth on Me, the works that I do shall he do also, and greater works than these shall he do, *because I go unto My Father.*" Brethren, then, is the name He gives to the disciples, because they are entering into fellowship with Him in His working; because, as the Father sent Him into the world, so they too are to receive the same mission in His name. "Mary comes and tells the disciples, I have seen the Lord, and He hath spoken these things unto me." They are thus led to expect to see the glorified One, and to hear what He has to deliver to them. In this sense we have said that the manifestation to Mary had not its end within itself, but paved the way for the appearance of the Lord among the Eleven, and their appointment to office. The question may nevertheless be repeated, why such a preparation was needed, why the Lord did not at once appear in the midst of "His brethren." We hope our answer will not be unsatisfactory if we recall a divine rule which prevails throughout the

entire history of the New Testament with extraordinary regularity. We mean that the joy which is to come to all people is made known to those who take part in it uniformly by an announcement from human lips. This is the way which God has ordained. And even those have had to come in this way to the joy of Easter, by whose preaching the whole world has received the message of salvation. Undoubtedly the apostolic saying is dark, and still needs to be cleared up: "He was seen of angels, preached among the Gentiles" (1 Tim. iii. 16). But one ray of its dazzling contents may be discerned with confidence. As far back as we can go, human preaching was ever the instrument of salvation; and if we seek to press further into its very earliest beginnings, they are lost in the mysterious region wherein the angel world are summoned to behold.

But if, then, the disciples have received Mary's message, we may surely now expect that the Lord will appear in their midst without any further intervening incident. And yet we have such an incident related. We proceed to the weighty task of explaining this enigmatical circumstance.

## THE TRAVELLERS TO EMMAUS.

The faithful zeal which exegesis, both in older and more recent times, has bestowed on the investigation of this section has certainly had results even in an apologetic point of view. Not only have many difficulties in detail been removed, but the illustration of the particulars has also brought out clearly the truly historical character of the narrative. There is not a single suspicious feature which lends itself to the idea of the poetical conception of a legend. We have already mentioned that even Strauss was not able to escape from this impression. And yet all this labour has not solved the real task. It will be impossible to contemplate the incident with entire satisfaction, until the Lord's motive for this appearance is understood, and therewith the proof furnished that it filled an important place in the object of the forty days. It cannot be denied that several noteworthy attempts have been made also in *this* direction.[1] Some have thought to find the reason of the appearance in the personality of the travellers.

[1] Among these we do not reckon explanations which fall under the charge of an unwarranted type finding. When Stier states the *meaning* of the event thus: "that He who has hitherto been visible will henceforth draw near to His own invisibly,

Gerhard considers these disciples as of a class who, abandoning hope and with faith disappearing, leave the circle of the disciples; to them peculiarly he thinks the Lord must have appeared, who quenches not the smoking flax (*Harm.* c. 211, 3). Others, on the contrary, lay stress on their prominent standing among the adherents of the Lord. Evidently, say they, they stood specially near the apostles (ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις, Rom. xvi. 7; Acts i. 21); from them they went out (two of them, Luke xxiv. 13), to them they returned (ver. 33); they too, therefore, had a right to see the glorified One with their own eyes. But all these views misplace the true point of the case. For the question is not why the Lord showed Himself to *them* in particular, but why He manifested Himself at all to any *others* before He appeared in the midst of the disciples.[1] The author of the section, at the close of the second Gospel, has provided us in one respect with a view bearing on the matter. He is evidently at pains to discover the pragmatical connection between the first three Christophanies; and he thinks he finds it in the fact that the disciples, after refusing faith to the message of Mary and the report of the travellers, first gained their conviction of the resurrection by the personal appearing of Christ. We cannot indeed adopt *this* pragmatism, for the facts do not wholly justify it. But the more do we acknowledge the correctness of the supposition that *both* events must be brought under the same theological viewpoint. The manifestation at Emmaus also served the end intended by the experience of Mary. Both are nothing else than preludes to the Lord's appearing among the Eleven. We do not indeed read of an express charge received by Cleopas and his companion; but it lay evidently in the intention of Christ that they, as Luke tells us, should immediately hasten back to Jerusalem to communicate what had happened to them. And there was need of these communications, though Mary had already completed her mission; there was need of them to secure the fulness of blessing for the manifestation to the disciples. The narrative itself must furnish the needed explanation.

He will be their fellow-pilgrim on the earth, nay, will turn in and abide with them," this may perhaps be an allowable application, but as to the understanding of the history it does not advance it in the least.

[1] We are supposing, of course, that neither of the two travellers belonged to the Eleven. If we held, with Carpovius, that the anonymous one was Peter, the whole question in relation to the narrative would take another form.

If we compare the charge given to the Magdalene with the message of the Emmaus disciples to the Eleven, there appears undoubtedly, so far as the *contents* are concerned, a striking similarity between the two; essentially the latter does not go beyond the former. For the Lord's ascension to the Father, of which we hear in the first narrative, is identical with the *entering into His glory* of the second; and the raising of the disciples to the rank of brethren, coincides with that later declaration of Christ's glory, that He will cause repentance and forgiveness of sins to be preached in His name among all nations. But side by side with this similarity of contents there is a striking difference of form (in describing it the author of the conclusion of Mark makes use of the expression, *another form*), which necessarily produced also a very different effect. Only on the threshold of the two accounts there is another likeness to be remarked. In the later as in the former one, there is a sympathetic inquiring into the cause of the unconcealed sadness. "Woman, why weepest thou? Whom seekest thou?" And so afterwards: "What manner of communications are these that ye have one to another, as ye walk and are sad?" But from that point the Lord changes His manner wholly. It was due to His will that Mary recognised Him at once, if she immediately reached a conviction which was never touched with a breath of doubt. Again it lay in His intention that no ray of light flashed on the eye of the travellers, startling them to ask if He Himself were not the third man beside them. "Their eyes were holden, that they should not know Him," ver. 16. And not only at the beginning of their meeting does He leave the disciples under their mistaken impression (ver. 18), but during the whole course of the conversation He keeps back the express discovery that He is the Lord, whose death they are lamenting. This circumstance renders the appearance of the Lord now before us different from all[1] other cases occurring during the forty days. Indeed, we might scruple to call it, in the strict sense of the word, a *manifestation* of the risen Christ. Did He not much rather conceal Himself

[1] The appearance by the lake of Galilee has sometimes been regarded as an analogous case. There, too, no doubt the Lord does not expressly make known who He is; but how wholly different is it with the disciples on the scene! "It is the Lord," so says John at the very first moment; and of the others, all of them, we are told: οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐτόλμα τῶν μαθητῶν ἐξετάσαι αὐτὸν σὺ τίς εἶ; εἰδότες ὅτι ὁ κύριός ἐστιν (John xxi. 12).

from the witnesses than make Himself known to them; did He not rather put a covering over His face than raise the veil! This peculiarity in His procedure could not escape the observation of commentators; only they have either ignored the question which arises from it, or, wandering from the main subject, have limited their attention to secondary points. From Augustine down to Gerhard,[1] commentators have striven to defend the Lord against a suspicion of simulation (the question in vv. 17 and 19, and still more the expressions in ver. 28, appeared to give ground for this suspicion). Of course the setting aside of such difficulties in detail is worthless, so long as the general difficulty is not removed. Above all, the appearance of contradiction, which prevails throughout the whole, demands to be satisfactorily explained. Undoubtedly the Lord puts Himself in the way of the disciples with the intention of revealing Himself to them; but as undoubtedly He wilfully made their recognition of Him difficult. How are we to harmonize these contradictories? For the solution which we offer, we claim the merit of correctness, because it stands approved when tested by the description of the evangelist. We proceed on the view that the Emmaus disciples were intended to reach the joy of Easter by no sort of sensible perception, but exclusively *by the way of faith*. Neither eye nor ear nor hand have a helpful side held out to them. The Lord does not address them in His wonted tones; neither does He allow them a view of the well-known features of His face; still less, finally, may they touch the marks of His wounds. This whole region of ocular appearance is completely removed from their senses. What do we see passing instead? First, they receive a rebuke, and the rebuke advances to instruction. What the former misses, the latter proposes to supply. The message of the women only produced in their hearts a feeling of pain, without availing in the least to awaken faith; so far they may be compared, as Gerhard rightly remarks, to the smoking flax. Now the Lord places them where faith when sinking gathers strength, and when oppressed, finds freedom. *They* have told

[1] Gerhard spares no pains to prove the delusion to be one which was due exclusively to the disciples. The ἑτέρᾳ μορφῇ of Mark is, according to him, to be understood not ὄντως, but οἰομένως; and so also the προσεποιεῖτο, ver. 28, and the determination of the object: εἰσῆλθεν τοῦ μεῖναι, ver. 29, are to be taken thus, quod discipulis ita *videbatur*, quod id futurum colligebant.

Him what it was on which their hope made shipwreck; *He* bids them consider the reason of their lamentation in the light of Scripture. And He does not leave the lofty task to their own thinking, but He Himself becomes interpreter, and points out the harmony between fulfilment and prophecy.

We dare not measure the result of the conversation by what meets the eye. The disciples continue still to think that the Lord is a pilgrim from a foreign land; but while held fast by this delusion, a strong feeling pervades and glows within them. "Did not our heart *burn* within us, while He talked with us by the way, and while He opened to us the Scriptures?" The words are obscure. It is to decline explaining them to say quite generally that they mean some lively emotion. The question at once arises, of what kind the emotion was, and, in fact, a more exact explanation presents itself spontaneously. The burning heart corresponds to the holden eye. It fares with the disciples as with the bride in the song: "I sleep, but my heart waketh." It is the stirring of reawakening faith to which their confession gives testimony. The smoking flax has become the strong flame, and despondency has again given way to hope. Without this hope having found a sure form, without this faith having laid hold of its object with clear consciousness, they have come back to the earlier fixedness of their hearts. They are no more as those who have no hope; they are no longer liable to the rebuke, "How is it that ye have no faith?" *They have again learned to believe and hope!* This was the Lord's aim, and He gained it—according to the disciples' own testimony (ver. 32)—by word and interpretation of Scripture. Only now, when they are raised to this platform, have they the same privilege as Mary enjoyed at the very first moment of her meeting. Their eyes are opened, and they know the Lord. It has been sought to answer the question whether the breaking of bread merely coincided in time with the opening of their eyes, or whether it is to be judged rather as the cause of this result. But there ceases to be any ground of question as soon as it is acknowledged that what secured the look of recognition for the disciples was the forth-putting of the Lord's power. His will kept their eyes holden as long as they lacked faith; His will opened them after the fire of faith was kindled in their hearts. Thus it was, in fact, *by the way of faith* that they came to the joy of Easter.

We have sought to point out the difference which the Lord observed in His conduct toward Mary and the Emmaus disciples. For the moment it may surprise us if, at the close of the accounts, we find again, instead of difference, a remarkable similarity. The instant Mary has recognised her Master, He gravely denies her the enjoyment of His presence; and the moment the eyes of the two disciples were opened, He disappeared from their view.[1] To Mary He gives the charge to carry the message to His brethren; He leaves the disciples to their own impulse to report to the apostles. But nothing else than likeness in the close was in reality to be expected. It is the consequence of the same aim which the Lord follows in both cases,—the aim, namely, to make the way clear for His manifestation to the Eleven. For as He appeared to Mary not on her own account, so His manifestation at Emmaus had not its object in the persons of the receivers. These, like her, were to be His heralds to the apostles. But they were not to be so in the same way. It is now clear why the Emmaus message was still necessary after Mary had already discharged her commission. Of the effect of the latter, indeed, we have no proper account. However probable the supposition that it awoke the Eleven from their state of lethargic sorrow to a more or less certain expectation, it appears equally certain that their faith yet laboured under an oppressive bondage. For it is not a merely individual confession which comes from the lips of the Emmaus disciples in ver. 22, but their words reflect the mood which in one degree or another pervaded the whole circle. And was such a circle a place for the Risen One to appear? We do not appeal to the decision of nice perception. Feeling rejects the thought that the Lord could have opened the scene of His reappearance with a rebuke of faithlessness. "O fools and slow of heart,"—He could not thus meet those for whom He intended a better greeting. But we do not press this point, it is not needed. If it was the object of the

[1] So far as this trait affects the bodily organism of the Risen One, it has been fully treated at an earlier stage. But it demands to be again considered from another point of view. It belongs peculiarly to the present case; no later appearance presents an analogy. Never did the Lord disappear so *suddenly* from the eyes of the apostles, never did He withdraw from them so *unexpectedly*. They were permitted to be joyful in His light, to hold Easter in His presence. But to *them* only did He allow what He denied to all others. His sudden disappearing at Emmaus is a strong proof that His manifestation there was chiefly in the interest of the apostles.

manifestations of the living One to invest the disciples with the apostolic office, the condition is clear on which He was able for this end to reveal Himself to them,—the restitution of their faith was indispensably presupposed. And the instruments were already there, by whose ministry the end could be reached. By the way of faith the Lord has guided the Emmaus disciples to the joy of Easter. They go to tell the Eleven what had happened to them in the interval, and the effect of their account cannot be doubted. They prepared a place of faith in the chosen disciples for the appearance of the Risen One.[1]

To sum up: The Lord wished to be expected when He appeared in the midst of His own with the salutation of peace; He wished to find them in the attitude He had once described in parabolic words: "Be ye like unto men who wait for the coming of their Lord;" and He brought them by Mary's message to this state of expectation. He wished to be received in *faith*, when He came to commit to them their high office; and this end He gained by the ministry of the Emmaus disciples. But thus all the conditions were fulfilled needful for His showing Himself in the midst of them, to use the words of Paul, "in fulness of blessing;" and lo, He appears!

### THE CHRISTOPHANY ON EASTER EVENING.

The manifestation on Easter evening forms the climax in the history of the forty days. In this light it becomes known to us chiefly from the description of the fourth evangelist. Its glory is barely seen through the narrative of Luke. The identity of the occurrence related by John xx. 19 et seq. and Luke xxiv. 36 et seq., has never yet been disputed; beginning, course, and end coincide so thoroughly that there is no place left for doubt. But as little can we conceal from ourselves that the two evangelists have laid the main stress on very different places. Luke dwells on the Lord's assurance, "It is I myself," and on the proof he gives of the reality of His body; for the rest, he lets the further course of the Christophany melt away into a general

[1] We may be told that the Lord Himself, when He appeared among His disciples, nevertheless took pains to restore their faith. Only it was not unbelief which met Him in their circle, but more the misgiving whether He was among them σωματικῶς. And such a doubt can co-exist with the full joy of faith.

history of the forty days.[1] John, indeed, does not entirely pass over the point emphasized by the third evangelist, but his main interest has obviously taken a wholly different direction. We ask attention to a circumstance which has either not been sufficiently appreciated at all, or at least has not received a satisfactory explanation. "Peace be unto you,"—with this salutation the Lord steps into the midst of His disciples. The Lutheran theologians have rightly rejected Calvin's explanation: "Vulgaris est salutandi forma apud Hebraeos;" but they themselves are equally mistaken when by *peace* they understand the whole blessings won by Christ.[2] For the purpose of explanation we have not to go back on the assurance which the Lord gave on the night of His Passion, John xiv. 27, but on an instruction which He delivered to His own at an earlier time when sending them out as evangelists. "Into whatsoever house ye enter, first say: Peace be to this house," Luke x. 5 et seq.; Matt. x. 12 et seq. The salutation of the risen Christ, therefore, is directed to the future preachers of salvation. It is the introduction of

[1] We hold the firmest conviction that Luke closed his account of the history of Easter evening as such with ver. 43. Ver. 44 begins a compendium of what the Lord spoke during the forty days, and especially before His ascension. As the section, John xii. 44–50, introduced by the words, "Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἔκραξεν καὶ εἶπεν," presents a summary of the testimonies which the Lord delivered respecting His person and preaching, so, too, it is here. If any one takes up the impression that the whole of Luke xxiv. is to be regarded as contained within the course of one day, with him there can be no dispute. We for our part confess to the very opposite, and we justify our impression by the εἶπεν δὲ αὐτοῖς, ver. 44, but still more by the οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι μου at the beginning, which sounds almost like a title. The charge that this is a violent and arbitrary shift of Harmonistic, we repudiate as wholly groundless. We should be unable to say how otherwise Luke ought to have written than he has done, if he had at all, comp. ix. 51, in view to carry the Gospel history down to the ἡμέρα ἀναλήψεως Χριστοῦ. It is a further corroboration, that by our view the apparent discrepancy between the conclusion of the third Gospel and the beginning of the Acts receives an easy and natural explanation. Dr. Wieseler (comp. his *Beiträge zur richtigen Würdigung der Evangelien und der evangelischen Geschichte*, Gotha 1869, p. 285 ff.) has adduced an extremely exact analogy from the archaeology of Josephus. There is another exemplification, which brings the matter perhaps into yet clearer light. Suppose that Luke, after completing his second work, had seen himself in a position to give additional information to Christendom respecting the later fortunes of Paul, his details of the Roman διατία would stand related to the end of the Acts as the beginning of the Acts is related to the close of the Gospel. We return again to the subject hereafter.

[2] Yet more decidedly are the special references to be rejected which more recent commentators allege. Tholuck refers to the "peace of reconciliation" which the Risen One gained; Hengstenberg, to the pledge of victory over all hostile powers; but εἰρήνη a victorious struggle,—that is purely impossible.

the act whereby He will deliver to them their office, with all the powers and duties which it contains. Expositors could scarcely have missed this the only possible view, had not a scene followed immediately after the "Peace be unto you," which seems to point attention to a quite different direction. But those are greatly mistaken who trace back this scene to a deliberate purpose, or judge it even as the real aim of Christ's appearing. When He saw the disciples trembling because they imagined they saw a spirit, it was certainly natural that He should remove the delusion from their hearts; but we cannot say on this account that the interest of His manifestation lay in setting aside this delusion, nor had His peace greeting anything to do with it.

What, then, do we see happening after this interlude? The Lord renews the same salutation: "*Again* He said unto them, Peace be unto you" (John xx. 21),[1] and follows it with the act which their conduct has for the moment delayed, the act of their appointment to office. "As the Father sent (ἀπέσταλκεν) Me, even so send (πέμπω) I you." In the variation of terms there is nothing to be sought,—least of all (as Hengstenberg thinks) the view of avoiding too great an equalization between Christ and the apostles.[2] But the emphasis lies, on the one hand, on the *as*, καθώς; on the other, on the present, *I send*. Καθώς we read, not ὡς or ὥσπερ. The two particles, as is well known, are distinguished in this way. The latter (*sicut*) is used to introduce merely a formal correspondence; the former, on the contrary (*quemadmodum*), a material, matter-of-fact correspondence. And so the point of comparison is not that in both cases a sending takes place, but the mission of the disciples is carried out in a way analogous to that in which, formerly, the sending of the Son was carried out by the Father. The Father never sent another

[1] This point of view is the only one which explains satisfactorily the *repetition* of the greeting. By the second εἰρήνη ὑμῖν the Lord begins anew; He proceeds to the act to which this formula was the introduction,—to the act which He had been prevented from carrying out immediately by the attitude of the disciples. Meyer's remark, that the repetition is to be understood in the way of emphasis and impressiveness, remains unmeaning so long as the reason of the repetition is not indicated. And Hengstenberg's explanation, that the first greeting was for the disciples and the second for the apostles, can hardly be defended from the charge of arbitrariness.

[2] The term which the Lord here applies to Himself, He claims also, ch. xvii. 18, for the disciples; on the other hand, that which He here uses in regard to the apostles, He elsewhere frequently employs of Himself.

into the world as He sent His Son; and the mission which the Lord gave to His disciples He never entrusted to any except them. It is the incomparable dignity of the apostolic call which has received its expression and meaning in the καθώς. An office whose co-efficient rests in the sending of the Son, must for this very reason possess the unequalled brightness which Paul has described 2 Cor. iii.; and this high calling the Lord gives His assembled ones at the present moment. In attaching weight to the present πέμπω, we are guided not only by the foregoing perfect, but also by the parallels in the high-priestly prayer (ch. xvii. 18), where both the protasis and the apodosis have the aorist. The aorists denote the fact; the change from the preterite to the present brings the time relations into prominence. The mission of the Son is completed, that of the apostles is beginning. And it begins, though still deferred in its exercise, when the Lord puts the office into their hands. "I send you,"—by this word they have received the apostleship for the world. From this time forward they *are* that to which grace destined them from the beginning.

From this viewpoint let us consider the act to which the Risen One immediately proceeded. By the phrase, "and when He had said this," it is put into immediate connection with the words just uttered. And, in point of fact, it casts as clear a light upon them as it receives in return. Already, at an earlier stage, we have devoted a thoroughgoing investigation to this highly important fact. It had to do only, however, with the problem, how the glorification of the Lord stood connected with the sending of the Spirit. The question as to the effect of the act was not then before us. "Receive the Holy Spirit." So says the Lord. It is as foolish to refuse the imperative its strict meaning, as it is impossible to understand its object in a weakened sense. "Take ye," and they *took;* here not less certainly than in the nearly related case, Matt. xxvi. 26. And *what* they took was the Holy Spirit, beside whom there is no other; whom, therefore, we are always to understand where the term, with or without the article, meets us. But an apparent contradiction which, in that case, stares us in the face, demands to be set aside. "Receive the Holy Spirit." So sounds the command on Easter evening; and on the day of the ascension the promise is given: "Ye shall receive power when the Holy Ghost is come upon you," Acts i. 8. Against the explanation that the one is related to the other, as

the beginning to the full enjoyment, we should be warned by the saying of the Baptist, "God giveth the Spirit not by measure" (John iii. 34). The approved remark of Bengel, "arrha pentecostes," the view of a "first-fruits of the Spirit" in a partitive sense, does not stand biblical testing; for it is the Spirit Himself, and not a preliminary measure of the Spirit, which is meant by the apostle, Rom. viii. 23, by the gift of the first-fruits. The difficulty is removed in a less violent way as soon as the Lord's act is viewed in its proper relation to His previous words. He names the disciples to be His apostles. His naming is their real exaltation to the dignity of this office. But they would not have truly received the office, which is aptly described by Paul as the "ministry of the Spirit," had not the gift of the Spirit been at that moment bestowed on them. (Gerhard, rightly: "acceperunt Spiritum ratione ministerii evangelici.") The word calling them to office needed the accompanying act,—not in order to its confirmation, but certainly in the interest of its actual realization. Let us look at this connection. In the light of it, it is easy to understand why the Easter gift manifested itself neither inwardly in their experience, nor even outwardly. Belonging strictly to the office, and the co-efficient of its idea, it could not but be hid and remain still, so long as the exercise of the office was yet delayed; and therefore we can understand why the subject of possession remained still a matter of promise. The tone of promise, Acts i. 8, was the more justified, as the assurance which is heard on the day of ascension relates not to the gift, but the power of the Spirit,—a power which, besides, is put in the close of the verse in the most express relation to the fulfilment of their duty as witnesses.[1]

We have sought to show, in the proper place, how significant it is that the Lord gave forth the streams of the Spirit from His

[1] This view removes the objections which Jul. Müller (*ubi supra*, p. 527) has raised against the only possible explanation of ver. 22. No; the church is not mistaken in celebrating the feast of Pentecost on the fiftieth day after Easter. Her right remains untouched, though the disciples received the gift of the Spirit on Easter evening. The Lord's own history presents an analogy. He was conceived by the Holy Spirit; and yet the spirit of power for the work of His office came upon Him at His baptism in Jordan. In the case of the apostles there was the same necessity. It was not till the moment when the exercise of their calling began that they could and must be filled with the δύναμις of the same Holy Spirit who had been already imparted to them as the δωρεά of their Lord.

body on occasion of His first manifestation in the midst of His own. Yet the stress of our narrative lies not so much on this point as on the entrusting of their office to the assembled ten. Herein lay the true and essential object for which the Risen One appeared in the midst of them on this Easter evening. To this object the salutation at the beginning was intended; the same object is reflected by the mighty utterance at the close: "Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them." Undoubtedly this concluding word of the Lord stands also in connection with the bestowal of the Spirit. For neither the remission nor the forgiveness of sins can be autocratic, but both alike stand wholly under the power of the Holy Spirit. But the condition is one thing, the actual power another. Therefore the power (ἐξουσία) to remit or to retain sins belongs to no one simply because he has received the gift of the Spirit; it must above all be given him from the right place. We, too, like Hofmann (comp. *Schriftbew.* II. p. 523), refuse to speak of an "empowering," and reject the view of a "special power" resting on a specific endowment; but how, then, could the Lord have guaranteed success to the apostles, —how could He give them assurances had not an express commission, nay, in some sense even plenipotentiary powers, been previously bestowed! Only the Son of man had the power on earth to forgive sins (Matt. ix. 6); now He commits it also to those to whom He says: "As My Father hath sent Me, so send I you." The words of this sending, and the utterance to which we have come at the close, are most intimately connected, and mutually complete one another. In the former case, a purely formal destination; here, the mere tone of assurance; but this very assurance gives substance to the formal destination, while the certification again has its basis in the commission of the apostles: "I send you." And for what purpose? Well, for the purpose of forgiving and retaining sins. The message which they are called to proclaim to the world is an offer of salvation. Received, it produces life and blessedness; rejected, it is a savour of death unto death. And "ye *shall* remit sins and retain sins;" for it is *I* who send you, and I send you in the same way as the Father sent Me Myself into the world.[1] Thus our closing word, too, like

[1] Thus, in ver. 23, there is not a word of a disciplinary function on the part of the apostles—of the power of the keys, in the ecclesiastico-political sense, of absolution, and excommunication. Comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* III. p. 271. Also Jul. Müller,

every other syllable which came this evening from the mouth of the risen Christ, was subservient to the installation of the apostles in their office. Thereby the aim of His present manifestation is exhausted. And the Lord gained His object. Only, indeed, not on the whole group of His own. One of them He must miss on His appearing. Thomas has frequently been reproached for this absence. In point of fact, the evangelist seems, by subjoining to the name of the disciple the phrase, *one of the Twelve* (comp. vi. 71), —for more is evidently meant thereby than the simple *συμμαθητής*, xi. 16,—desirous to mark the fact that he was not *with them* as a matter of surprise.[1] Nor certainly dare we judge the circumstance as accidental, in the same sense as accident may have formed the company in ch. xxi. Only the reason of it should have been investigated before proceeding to frame a charge. Meanwhile, be that as it may, the Lord would not and could not let the disciple go. No other save the one lost child should fall under the doom of the prophecy: "his bishopric let another take" (Acts i. 20). We are therefore prepared to find the Chief Shepherd dealing with the missed one. Whether the ten cherished such an expectation we know not. Certainly we are much more inclined to suppose that the case of Thomas detained them in Jerusalem, than to the conclusion that their desire to complete the eight days of the Passover feast hindered them from starting for Galilee as they were commanded. So soon as the excommunication is removed, they go their appointed way.

### THE HISTORY OF THOMAS.

The fourth evangelist has so prepared us, by more than one statement, for the conduct of Thomas, that it can neither surprise us nor appear at all mysterious. The "*morositas*," which Gerhard ascribes to the disciple, no more characterizes him than the self-sufficiency (*αὐτοσοφία*) with which this theologian charges him. John teaches us to know him better. He has revealed a side of

*ubi supra*, p. 525. Augustine's beautiful remark, "haec verba certiora sunt, quam omnia regum edicta et diplomata," we should not admit in this relation.

[1] On the contrary, we decidedly reject the view that the phrase *ὁ λεγόμενος Δίδυμος* is meant to describe the character of the disciple—his *διψυχία*. This appellation is also found in places where the disciple, as in xxi. 2, is mentioned in a purely historical connection. The search after secret tendencies in John's designations of persons has not furthered the understanding of the fourth Gospel, but the reverse.

his character which separated him more or less sharply from the rest, and which explains his present absence from their society. True, none of them understood the words in which the Lord, on the night of His Passion, testified to them of His departure to the Father, and His coming again; but how external was the sense in which Thomas particularly understood the saying (John xiv. 5), and how alarmingly near does he border on the fleshly misunderstanding of the Jews (vii. 35, viii. 22)! True, all the disciples tried to dissuade the Master when He was resolved to go to Judea (xi. 8),—they are afraid of His possible death; but it is only Thomas who persists in his protest, and indulges in an expression on the subject which breathed everything else rather than the courage of love and obedience which commentators have found in it. Undoubtedly this disciple also was firmly and inwardly persuaded of the Messiahship of Jesus; but we have more than mere imagination to guide us as to the way which led him to this conviction, and as to the view which he formed of its meaning. If there was any one of the Eleven to whom the sentence applied, "thou savourest not the things which be of God, but the things which be of men," Thomas is decidedly the man most exactly described by the words. He believed from the beginning only because he saw,—because he observed a superhuman power in the appearing of Jesus; in this power he hoped,—from it he expected the redemption of Israel. He, more than any of the others, lacked the faith which needs not this medium of proof, and holds its ground independently of it,—the faith which opens up in the soul a source of blessedness (comp. the beatitude, ver. 29). Hardly did he, from the heart, unite in the confession which the disciples made at the end of the conversations of Passion night, and which the Lord sealed with the acknowledgment, "*ye believe*" (John xvi. 30, 31). It is characteristic when he meets the stirring call, "Believe in God, believe also in Me" (John xiv. 1), with an objection which stood diametrically opposed to the exhortation still sounding in his ear. When, now, he saw the Lord succumb in the struggle,—when he saw the end of the Christ on the cross,—then the crutch which had supported his faith fell away, and his hope lost its support. It is true the disciples all went to their own when the Shepherd of the flock was smitten; but in the case of Thomas, his return to his own was accompanied with shipwreck of faith. "Be (become) not faithless, but believing;" the Lord

sends this arrow deep into His disciple's soul in the hour of His appearing. Commentators rightly insist on the strict meaning of the *become* (γίνου). Thus they hold it is not being (*seyn*), but coming into being (*werden*) which is spoken of. And they are not likely to let their right be disputed, either by "fine experts in the Greek," nor by the phrase of Gess (*ubi supra*, p. 345), that in this way men land in groundless refinements. Only it is impossible to draw the line with perfect sharpness between the two. The disciple is pointed to the threatening end just because he is already treading the way of danger—because with him the process of progressive unbelief is already begun. The history testifies to the justice of this supposition. Thomas, too, received the message of Mary. The impression it made on the Eleven was certainly not the same in the case of all; important shades of difference are a matter of course. But on one of them it produced no effect whatever, not even that measure to which the Emmaus travellers confess. If persistent faith again united the rest, he whom we miss from their circle did not share their hope in the least. It is not "heaviness and melancholy misgiving," or anything else which commentators have arrived at in the way of psychology, but simply the want of faith which explains his separation. Now there is brought to him news of the event of Easter evening. And what is revealed by his manner of meeting it? He is not astonished; he expresses no wish, no other interest whatever, save that of contradicting the report of the witnesses. The negative form in which he expresses himself has not escaped the penetration of Bengel. This excellent commentator rightly remarks: "non dicit, si videro credam; sed solummodo, nisi videro non credam." And with equal right he infers the conclusion: "professa incredulitas!" For the man who can assert this decisive "I will not believe," has denied the faith, and seems determined to follow to the end the way of unbelief. Only a higher power is able to put an arrest on the motion, and work a complete revolution. And, in fact, this higher power interposed decisively.

The Lord would not have again appeared to His own in Jerusalem, had not the case of Thomas altered His original intention. It was for this disciple's sake that He manifested Himself once more on the same spot. It is only His salutation that He offers to the whole circle; in all His further dealings He addresses Himself entirely to the one. But the aim of His manifestation

was not confined to the *person* of this one. Otherwise He would have showed Himself to him *apart*, as He had already done to Peter, and as He did afterwards to James. That the dialogue with Thomas passed in the presence of all so publicly and solemnly, betrays a purpose which, reaching far beyond the disciple's individual want, contemplated a far-reaching blessing.

To understand this purpose, let us once more consider the phenomenon presented by him who was the first to enjoy the blessing. From the earliest times it has been customary to call Thomas a doubter. We think the designation apt. Nay, we hold that this is the first case in Christian history in which the idea of doubt found a concrete realization. The popular understanding of it requires considerable modifications. It is confounded with the modern phenomenon of scepticism, when its essence is sought in an undecided oscillation between opposite poles. Doubt arises from unbelief; in the latter is to be found its absolutely necessary condition. Thomas had forsaken faith, even before the thought of doubt entered his heart, or the word doubt went out of his mouth. There is a like anachronism in applying modern categories, when doubt is taken to rest in the region of the understanding only. The distinction between head and heart in general finds small support in Scripture, least of all has it biblical confirmation in the domain before us. There we find the thoughts (*διαλογισμοί*) put in too close a relation to the heart[1] to admit of our supposing that the heart is at bottom disposed to faith, and only the understanding refuses to follow its drawing. It is still the fashion to credit Thomas with a "critical turn of mind;" but this cheap phrase, this arbitrary abstraction, does not help the understanding of the case. Let us look closely at the Gospel account. The demand of the disciple is related to us with remarkable fulness and particularity. The gist of the matter must be contained in this demand. So it was the Lord's resurrection which the doubter questioned. He argues a fact away which, the instant it is stated and accepted, deprives unbelief of its basis and of every pretext for its justification. Thus, then, doubt would seem to be the weapon of which unbelief

[1] And that no less in relation to the *ἐκπορεύεσθαι* (comp. Matt. xv. 19: *ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ἐξέρχονται διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί*), as in respect of the *εἰσπορεύεσθαι* (comp. Luke xxiv. 38: *διατί διαλογισμοὶ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν;*).

makes use for its self-preservation; it is the means employed by it to maintain its standing.[1] This weapon was to be wrested, this instrument to be taken from it; such is the end for which the Captain of faith appears. He judged the doubt and destroyed its power. He constrains the disciple to make the good confession; and by the rebuke which He adds, He has paved the return to faith throughout the entire future of His church for all like-minded spirits.[2] The twofold question which arises is sufficiently answered in the text. As for Thomas himself, it was the Lord's appearing indeed which removed the disciple's doubt. But wherein lay the effectual power? The picture which Gerhard draws, "non pudore ac rubore suffusus, sed audacter et intrepide digitos suos in vestigia clavorum ingerit, donec resipisceret et exclamaret, dominus meus et Deus meus," is probably the exact opposite of the truth. No one receives the impression from this confession that it was the fruit of a testing by the senses; it is even hard to persuade oneself that the disciple actually put his test in practice.[3] The words which break from him remind us vividly of an earlier case. It was exactly so that Nathanael once confessed: Rabbi, Thou art the Son of God, Thou art the king of Israel. And when did he confess this? When he felt the look of the heart-knower. So Thomas also feels himself read by the eye of one who sees what is hidden, and has

[1] It is not at all peculiar to the case before us that doubt appears specially directed against the Easter tidings. The same will happen in every case in which it is resolved to consolidate and maintain itself. It must always in the end dispute *that* fact which, if it is admitted, renders every other misgiving utterly insignificant. Doubt in Christianity taken concretely is ever a doubt of the Lord's resurrection. This is attested by history. In a former connection we expressed our agreement with Hofmann's observation, that those Christians in Corinth certainly did not question the resurrection of Christ directly. But the apostle fears that they have slid from the path of faith (1 Cor. xv. 33, 34); he fears the infection of doubt from which they suffer, and foresees with certainty that they will proceed in this way at last to the denial of the Easter message. By way of precaution, therefore, he turns attention to the possible danger. It is further notorious that the later scientific assault upon Christianity, from the Fragmentist down to the present hour, has uniformly found its climax in contesting the Lord's resurrection.

[2] The oft-repeated saying, that doubt is a bridge of faith, is only so far relatively true, that of course weakened faith may again be healed by the overcoming of the doubt. With this exception, the proposition remains true, that doubt born of unbelief follows the interest of the latter.

[3] We agree with Stier in inferring from the Lord's words, ὅτι ἑώρακάς με πεπίστευκας, that Thomas did not go the length of touching. Comp. *Reden Jesu*, VI. p. 778.

found out the counsel of his heart. We must compare the Lord's words with the claim which the disciple had set up. The grace of Christ offers him precisely what he had described as the price of his faith—almost letter for letter; and to his asseveration, "I will not believe," there is returned the echo, "Become not faithless, but believing." It was this that overcame him,[1] and carried him far beyond the merely negative result of the removal of his doubt. He has seen the Lord, and holds himself to be persuaded of His resurrection; however, we do not find him resting here, but by this means he is raised to the height of faith, and appears as like the others as a true apostle of the Lord.

There is good reason for speaking of a permanent gain which has accrued to Christendom from the history of Thomas. Older commentators especially have sought to indicate its worth. They rate it far too high. Never should they have gone the length of saying that the doubt of the one has been a greater blessing to the church than all the faith of the rest. "Dubitavit ille, ne nos dubitaremus;" in this saying of Gregory's the limit is rightly drawn. "*Ne nos* dubitaremus," for here the Lord has in fact deprived doubt of its right and ground for all ages. Thomas is evidently conscious of something wrong; he is ashamed because he has doubted. But every later doubter brings himself under a bitterer reproach. For he disregards what the Lord did here in giving the fullest satisfaction to the demand of the disciple. Henceforth doubt is a mere pretext. The Lord's parting word: "Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have believed," is in form a universal proposition similar to the beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount; in substance it is intended for the future of the church. It by no means questions the blessedness of Thomas; this appears as plainly from the words of his confession, as it shone forth in the report of Mary that she had seen the Lord (ver. 18), and in the exclamation of the disciples: We have seen the Lord (ver. 25). But certainly those make shipwreck of faith and faith's blessedness who are not satisfied with the message of the apostles, now that the Lord has gone beyond the domain of the senses. And so Peter writes to the

[1] The circumstance that the fourth evangelist more than the others is in the habit of judging the look of the heart-knower both as a prominent sign of His divinity and also as the most effectual instrument of His power over the souls of men, goes certainly to commend this view.

churches of the Diaspora: "whom not seeing, but believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable." And in beautiful harmony with the history of Thomas and with the beatitude in which it terminated, the fourth evangelist puts the copestone on his narrative with the words: "These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through His name."

We have described the installation of the disciples of Jesus in the apostolic office as the comprehensive and exhaustive object of the manifestations of the risen Christ, and the last considered narrative by no means forms an exception. It, too, may be regarded without violence from the same teleological viewpoint. On the one hand, so far as concerns Thomas, the effect of his experience was not only the reviving of his faith, but at the same moment he also entered into office. It was not necessary for this end that the Lord should repeat what He did on Easter evening. For it was not on the disciples individually, but on the whole assembly, that He bestowed the breath of His mouth, the gift of His Spirit. Whoever received a sure place in this privileged circle became thereby possessed of its blessings. And on the other hand, the disciples, through what passed before them in the case of the one, gained a mighty weapon for the carrying out of their office. They learned to stand the fight against doubt, and to know that all-important side of their calling, which Paul has described as a "pulling down of strongholds and imaginations and every high thing," as a "bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." Nevertheless, it remains true that this second manifestation in Judea did not lie in the Lord's original intention. He has sent His own to Galilee, and for Galilee they start. There they await His renewed appearing, and their expectation is not disappointed.

### THE MANIFESTATION BY THE LAKE.

It may seem that the critical question to which the last chapter of the fourth Gospel gives rise, and which still continues to excite a lively interest, is a matter of indifference for apologetic purposes. Even those on whom the section produces the impression first proclaimed by Grotius, yet refer the substance of the history to the authority of the evangelist; whether they

hold that the apostle added the appendix with his own hand at a later time, or that we owe the written form to the church of Ephesus transmitting his oral communication. So in any case there would remain a sufficiently sure basis for considering the subject. And yet it is with deliberate purpose we put the confession at the outset, that for our part we are convinced of the continuity of the Johannine authorship. The grounds on which Carpovius was led to his well-known judgment may not be accepted; the judgment itself—"nova est haec sententia et *nullo nitens fundamento*" (*Bibl. illustr. ad Joh.* xx. 30)—is perfectly right. For it is no argument to say that the end of ch. xx. bears the stamp of a formal conclusion, and prepares us for no further statements. Those who take up this impression from the words can surely only have read them in a very hasty way. Undoubtedly the evangelist terminates that narrative which was intended to establish the faith of his readers; but he has by no means precluded himself from relating facts which, if less significant for the flock, are the more so for the shepherds. And this is precisely the character of the section before us.

"After these things," so it begins. The phrase is well known to us from the fourth Gospel. It is not used to introduce an "appendix" (so Meyer), but an account of events separated from the preceding by a longer or shorter interval, though otherwise linked to them (vi. 1, *et al.*). "This is now the third time that Jesus showed Himself to His disciples," so we read in ver. 14; but this notice does not seem to us to be reconcilable either with the appendix-theory or with the supposition of another author. Accordingly we should require more conclusive arguments than the ordinary ones before giving up a view which passed undisputed in the church down to the time of Grotius. But, indeed, the more persistently we hold it, the more urgent does the question become, what was the Lord's object in this manifestation. He who holds our chapter to be an addition of later date will be easily won to the opinion which Credner, among others (comp. *Einl. in das N. T.* I. p. 233), represents. "The error spread through the churches that the Apostle John would live on till Christ's second coming. The view of removing this delusion, or at least making it harmless, led the author to commit to writing the exact words in which the Lord indicated the fate of this disciple. The proper aim of the narrative is therefore to

be sought in the contents of the last verses, while all that precedes is to be regarded as a mere historical framework."

On the contrary, the man who insists on the continuity of the Johannine record will undoubtedly find the main point of the history in its first half, the final verses being least of all emphasized.[1] His entire position as an inquirer will be a different one. His question will not take the form: for what reason has the author communicated the narrative? but its tenor will be this: for what purpose did the Lord manifest Himself in the way described?

The natural consequence of the peculiar charm of the narrative before us and its mysterious character has been, that no other portion of John's Gospel has been so thoroughly treated (comp. Stier, *Reden Jesu*, VI. pp. 795–876; Hengstenberg, *Comm.* III. pp. 322–359). Every detail has been explored by the zeal of investigators, and there is hardly an imaginable question which has not been raised and attempted to be answered. It has been sought to ascertain the relation between the φιλεῖν and the ἀγαπᾶν, between the *Simon son of Jonas* and the *Peter;* the question has been weighed whether the Lord partook of the meal, or whether He acted merely as the host; whether the meal hour passed in solemn silence, or seasoned with conversation. That most of these inquiries have led to views full of arbitrariness, and assertions full of error, will be confessed by those who have glanced over the literature referred to. But yet much more have we to lament the circumstance that this style of microscopic observation has led away from the question which we regard as the weightiest and most essential. It is true, commentators have touched it in passing; but it claims a more satisfactory solution than Gerhard gives when he says: "Christus eo venerat, ut discipulis resurrectionis suae veritatem et majestatem *denuo* manifestaret;" or Stier, when he supposes that the Lord, pointing to the future while pledging these blessings, meant to represent as in a figure His continued spiritual presence and operation.

There can be no doubt in our case as to the point from which we have to start if we take the object of all the manifestations

[1] And this will appear as inevitable in any circumstances whenever the Lord's question to Peter, τί πρὸς σέ; is duly estimated. A statement which is introduced by this question can certainly not be the gist of the whole narrative.

of the risen Christ to be the raising of the disciples to the apostolate; we stand, of course, by the presupposition that the present manifestation also took place in the same interest. And this view is justified on all sides in the most obvious way. No one reads the narrative without being reminded of an earlier occurrence which accompanied the calling of the first disciples. At least John himself was deeply moved by this reminiscence; for it was in consequence of it that he recognised the man on the shore. That earlier draught of fishes made by Peter was interpreted by the Lord as expressly teaching the Halieutics of His disciples; and so we think here also of their calling as fishers of men. But why is this symbolical deed repeated before the eyes of the disciples? In what interest are they so anxiously reminded of its meaning? And on what point are they called to lay stress? Do they receive a renewed pledge of the success of their work?[1] Or the proof over again that all blessing comes from the Lord only? They needed neither the one nor the other. But one thing at least we understand. When the Lord raised them on Easter evening to the dignity of His apostles, it was the exalted character of the office, its power and right, on

[1] The evangelist has transcribed the number of the fishes caught. Hence the conclusion has been often drawn, that the gist of the narrative is to be found in the largeness of the draught. But the success in this case does not at all exceed the amount of the take at the beginning. Here the net remains unbroken, whereas in the former case it gives way, and two boats are not sufficient to receive the fulness of the blessing. As to the rest, it is true that the hundred and fifty and three large fishes are meant to indicate the abundance of the result, exactly as the six waterpots indicate the large quantity of wine which Jesus provided at Cana, and the baskets full of fragments the overflowing remains of the desert meal. On the number as such we lay no stress, and repudiate the allegorical game which has frequently been played with it. If Peter counted the fishes at all, the result must have been, of course, an exact number, and the only wonder on the subject could be that the man who was so deeply overpowered on occasion of the first draught, found in the present case composure for counting. Strauss has set it down to the praise of Dr. Hengstenberg that here for once he has made a genuine discovery. By the number there is really symbolized, he tells us, the πλήρωμα ἐθνῶν; for Solomon rightly counted a hundred and fifty-three thousand strangers in the land of Israel (2 Chron. ii. 17), and for every thousand there is a fish. Dr. Hengstenberg is by no means altogether unmoved by this praise. For our part, we should have repudiated such a Danaean gift. Meanwhile the "discovery" is of no higher value than the supposition made by Jerome. We have every reason to reject the former still more decidedly than the latter. The man who regards our narrative as a myth will, of course, welcome the vaunted interpretation. On the opposite supposition, along with the interest, there disappears every argument in its support. Comp. Strauss, *die Halben und die Ganzen*, p. 126 f.

which He Himself laid stress. He reflected on their countenances the fulness of that majesty wherein He appeared before their eyes. The hour had struck when His assurance came to its fulfilment: "Ye are they which have continued with Me in My temptations; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as My Father hath appointed unto Me, that ye may sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." As He Himself at the bidding of His Father, "Sit Thou on My right hand," has taken the sceptre of His kingdom, so on His side He installs the disciples in their place of power in this kingdom. That in this solemn hour He leaves the reverse side of the case untouched, and chooses so to do, requires no explanation or justification. But it must have caused us astonishment if He had not afterwards impressively exhibited it. The power of the apostles was conditional on the humility of their service; their success depended on their restless, unwearied, self-denying activity. In great patience, in pains and labour, in watching and fasting, they were to approve themselves as the servants of Christ. They sat on their thrones; but their judging and ruling was to go hand in hand with their gospel ministry, and to be founded on it wholly. And that is precisely what the history of the draught of fishes has represented symbolically.

Viewed from this standpoint, it cannot appear in the general as a mere repetition of a former occurrence; it cannot be so regarded at all, when we consider how closely it is interwoven with the immediately succeeding narrative. From the beginning the Lord had in view the meal which followed; the draught of fishes must needs terminate in a meal. Therefore He asks when He appears on the shore: "Children, have ye any meat?" And when they answer no, He gives them direction and counsel how to find the food which He desired. Rightly has a recent commentator remarked, that the concern of the disciples was with the take as such; the Lord's, on the other hand, with the take in relation to the meal.[1] Such, indeed, is the purport of His command: "Bring hither of the fish which ye have caught;" and such the purport of His invitation to the assembled company: "Come and dine." Food is what He desires from their hands;

[1] Meyer is wrong in saying that not the meal, but only the preceding draught, was the aim of Christ's appearance. This view tears asunder what is coherent, and deprives the narrative of its peculiar characteristic, that in which it differs from the event related by Luke.

and food again which His hand dispenses to them. The saying of the parable finds its fulfilment wherein the Lord commands His servant: "Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself, and serve me, till I have eaten and drunken" (Luke xvii. 8); but the other side of the parable is also verified, wherein the Master gives to His true servants the promise: "Verily I say unto you, That He shall gird Himself, and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and serve them" (Luke xii. 37). What, then, is the food which the head of the kingdom can desire from His chosen servants? No other than this, that they bring Him souls for His own, whom they win with pains and labour. And what sort of meal is it which He prepares for His faithful servants? None other than this, that He recompenses them for what they have accomplished in His service. It is perfectly intelligible why the text mentions different food, one for the Master and the other for the disciples. They do not eat of the proceeds of their draught; it does not belong to them. But they find the table ready on the shore—their host has provided it out of *His* stores; so it is one joy which the Master and another which the servant tastes. And yet they are gathered with one mind to the common meal, and they share its enjoyment. We see the Lord and His servants partaking together of that joy which had been predicted in an earlier place under another figure: "One soweth and another reapeth; he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathers fruit unto life eternal, that he that soweth and he that reapeth may *rejoice together*."

We hope that the view advanced will receive confirmation from the further course of the narrative. The further *course* we say deliberately. The section beginning with ver. 15 has been so sharply divided from the preceding, that it has been almost judged as the account of a new and independent appearance of the Lord. This is not so indifferent a matter as might at first sight appear. That the words of the evangelist in ver. 14, "This is now the third time that Jesus showed Himself," make the impression of a conclusion we will not deny; but it will also be granted to us that the words, "so when they had dined," prove the unbroken continuity of the narrative. We do not allow the decision to be a matter of feeling, we appeal to a higher tribunal. The misleading interpretations, to which the new phase of the

narrative has been subjected, arise mostly from the circumstance that its connection with the whole has been overlooked. Hence some speak of what the Lord does in this hour as a reinstating of Peter in his former place; they assume that the whole position of the disciple was so shaken by the sin of his denial that its restoration was an absolute necessity. But there is only a solitary feature in the text which forms an apparent argument for this view. Admitting that the question which the Lord puts three times to the disciple really points back to the thrice-given denial, the ground is too weak to support an opinion which everywhere else in Scripture is met only with difficulties. "Jesus turned and looked on Peter; and Peter went out and wept bitterly" (Luke xxii. 61, 62); with this look of the Lord, with this penitence on the part of the disciple, the matter was at an end. Of any posterior effect of the misdeed there is nowhere to be found a single word. His conduct on Easter morning, or whensoever we meet him during these festal days, is not in keeping with the supposition that a special burden lay on his heart, that a secret sentence of outlawry troubled his inner freedom and openness. At least, to put it in the mildest way, it is awkward to speak of a *re*installation of that disciple to whom, as well as to the others, the word had been spoken: "As My Father hath sent Me, so send I you,—receive ye the Holy Ghost!"

Others who do not adopt this view in its entirety have attempted to modify the common opinion. "The apostle did not recover a place he had forfeited, but he was raised at this very moment to the place to which the Lord had destined him from the first. The primacy of the apostles, the chief guidance of the church, was now made over to him by the Shepherd of the flock" (comp. Hengstenberg, *Comm. zum Joh.* III. p. 343). But however it may be with the primacy of Peter, it is impossible in all the circumstances to conceive of this as the *introduction* of the disciple to it. Neither did he need anything of the kind, nor would it, either by means of the searching question or of the commission which followed upon it, have found its realization. Certainly love to Jesus is the requisite of a true apostle; but a higher degree of it does not qualify for the primacy. Certainly it is the servant's duty to feed the Shepherd's flock, but for that very reason it cannot well have been a prerogative of the first of

them. We shall arrive at a more satisfactory view of the section if we regard it as a real continuation of the preceding narrative.

The draught of fishes completed, the meal just taken formed the basis on which the Lord proceeded to His conversation with Peter. The continuous thread presents itself spontaneously to view. The direction "Feed My sheep" evidently rests on the command to cast the net into the sea; nay, the new call is essentially a simple taking up of the first. The difference is only in the figure, the matter symbolized is the same in both cases. Here, as before, the Lord has in view the services which the apostles are to render to His kingdom by indefatigable labour.[1] With the same directness does the question, "Lovest thou Me?" arise from the meal which has been provided. He who rewards so graciously the services rendered to Him may surely expect a self-sacrificing, patient, laborious love. But where now is the progress, the new element in the further course? The answer is to be found in the light of Christ's prophecy. We have interpreted the fishing of the disciples as signifying the labour of their career as evangelists. But they have more to pass through than watching and fasting, work and conflict. "We are reproached, we are blasphemed; we suffer persecution, and have sorrow always; we are killed all the day long, and are accounted as sheep for the slaughter." And for some of them a peculiarly tragical lot was in store. In the highest measure for Peter. "Simon Jona, lovest thou Me more than these?" So the Lord begins His conversation with him. Only in the first of the dialogue did He put the question in this way; the second and third time the element of comparison disappears. It thus becomes clear what is the purport of the *more than these.* It leads the disciple not to a bitter retrospect of his

[1] The Lord's twofold direction has been explained of the double side of the apostles' calling; in the former their Halieutics, in the latter their Poimenics (so especially, Stier, *Reden des Herrn*, VI. p. 834). If any one chooses merely to find a support for these modern categories in our narrative, we would not dispute with him; but we recognise no such intention on the part of the Lord. Many a one has given too much weight to the thought that Peter's commission seems restricted to those who have already become members of the kingdom. But it is surely enough to point to the words of the parable: καὶ ἄλλα πρόβατα ἔχω . . . κἀκεῖνά με δεῖ ἀγαγεῖν. From these it is plain that the Lord can designate even those who have not yet entered into the net of the kingdom of heaven as *His sheep.*

former bold protestations (Matt. xxvi. 33), and still less to a dangerous comparison with the love of other souls; but it prepares him for the severer tests which he more than all others is to endure. Actually above all the others. The prophetical words of ver. 18 have been almost universally referred to the martyr death of the apostle. Their spiritual interpretation, on which voices here and there are still heard insisting, is disproved by ver. 19. The one point at which commentators diverge is whether this prophecy is meant to foretell some violent death in general for the disciple, or his crucifixion in particular. If we decide without hesitation for the latter alternative, it is not from a desire to prove the singularity of Peter's fate, but altogether on exegetical grounds.[1] For the peculiar bitterness of the lot which befell this apostle is not the death of the cross in itself, but the circumstance that he had to endure it at the end of his course. Hence the Lord prefixes the point of time, "when thou art old," with obvious emphasis. The disciple has borne the burden and heat of the whole day, and now when it is evening he is recompensed with this cup. James, too, endured the martyr death; but when it was yet early, somewhere about the third hour, his Lord called him home; Peter gathered the marks of

[1] If we compare the evangelist's explanation in ver. 19 with the explanations which he has given, ch. xii. 33 and xviii. 32, in exactly similar terms, we shall scarcely be able to resist the conviction that he had the same image in both cases before him. In the parallels quoted he meant indisputably the death of Jesus on the cross; here, too, he uses the *ποίῳ θανάτῳ* in the same sense. And it was not the event which first led him to this explanation of the prophetic words; he understood them so and not otherwise immediately. The *ἐκτενεῖς τὰς χεῖράς σου* is so definite a description, that the idea of impotence yielding itself to external violence does not seem sufficient to explain the phrase. According to Artemidorus, the *ἔκτασις χειρῶν* was characteristic of crucifixion; it was that which peculiarly struck the eye. As the *ὑψοῦ* was the right word for the death of *Jesus* on the cross, so the *ἐκτενεῖν τὰς χεῖρας* offered itself as an appropriate description of the crucifixion of the *disciple*. Meyer has met this with a strange objection. He says that in this case the arrangement of the phrases would be astonishing, nay, that the *οἴσει σε* at the end would appear simply absurd. The difficulty disappears without any need of Casaubon's precarious explanation. Both halves of ver. 18 correspond exactly with one another. *Ὅτι ἦς νεώτερος . . . ὅταν γηράσῃς; ἐζώννυες σεαυτόν . . . ἄλλος σε ζώσει; περιεπάτεις ὅπου ἤθελες . . . οἴσει σε ὅπου οὐ θέλεις.* There is only one element in the second hemistich that does not find its parallel; the *ἐκτενεῖς τὰς χεῖράς σου* is over and above. But it thus appears clearly that it is not meant to be added as a third member to the following phrases, but that it contains the viewpoint from which the contrast between past and future is to be regarded. And so far it must stand, of course, in the first place.

Jesus on his body till he suffered the baptism of his death. Hence, in view of this future, the heart-knower puts to him the question: "Lovest thou Me more than these?" The depth of his love, the enjoyment of a food of which the world knows not, the certainty of the eternal retribution,—this is to strengthen him to gird up his loins and enter these lists.

It has been rightly remarked by a recent commentator, that the prophecy of this exodus was an important element in fitting the disciple for his office. The Lord testified to Paul also immediately after his call, how much he must suffer for His name's sake. It may appear a blessing to the children of the world that the sad future is veiled from their view; the apostle of the risen Christ is of another mould. He does not doubt that he is following the Captain of the faith through suffering and death to glory. The Lord knows His own; He knows what they endure. And that He was not deceived in them is plain from the Epistles of Peter and Paul. The very fact that they saw the cup of their decease from afar, made them fervent in spirit, and their step elastic in their course. So tragical an end was not destined for all the apostles, and especially not for all whom we find gathered here on the lake. There was one in the group for whom a peculiarly gentle lot was in store. The Lord would have had no occasion to give any hint of his future had not Peter's question forced Him to speak of it. The disciple's question is dictated by the well-known peculiarity of his temperament; and the reason of the Lord's declinature is doubtless to be found in the same fact which was its origin. We say, its declinature. Commentators are at variance, in so far as some hold that Jesus parried the disciple's wish in form, but in fact acceded to his request; while others warn us against extracting a categorical judgment from a conditional sentence. And the latter are in the right. When the evangelist exhorts his readers to hold by the *ipsissima verba* of the Lord's answer, he disputes their right to draw an inference from them, or to make them the subject of their interpretation at all. At least he gives them to understand that every attempt at explanation will be fruitless. His direction has not been followed; but men have set themselves zealously to make out the sense in which John was to remain till the Lord's coming. It has been said that the apostle, as the author of the Apocalypse, did in fact see the coming Christ; that the

Lord fulfilled this enigmatical saying in this herald of His judgment upon the world (Bengel: "Petro crux, Joanni apocalypsis illa magna per aenigma hoc loco promissa est"). Others find the solution in a Johannine type of the church which is to supervene at the close of the Petrine period (so first Joachim von Floris, *Introd. in Apoc.* p. 84; comp. Engelhardt, *Kirchengesch. Abhandl. über den Abt Joachim und das ewige Evangelium*, p. 32 ff.). Others have called attention to the contrast between the *till I come* and the *follow Me*. Not the violent death of martyrdom, but a departure resembling the most immediate home-taking by His gracious hand, was the end which the Lord set before the disciple whom He loved. Had we to decide at all between these views, the actual result would fall weightily into the scales for the last. But there is no need of deciding. The author wishes to meet the delusion of the brethren by the very fact of emphasizing the hypothetical form of Christ's declaration. The Lord's words are not to the effect, "I *will* that he remain, and he *shall* remain;" but merely supposing the case, "*if* I will." If we lay emphasis on this conditional *if*, then the *come* preserves its natural meaning. It denotes the same return of Christ as the angels announce on the day of His ascension (ἐλεύσεται, Acts i. 11).[1] Thus understood, the saying loses the enigmatical mysterious sound which is wont to be heard in it; but the loss is compensated by a gain. The whole emphasis rests on the declinature which Peter receives. "What is that to thee?" so the Lord answers him. To the evangelist also this question must have been of the highest value; for he has again quoted it in ver. 23, though it appears there to be unnecessary. Its worth is seen in the light of the exhortation by which it is immediately succeeded, "Follow thou me." It was not as a confidential communication, but with a very definite aim, that the Lord had foretold his future fate to His disciple. The prophetical word was intended to season and stimulate his following of his Master.

[1] That the emphasis does in reality rest exclusively on the conditional particle appears clearly, especially when it is considered that the ideas expressed by "*not dying*" and "remaining till the coming of the Lord" are identical. The former only the negative, the latter the positive side of the same thing. He who dies not, lives till the Lord's coming again; and he who remains till the Lord comes, is the man who dies not, 1 Cor. xv. 51! The real purport of the correction made by the evangelist is nothing else than this: "Jesus said not to him, he shall not die; but, *If I will that he die not*, what is that to thee?"

He can destroy this blessing, but he can also heighten it. He will destroy it if in the way of comparison he looks to others, but he will heighten it in proportion as he lays to heart his Lord's last rebuke.

We were concerned to prove that the manifestation by the lake was, as a whole and in all its details, subservient to the fitting of the disciples for their office. In its entire compass, it follows the same aim as all the manifestations of the Risen One. In the history of every one of them, the supposition which we made in the outset has been evidently verified. Regarded from this point of view, the narratives have become transparent and comprehensible. The final proof of our view will be found in the history of the last appearing of the living One.[1]

[1] This would be the place where we should have to consider the history given us in the first Gospel of a manifestation of Christ on the mountain of Galilee, *if* we could regard the passage as describing a single appearance of the Risen One. We have already explained the grounds which lead us to the conclusion, that the account of Matthew is rather a summary of all the manifestations in which the Lord showed Himself alive to the apostles. If we now add the assurance that the impression, which we continue to receive from the entire character of the narrative, confirms us in this conviction, we are well aware that an impression so subjective, especially on a field like the present, can lay no claim to any value. Yet we cherish the quiet hope that others will share it with us, if only they add a circumstance which after all gives an objective basis to the feeling described. The lapidary-style in which the Lord's commands appear, vv. 18–20, embracing three powerful declarations hardly joined with one another by a connecting particle, would be perfectly appropriate, or rather the only suitable one, if the entire intercourse between the risen Christ and the disciples had in reality been confined to this one meeting. But we know He manifested Himself to them often and variously, He spoke much to them of the kingdom of God. And can we suppose that in any single case of these numerous appearances, especially in one which certainly could neither have been the first nor the last in the series, He addressed them in such words as are here before us? We cannot admit this conviction. But just because we should understand this speech *in the mouth of the Lord* only on the supposition that He had not appeared more than once in the midst of His disciples,—just because of this does it become clear to us even *in the Gospel narrative*, only if we suppose that the apostle means to sum up in his account the entire manifestations of the living One. And with a master hand he has done this. It needs no proof that it embraces everything which the Gospels of Luke and John give us from the forty days, without leaving out one essential particular. Matthew provides us in the highest measure with—to use a happy expression of Augustine—a narratio *plena* of the Lord's manifestations; a *narratio*, such as only the pencil of an apostle could have drawn so faithful and majestic, so comprehensive and exhaustive, and which certainly differs specifically from the apocryphal description at the close of Mark. And yet we know what a difficulty still arises. The evangelist begins: προσελθὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς λέγων κ.τ.λ. And this preface certainly does not seem to raise the expectation that a composition framed by the author himself is about to follow, but rather the view

## THE LORD'S APPEARING ON THE DAY OF HIS ASCENSION.

When the object of our Lord's last appearance is asserted to be, as it usually is, His leave-taking from His own, this is not merely intelligible, but in some respects well founded. In point of fact, He gathered the Eleven round Him with this view; they were to be witnesses of His ascent to the Father. They were to know where He was; they were to know it through the same sensible experience which had convinced them that He was truly risen from the dead. "While they beheld, He was taken up,"—so accordingly runs the narrative; "and a cloud received Him out of their sight." After every time that He appeared among them, He vanished, ἄφαντος ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῶν; but here they *saw* Him vanish, "they beheld Him ascend up where He was before." Gerhard: "non ἀφανισμός quidam vel nuda ἀορασία, sed τοπικὴ μετάστασις, localis translatio, visibilis elevatio." But it lies in the nature of His leave-taking, that the *beholding* by itself could not exhaust the purpose of the appearance. It was a parting which, notwithstanding its full and earnest reality (John xvii. 11: "I am no more in the world, but

that the Lord did really speak in these terms and in this very order. Only there is a perfectly analogous case in the fourth Gospel, which may help us entirely over this difficulty. We mean the passage in John xii., to which we formerly referred in passing. The apostle has closed the history of the public testimony of Jesus to Israel. He writes (in ver. 36): ταῦτα ἐλάλησεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ ἀπελθὼν ἐκρύβη ἀπ' αὐτῶν; and the reflection on its result, which he subjoins, vv. 37–43, evidently supposes a definitive conclusion. And yet there follows, vv. 44–50, a series of solemn utterances made by the Lord regarding His person and mission. By far the greater number of commentators, and among them men so thoroughly conservative as Stier (comp. *Reden Jesu*, V. p. 103 ff.), have recognised the impossibility of taking the passage as containing an actually delivered address either to the people or to the disciples (Calvin); and they rightly hold that the evangelist comprehends in it the testimonies which the Lord bore to Himself during the entire course of His preaching. Perhaps Christ nowhere spoke in these very terms, and certainly never in this order. But undoubtedly the true sense and the full contents of His μαρτυρία are comprehended in the powerful passage. And yet how does the apostle introduce it? He writes: Ἰησοῦς δὲ ἔκραξεν καὶ εἶπεν (ch. xii. 44). To this corresponds in our passage of Matthew the ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς λέγων. The relation in which the Johannine section stands to the entire previous declarations of the Lord regarding Himself, His dignity and work, is the very same as that in which Matthew's account stands to the history of all the manifestations of the Risen One. Whoever accepts our view will find himself freed from the last difficulties to which the Enantiophany between Matthew's account of the resurrection on the one side, and the descriptions of the third and fourth evangelists on the other, can give rise.

these are in the world, and I come to Thee"), on the one hand left them still in possession of His fellowship in the Spirit, and on the other left them to await their reunion in glory. "I am with you always, even to the end of the world," and "where I am, there shall also My servant be." Such a leave-taking could not pass in silence. If, therefore, the closing description of the third evangelist seems to imply that its significance ended in the mere symbolism of the hands outstretched to bless, we regard it as a desirable complement, and one answering to our expectation, when, in the Acts of the Apostles, we have a conversation related which the Lord held with the assembled group immediately before His ascension. Thus we shall have to express ourselves to this effect: "Not to take leave in itself, but to take leave *after these words*, did the Risen One reveal Himself for the last time." This conversation could have no other subject than the office which the apostles had undertaken. For the Lord desires to accompany the exercise of this office with His blessing; and on the day of His coming again, He will receive from the hands of His commissioned servants the result of their work. Only one question requires to be answered. After all that had been spoken and done during the forty days, what need could there be for anything more in this connection? And how far was it met by the utterances of Christ? Our answer is not doubtful; it lies clearly before us in the words of the text. It is *the time and place for beginning their work* about which the Lord gives command to the apostles. They were not to raise their voices as witnesses until they had received the definite impulse from above; and they were to begin their evangelistic career nowhere else than in the city of Jerusalem.[1]

[1] If we lay the emphasis in the present manifestation upon these apparently secondary directions, a difficulty is removed, which the entire history of the Lord's appearances may offer to the superficial observer. Characteristic is the remark to which Bengel was led in this relation (on Matt. xxviii. 19); comp. *Gnom.* I. p. 194: "Munus apostolicum saepius Apostolis suis injunxit Salvator a mortuis redux; Evangelistae igitur praeceptorum istorum summam hac illave occasione data potuerunt exhibere." He wishes evidently to satisfy his readers about the astonishing circumstance that an act, which from its very nature excludes repetition, does yet appear from the Gospel records as performed several times, according to his own reckoning not less than four times. The note, however, leaves the difficulty unsolved. The "*saepius injunxit* Salvator Apostolis suis munus" is to be decidedly rejected. We can easily understand why it is that the Lord, as often as He becomes visible to the eyes of His disciples during these forty days, always puts the

Those who refuse to acknowledge that the Lord bestowed on His disciples the gift of the Spirit on Easter evening, are certainly in a position to insist on the common view of the aim of His last appearance. "Jamjam in coelum ascensurus promisit Christus discipulis suis Spiritum sanctum, per quem donis ad evangelii praedicationem et miraculorum operationem necessariis instruerentur; ac *de hac Spiritus promissione in praesente pericope*

apostolic office in the foreground; for His whole appearing before them is in the interest of this office. But the investing of the receivers with it, strictly speaking, could of course only happen once,—and in the Christophany on Easter evening we have seen it carried out as in its right place. This *installation* into office was afterwards succeeded by various *instructions*. For those, indeed, who persistently regard the relative passage in the first Gospel as the description of a single appearance of the Risen One, there is no possibility of getting over a painful perplexity in reference to this matter; and as against them criticism possesses an indisputable advantage. But this is a circumstance which will form a new recommendation of the view proposed by us of the passage in Matthew. We remark, besides, a phrase used by Bengel in the note we have quoted, a phrase which proves the recognised gift of insight possessed by this commentator in all its penetration and delicacy. "Potuerunt *summam exhibere* Evangelistae praeceptorum illorum hac illave occasione data." *Summam exhibere;* in these terms, in fact, the narrative of Matthew is precisely described. We have only to regret that Bengel has not followed his correct feeling more impartially, that he has not drawn its natural consequence. Probably he was hindered from doing so by the fear that in this case he would lose a definite and sure place for Christ's command of baptism. But this fear would have been ungrounded. For our part, we have no doubt to what hour the institution of the sacrament in question is to be referred. The close of Mark, which, notwithstanding its spuriousness, has already rendered us many important services, puts us here again on the right track. Its author subjoins to the direction borrowed from Matthew, "κηρυχθέντες κηρύξατε," the declaration, ὁ πιστεύσας καὶ βαπτισθεὶς σωθήσεται, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστήσας κατακριθήσεται. This dictum does not merely remind us of John's "ἄν τινων ἀφῆτε τὰς ἁμαρτίας, ἀφίενται αὐτοῖς, ἄν τινων κρατῆτε, κεκράτηνται," but undoubtedly coincides with it. But in that case the interpolated βαπτισθείς (Mark xvi. 16) leads us to the otherwise very natural supposition, that the command of baptism could have been delivered nowhere else than on occasion of the Christophany of Easter evening. The fact that John is silent as to this command falls to be judged in the same way as the analogous circumstance that the same evangelist likewise passes over the institution of the Eucharist. But as to the fact that Luke, too, does not expressly relate the Lord's command (we only catch a slight though discernible glimpse of it in his narrative; it is noticeable in the words, "κηρυχθῆναι ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ μετάνοιαν καὶ ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν," xxiv. 47, as soon as it is compared with the passage, Acts ii. 38, "μετανοήσατε καὶ βαπτισθήτω ἕκαστος ὑμῶν εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν"), those will not be surprised who, on the one hand, take into account what we have already said as to the character of Luke's Gospel, and on the other, have regard to the fact that no biblical author proceeds so decidedly as he does on the silent *assumption* that baptism is a βουλὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν. To repent and be baptized, to be baptized and receive salvation, that is, forgiveness of sins,—these he has uniformly conceived as inseparable from one another, nay, both in his view fall into one.

*agitur*," Gerhard, *Harm.* c. 217. For our part, understanding as we do the "receive ye the Holy Spirit," John xx. 22, this view becomes impossible. But apart from this altogether, we should be obliged to reject it on purely exegetical grounds. No one can have carefully weighed the text before us, who takes from it the impression that it is meant to be in the tone of promise. The observation which produces this impression goes no deeper than the surface. "He commanded them,"—this we read as the heading of the whole; and the progress of the discourse continues to be regulated by this description to its close. The Lord speaks throughout in the sense of command. Strictly speaking, He does not appear at all at the present hour as one promising; He merely reminds the disciples of the assurance which they had formerly heard from His mouth ("which ye heard of Me"). And founding on this reminder, He makes His will known to them. Both phases of the passage begin with prohibitions; not to depart from Jerusalem, ver. 4; it is not for you to know, ver. 7. And in both cases the progress is marked by means of the particle *but* (ἀλλά). But on a prohibition the particle of contrast, ἀλλά, cannot introduce a promise, but only a demand. Instead of what the apostles are to avoid, there is another thing which they are directed *to do*. And what is this positive command? It is, as is expressly mentioned in ver. 4, as is tacitly involved in ver. 8, contained in the *wait*. "Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning" (Luke xii. 35); in this earlier word of the Lord we have obviously the principle of exposition for the present discourse. Their attitude is to be that of readiness, of the "preparation of the Gospel of peace" (Eph. vi. 15); already their foot is to be lifted for the prescribed course, for the beginning of it is immediately before them ("not many days hence"). But ere they tread the lists, a sign from above will be given, and they are to await the heavenly guidance with their torch burning. They are not to depart from Jerusalem to praise the great things (μεγαλεῖα) of God somewhere or other, according to their own judgment, but to remain there until the Spirit shall open their mouth to bear witness to Israel. They are not to question and search after times and seasons, but simply wait the moment which the Father has fixed ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐξουσίᾳ. We have proved in a former place that it is not the bestowal of the Spirit, but their anointing with it, which is

meant in ver. 5. The apostles had already received the gift; but the hour was yet in the future when this gift was to penetrate their consciousness inwardly, and tell in power and work outwardly. It is only when thus understood that the particle ἀλλά in ver. 4 receives its full meaning; only then does it introduce a contrast to the preceding prohibition. The disciples themselves understood the Lord in this sense. They put a question to Him. Modern exegesis defends them against the charge of having cherished even till then the thoughts of a carnal Judaism. Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* III. p. 647) has rightly contradicted the view that their words were the expression of a worldly hope. It rested wholly on the foundation of the O. T. promise, and that a promise which, in reality, was near its fulfilment. But what moved them at this hour to put such a question, and why does the Lord set it so decisively aside? It occurred to the disciples as a consequence of ver. 4. If they were not to leave Jerusalem, but there await power from on high to carry out their office as witnesses in this very city, it appeared quite as if the kingdom were to arise in Israel, that Israel which had rejected the Lord of the kingdom. And was it a deceitful appearance or a delusion? Peter certainly did not so explain it, when, in his Pentecostal sermon, he proclaimed: "The promise is to you and to your children; to you first God, having raised up His Son Jesus, sent Him to bless you;" and when, in case of their repentance, He sets before them in sure prospect the seasons of refreshing, the times of restitution (Acts iii. 20, 21). On the material side, therefore, the question of the disciples cannot have been the subject of rebuke. We do not even grant, with Hofmann, that "in so far at least they were mistaken, as they conceived of their own equipment with the Spirit and His outpouring on Israel as so close to one another" (*ubi supra*, p. 547). Of a *mistake* of the apostles there is not a word here. It is not a false *view* which the Lord meets with His answer, but a displeasing mode of *conduct*. The words of ver. 7, "it is not for you to know," must be rightly understood. They have as little to do with the limits which are fixed to the knowledge of the finite mind, as with future epochs in the history of the kingdom of heaven.[1] The γνῶναι in

[1] The right understanding of the words has been hindered by regarding the Lord's saying, Matt. xxiv. 36, as an explanatory parallel. The two passages have nothing in common. Olshausen's explanation (*Com.* II. p. 587) is an entire mistake. On

this connection does not denote any knowing, seeing through, or comprehending, but is meant in the sense of searching (*ἐρευνᾶν*), *ἐξετάζειν*, inquiring into. Instead of prying into the time or hour of the promise of the Father, they are to await its fulfilment, a fulfilment which will take place first in themselves, and then through their ministry in ever-widening circles. In this *wait* the question about time finds a sure grave. We claimed for the particle *but* in ver. 4 its strict rights; we raise the same claim for the *but* at the beginning of ver. 8. And we secure a direct contrast the moment we cease to understand the words which follow in the sense of a promise, and put the emphasis on their hortatory character. Waiting is the duty of the apostles, waiting for the power which shall fill them from above; this power will form the watchword to begin their work of testimony; and in Jerusalem they are to begin it! In fact, the longer we meditate on the passage, the more firmly are we persuaded that this, and nothing else, was the purpose of the last Christophany.

Yet the question may be raised, whether the Lord, in giving the direction described, meets a real want; and perhaps a still graver scruple may be felt as to whether the conversation so understood is in keeping with a parting hour. Let us see whether the objection is well founded. As to those who dispute the need, we meet them with a counter question. Suppose the apostles had begun to bear witness of Christ before the Spirit consecrated their tongues; suppose they had broken the bond of connection which the Lord established in His declaration, "The Spirit shall testify of Me, and ye also shall bear witness" (John xv. 26, 27; comp. also Acts v. 32: "We are witnesses, and so is also the Holy Ghost"),—and so had attempted the first steps of their apostolic career without an express impulse from above, and consequently without the corresponding fruit. Or suppose they had left Jerusalem, and had chosen for their field of labour the same Galilee in which they had witnessed the brilliant successes of their Master. These are not monstrous, inconceivable cases; we might without scruple designate them as perfectly possible; nay,

the contrary, our passage is related to what Peter says of the prophets, *ἐρευνῶντες, εἰς τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρὸν ἐδήλου τὸ πνεῦμα.* What the apostle remarks there to the honour of the prophets is here interdicted by the Lord to His disciples, because the fulfilment lay most immediately near.

who knows but it may be found probable that the disciples would have determined so and not otherwise if the Lord had left them to the freedom of their own impulses. It needed His express direction to guard them against this mistake; His direction to protect the rising kingdom from such a threatening danger.[1] But if, then, such a command met the want of the disciples, nay, if it was indispensable to them, at what other hour should it have been given than at the very hour of parting? It did not in any way lessen the solemnity of the scene; and it will not be felt as a discord that it deals only with secondary points. In general, time and place may be of less consequence; in the case before us, they had the highest importance. The conduct of the apostles on the day of Pentecost is very commonly regarded as an event in the history of the world; and to this day it has preserved its overwhelming impression. But it appears as one condition essential to this impression, that the disciples followed the direction which the Lord left them in the hour of His departure.

"Ye shall be My witnesses to the uttermost part of the earth," such are the last words which the earth heard from the mouth of the Lord. After these words He stretched out His hands to bless, and before the gaze of His disciples He ascended into heaven. He leaves the apostles behind as His witnesses. Into this office He has inaugurated and introduced them during the forty days' intercourse. All the manifestations of the Risen One of which the history tells are calculated to realize the purpose: "Ye shall be My witnesses to the uttermost part of the earth." The study of the narratives one by one has led us to this result; but we hope that their historical character will thus at the same time be vindicated against the attack of criticism. For all scruples about their credibility lose their point when there is demonstrated to be a purpose, a saving purpose, to which they were directed. With-

[1] Strauss, as is well known, has called it strange that the apostles should have waited till the fiftieth day before proclaiming the resurrection of Jesus, supposing they had really been witnesses of it. And herein he finds a reason for denying the reality of the Easter miracle. On the other hand, it corresponds to his expectation that they betook themselves soon to Galilee, and he can show how their visions of Christ arose on this home soil. For the possibility that the conduct of the disciples depended on another factor than their reflection and resolution, that they in their going or staying, acting or waiting, were carrying out commands which they had received,—for such a possibility historical criticism leaves no room.

out these manifestations of the Risen One, the office which has overcome the world would neither have been founded nor executed. "I send you," and they went out into all lands. They delivered to the world their testimony, and they found faith on the earth. They will continue to find this faith, for though dead they yet speak. The Lord directed them to spread the witness of Him "to the uttermost part of the earth;" but He also assured them that His blessing would accompany it "even to the end of the world." And it will neither be silenced nor in vain, because the power as well as the promise comes from Him who is risen from the dead, and who will reign till all enemies, the hostility of criticism included, are made His footstool. This is not yet the case. As the apostle acknowledged in his day, "now we see not yet all things put under Him" (Heb. ii. 8), so we see at the present hour how criticism, for example, continues hostilities against Him whom God has exalted with the full energy of logical consequence, and, as it seems, with rising bitterness, and unhappily also with growing success. Hostilities against Him! so we express ourselves. True, it puts on the appearance of simply pursuing the object of enlightening the world as to the true state of matters by dispassionate, scientific investigation. But its fanaticism breaks out everywhere all too keenly against the person of Him who has set before it, as before every other source and centre of hostility, the prospect: "Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sit on the right hand of the power of God, and come in the clouds of heaven." With this hatred it seeks to gain fresh recruits and adherents, and justifies the complaint of Jul. Müller (*Dogmat. Abhandl.* p. vi.), that the Spirit of the world unveils its hostile attitude to Christianity ever more clearly, and that compromise with it is impossible.

We should accordingly expect that the attack of the adversary would be directed with very peculiar intensity against that fact in the Gospel history which gives the most immediate testimony to the exaltation of our Lord to the throne of dominion, we mean against the *ascension to heaven* related at the close of His last earthly appearance. This was to be expected all the more, because the attempt to set aside this doctrine appears as a necessary complement to the endeavour to overthrow the certainty of the Easter tidings; for, let men say what they will, the account of the ascension is and remains a powerful support of the resur-

rection history itself.[1] But in this expectation we find ourselves deceived. It is true, Strauss has devoted a section of his work to this subject. But instead of producing a single argument against the reality of the fact, he confines himself to showing how the myth could have been formed and maintained in Christian tradition. And the proof is so involved and artificial, so obscure and self-contradictory, and even the otherwise thoroughly welcome analogy from the history of Elijah furnishes so weak an auxiliary,[2] that the author has not found any following among his own friends; if on the ground of this performance he were to look round on the circle of his adherents, he might meet in many an eye the augur's look. The view that the disciples could have dreamed an occurrence such as that before us in Acts i. 9, the men of whom Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* III. p. 2), founding on Acts i. 6, rightly maintains, that even *after* the resurrection took place it did not enter into their thoughts that the Lord was leaving the world and going to the Father,—this view criticism, on grounds of prudence, should not have proposed to thinking men.

But whence this lack of energy in the region before us? Have its powers failed here, or has it accounted special efforts at this particular place superfluous? The latter alternative is no doubt the true one. It could not see any occasion to put forth its powers to wrest a doctrine from theologians which they themselves did not seem at all to hold with a firm hand. In truth, it is a wonderfully indifferent attitude which many of them take up towards the fact of Christ's ascension. They do not expressly surrender it, but it is of no great importance to them either dogmatically or historically; on this point they think they may make a concession to "science" or to the current of the age, without sacrificing anything essential to the good cause. The close of Hase's *Leben Jesu* continues to pass in a large circle as

[1] Faith in the Lord's ascension may be weak in proportion as doubt gathers strength as to His resurrection. But the *account* of the former is not affected in the least, though the history of the latter falls under suspicion. So much the less is this the case, because the ascension, when strictly taken as we shall show, is not a subject at all of the *Gospel* history.

[2] Strauss himself has been obliged to grant that from the type of the Elijah narrative only one of the particulars advanced by Luke can be derived. On closer consideration it would not have escaped him further, that two occurrences, the one of which has for its subject a taking home by external power, the other a going home in the power of self, scarcely stand to one another in the relation of analogy.

one of extraordinary "beauty." Even Stier confesses that the last passage in Neander's *Leben Jesu Christi* may atone for many suspicious elements in that composition. And yet in the former work, in the "beautiful conclusion," the fact vanishes in a phrase; and in the latter we can discover nothing of a very conciliating character, when it is merely admitted that the apostles "presupposed" a supernatural removal of Christ from the earthly phenomenal world "under some form or other." Meyer seems to have expressed the thought of a considerable majority when stating that, in general, the *actual fact* is immovably established by the declarations of the N. T., but that a *visible, striking occurrence meeting the senses* belongs to later tradition, and is to be regarded as a reflection of the idea of the Lord's Parousia.[1] It was one of the last matters which engaged the late Dr. Hengstenberg, to contend for the full reality of the occurrence, as Luke has related it. Comp. *Evangel. K. Z.*, Jahrgang 1868, Nr. 67–72. The weaknesses of the apologetic course adopted by this theologian are apparent also in this essay. And if the author states in the outset that a novice may easily become bewildered when face to face with the objections to the ascension, we do not think that his vindication of the narrative has broken the spell of this bewilderment. But as he has the imperishable merit of having, during a long scientific career, defended the main facts of sacred history against unbelief and half-belief with unswerving persistency, it seems to us like an initial crowning of this merit

[1] We cannot succeed in harmonizing this decided acknowledgment of the actuality of the ascension with the not less decided refusal to admit a striking, sensible occurrence. And we cannot altogether rid ourselves of the suspicion, that at the foundation of this explanation there lies an analogous attitude towards the resurrection. When one denies the "striking, sensible occurrence" in the case of the ascension, he may lose himself in spiritualism in respect of the resurrection also, and secretly question the ὄντως ἐγήρθη (ὄντως in the biblical sense, not in the sense of a false philosophy), just as he sets aside the ὄντως ἐτάφη. If any one maintains that Jesus died and was buried, that by His death He went to God, and in His very dying His resurrection and ascension were completed, we regard the view, it is true, as antibiblical and unchristian; but yet there is in it sense, thought, and conceivableness. But if one teaches, on the other hand, that the Lord truly rose from the dead, and had intercourse as such with His own, that He then also really went to heaven, only not in a visible, sensibly striking manner, we cannot by any possibility enter into his thought. The Lord confessedly described His ascension, whenever He predicted it, as a visible occurrence, as an object of human θεωρεῖν. To what forced and impossible explanation of the words, "ἐὰν θεωρῆτε τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀναβαίνοντα ὅπου ἦν τὸ πρότερον," Meyer is driven, may be seen in his *Comm. zum Joh.*, 4 Aufl. p. 237.

when, near his own departure, he gives his scientific testimony to the Scripture record of the home-going of his Lord and Saviour.[1]

The lukewarm attitude of many theologians to the history of the ascension rests partly on external, partly on internal grounds. Hengstenberg, in accordance with his habit, has devoted a searching investigation only to the former. His proof that those biblical authors also who do not relate the fact yet knew of it and assumed it, was really superfluous. So much indeed is acknowledged even by Meyer; nay, even Strauss has not called it in question. On the other hand, he seems unsuccessful in his way of seeking to explain the "enigmatical" silence both of Matthew and John as to the historical course of the event. It rests throughout on an erroneous judgment respecting the aim pursued by the two authors in their works. No one will concede to him "that for Matthew matter of fact as such had only a subordinate significance," that this evangelist therefore passes over those facts in silence which wanted definite interest from the viewpoints which guided him. But still less can his assertion be admitted, that John intends merely to complete the three first evangelists, that he holds specially close by Luke, and so passes over what was already known both from him and from tradition. By these suppositions many inconvenient facts in the narratives of the evangelists may be got rid of; but the door is at the same time thrown wide open to the play of caprice, and it is impossible to have any confidence in the ground on which we must then move.

Thus the "strange" silence of the two apostles respecting the history of the ascension is in want of a more satisfactory explanation. But is such an explanation to be found? We have before this (in Part I. of these contributions, p. 168 et seq.) laid down and justified the principle, that the want of single narratives in one or the other Gospel, nay, even the circumstance that only one author gives them while the others pass them over, is not in itself to be judged as a proof against their credibility. And we do not in the least scruple to apply this principle in the case before us. Only we cannot conceal from ourselves that the

[1] We have no doubt that the judgment of history on this theologian will one day differ from that which Dr. Ritschl, in his often quoted work, has been led to pass. This we call unjust and inept, especially because it mistakes the region in which lay the true and essential tendency of the much abused author.

difficulties are not thereby removed which criticism, for the reason assigned, has raised against the history of the ascension. If any one maintains that the narrative of the raising of Lazarus is an unhistorical myth, because the Synoptists know nothing of it, this is an arbitrary assertion. But if, on the contrary, any one desires to have the silence of Matthew and John respecting Christ's ascension *explained*, his demand is well founded. An answer which would be perfectly sufficient in respect of any single deed of the Lord, cannot give full satisfaction in view of an event like this. But to the end of reaching a better, we must put a preliminary question. Which is the circumstance needing explanation? Is it the fact that Matthew and John pass over what Luke relates? *Or is it not rather the other circumstance that this evangelist relates what those withhold?* In our opinion, this latter is really the only point in question. If the two apostles have passed over the fact before us in silence, they have done so in perfect consistency; it was self-understood, it was necessarily so. The truth is, the Lord's ascension lies beyond the Gospel history in its true and rightly defined compass. We have already in an earlier connection and in another interest protested against St. Bernard's expression in describing the ascension as the "clausula felix itinerarii Christi."[1] Here we intensify our protest. Meyer's remark, that if the event really transpired in the way described, then Matthew and John could neither morally nor historically have passed over "this most glorious and worthy copestone," is the very reverse of the truth. It is not the ascension, but the manifestations of the risen Christ which form the close of the completed history (*τῶν πεπληροφορημένων ἐν ἡμῖν πραγμάτων*); that is rather the point of departure for a *new* history beginning. Its right place is not at the end of the Gospels, but at the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles. And there, accordingly, we find it, strictly speaking, *related*. The strange circumstance that Luke has given an account of it in his Gospel, is partly explained by this author's striving after the greatest possible completeness (Luke i. 3: *πᾶσιν ἀκριβῶς*), a striving to which he elsewhere pays extraordinary regard (witness the preface to the history of John the Baptist in the Gospel, or the account of the end of Herod in the Acts; no other evangelist

[1] The phrase has been most seriously used in the work of Jac. Carpovius, *itinerarium Christi redivivi*, Jena 1763.

has an element of the kind); but it finds its solution partly in the peculiar character of the notice itself which is given by the third evangelist. Its shortness and obscurity, its summary character and the evident haste which it makes to the conclusion, betray the author's feeling that he is passing beyond the true boundary of the task before him; while, on the contrary, in the fulness and transparency of the passage in the Acts, the conviction is reflected, that he is putting it in its right place and laying the true foundation of the history of the Acts of the Apostles.[1]

Thus we cannot fully trust the assurances of those who say they must reject the history of the ascension because it is not sufficiently accredited by the eye-witnesses. That must surely be a pretext, rather than the real motive. It is true Schleiermacher has also contested the purity of the source which is opened in the Acts. "We cannot know how much of these statements rests on definite reports, and how much is taken up as fact from explanations and views which were not meant to be strictly matter of fact. And so in the history of the ascension, we have perhaps a less widely-spread composition of really historical and other elements carried over from other delineations into the historical field" (*L. J.* p. 507 ff.). But if we read rightly between the lines, we can see that he has been honestly pained thus to deal with a writing whose truly historical character forces recognition from him. Only under the pressure of necessity did he seek this assistance from criticism, after the fact had become to him untenable for quite different reasons. He makes no secret of the real motive which determines him, apart from the narrative of Luke. The view which it presents is in his estimation too external and material; he discovers in it an inner contradiction. An event, the end of which does not correspond to its beginning, is one which he cannot construe to

[1] From this point of view the last scruples raised by the apparent contradiction between the close of the third Gospel and the opening verses of the Acts are completely set at rest. We beg our readers at this point to go back to our earlier remarks on the same subject. Here we add the wish that they would compare the views which Schleiermacher has made regarding the closing part of the third Gospel (comp. p. 299 ff.), in his work on Luke (Berlin 1817),—a work in many respects classical, now unfortunately almost neglected. The delicate observation and sound tact of this theologian appear here most brilliantly. One may appropriate the undoubtedly true elements in these remarks, without acknowledging the general result to which the author has been carried.

himself as an actual occurrence. "The motion begins with a bodily one, its goal on the contrary is sitting at the right hand of God; but this can never be regarded as the end of a bodily motion in space." Undoubtedly Schleiermacher is quite right in the explanation of his text. His exegesis does justice to the opening words: "He was taken up as they beheld," as well as to the description of the disciples which follows: "they looked stedfastly toward heaven as He went up." For in fact there is expressed here, to use the words of J. Gerhard, by no means a mere "*ἀφανισμός* quidam, disparitio aut evanescentia, vel nuda quaedam *ἀορασία*," but a real "*τοπικὴ μετάστασις*, localis et visibilis elevatio" (comp. *Harm.* c. 218).[1] Only the first question continues to be, whether between this *terminus a quo* (as it is called in church dogmatics, comp. Quenstedt, *l.c.* p. 382) on the one side, and the *terminus ad quem* on the other,—whether the latter be designated as the *πού beatorum*, or specifically as the *dextra Dei*,—there exists so striking a contradiction. Only on one condition would there be such a cleft between them, namely, if the visible motion were alleged to be continuous. But *this* is the very condition which the doctrine of the church has repudiated most expressly as erroneous and absurd.[2] "The exaltation in space continued only so long as the eyes of the disciples followed the Lord, thereafter another process of motion began." "Quid post subductionem ex oculis discipulorum factum sit *et qua motus specie porro in sublime iverit*, non memorant Evangelistae. Quod nubes texit, nobis retegendum non est" (Quenstedt, *l.c.* p. 382). Undoubtedly Schleiermacher knew these definitions and explanations. But as undoubtedly they were not able to disarm his misgiving. And, indeed, they could hardly do so in the form in which they come before us.[3] Nevertheless, they

[1] Hence, also, the strongly emphasized proposition of church dogmatics: "forma ascensionis consistit non in disparitione, sed in vera realique loci mutatione atque in sublime elevatione." Comp. Quenstedt, *l.c.* p. 382.

[2] Quenstedt, *l.c.* p. 382: "Certe, si *ut ante* motu locali, successivo et physico ascendit, ne nunc quidem Christus in coelum venit."

[3] The weakness of the theological doctrine consists chiefly in the fact that it assumes one kind of motion at the beginning, and again another in the progress of the *elevatio* Christi. From the initial *motus localis, successivus, physicus*, it distinguishes another species of exaltation which succeeds, and of which it says that it lies beyond the power of human conception. But such a distinction between a definite and an indefinable meaning of the same idea is inadmissible in the domain of science. The recourse had to the allegation of incomprehensibility produces the

not merely present one element of the truth, but the way which they take to solve the enigma is in fact, taken generally, the right one. All that is needed is a modification of the view. We point back to the section in which we have treated the corporeity of the Risen One. We said then that the Lord revealed Himself to the eyes of the disciples in a material body; and it was pointed out at the same time how this materiality is demanded by the idea of *manifestation*. Now, then, it was in this way and no otherwise that He met the circle of His own in this last manifestation. And if He ascended on high "as they beheld," to convince them by their senses that He was going to the Father, and that they need not expect any further earthly intercourse with Him, His elevation must have been unconditionally a *motio localis, successiva et physica*. The Lord effected this motion by the miraculous power of His will. Exactly as He once walked on the sea, He now rises into the air.[1] But the instant He was removed from the view of the disciples,—that is, the instant the

impression of a mere evasion of the difficulty which can satisfy nobody. No doubt Schleiermacher had more than merely this to object to in the doctrine of the church. When he explains "the sitting at the right hand of God is a purely *spiritual* conception," the theologians of the church agree with him in guarding themselves against the view that the *dextra Dei* is the *locus felicitatis*. Comp. Egid. Hunnius, *l.c.* p. 103: "ut locus non est, ita nulli loco includitur, quia est extra et supra omnem locum." Only they have given another meaning to the idea than that it simply denotes "the peculiar and incomparable dignity of Christ lifted above all conflict" (comp. Schleiermacher, *Glaubensl.* II. § 99). And consequently they have assumed a real withdrawing of the Lord from the earth, as real as His ascent to *supramundane* glory. This was the necessary consequence of their definition, "sessionem ad dextram Dei esse universale, omnipotens et omnipraesens in coelo ac terra dominium" (Gerhard, *l.c.* p. 2271). But whether in this they are not in perfect harmony with the declaration, "ἀφίημι τὸν κόσμον καὶ πορεύομαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα," John xvi. 28, we confidently leave to the decision of the reader.

[1] The teaching of Quenstedt, therefore, is far from being quite correct when he says: "fuit autem haec motio localis non secundum modum corporis naturalis,—quod natura sua deorsum fertur,—sed secundum modum corporis spiritualis seu spiritualibus dotibus ornati." It is not at all so; for it was not the *natura* of the corpus spirituale, but the *voluntas* of the person, which produced the elevation (in space) of the (material) body. It was not "the peculiarity of His bodily organism" (as Olshausen holds, comp. *Comment.* I. p. 491) which formerly enabled the Lord to walk on the water of the sea, but only His miraculous power (had not Peter been guilty of the want which was rebuked, his *faith* would have accomplished the same). And as little did an "ethereal" organism, freed from the law of gravity, enable the Risen One to mount into the air; but this too was purely the effect of His *voluntas*. If Calvin in his already mentioned sharp polemic against *pueriles argutiae* had this point in view, his impatience—nay, even the ridicule of Nic. Arnoldus—was not wholly unjustified.

element of manifestation passed away,—that idea also ceased which necessarily assumes the material body, and is incongruous with the spiritual body. It was not another *species* of motion which came into force, but no motion at all of whatever kind could any more have place; the *spiritual body* is immediately at its goal.[1] "This same Jesus who is *taken up* into heaven," such are the words of the angels (Acts i. 11); *taken up*, He *is* therefore already in heaven. And so from that hour onwards we find the disciples occupied in adoring Him of whom they believe and know that He sits on the throne of glory at the right hand of the Father.[2] In this last contemplation we have not been trespassing beyond the bounds of our theme. *It* too has been meant merely in the interest of a vindication of the resurrection history. If, we mean, the account of the Lord's ascension cannot be set aside either on external or internal grounds, then it tells with important weight in favour of that history which is its necessary condition. The ascension is wont to be regarded as a consequence of the resurrection, and in fact the Risen One could have left the world only by way of the ascension. He who was born of woman could die from the violence of sin and according to the counsel of His Father; but having recovered His life from the grave, He could only complete His *going to the Father*

[1] Gerhard rightly asserts (*Harm.* c. 212): "corpus spirituale non movetur de loco in locum," and his remark is equally to the point, that terms like ὑπάγειν, πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, are to be understood solely from the viewpoint of the goal. Comp. *Harm.* c. 179, p. 1591 of the Frankf. Hamb. ed.: "Non terminus *a* quo, nec via *per* quam, sed terminus *ad* quem illius abitus per has phrases denotatur." Those who from these expressions have inferred a continuity of motion from the Mount of Olives to the throne of glory may mean well, but they only injure the good cause.

[2] And so we leave every one to judge of the remark in which Strauss (comp. *der Christus des Glaubens*, p. 205) has declared his assent to the explanation of Schleiermacher: "Even if we did find the exaltation of Jesus to a superhuman condition admissible, we should yet not be able with our present idea of the world to think that the way to it was a lifting up into the clouds." No doubt the history of theology may have some incautious and incorrect expressions to point to in this connection. For example, the Rostock theologian J. Fr. König (*theolog. posit. acroamat.* § 387 ff.) taught a terminus *per quem* of the ascensio Christi, and described it as coelum cum aëreum tum siderium. But these extravagances have always been conclusively disavowed by the real leaders of the development of dogma. When criticism holds up such vagaries as expressing the view of church theology or even of the Holy Scriptures; when it thereupon expends assaults which apply only to views as unchurchly, as unbiblical, to throw suspicion on the fact itself,—such conduct is no doubt right skilfully calculated to tell on the ignorant, but as to the ethical description and the scientific worth which belong to it, there can be no doubt.

as Luke relates it to us. With pointed and crushing effect Strauss has described the hopeless perplexity in which Schleiermacher found himself when he laboured to save the resurrection while setting aside the ascension; and with equal truth he has laid bare the dilemma in which this theologian consequently leaves his readers at the close of his *Leben Jesu.* But we have good right notwithstanding to use the same ascension, which is the consequence of the resurrection, for the purpose of inferring backwards to the latter. Even Strauss dare not refuse to acknowledge this right after conceding that the "myth of the ascension" could *not* be explained from the wish or necessity to have a full period for the new state of the Risen One. If, then, Luke's narrative is vindicated from the special difficulties raised against it, there is thereby gained an *independent* factor in support of the Lord's resurrection. But, in truth, as we have never cared to string argument on argument in isolated and fragmentary contemplation, we advance this point, too, only in connection with the main proposition from which we started at the first. Jesus is the Christ, such was the fact we assumed. If He is so, then He *must* go to heaven after He rose from the dead. "The heavens must receive Him whom God raised up, of which we are all witnesses." Jesus is the Christ, such was the truth *we* assumed; and *as many* as hold fast this premiss—we think we have proved—may gain such a position, that not in the mere defiance which faith breathes, but with that conviction which rests on impartial scientific investigation, they shall be able to meet the triumph of criticism with the answer: *and yet is the Lord truly risen from the dead!*

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